Restore contract-proxied stake transfers

[UnArbosFour]

Context

Release 453 fixed a proxy filter-laundering vulnerability by preserving inherited origin filters across nested proxy calls.

This also blocked legitimate contract deposit flows that execute:

Contract::call_runtime(
    Proxy::proxy(
        real = depositor,
        SubtensorModule::transfer_stake { ... }
    )
)

The inner transfer_stake must now pass both the contract call filter and the user’s proxy-type filter. Because ContractCallFilter only permitted Proxy::proxy, these calls began failing with CallFiltered.

Changes

• Allow SubtensorModule::transfer_stake through ContractCallFilter.
• Bump the runtime spec_version from 453 to 454.

Security

This does not reintroduce the proxy vulnerability fixed in release 453.

The effective authorization remains the intersection of all inherited filters:

• The contract must be explicitly registered as the user’s proxy.
• The selected proxy type must permit transfer_stake.
• NonTransfer and NonFungible proxies continue to reject the transfer.
• SmallTransfer continues to enforce its amount limit.
• Other nested calls remain blocked.
• A direct contract-origin transfer_stake can only move stake owned by the contract account itself.

Validation

• cargo fmt --check --all
• git diff --check

[vercel]

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated
subtensor	Ready	Preview	Sep 3, 2026 8:26pm UTC

[github-actions]

🛡️ AI Review — Skeptic (security review)

VERDICT: SAFE

HIGH scrutiny: account is 63 days old, but has repository write access and substantive merged history; no Gittensor association found. Branch targets main.

Static review found the allowlist expansion limited to transfer_stake. Direct contract calls can affect only the contract account’s own stake; proxied calls still require an explicit delegation and must pass the selected proxy-type filter inherited by do_proxy. The runtime version is bumped appropriately.

Findings

No findings.

Conclusion

No malicious behavior or security vulnerability was found in this diff.

---

🔍 AI Review — Auditor (domain review)

VERDICT: 👍

UNKNOWN Gittensor association; newer account with repository write access and substantive merged contribution history.

The filter expansion is narrowly limited to transfer_stake; proxied calls remain constrained by the delegated proxy type, while direct contract calls can affect only the contract account's stake.

PR #3139 contains the same functional commit but omits this branch's required runtime version bump. This PR is the better candidate. Recommend closing #3139.

Static review only; runtime execution was unnecessary. git diff --check passed and git status --short was clean.

Findings

Sev	File	Finding
MEDIUM	runtime/src/lib.rs:1418	Add regression coverage for the expanded contract filter	inline

Conclusion

The implementation restores the intended contract-proxy flow without bypassing inherited proxy restrictions. It is ready after adding focused regression coverage.

[github-actions]

AI review — see the sticky summary comment for the verdict and the inline comments below for specific findings.

[github-actions]

[MEDIUM] Add regression coverage for the expanded contract filter

This production regression fix changes a security-sensitive runtime allowlist but adds no test. Add focused coverage proving that the filter accepts transfer_stake and Proxy::proxy, rejects unrelated calls, and—preferably through dispatch—preserves rejection by NonTransfer, NonFungible, and over-limit SmallTransfer proxies.

[github-actions]

🔄 AI review updated — Skeptic: SAFE Auditor: 👍