agent-action-shield

Human-in-the-loop UI for AI agent tool calls. Score each tool call, escalate by risk tier, and keep a tamper-evident audit trail of every decision. Framework-agnostic core with drop-in React and Vue approval UI. Zero runtime dependencies.

AI agents that call tools also make mistakes. They refund the wrong customer, delete the wrong invoice, or send a draft as a real email. The fix is not "always ask the user" (alert fatigue) and not "trust the model" (production incidents). It is risk-aware tiered confirmation: the same pattern WalletConnect Smart Sessions proved for Web3 transactions, now applied to AI agents.

Backend frameworks (LangGraph's interrupt(), Vercel AI SDK's needsApproval, CopilotKit) already know how to pause an agent for human review. What they leave to you is the part the user actually sees: the approval UI, the risk tiering that decides whether to even ask, and a record of what was decided. agent-action-shield is that layer. It sits on top of whatever backend you already use, or none at all.

You get four risk tiers, a Promise-based API, a tamper-evident audit trail, and drop-in React / Vue approval UI, all in one package with zero runtime dependencies.

This is a UX and decision-provenance layer, not a security boundary. It protects legitimate users from agent mistakes. It does not stop a malicious user (who can disable JavaScript). For that, pair it with a server-side gate. See What this is NOT.

import { ActionShield } from "agent-action-shield";

const shield = ActionShield.create({
  policies: [
    { tool: "send_payment", risk: ({ amount }) => Math.min(100, (amount as number) * 0.1) },
    { tool: "delete_*", risk: () => 100 },     // glob: always REQUIRE_APPROVAL
    { tool: "search", risk: () => 0 },         // always INSTANT
  ],
  audit: { sessionSecret: "keep-in-env-not-source" },
});

// Wrap every AI tool call:
const decision = await shield.review({
  tool: "send_payment",
  args: { amount: 500, to: "alice" },
});
const outcome = await decision.proceed();   // resolves on approve, deny, or timer
if (outcome.executed) await realSendPayment(/* ... */);

Why?

Production AI agents keep hitting the same wall: the backend knows how to pause for approval, but nobody ships the frontend for it.

"Backend frameworks like LangGraph and CopilotKit are great at handling the 'pause' state for Human-in-the-Loop workflows. But they leave the frontend completely up to you." — DEV Community

"When an agent has the tool-call ability to delete_invoice or refund_customer, a hallucination is a catastrophic business failure."

Backend HITL tools (Vercel AI SDK's needsApproval, LangGraph's interrupt(), CopilotKit, Microsoft AgentMesh) handle the pause. agent-action-shield handles everything after the pause: how the choice is shown to a human, how risk decides whether to even ask, and how each decision is recorded for later review. It works alongside them, not instead of them.

Design principles

Framework-agnostic core, thin adapters. Vanilla TypeScript core with zero runtime dependencies. React and Vue 3 adapters at subpath imports. Zero coupling to LangChain, Vercel AI SDK, or any specific agent framework.
Safe-by-default. Any tool without a matching policy gets defaultRisk: 100 → REQUIRE_APPROVAL. Forgetting to add a policy makes things annoying, not dangerous.
Promise-based primary API. Wrap every tool call with await shield.review(call); await decision.proceed();. Straight-line async code, no callback registration to forget.
Tamper-evident audit log. HMAC-SHA-256 chained entries. verify() returns the index of the first tampered entry and why.
No backend assumption. Works in the browser, in Electron, in Node CLIs, in service workers. Bring your own storage adapter if localStorage doesn't fit.

Install

npm install agent-action-shield
# or pnpm add agent-action-shield
# or yarn add agent-action-shield

Requirements

Node.js 20+ or a modern browser with Web Crypto SubtleCrypto.
TypeScript 5.6+ for full type benefits (the package ships as ESM + CJS, types included).

Peer dependencies (all optional)

react ^18.0.0 || ^19.0.0 — only needed if you import from agent-action-shield/react.
vue ^3.0.0 — only needed if you import from agent-action-shield/vue.

The core has zero runtime dependencies.

The four tiers

Each tool call resolves to exactly one tier based on its computed risk score (0–100) and the configured thresholds.

Tier	Trigger	Behavior
`INSTANT`	`risk < notify`	Action runs immediately. Audit logged. No UI shown.
`NOTIFY`	`notify ≤ risk < delay`	Action runs immediately. A notification surfaces (toast / inline). Audit logged.
`DELAY`	`delay ≤ risk < approve`	Action queued for `delayMs` (default 5 s). User can hit cancel during the countdown. Audit logged at resolution.
`REQUIRE_APPROVAL`	`approve ≤ risk`	Action blocked until the user explicitly approves (or denies). Modal UI in React / Vue adapters.

Threshold semantics

Three thresholds: notify, delay, approve. All in [0, 100].
Constraint: 0 ≤ notify ≤ delay ≤ approve ≤ 100. Violations throw at create() time.
Defaults: { notify: 10, delay: 30, approve: 50 }.
A score landing exactly on a threshold escalates to the higher tier (e.g. risk = 50 with default thresholds → REQUIRE_APPROVAL).
Risk scores below 0 are clamped to 0; above 100 are clamped to 100.

Per-policy thresholds shallow-merge on top of the global thresholds.

Quick start (framework-agnostic)

import { ActionShield } from "agent-action-shield";

const shield = ActionShield.create({
  policies: [
    // Score = amount * 0.1, capped at 100. amount 50 → 5 (INSTANT),
    // 200 → 20 (NOTIFY), 400 → 40 (DELAY), 1000 → 100 (REQUIRE_APPROVAL).
    {
      tool: "send_payment",
      risk: ({ amount }) => Math.min(100, (amount as number) * 0.1),
    },
    { tool: "delete_*", risk: () => 100 },
    { tool: "search", risk: () => 0 },
  ],
  audit: { sessionSecret: process.env.SHIELD_SECRET! },
});

async function executeToolCall(
  tool: string,
  args: Record<string, unknown>,
) {
  const decision = await shield.review({ tool, args });
  const outcome = await decision.proceed();
  if (outcome.executed) {
    return realToolHandlers[tool](args);
  }
  throw new Error(`AI action denied: ${outcome.reason}`);
}

That's it. The proceed() promise resolves immediately for INSTANT / NOTIFY, after the countdown for DELAY, and after the user's choice for REQUIRE_APPROVAL.

React adapter

import { ActionShield } from "agent-action-shield";
import {
  ShieldProvider,
  ConfirmModal,
  useShield,
} from "agent-action-shield/react";
import "agent-action-shield/react/modal.css"; // optional default styles

const shield = ActionShield.create({ policies: [/* ... */] });

export default function App() {
  return (
    <ShieldProvider shield={shield}>
      <YourAgentUI />
      <ConfirmModal />     {/* renders when REQUIRE_APPROVAL is pending */}
    </ShieldProvider>
  );
}

Custom approval UI

If you don't want the default modal, drive your own UI with the hook:

function MyCustomApprovalUI() {
  const { pendingDecision, approve, deny } = useShield();
  if (!pendingDecision) return null;
  return (
    <Dialog>
      <h2>{pendingDecision.call.tool}</h2>
      <code>{JSON.stringify(pendingDecision.call.args)}</code>
      <p>Risk: {pendingDecision.riskScore.toFixed(1)}</p>
      <button onClick={() => approve()}>Approve</button>
      <button onClick={() => deny("user cancelled")}>Deny</button>
    </Dialog>
  );
}

Keyboard shortcuts

<ConfirmModal /> listens for Enter (approve) and Escape (deny) by default. Pass disableKeyboardShortcuts to opt out.

Customizing the default modal

<ConfirmModal
  title="Approve this AI action?"
  approveLabel="Yes, proceed"
  denyLabel="No, cancel"
  renderArgs={(args) => <YourPrettyArgsViewer args={args} />}
  renderForTiers={["DELAY", "REQUIRE_APPROVAL"]}   // also show for DELAY
  className="my-modal-theme"
/>

Vue adapter

<script setup lang="ts">
import { ActionShield } from "agent-action-shield";
import {
  ShieldProvider,
  ConfirmModal,
} from "agent-action-shield/vue";
import "agent-action-shield/vue/modal.css"; // optional default styles

const shield = ActionShield.create({ policies: [/* ... */] });
</script>

<template>
  <ShieldProvider :shield="shield">
    <YourAgentUI />
    <ConfirmModal />
  </ShieldProvider>
</template>

Custom approval UI (Vue)

<script setup lang="ts">
import { useShield } from "agent-action-shield/vue";

const { pendingDecision, approve, deny } = useShield();
</script>

<template>
  <Dialog v-if="pendingDecision">
    <h2>{{ pendingDecision.call.tool }}</h2>
    <code>{{ JSON.stringify(pendingDecision.call.args) }}</code>
    <p>Risk: {{ pendingDecision.riskScore.toFixed(1) }}</p>
    <button @click="approve()">Approve</button>
    <button @click="deny('user cancelled')">Deny</button>
  </Dialog>
</template>

The Vue API mirrors the React API one-for-one. Reactive values are returned as Ref / ComputedRef; unwrap with .value in script or use directly in templates.

Policy authoring

ActionShield.create({
  globalThresholds: { notify: 10, delay: 30, approve: 50 },
  defaultRisk: 100,    // unknown tools require approval (safe-by-default)
  delayMs: 5000,       // 5-second DELAY countdown

  policies: [
    // Linear risk scaling
    {
      tool: "send_payment",
      risk: ({ amount }: { amount: number }) => Math.min(100, amount * 0.1),
    },

    // Always require approval (glob)
    { tool: "delete_*", risk: () => 100 },

    // Always require approval, with a per-policy threshold lowering
    {
      tool: "publish_post",
      risk: () => 60,
      thresholds: { approve: 40 },     // lower bar: approve at 40 instead of 50
    },

    // Context-aware: known recipients lower risk
    {
      tool: "send_email",
      risk: ({ to }: { to: string }) => {
        if (KNOWN_CONTACTS.includes(to)) return 5;       // INSTANT
        if (to.endsWith("@yourcompany.com")) return 15;  // NOTIFY
        return 80;                                       // REQUIRE_APPROVAL
      },
    },

    // INSTANT for reads
    { tool: "search", risk: () => 0 },
  ],
});

Glob matching

The tool field matches the call's tool name in two passes:

Exact match first. send_payment matches only send_payment.
Glob fallback. * matches zero or more characters (any non-newline), the standard glob expectation. delete_* matches delete_invoice, delete_user, and also the bare delete_ prefix.

Exact matches always beat globs, even when the glob appears earlier in the array.

Risk function contract

Must be pure. Same args in, same score out. The audit log replays the call and the score; impure risk functions break forensic replay.
Return a number in [0, 100]. Out-of-range values are clamped.
Non-finite values (NaN, Infinity) are treated as 0. Don't return them from your risk function.

Audit log + tamper detection

Every decision lands in an HMAC-chained audit log. Each entry contains:

A SHA-256 hash of the entry's canonical-JSON body.
A prevHash linking to the previous entry's hash (per session).
An HMAC-SHA-256 signature of the hash, keyed by the session secret.

// Read entries for a session:
const entries = await shield.audit.read("session-id");

// Verify the chain:
const result = await shield.audit.verify("session-id");
// → { valid: true }
// → { valid: false, failedAt: 3, reason: "content-mismatch" }

// Clear the log:
await shield.audit.clear("session-id");      // one session
await shield.audit.clear();                  // everything

verify() detects three kinds of tampering:

`reason`	What happened
`content-mismatch`	Someone modified `call`, `decision`, `outcome`, etc. The recomputed hash doesn't match the stored hash.
`broken-chain`	Entry's `prevHash` doesn't match the previous entry's `hash`. Indicates insertion, deletion, or reordering.
`signature-mismatch`	Entry's `signature` doesn't match HMAC-SHA-256 of its hash. Indicates forgery by someone who could write but didn't know the secret.

Session secret

ActionShield.create({
  policies: [/* ... */],
  audit: {
    sessionSecret: "long-random-string-from-env-not-source-code",
    // or Uint8Array for binary secrets
  },
});

Critical rule: the session secret stays in memory. Never persist it to the same store as the audit log — that defeats tamper evidence. If you want verification to survive page reloads, derive the secret externally (e.g., from a logged-in user's password via Web Crypto).

If you omit audit.sessionSecret entirely, an ephemeral random secret is generated. The audit log still works during the current process lifetime, but verification will fail across reloads (because the new instance has a different secret). That's correct behavior — and usually fine for browser tabs that don't need cross-session forensics.

Storage adapters

import { memoryAdapter, localStorageAdapter } from "agent-action-shield";

ActionShield.create({
  policies: [/* ... */],
  audit: {
    sessionSecret: "...",
    adapter: localStorageAdapter("my-app/audit"),   // persists across reloads
    // or memoryAdapter()  — default, lost on reload
    // or your own: { append, readAll, clear }
  },
});

A custom adapter is just an object with three methods (see AuditAdapter in source). Useful for IndexedDB or pushing to a backend.

API reference

`ActionShield.create(options): ActionShield`

Option	Type	Default	Description
`policies`	`Policy[]`	(required)	One or more tool policies. `[]` is valid (everything falls through to `defaultRisk`).
`globalThresholds`	`Partial<Thresholds>`	`{ notify: 10, delay: 30, approve: 50 }`	Global tier transition thresholds.
`defaultRisk`	`number`	`100`	Risk for unmatched tools. Default 100 = `REQUIRE_APPROVAL` (safe-by-default).
`delayMs`	`number`	`5000`	Countdown for `DELAY` tier in milliseconds.
`audit.sessionSecret`	`string \| Uint8Array`	random ephemeral	HMAC key for tamper-evidence.
`audit.adapter`	`AuditAdapter`	`memoryAdapter()`	Storage backend.
`audit.persistKey`	`string`	`"agent-action-shield/audit"`	Reserved — passed through to adapters that use it.

Throws ShieldError for invalid defaultRisk, delayMs, or threshold ordering.

`shield.review(call): Promise<Decision>`

Field	Type	Required	Description
`tool`	`string`	yes	The tool name as the agent called it.
`args`	`Record<string, unknown>`	yes	Tool arguments. JSON-serialized for the audit log.
`agent.name`	`string`	no	Free-form agent identifier.
`agent.session`	`string`	no	Session bucket for audit log. Defaults to `"default"`.
`metadata`	`Record<string, unknown>`	no	Attached to the audit entry.

Returns a Decision with proceed(), approve(), deny(). See Decision lifecycle below.

`shield.audit`

The AuditLog instance. Methods:

Method	Returns	Description
`audit.read(session?)`	`Promise<AuditEntry[]>`	Read entries. Pass a `session` to filter; omit for all sessions sorted by `ts`.
`audit.verify(session?)`	`Promise<VerifyResult>`	Tamper-detect. Returns `{ valid: true }` or `{ valid: false, failedAt, reason }`.
`audit.clear(session?)`	`Promise<void>`	Clear entries.
`audit.append(body)`	`Promise<AuditEntry>`	Write a custom entry. Most callers don't need this — the shield writes automatically.

`shield.on(name, listener): UnsubscribeFn`

Subscribe to lifecycle events:

Event	When
`decision:pending`	A `DELAY` or `REQUIRE_APPROVAL` decision was created.
`decision:approved`	A pending decision was approved.
`decision:denied`	A pending decision was denied.
`decision:executed`	An action actually ran (any tier).
`audit:tamper-detected`	Reserved — emitted by future helpers built on `verify()`.

`shield.pendingDecisions`

Getter returning the list of currently non-finalized decisions (DELAY waiting on timer, REQUIRE_APPROVAL waiting on user). Used by UI adapters to render a list. INSTANT and NOTIFY decisions auto-finalize inside review() and never appear here.

`shield.approveDecision(id)` / `shield.denyDecision(id, reason?)`

Externally approve / deny a pending decision by its ID. UI adapters call these when the user clicks Approve / Deny buttons.

`shield.dispose()`

Free internal state. After dispose(), no further review() calls should be made. Any pending decisions are denied with auto-canceled.

Decision lifecycle

Every Decision returned by review() has these methods:

Method	When to call	What it does
`decision.proceed()`	Agent code awaits this	Resolves immediately for `INSTANT` / `NOTIFY`. Starts the `DELAY` countdown. Parks `REQUIRE_APPROVAL` until external approve / deny. Same promise instance on every call.
`decision.approve()`	UI calls this	Externally signal approval. For `DELAY`: skips the countdown. For `REQUIRE_APPROVAL`: lets the action execute. No-op for already-decided decisions.
`decision.deny(reason?)`	UI or agent	Externally signal denial. No-op for already-decided decisions.

Comparison vs alternatives

	`agent-action-shield`	`agent-approval-card`	Vercel `needsApproval`	`@microsoft/agentmesh-sdk`
Framework-agnostic core	✅	❌ React-only	❌ Vercel SDK-locked	❌ Backend-only
React adapter	✅	✅	(via SDK)	❌
Vue adapter	✅	❌	❌	❌
4-tier escalation	✅	❌ binary	❌ binary	(different model)
Tamper-evident audit log	✅ HMAC-chained	❌	❌	(different model)
Risk scoring	✅ pluggable	❌	❌	✅ trust score
Browser runtime	✅	✅	✅	❌ Node only
Zero runtime deps	✅ core	❌	(SDK)	❌

Not affiliated with any of the above. Built independently to fill the framework-agnostic + risk-scoring + audit-trail gap.

Examples

Three demos under examples/:

File	Run	What it shows
`headless.ts`	`npm run example:headless`	All 4 tiers + audit verify + tamper detection. Console output.
`react-demo.tsx`	Drop into a Vite + React project	5 buttons (one per tier) + default modal
`vue-demo.vue`	Drop into a Vite + Vue project	Same as React, in Vue 3 SFC form

The headless demo's tamper test output:

============================================================
  Tamper test — modify entry #1's call.args and re-verify
============================================================
  Before: entry #1 args = {"amount":200,"to":"alice@example.com"}
  verify(): {"valid":false,"failedAt":1,"reason":"content-mismatch"}
  ↑ verification correctly detects the tamper at index 1.

Troubleshooting

ShieldError: thresholds must satisfy 0 ≤ notify ≤ delay ≤ approve ≤ 100

Your globalThresholds or per-policy thresholds violate the ordering rule. Make sure notify ≤ delay ≤ approve and every value is in [0, 100].

ShieldError: Web Crypto SubtleCrypto is not available

You're running on an environment without globalThis.crypto.subtle. Modern browsers and Node 20+ have it; older Node versions don't. Upgrade to Node 20+ or polyfill with @peculiar/webcrypto.

audit.verify() returns { valid: false } immediately after a page reload

You used localStorageAdapter (entries persist) without supplying a stable sessionSecret (or the secret changed between loads). Tamper-evidence requires the verifier to hold the same secret that signed the entries. Derive your secret externally (env var, user password via Web Crypto, OAuth-issued nonce) and pass it consistently.

Modal doesn't disappear after Approve / Deny in tests

Your test framework's act (React) or flushPromises (Vue) hasn't flushed yet. Await the decision promise inside the same act block, or call flushPromises() after await promise. See tests/react/modal.test.tsx and tests/vue/modal.test.ts for the patterns.

REQUIRE_APPROVAL never resolves

decision.proceed() for the REQUIRE_APPROVAL tier does not resolve until someone calls decision.approve(), decision.deny(), shield.approveDecision(id), or shield.denyDecision(id, reason). If your UI never wires the buttons, the promise hangs forever. In React this is the useShield() hook + <ConfirmModal />; in Vue the same. Plain JS: hook up your own approve / deny calls.

Tests in CI environments without Web Crypto

Vitest's happy-dom and jsdom environments provide Web Crypto. Node 20+ provides globalThis.crypto. If you're testing in a stripped-down environment, polyfill before importing.

What this is NOT

Not a security boundary. A malicious user can disable JavaScript. This package protects legitimate users from agent mistakes, not from attackers. The audit trail is tamper-evident against accidental or in-app corruption, not against an attacker who controls the page (the signing secret lives in the same runtime). For real adversarial protection, pair with a server-side approval gate where the secret and log live off-client.
Not a backend HITL framework. It does not durably pause an agent across process restarts or own the approval transport (Slack, email, webhooks). That is what LangGraph interrupt() + checkpointing, Temporal, and HumanLayer are for. This is the frontend and decision-record layer that sits on top of them.
Not an ML risk scorer. We provide the risk function hook; you plug your own logic: heuristics, a call to a fraud-detection API, a small classifier, whatever fits.
Not a WebAuthn signing layer. If you need cryptographic proof that a specific user approved a specific action, layer WebAuthn on top of our approve() callback. We don't bundle it.
Not an automatic backend rollback. If the agent calls a server-side tool and the frontend denies after the server already executed, the backend won't undo it. Gate write-heavy operations server-side too.

Contributing

Issues and PRs welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for development setup, test layers, and how to add a new framework adapter.

Security issues: please email muhammad.zeeshan2@outlook.com privately. Subject line: [agent-action-shield SECURITY].

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

Acknowledgements

The WalletConnect Smart Sessions team for proving the tiered-approval UX pattern in the Web3 space.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (LLM06: Excessive Agency) for documenting why this is a category, not a one-off.
Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, and the LangChain / LangGraph teams for building the agents that needed something like this in the first place.

Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
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.github/workflows		.github/workflows
examples		examples
src		src
tests		tests
.gitignore		.gitignore
CHANGELOG.md		CHANGELOG.md
CONTRIBUTING.md		CONTRIBUTING.md
LICENSE		LICENSE
README.md		README.md
package-lock.json		package-lock.json
package.json		package.json
tsconfig.json		tsconfig.json
tsup.config.ts		tsup.config.ts
vitest.config.ts		vitest.config.ts

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agent-action-shield

Table of contents

Why?

Design principles

Install

The four tiers

Threshold semantics

Quick start (framework-agnostic)

React adapter

Custom approval UI

Keyboard shortcuts

Customizing the default modal

Vue adapter

Custom approval UI (Vue)

Policy authoring

Glob matching

Risk function contract

Audit log + tamper detection

Session secret

Storage adapters

API reference

ActionShield.create(options): ActionShield

shield.review(call): Promise<Decision>

shield.audit

shield.on(name, listener): UnsubscribeFn

shield.pendingDecisions

shield.approveDecision(id) / shield.denyDecision(id, reason?)

shield.dispose()

Decision lifecycle

Comparison vs alternatives

Examples

Troubleshooting

What this is NOT

Contributing

License

Acknowledgements

About

Topics

Resources

License

Contributing

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Forks

Releases 1

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Languages

`ActionShield.create(options): ActionShield`

`shield.review(call): Promise<Decision>`

`shield.audit`

`shield.on(name, listener): UnsubscribeFn`

`shield.pendingDecisions`

`shield.approveDecision(id)` / `shield.denyDecision(id, reason?)`

`shield.dispose()`

Packages