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* update 2024-10-26 06:20:22
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<summary>2024-10-23 22:46:44 - Countering Autonomous Cyber Threats</summary>

- *Kade M. Heckel, Adrian Weller*

- `2410.18312v1` - [abs](http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.18312v1) - [pdf](http://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.18312v1)

> With the capability to write convincing and fluent natural language and generate code, Foundation Models present dual-use concerns broadly and within the cyber domain specifically. Generative AI has already begun to impact cyberspace through a broad illicit marketplace for assisting malware development and social engineering attacks through hundreds of malicious-AI-as-a-services tools. More alarming is that recent research has shown the potential for these advanced models to inform or independently execute offensive cyberspace operations. However, these previous investigations primarily focused on the threats posed by proprietary models due to the until recent lack of strong open-weight model and additionally leave the impacts of network defenses or potential countermeasures unexplored. Critically, understanding the aptitude of downloadable models to function as offensive cyber agents is vital given that they are far more difficult to govern and prevent their misuse. As such, this work evaluates several state-of-the-art FMs on their ability to compromise machines in an isolated network and investigates defensive mechanisms to defeat such AI-powered attacks. Using target machines from a commercial provider, the most recently released downloadable models are found to be on par with a leading proprietary model at conducting simple cyber attacks with common hacking tools against known vulnerabilities. To mitigate such LLM-powered threats, defensive prompt injection (DPI) payloads for disrupting the malicious cyber agent's workflow are demonstrated to be effective. From these results, the implications for AI safety and governance with respect to cybersecurity is analyzed.

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<summary>2024-10-24 09:09:20 - Binary Code Similarity Detection via Graph Contrastive Learning on Intermediate Representations</summary>

- *Xiuwei Shang, Li Hu, Shaoyin Cheng, Guoqiang Chen, Benlong Wu, Weiming Zhang, Nenghai Yu*

- `2410.18561v1` - [abs](http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.18561v1) - [pdf](http://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.18561v1)

> Binary Code Similarity Detection (BCSD) plays a crucial role in numerous fields, including vulnerability detection, malware analysis, and code reuse identification. As IoT devices proliferate and rapidly evolve, their highly heterogeneous hardware architectures and complex compilation settings, coupled with the demand for large-scale function retrieval in practical applications, put forward higher requirements for BCSD methods. In this paper, we propose IRBinDiff, which mitigates compilation differences by leveraging LLVM-IR with higher-level semantic abstraction, and integrates a pre-trained language model with a graph neural network to capture both semantic and structural information from different perspectives. By introducing momentum contrastive learning, it effectively enhances retrieval capabilities in large-scale candidate function sets, distinguishing between subtle function similarities and differences. Our extensive experiments, conducted under varied compilation settings, demonstrate that IRBinDiff outperforms other leading BCSD methods in both One-to-one comparison and One-to-many search scenarios.

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<summary>2024-10-24 14:35:43 - How Far Have We Gone in Binary Code Understanding Using Large Language Models</summary>

- *Xiuwei Shang, Shaoyin Cheng, Guoqiang Chen, Yanming Zhang, Li Hu, Xiao Yu, Gangyang Li, Weiming Zhang, Nenghai Yu*

- `2404.09836v3` - [abs](http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.09836v3) - [pdf](http://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.09836v3)

> Binary code analysis plays a pivotal role in various software security applications, such as software maintenance, malware detection, software vulnerability discovery, patch analysis, etc. However, unlike source code, understanding binary code is challenging for reverse engineers due to the absence of semantic information. Therefore, automated tools are needed to assist human players in interpreting binary code. In recent years, two groups of technologies have shown promising prospects: (1) Deep learning-based technologies have demonstrated competitive results in tasks related to binary code understanding, furthermore, (2) Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively pre-trained at the source-code level for tasks such as code understanding and generation. This makes participants wonder about the ability of LLMs in binary code understanding. In this work, we propose a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of LLMs in real-world reverse engineering scenarios. The benchmark covers two key binary code understanding tasks, including function name recovery and binary code summarization. We gain valuable insights into their capabilities and limitations through extensive evaluations of popular LLMs using our benchmark. Our evaluations reveal that existing LLMs can understand binary code to a certain extent, thereby improving the efficiency of binary code analysis. Our results highlight the great potential of the LLMs in advancing the field of binary code understanding.

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