fix: close signature-verification bypass and harden input validation - #9
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June 1, 2026 04:39
…alidation Security and correctness fixes from repo audit: - CRITICAL: Check 3 no longer accepts any 64-hex-char string in demo mode. Previously `sigHex.length === 64` was treated as a passing (warn) signature. Demo mode now only warns on an EXACT expected-digest match and fails closed otherwise. - Validate algorithm agreement (registry key + cert issuer must be ed25519) and that the signature is a well-formed 128-char hex string BEFORE attempting Ed25519 verification, instead of letting Buffer.from(...,"hex") silently truncate malformed input. - Check 1 now validates field TYPES of untrusted input (issuer object, causal_chain array, outputs object, signature/merkle_root strings), not just presence, before later checks dereference them. - Make verify.update() encoding explicit (utf8) to match sha256Hex. - CLI version string now read from package.json instead of hardcoded, so it cannot drift on version bump. - Fix malformed .gitignore (literal "\n" replaced with real newlines so node_modules/ and dist/ are actually ignored). dist/ rebuilt from patched source.
…es-HDq24 # Conflicts: # .gitignore # dist/index.js # src/index.ts
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Repo audit fixes — causallayer-verifier
Closes a Critical signature-verification bypass plus several correctness/packaging issues found during a code audit.
Critical
sigHex.length === 64), reporting it as a passingwarn. Demo mode now onlywarns on an exact expected-digest match and fails closed otherwise. Verified: a forged cert (unknown key + 64-hex signature) is now rejected with a hardfail.High
ed25519) and that the signature is a well-formed 128-char hex string before attempting Ed25519 verification — instead of lettingBuffer.from(...,"hex")silently truncate malformed input.Medium / Low
verify.update()encoding made explicit (utf8) to matchsha256Hex.package.json(was hardcodedv0.1.0)..gitignore(literal\n→ real newlines, sonode_modules/anddist/are actually ignored).dist/rebuilt from patched source.Not included (need signer-side coordination)
Remote registry trust-pinning, RFC-8785-compliant canonicalization, and Merkle duplicate-leaf domain separation were intentionally left out — changing them alters verification behavior and must be aligned with the signing server.
🤖 Generated during a repository code audit.
Generated by Claude Code