Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Currently DAAP sessions IDs are generated in a predictable manner, i.e. starting from 100 and incrementing from there. This can be easily exploited to hijack sessions and gain access to password protected libraries.
Since forked-daapd depends on libgcrypt anyway, I used it to generate unpredicatable random DAAP session IDs. Since we have to check for (admittedly unlikely) collisions, generating a new ID now takes O(log n) instead of O(1), where n is the number of open sessions, but this shouldn't be a problem as n usually isn't very large.
Proof of concept sniffer for predictable DAAP session IDs: