Quill is a small, actively-developed, pre-1.0 project maintained by one person. This policy sets expectations accordingly, not as a template copied from a larger project with a dedicated security team.
Only the latest released version (currently v0.11.3, see Releases) is supported with security fixes. There is no long-term support branch - point releases ship frequently, and a fix lands in the next tagged version rather than being backported.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability - that discloses it to everyone, including anyone who might exploit it, before a fix exists.
Instead, report privately using either of these:
- GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: use the Report a vulnerability button under this repo's Security tab (Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability). This is the preferred path - it keeps the report and any discussion private until a fix ships.
- Email: tamil@iniyan.pro, the same contact address used for Quill's in-app Feedback and the landing site's privacy/terms pages. Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and its potential impact.
You should expect an initial response within a few days. Quill is a side project, not a funded security team, so please be patient: a fix's timeline depends on severity and complexity, but confirmed vulnerabilities get prioritized over regular feature work.
Quill is a local-first macOS app. Realistic areas of concern:
- The dictation-cleanup/enhancement pipeline (
Sources/quill/Style/) mishandling or leaking dictated text, especially anything that could send local-only data to a cloud provider without the user's explicit BYOK opt-in. - API key handling (
Sources/quill/Settings/APIKeyStore.swift) - keys are stored in the macOS Keychain, never written to disk in plain text; a bug that changes that is a real vulnerability, not a hardening suggestion. - The auto-update mechanism (
AppUpdater.swift,appcast.xml, Sparkle's EdDSA signing) - anything that could let an unsigned or tampered update be accepted. - Text injection (
Sources/quill/Input/) - anything that could inject into the wrong app/window, or be triggered without the user's own dictation.
- Quill is not notarized (no Apple Developer Program enrollment). Gatekeeper's warning on a direct
.dmgdownload is expected, documented behavior, not a vulnerability to report. - Denial-of-service reports against a local, single-user desktop app (e.g. "the app uses a lot of memory if you feed it a huge file") are generally not actionable the way they would be for a server.
Thank you for helping keep Quill and its users safe.