| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main |
Yes |
| Latest tagged release | Yes |
| Older releases | Best effort |
If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:
- Do NOT open a public issue.
- Use GitHub Security Advisories to report privately.
- If the advisory flow is unavailable, open a minimal public issue requesting a private contact channel without including exploit details or reproduction steps.
- Include: description, reproduction steps, affected surface, and potential impact.
We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and provide a fix timeline within 7 days.
This policy covers ARLE, including:
- HTTP API endpoints (
/v1/completions,/v1/chat/completions) - Agent tool execution (
shell,pythontools) - CUDA kernel memory safety
- Model weight loading and deserialization
The built-in agent tools (shell, python) execute arbitrary code by design.
These tools are intended for local/trusted use only. Do not expose the
tool-enabled local agent to untrusted input.
Use:
arle --doctor
arle --model-path /path/to/model run --no-tools --prompt "..."arle --doctor reports the active tool sandbox backend:
nsjail: preferred Linux sandbox path when installed.sandbox-exec: macOS fallback when available.bare: no supported sandbox backend was detected.
If the backend is bare, use --no-tools for untrusted prompts or install a
supported sandbox before enabling tool execution.