fix(ci): allow CodeQL to check out fork PR head SHA - #220
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actions/checkout@v7 added a guard that refuses to check out a fork pull request's head SHA inside a pull_request_target workflow unless explicitly opted in, breaking CodeQL analysis on every fork-originated PR (e.g. #208) since the checkout v6 -> v7 bump. Set allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true, which is safe for this workflow: it carries no secrets and permissions are scoped to security-events:write and contents:read only, per the existing threat-model comment.
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Summary
actions/checkout@v7refuses to check out a fork pull request's head SHA inside apull_request_targetworkflow unless explicitly opted in (a new "pwn request" guard) — this has been failing CodeQL analysis on every fork-originated PR (e.g. docs: add ty language server configuration #208) since the checkout v6 -> v7 bumpallow-unsafe-pr-checkout: trueon the CodeQL workflow's checkout steppermissions: {}) and the analyze job's permissions are scoped tosecurity-events: write+contents: readonly, matching the threat-model comment already documented in the workflowTest plan
fy lint .github/workflows/codeql.yml— no errors (pre-existing style infos only)Analyze (actions)/Analyze (rust)pass once this merges and PR docs: add ty language server configuration #208 (or another fork PR) re-runs CodeQL