refactor(tpm): delegate NV certify parsing to Agent Manifest

.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Reference-vector checksums cover exact producer bytes on every CI platform.
+tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/** -text
+tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/*.bin binary
+# tpm2_nvreadpublic emits this terminal blank line; retain the checksummed output.
+tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/nv-public.yaml whitespace=-blank-at-eof

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -9,6 +9,17 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ### Changed
 
+- TPM NV-certify wire parsing now delegates to Agent Manifest 0.11.2 instead of
+  maintaining a second `TPMS_ATTEST`/`TPMS_NV_CERTIFY_INFO` parser in cMCP.
+  The public `parse_nv_certify` return shape and `ValueError` contract remain
+  intact. The shared parser also makes cMCP accept valid size-prefixed
+  `TPM2B_ATTEST` transport framing, reject undeclared bytes after `nvContents`,
+  and verify AK signatures over the canonical inner `TPMS_ATTEST` rather than
+  over the transport length prefix. A genuine swtpm-produced two-certify
+  reference pair exercises the complete chain,
+  signature, phase, index, and extend-relation path. The synthetic fixture CA is
+  test trust only and makes no hardware-provenance or vendor-enrollment claim.
+
 - Removed AGT/`agent_os` from the production dependency graph. cMCP now owns the
   runtime call and response enforcement path; AGT remains isolated to CI and
   release governance verification. Legacy `agent_os_version` bundle metadata is

docs/spec/tpm-security-model.md

@@ -98,7 +98,14 @@ Because extends accumulate, one certified value cannot be checked against anythi
 
 **P2 is now implemented.** Collection is `cmcp_runtime.tee.measurement.certify_and_extend_gateway_measurement`, appraisal is `cmcp_verify.nv_certify.verify_gateway_measurement`, and startup wires both at step 3b. Only the platform attestation key is used to certify: a transient key would give a verifiable signature with no provenance, which is worse than an honest absence because it looks like evidence, so a platform without a certified key falls back to the unsigned extend and ships no evidence at all.
 
-`agent_manifest.verify_tpm_quote` cannot appraise this, because it rejects any attest type that is not `TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE` and its parser assumes a `TPML_PCR_SELECTION` union. The certificate chain is still delegated to `agent_manifest.verify_cert_chain`; only the `TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV` and `TPMT_SIGNATURE` wire formats are local, tracked upstream as agentrust-io/agent-manifest#255.
+Agent Manifest 0.11.2 is the wire-format authority for this path:
+`parse_tpm_nv_certify` parses and type-checks the signed common header plus
+`TPMS_NV_CERTIFY_INFO`, `parse_tpmt_signature` parses the signature envelope, and
+`verify_cert_chain` validates the supplied AK chain against verifier-pinned roots.
+cMCP verifies the typed signature with that AK and owns the gateway-specific
+two-certify phase binding, same-index requirement, expected digest, and extend
+relation. `agent_manifest.verify_tpm_quote` remains quote-specific and is not used
+to appraise an NV certification.
 
 **What P2 still does not give you.** The appraisal proves the gateway extended a specific digest into a specific index. It does not prove that digest corresponds to *known-good* code unless the relying party supplies an expected value; without one, `verify_gateway_measurement` reports the pair as internally consistent and says so in its details rather than implying more. Deciding what the expected digest should be for a given release is a release-engineering question, not a TPM one.
 

docs/testing/hardware-validation.md

@@ -340,10 +340,14 @@ With both fixed, the following hold on hardware:
   `TPMT_SIGNATURE`. A NULL scheme resolves to the key's own, RSASSA/SHA-256 here.
 - **The platform AK at `0x81000003` can sign an NV certify.** This was an open
   question, since it is a restricted signing key; the answer is yes.
-- **`parse_nv_certify`'s field offsets are correct against a real blob.** This was
-  the highest-risk item, as the offsets came from the TCG structures spec and had
-  never met real bytes. `indexName`, `offset` and `nvContents` all parse, and
-  `nvContents` equals the value returned by `TPM2_NV_Read`.
+- **The signed NV field layout was checked against a real blob.** This was the
+  highest-risk item, as the offsets came from the TCG structures spec and had
+  never met real bytes. `indexName`, `offset` and `nvContents` all parsed, and
+  `nvContents` equalled the value returned by `TPM2_NV_Read`. That run exercised
+  cMCP's then-local parser. cMCP's public `parse_nv_certify` adapter now delegates
+  wire parsing to `agent_manifest.parse_tpm_nv_certify`; the committed swtpm
+  reference pair independently exercises that current boundary without adding a
+  hardware-provenance claim.
 - The extend relation holds on hardware across two consecutive starts: run 1
   provisioned the index and run 2 reused it, with run 2's `pre` equal to run 1's
   `post`, which is the accumulation the two-certify design exists to handle.

src/cmcp_runtime/tee/measurement.py

@@ -44,8 +44,11 @@
 The certify path was validated in the same session, after that run found two
 defects in it: the ``nv_certify`` call omitted the required ``in_scheme`` and
 ``size`` arguments, and a freshly provisioned index cannot be certified at all. Both
-are fixed; the platform AK does sign an NV certify, and the parser's field offsets
-are correct against a real blob. See docs/testing/hardware-validation.md.
+are fixed; the platform AK does sign an NV certify, and its signed field layout
+matched the value read from the hardware index. That run exercised cMCP's
+then-local parser. The current adapter delegates to Agent Manifest, with the
+committed swtpm reference pair independently exercising that parser boundary but
+making no new hardware-provenance claim. See docs/testing/hardware-validation.md.
 
 ## Predictability is deliberately left to the verifier
 

src/cmcp_verify/nv_certify.py

@@ -28,16 +28,19 @@
 would already fail the chain check, but making the role explicit means a verifier
 never has to infer it from ordering.
 
-## Why this is not delegated to agent-manifest
-
-``agent_manifest.verify_tpm_quote`` rejects any attest type that is not
-``TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE``, and ``parse_tpm_quote`` assumes the attested union is a
-``TPML_PCR_SELECTION`` followed by a PCR digest. An NV certify carries a
-``TPMS_NV_CERTIFY_INFO`` instead, so neither can read it. The certificate chain
-*is* delegated (``agent_manifest.verify_cert_chain``), matching how
-:mod:`cmcp_verify.sev_snp` and :mod:`cmcp_verify.tdx` already work. Teaching
-agent-manifest ``TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV`` is tracked in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#255,
-alongside the same gap for ``TPMT_SIGNATURE``.
+## Boundary with agent-manifest
+
+Agent Manifest owns the TPM wire formats: ``parse_tpm_nv_certify`` parses the
+signed common header and the ``TPMS_NV_CERTIFY_INFO`` union, accepts bare
+``TPMS_ATTEST`` and size-prefixed ``TPM2B_ATTEST`` transport framing, and requires
+the union payload to consume the complete inner structure. Its returned
+``attest.raw`` is the exact inner byte range signed by the attestation key.
+
+cMCP keeps the gateway-specific policy: the two-certify phase bindings, same-index
+check, expected gateway digest, and extend relation. It also preserves the public
+``parse_nv_certify`` compatibility adapter and performs signature verification
+against the certified AK. Certificate-chain and TPM signature-envelope parsing are
+delegated to Agent Manifest as well.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -50,13 +53,17 @@
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from typing import Any
 
-from agent_manifest import parse_tpmt_signature
+from agent_manifest import TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV as _TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV
+from agent_manifest import (
+    TpmNvCertify,
+    TpmVerificationError,
+    parse_tpm_nv_certify,
+    parse_tpmt_signature,
+)
 
-# TPMS_ATTEST header constants.
-_TPM_GENERATED_VALUE = 0xFF544347
-TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV = 0x8014
-_CLOCK_INFO_LEN = 17
-_FIRMWARE_VERSION_LEN = 8
+# Preserve the module-level constant imported by existing cMCP callers/tests while
+# taking its value from the canonical wire-format library.
+TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV = _TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV
 
 # TPM2_ALG_ID digests a signature may use.
 _ALG_SHA1 = 0x0004
@@ -110,50 +117,32 @@ def certify_qualifying_data(nonce: bytes, phase: bytes) -> bytes:
     return hashlib.sha256(b"".join(parts)).digest()
 
 
-def _read_u16(buf: bytes, pos: int) -> tuple[int, int]:
-    if pos + 2 > len(buf):
-        raise ValueError("TPMS_ATTEST truncated reading a 16-bit field")
-    return int.from_bytes(buf[pos : pos + 2], "big"), pos + 2
+def _parse_nv_certify(attest: bytes) -> TpmNvCertify:
+    """Use Agent Manifest's parser while preserving cMCP's ``ValueError`` API."""
+    try:
+        return parse_tpm_nv_certify(attest)
+    except TpmVerificationError as exc:
+        raise ValueError(str(exc)) from exc
 
 
-def _read_2b(buf: bytes, pos: int) -> tuple[bytes, int]:
-    size, pos = _read_u16(buf, pos)
-    if pos + size > len(buf):
-        raise ValueError("TPMS_ATTEST truncated reading a sized buffer")
-    return buf[pos : pos + size], pos + size
+def _as_nv_certify_info(parsed: TpmNvCertify) -> NvCertifyInfo:
+    return NvCertifyInfo(
+        qualifying_data=parsed.attest.qualifying_data,
+        index_name=parsed.info.index_name,
+        offset=parsed.info.offset,
+        nv_contents=parsed.info.nv_contents,
+    )
 
 
 def parse_nv_certify(attest: bytes) -> NvCertifyInfo:
-    """Parse a ``TPMS_ATTEST`` whose attested union is ``TPMS_NV_CERTIFY_INFO``.
+    """Parse a bare or size-prefixed TPM NV certification.
 
-    Layout after the common header is ``indexName`` (TPM2B_NAME), ``offset``
-    (UINT16), then ``nvContents`` (TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER). Raises ``ValueError`` on
-    anything malformed, including a structure that is not an NV certify, so a quote
-    cannot be passed here by mistake and silently appraised.
+    Wire parsing is delegated to :func:`agent_manifest.parse_tpm_nv_certify`.
+    ``ValueError`` and the cMCP ``NvCertifyInfo`` return shape are retained for
+    compatibility. A quote, truncated structure, or structure with undeclared
+    trailing data is rejected rather than partially appraised.
     """
-    if len(attest) < 6:
-        raise ValueError("TPMS_ATTEST too short")
-    magic = int.from_bytes(attest[0:4], "big")
-    if magic != _TPM_GENERATED_VALUE:
-        raise ValueError(f"TPMS_ATTEST magic is not TPM_GENERATED (magic={magic:#x})")
-    attest_type, pos = _read_u16(attest, 4)
-    if attest_type != TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV:
-        raise ValueError(
-            f"attestation is not an NV certify (type={attest_type:#x}, "
-            f"expected {TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV:#x})"
-        )
-    _qualified_signer, pos = _read_2b(attest, pos)  # TPM2B_NAME
-    qualifying_data, pos = _read_2b(attest, pos)  # extraData
-    pos += _CLOCK_INFO_LEN + _FIRMWARE_VERSION_LEN
-    index_name, pos = _read_2b(attest, pos)  # TPM2B_NAME of the NV index
-    offset, pos = _read_u16(attest, pos)
-    nv_contents, pos = _read_2b(attest, pos)  # TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER
-    return NvCertifyInfo(
-        qualifying_data=qualifying_data,
-        index_name=index_name,
-        offset=offset,
-        nv_contents=nv_contents,
-    )
+    return _as_nv_certify_info(_parse_nv_certify(attest))
 
 
 def build_envelope(
@@ -259,10 +248,12 @@ def fail(reason: str, **extra: str) -> NvCertifyResult:
 
     # 2. Structure and attest type.
     try:
-        pre = parse_nv_certify(pre_attest)
-        post = parse_nv_certify(post_attest)
+        pre_parsed = _parse_nv_certify(pre_attest)
+        post_parsed = _parse_nv_certify(post_attest)
     except ValueError as exc:
         return fail("malformed_nv_certify", error=str(exc))
+    pre = _as_nv_certify_info(pre_parsed)
+    post = _as_nv_certify_info(post_parsed)
     verified.append("structure")
 
     # 3. AK certificate chain to a pinned root, delegated to agent-manifest.
@@ -284,13 +275,13 @@ def fail(reason: str, **extra: str) -> NvCertifyResult:
 
     # 4. Both signatures, against the certified AK.
     try:
-        for label, blob, sig in (
-            ("pre", pre_attest, pre_sig),
-            ("post", post_attest, post_sig),
+        for label, attestation, sig in (
+            ("pre", pre_parsed, pre_sig),
+            ("post", post_parsed, post_sig),
         ):
-            parsed = parse_tpmt_signature(sig)
+            parsed_signature = parse_tpmt_signature(sig)
             try:
-                _verify_signature(ak_public, parsed, blob)
+                _verify_signature(ak_public, parsed_signature, attestation.attest.raw)
             except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
                 return fail("signature_invalid", which=label, error=str(exc))
     except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# swtpm NV-certify reference pair
+
+These files are an independent-producer reference for cMCP's gateway-measurement
+appraisal path. They were emitted by `swtpm` 0.7.3 and `tpm2-tools` 5.6 in an
+Ubuntu 24.04 container, using a restricted RSA-2048 attestation key configured for
+RSASSA/SHA-256. Neither cMCP nor Agent Manifest produced the attestation or
+signature bytes.
+
+The pair certifies a 32-byte `TPM_NT_EXTEND` index immediately before and after
+extending the gateway digest:
+
+```text
+post-contents = SHA256(pre-contents || gateway-digest)
+```
+
+Both attestations are bare 173-byte `TPMS_ATTEST` structures with type
+`TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV` (`0x8014`). Both signatures are 262-byte marshalled
+`TPMT_SIGNATURE` values: RSASSA (`0x0014`), SHA-256 (`0x000b`), and a 256-byte
+signature. `nv-public.yaml` is the output of `tpm2_nvreadpublic 0x01500018`; its
+Name is checked against the Name signed into both attestations.
+
+## Signed bindings
+
+- Verifier nonce: 32 bytes of `a5`.
+- Pre qualifying data:
+  `ac2bc955b7d97a5589f9a6c48db86f87aea9d9af22e43cc97330f7b560145fa3`.
+- Post qualifying data:
+  `230587d8162f6a14fb8573d2b3fddec4b98413ffad0f83e804aff3740d8bfa8c`.
+- NV handle used by the producer: `0x01500018`.
+- Certified offset and size: `0` and `32` bytes.
+- Index Name:
+  `000bcf69802ad7625fffd515aecef934a1632ca6c7df36bf5a4e241d33701465a854`.
+- Gateway digest:
+  `4ea5ee68fea05586106890ded5733820bb77d919cda27bc4b8139b7cd33b8889`.
+
+The qualifying data are cMCP's length-prefixed, phase-separated hashes for
+`pre` and `post`. The first extend used `seed-event.bin` because a newly defined
+extend index is uninitialized and cannot yet be certified.
+
+## Certificate construction and assurance boundary
+
+`ak-public.pem` is the exact public key returned by `tpm2_readpublic` for the swtpm
+AK. `ak-cert.pem` is a test certificate made afterwards by placing that public key
+under `synthetic-root.pem`; the test asserts that the certificate and TPM output
+contain identical public keys. The synthetic CA private key and all TPM state,
+contexts, and private material were destroyed and are not committed.
+
+This corpus proves that the parser and appraisal path accept one independently
+emitted software-TPM wire image, authenticate both signatures under the included
+test chain, bind the two phases and index Name, and check the extend relation. It
+does **not** prove a physical TPM, vendor enrollment, EK-to-AK credential
+activation, non-exportability, hardware key residency, requester/TPM co-location,
+boot state, runtime integrity, or safe application behavior. A software TPM may
+also be operated as a remote signing oracle.
+
+## Producer sequence
+
+The essential commands were:
+
+```sh
+tpm2_createek -G rsa -c ek.ctx -u ek.pub
+tpm2_createak -C ek.ctx -G rsa -g sha256 -s rsassa \
+  -c ak.ctx -u ak.pub -n ak.name
+tpm2_flushcontext -t
+
+tpm2_nvdefine 0x01500018 -C o -g sha256 -s 32 \
+  -a 'ownerread|ownerwrite|nt=extend'
+tpm2_nvextend 0x01500018 -C o -i seed-event.bin
+
+tpm2_nvcertify -C ak.ctx -c o -g sha256 -s rsassa -f tss \
+  -q ac2bc955b7d97a5589f9a6c48db86f87aea9d9af22e43cc97330f7b560145fa3 \
+  --size 32 --offset 0 --attestation pre-attest.bin \
+  -o pre-tpmt-signature.bin 0x01500018
+
+tpm2_nvextend 0x01500018 -C o -i gateway-digest.bin
+
+tpm2_nvcertify -C ak.ctx -c o -g sha256 -s rsassa -f tss \
+  -q 230587d8162f6a14fb8573d2b3fddec4b98413ffad0f83e804aff3740d8bfa8c \
+  --size 32 --offset 0 --attestation post-attest.bin \
+  -o post-tpmt-signature.bin 0x01500018
+```
+
+`tpm2_print` 5.6 does not understand the `TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV` union. The tests
+therefore parse the signed structures with the released Agent Manifest parser and
+independently compare the signed Name with `tpm2_nvreadpublic` output.

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/SHA256SUMS

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+6f13324e7cd6d5302bc8af2d66321c8597bb04256cba31660da403534a545dd5  ak-cert.pem
+2695b54c92d2fc515cc3769ddc93682977a2bc073900ff3300a473f5f7d9bd10  ak-public.pem
+e1ff313ca44d96a8e827915e3a004a8c72d1ca48844ab3f4a8ac5707d4bbd19c  gateway-digest.bin
+1c39e6d7f1fbbf5c86142288c52d8c0d19438a7ab5a303ef62517f1edd6edc2a  nv-public.yaml
+d6f807d21ea2d255897451c0e3ec528648a51b2d58097fec891fd654b5d27e7e  post-attest.bin
+eba6ca529787d3a63e04eebacf829f5b86cc3bd30de7112269116ba53edbdd0d  post-contents.bin
+5e22d7c3220dfd5b0f9b029d57d65b1a5c80d1235f7d6d12d0d1564a1a582c0b  post-tpmt-signature.bin
+d94c9c11c152e16a57c2daa7090f57da94b068b0e43511d73bd6fa5dc1b26e29  pre-attest.bin
+25496e06bd981ee16f2f177f1c69106ff712a77d259ef7616e203bcba572b523  pre-contents.bin
+03288dc5973a51bd44ff47b156a524be1f837ea69d3cdfb3a08827afeef37d9e  pre-tpmt-signature.bin
+ee20f2868946b0095c0bd65d8564237cc5cc1debea71c5dc3ead281124ae05f6  seed-event.bin
+8f33533725b2db95f1e3c7b8bf0240923fff6b34c4fcf88d7b72589d89b0fddc  synthetic-root.pem

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/ak-cert.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/ak-public.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1thCyGmNJrEcUYRUXsU4
+qEg0j395Qc4HC/E/1AZ/OQ/G1TADykn/oZVkJwF7cXcJeTDakXHzNBs5E6w1g1ej
+dOF6j7USiTgu1VrMLxhBaJlg3E/5YwCStKbOXpMDj0hXEC+3U2k4EhqjuKp3GSyl
+UtvbloAAChF/0iRoOxyVXFm4O6rVZdMXz9U+/7Jymms9Xqqvn9zTLkU+XBnaxpWi
+gstDoC5CBcbAtycXZE1k/C7QCyTZvrimqmtNlCDGmP8hyK+bNAuBWvaeE/JwWIhZ
+pr5dWapi4WBKp7hO4K9GW5UfzWEz2vcG11MXO4aEO2Q1MbSWlDG97E6yYHNg2/xY
+twIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/gateway-digest.bin

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+N¥îhþ U†hÞÕs8 »wÙÍ¢{ĸ›|Ó;ˆ‰

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/nv-public.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+0x1500018:
+  name: 000bcf69802ad7625fffd515aecef934a1632ca6c7df36bf5a4e241d33701465a854
+  hash algorithm:
+    friendly: sha256
+    value: 0xB
+  attributes:
+    friendly: ownerwrite|nt=0x1|ownerread|written
+    value: 0x20020042
+  size: 32
+

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/post-contents.bin

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Ý.lLÈ0nÃ.S—=ÛÚÊBb:‰¨‚/—]x#V‘

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/pre-contents.bin

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Äÿ‰L:ˆI´ì«áÍÜ;ç¿Ãþã+ˆi™æãžy“‡

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/seed-event.bin

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ÇÅêyóëT+%Îi×û;Ýש‹4¹ÖôÆäë¡âӏ

tests/fixtures/reference/swtpm-nv-certify-0.7.3/synthetic-root.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBrDCCAVOgAwIBAgIUE6+q70duBW8wyyYiMNYYryxgsbQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
+JDEiMCAGA1UEAwwZY01DUCBzd3RwbSByZWZlcmVuY2Ugcm9vdDAeFw0yNjA5MDIw
+MjIyNDdaFw0zNjA4MzAwMjIyNDdaMCQxIjAgBgNVBAMMGWNNQ1Agc3d0cG0gcmVm
+ZXJlbmNlIHJvb3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARANBe7aD3FQdTm
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+MHECDIP8o2MwYTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUzLy1poKFkMXlj9OICF8WmHXhjOYwHwYDVR0j
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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----