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Gradio Blocked Path ACL Bypass Vulnerability

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jan 14, 2025 in gradio-app/gradio • Updated Jan 14, 2025

Package

pip gradio (pip)

Affected versions

< 5.11.0

Patched versions

5.11.0

Description

Summary

Gradio's Access Control List (ACL) for file paths can be bypassed by altering the letter case of a blocked file or directory path. This vulnerability arises due to the lack of case normalization in the file path validation logic. On case-insensitive file systems, such as those used by Windows and macOS, this flaw enables attackers to circumvent security restrictions and access sensitive files that should be protected.

This issue can lead to unauthorized data access, exposing sensitive information and undermining the integrity of Gradio's security model. Given Gradio's popularity for building web applications, particularly in machine learning and AI, this vulnerability may pose a substantial threat if exploited in production environments.

Affected Version

Gradio <= 5.6.0

Impact

  • Unauthorized Access: Sensitive files or directories specified in blocked_paths can be accessed by attackers.

  • Data Exposure: Critical files, such as configuration files or user data, may be leaked.

  • Security Breach: This can lead to broader application or system compromise if sensitive files contain credentials or API keys.

Root Cause

The blocked_paths parameter in Gradio block's initial configuration is designed to restrict user access to specific files or directories in the local file system. However, it does not account for case-insensitive operating systems, such as Windows and macOS. This oversight enables attackers to bypass ACL restrictions by changing the case of file paths.

Vulnerable snippet:

# https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/blob/main/gradio/utils.py#L1500-L1517
def is_allowed_file(
    path: Path,
    blocked_paths: Sequence[str | Path],
    allowed_paths: Sequence[str | Path],
    created_paths: Sequence[str | Path],
) -> tuple[
    bool, Literal["in_blocklist", "allowed", "created", "not_created_or_allowed"]
]:
    in_blocklist = any(
        is_in_or_equal(path, blocked_path) for blocked_path in blocked_paths
    )
    if in_blocklist:
        return False, "in_blocklist"
    if any(is_in_or_equal(path, allowed_path) for allowed_path in allowed_paths):
        return True, "allowed"
    if any(is_in_or_equal(path, created_path) for created_path in created_paths):
        return True, "created"
    return False, "not_created_or_allowed"

Gradio relies on is_in_or_equal to determine if a file path is restricted. However, this logic fails to handle case variations in paths on case-insensitive file systems, leading to the bypass.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

Steps to Reproduce

  • Deploy a Gradio demo app on a case-insensitive operating system (e.g., Windows or macOS).

    import gradio as gr
    def update(name):
        return f"Welcome to Gradio, {name}!"
    
    with gr.Blocks() as demo:
        gr.Markdown("Start typing below and then click **Run** to see the output.")
        with gr.Row():
            inp = gr.Textbox(placeholder="What is your name?")
            out = gr.Textbox()
        btn = gr.Button("Run")
        btn.click(fn=update, inputs=inp, outputs=out)
    
    demo.launch(blocked_paths=['resources/admin'], allowed_paths=['resources/'])
  • Set up the file system:

    • Create a folder named resources in the same directory as the app, containing a file 1.txt.

    • Inside the resources folder, create a subfolder named admin containing a sensitive file credential.txt (this file should be inaccessible due to blocked_paths).

  • Perform the attack:

    • Access the sensitive file using a case-altered path:

      http://127.0.0.1:PORT/gradio_api/file=resources/adMin/credential.txt
      

Expected Result

Access to resources/admin/credential.txt should be blocked.

Actual Result

By altering the case in the path (e.g., adMin), the blocked ACL is bypassed, and unauthorized access to the sensitive file is granted.

image-20241119172439042

This demonstration highlights that flipping the case of restricted paths allows attackers to bypass Gradio's ACL and access sensitive data.

Remediation Recommendations

  1. Normalize Path Case:

    • Before evaluating paths against the ACL, normalize the case of both the requested path and the blocked paths (e.g., convert all paths to lowercase).

    • Example:

      normalized_path = str(path).lower()
      normalized_blocked_paths = [str(p).lower() for p in blocked_paths]
  2. Update Documentation:

    • Warn developers about potential risks when deploying Gradio on case-insensitive file systems.
  3. Release Security Patches:

    • Notify users of the vulnerability and release an updated version of Gradio with the fixed logic.

References

@freddyaboulton freddyaboulton published to gradio-app/gradio Jan 14, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jan 14, 2025
Reviewed Jan 14, 2025
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jan 14, 2025
Last updated Jan 14, 2025

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

0.043%
(11th percentile)

CVE ID

CVE-2025-23042

GHSA ID

GHSA-j2jg-fq62-7c3h

Source code

Credits

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