Improve IAM cloud privilege escalation coverage#1047
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Skill Improvement ($50-150 Bounty)
Skill Modified
Skill name: iam-review
Skill path:
skills/identity/iam-review/What Was Wrong
iam-reviewcovered least privilege, stale accounts, MFA, JIT, and service account hygiene, but it did not require reviewers to test cloud-specific privilege escalation paths. A principal can look limited in a broad IAM review while still being able to escalate through role passing, service account impersonation, policy mutation, app credential control, or workload identity attachment.What This PR Fixes
This PR adds a cloud privilege escalation evidence gate to
iam-review:iam:PassRole, runtime workload launch/update paths, IAM policy self-management, STS role assumption, trust conditions, SCPs, and permissions boundaries.Closes #1027.
Evidence
Before (skill misses this):
{ Action: [iam:PassRole, lambda:CreateFunction], Resource: * }The prior skill could flag this as broad access, but it did not force the reviewer to connect it to an administrative runtime role that can be passed to Lambda.
After (now correctly handled):
The updated skill requires reviewers to document the principal, escalation primitive, target role/workload, trust policy,
iam:PassedToServiceconditions, SCPs, permissions boundaries, observed result, and guardrail status.Test Cases Added/Updated
tests/vulnerable/)tests/benign/)Validation performed:
git diff --checkBounty Tier
Bounty Info