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WalkthroughUpdated two npm integration test scripts to add a Chrome feature flag and replaced a single Content-Security-Policy line in Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant Dev as Dev (npm)
participant TC as TestCafe
participant Chrome as Chrome (launched)
participant App as example:application
participant Netlify as Netlify (headers)
rect "#e6f7ec"
Dev->>TC: run `npm run integration` / `integration:headless`
Note right of TC: invoked with\n'chrome[ :headless] --disable-features=LocalNetworkAccessChecks'
TC->>Chrome: launch Chrome with flag
Chrome->>App: request app URL (App started via npm)
App->>Chrome: respond with app content
end
rect "#eef3ff"
Note over Netlify: Deployment headers updated (CSP, Permissions-Policy, CORP/COOP, etc.)
Chrome->>Netlify: fetch resources
Netlify->>Chrome: responds with expanded security headers
end
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~10 minutes
Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers
Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
✨ Finishing touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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netlify.toml(1 hunks)
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netlify.toml (1)
4-5: Verify thatframe-ancestors *is appropriate for your use case.The policy allows embedding from any origin, which aligns with the design goal of supporting template embedding. However, this is a significant security consideration and should be explicitly approved.
If possible, consider restricting
frame-ancestorsto trusted origins (e.g.,frame-ancestors 'self' https://trusted-domain.com) rather than allowing all origins. If*is necessary, ensure this decision is documented and approved.Also applies to: 8-8
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- GitHub Check: Redirect rules - generic-templates
- GitHub Check: Header rules - generic-templates
- GitHub Check: Pages changed - generic-templates
- GitHub Check: Lint & Test
🔇 Additional comments (2)
netlify.toml (2)
18-21: ✅ Standard security headers look good.Lines 19-21 follow security best practices:
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniffprevents MIME-type sniffing attacks.Strict-Transport-Securitywith 1-year max-age andincludeSubDomainsenforces HTTPS.Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-originbalances privacy and functionality appropriately.These headers are well-suited for a template embedding service.
13-16: Embedding functionality will NOT be broken by COOP "same-origin".The review comment conflates two distinct HTTP header mechanisms:
Embedding capability (iframe loading): Controlled by CSP
frame-ancestors *on line 7, which explicitly allows embedding from any origin. This header remains effective and unrestricted.Browsing context isolation (cross-origin access): Controlled by COOP
same-originon line 15, which prevents cross-originwindow.opener/parent access.The codebase does NOT rely on cross-origin opener access—all external links explicitly use
rel="noopener noreferrer"to prevent it. Therefore, COOPsame-originis a security-hardening measure, not a breaking change.The policy is intentional and consistent: the site allows iframing from any origin (CSP) while maintaining cross-origin isolation (COOP). No verification of embedding compatibility is needed.
Likely an incorrect or invalid review comment.
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♻️ Duplicate comments (1)
netlify.toml (1)
7-8:⚠️ CSP still contains'unsafe-inline'and'unsafe-eval'—unresolved from previous reviews.This is a duplicate of critical security concerns flagged in earlier reviews (commits cad4a8e and d2300b6). The CSP on line 8 still includes:
'unsafe-inline'inscript-srcandstyle-src'unsafe-eval'globallyThese directives significantly weaken XSS protection and should be removed entirely. The previous review commits claim resolution, but the issue persists. Before merging, you must either:
- Remove the unsafe directives and use cryptographic nonces (generated per HTTP response) or SHA-256 hashes for any legitimate inline scripts/styles, or
- Explicitly document why these directives are necessary for template embedding and accept the security trade-off with team/security sign-off.
Audit the codebase and dependencies to confirm nothing actually relies on
eval()or inline script execution before removal.Do you want me to generate a verification script to confirm whether eval patterns or inline script dependencies actually exist in the codebase?
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netlify.toml (1)
10-11: Good: Permissions-Policy, CORP, and additional security headers provide defense-in-depth.The Permissions-Policy is well-configured with restrictive defaults. CORP is set to
same-origin, COOP is nowsame-origin(an improvement from the previousunsafe-none), and headers like STS, Referrer-Policy, and X-Content-Type-Options add meaningful layers of protection.However, these improvements are undermined if the CSP unsafe directives and overly-broad
frame-ancestorsare not addressed.Also applies to: 13-21
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