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feat: import/export persistence clean up#624

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OisinKyne merged 19 commits into
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feat/stack-export-import
Jun 11, 2026
Merged

feat: import/export persistence clean up#624
OisinKyne merged 19 commits into
mainfrom
feat/stack-export-import

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@OisinKyne

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Problem to be solved

Losing agent data on a purge. And other resources giving up on the persistence aspects.

This fable run was intended to add import / export, and phase 2 was to bring more persistence back, to make the cluster more declarative than imperative. Next step is to rebase (ish) off the other pr in flight #623

Summary

Phase 2 is done and staged on
feat/stack-export-import (on top of your
Phase 1 commit ba9b536) — stopping
short of committing per your yubikey
workflow.

What record-on-write now covers

Agent CRs — obol agent new/update
persist the applied manifest to
$CONFIG_DIR/agents/.yaml; agent
delete removes it; agentcrd.ResumeAll
replays them at stack up. This was the
worst gap: host seeds existed but
nothing recreated the CR, so agents (and
any offer pointing at them) silently
never returned.

sell agent offers — now persist into the
existing sell-http/ store, so the
proven replay path and sell delete
cleanup handle them with zero new
machinery. sell mcp (foreground process)
and sell demo (ephemeral) stay
unrecorded by design.

Model config — obol model
setup|prefer|remove snapshot the
resulting model_list plus referenced
provider API keys to
$CONFIG_DIR/llm/recorded-models.yaml
(0600). paid/* entries are filtered out
— verified live against your cluster,
where the real paid/AEON-7/... purchase
route was correctly excluded while the
Ollama entry was captured. The subtle
design point: recording happens only at
the command layer, never from
autoConfigureLLM — otherwise stack-up
auto-detection would overwrite your
preferences moments before
model.ReconcileRecorded (which runs
after auto-config, before default-Hermes
setup, so your recorded head model
stays the agents' default).

Remote RPCs — AddPublicRPCs/AddCustomRPC
/RemovePublicRPCs maintain
$CONFIG_DIR/rpc/recorded-upstreams.yaml
(0600, since custom URLs can carry
paid-provider keys), with ChainList
endpoints snapshotted at add-time for
deterministic offline replay. stack up
replays through the same idempotent add
functions. Local-node upstreams stay
unrecorded — network sync already
re-registers those.

Stack-up ordering is pinned by a
source-guard test
(cmd/obol/stackup_resume_guard_test.go,
mirroring your existing resumeSellOffers
guard): stack.Up → RPCs → Agent CRs →
sell offers, with Agent CRs strictly
before offers since agent-backed
ServiceOffers resolve agent.ref.

Validation

All 35 packages pass. Live smoke on your
dev cluster: model record verified with
the paid-filter; agent full cycle
verified (agent new → record written →
CR deleted from etcd → replayed from
record → agent delete → record and data
dir cleaned). Cluster left healthy
(hermes 2/2 Running). stack export needs
no changes — the config component picks
up all three new stores automatically.

One noted follow-up in the plan doc:
(agent new → record written → CR deleted from etcd → replayed
from record → agent delete → record and data dir cleaned).
Cluster left healthy (hermes 2/2 Running). stack export needs
no changes — the config component picks up all three new stores
automatically.

One noted follow-up in the plan doc: custom RPC endpoints have
no removal command (network remove only drops ChainList
selections, matching its cluster-side semantics), so a recorded
custom endpoint currently requires editing the file — a
network remove --endpoint flag would close that. Phase 3
(sellable OCI bundles + obol sell export) remains the open
phase.

bussyjd and others added 14 commits June 10, 2026 19:04
After a host reboot Docker's restart policy brings the k3d cluster back
without a `stack up`, so resumeSellOffers (previously only reachable
from the stack-up action) never runs: persisted sell-inference offers
survive in etcd but their host gateways are gone, every offer sits at
UpstreamHealthy=False, and the public catalog (/api/services.json)
serves []. Observed live on the rc14 prod seller after a reboot.

- expose the existing resume path as `obol sell resume` (idempotent:
  live-PID gateways are skipped, kubectl applies re-assert)
- `--install-boot-unit` writes + enables a systemd user unit on Linux
  so resume runs automatically at boot (lingering hint printed)
- refresh the stale resumeSellOffers doc comment (it claimed gateways
  are not restarted; startDetachedInferenceGateway has done so since
  the resume feature shipped)
Live reboot test on the seller box surfaced two ways the relaunched
gateway dies instantly, leaving the offer at UpstreamHealthy=False:

1. Binary skew: startDetachedInferenceGateway preferred the installed
   BinDir obol over the binary running `sell resume`. The arg-builder
   encodes the running version's flag surface, so an older installed
   CLI (rc11 predates the --description spelling) rejects the args
   with "flag provided but not defined". Relaunch now spawns the
   running executable (resumeGatewayBinary), and the arg-builder emits
   --register-description — the one spelling every released CLI
   parses — as belt-and-braces for the BinDir fallback.

2. Validation drift: the slash-in-model rule (added after existing
   descriptors were persisted) rejected the replayed model name, so
   pre-rule offers could never resume under a new binary either. The
   spawned gateway now carries OBOL_SELL_RESUME_REPLAY=1 and the rule
   downgrades to a warning for replays; new offers still hard-fail.

Tests: TestResumeGatewayBinaryPrefersRunningExecutable,
TestResumeGatewayEnviron, TestValidateSellInferenceModelName, and
TestBuildResumeGatewayArgs now pins --register-description and bans
the rc12+ spelling.
Two more gaps found prepping the unattended reboot test:

- installResumeBootUnit pinned BinDir/obol into ExecStart. On a box
  whose installed CLI predates `sell resume` (rc11 on the live seller),
  the unit fails on every boot. Pin the binary running the install
  command instead (it just proved it has the subcommand) and print the
  pinned path so the operator knows to re-install after moving it.

- At boot the k3d API server lags Docker by a minute or more, and
  resumeOneInferenceOffer's kubectl applies run BEFORE the gateway
  relaunch and warn-and-continue — a too-early resume silently resumed
  nothing and nothing retried. `sell resume` now waits for /readyz
  (3min cap) before replaying offers; `stack up` is unaffected.

Tests: TestWaitForClusterAPI (nil fast-path without kubeconfig, error
after deadline for unreachable cluster).
Third live-reboot finding: the unit ran at boot, resume reported
"Gateway started in background", and the gateway was dead anyway with
an empty log. setsid detaches the session but NOT the cgroup — the
relaunched gateway lives in the unit's cgroup, and when a plain
Type=oneshot unit deactivates, systemd kills every process left in it.

RemainAfterExit=yes keeps the unit active (exited) after ExecStart,
which preserves the cgroup and the gateway with it. Side effect worth
having: `systemctl --user stop obol-sell-resume` is now a deliberate
way to take the gateways down.

TestRenderResumeBootUnit pins the new directive.
…n freshness

Every docker-publish-x402 branch build now lands a pin-bump commit
(repin-embedded-pins job) updating the embedded x402-verifier /
serviceoffer-controller / x402-buyer references to the images just built,
and the release workflow gains a verify-image-pins gate that fails the tag
when any source in the binaries' live import graph (go list -deps) changed
after the pinned build commit. Together they make the rc14 stale-pin trap
— a release whose embedded pins predate its own payment-path changes —
structurally impossible: the bump is automatic, and a tag cut before the
bump lands cannot release.

The bump is committed through the GraphQL createCommitOnBranch API, so
the commit is signed by GitHub itself (verified, github-actions bot) —
compatible with the repo ruleset rejecting unsigned commits, which a
workflow git push could never satisfy. expectedHeadOid is the live
remote head with one retry on race; only the two guarded template files
are ever sent.

The gate is fail-closed (a go-list failure refuses to pass rather than
degrade to a partial path set), binds each embedded digest to what GHCR
serves for the pinned tag (a fresh tag with a hand-edited digest fails),
ignores _test.go/testdata churn, and hunk-filters the two pin-carrying
templates so pin bumps don't self-stale while any other edit to them
still counts. release/** branches get the same build+repin treatment as
main.

The exact-ref pin tests become invariant tests: pins must be digest-
pinned, share one build commit, and descend from the named fix commits
(ancestry-verified via git, skipped on shallow clones) — so the bot can
bump pins without touching Go files while the carries-fix-X guarantees
get stronger.
…edger

Generalizes the resume path per review feedback: the sell-http store
becomes the persisted-ServiceOffer ledger (dir name kept for files
written by shipped CLIs) and every offer type without a host process
persists into it — sell http, sell agent (both creation sites), the
agent-backed demo (offer only: replaying an Agent CR would mint a fresh
wallet and orphan funds on the old one), and the legacy demo as a v1
List bundle (namespace + backend Deployment + Service + offer) so
resume restores a working demo rather than an offer with a missing
upstream. sell mcp has no ServiceOffer (foreground server) and is
documented as not resumed.

resumeSellOffers simplifies to one kubeconfig guard + two phases:
inference store (cluster artifacts + detached gateway relaunch), then a
single ledger walk with type-aware messaging via a pure, tested loader.

Two lifecycle holes closed while building the coverage matrix:
- obol agent delete now drops the agent namespace's ledger entries —
  otherwise every later resume replays ghost offers for a deleted agent.
- obol sell update now refreshes the ledger from the live post-patch CR
  (List-bundle aware) — otherwise the next resume kubectl-applies the
  OLD payTo/price back, silently reverting an intentional payment
  change. Update also adopts offers created outside the CLI.

New tests: mixed-type ledger walk, demo List-bundle parsing,
namespace-scoped removal round-trip, and source-scope guards on every
persist/refresh/cleanup site.
Three confirmed majors, all reproduced against a live cluster:

- agent delete left the agent's ServiceOffers ALIVE in etcd (the agent
  finalizer tears down children but leaves the namespace and offers)
  while sweeping their ledger entries — and a surviving offer
  reconciles back to Ready, paying the deleted agent's wallet, if the
  name is ever reused. deleteCRDAgent now deletes the namespace's
  ServiceOffer CRs (the offer finalizer handles route/registration
  teardown) and the ledger sweep moves into the cluster-reachable
  branch, since an unreachable cluster means the CRs survive and the
  ledger must keep covering them.

- sell stop never refreshed the ledger, so an etcd-wiping
  stack-down/up replayed the pre-drain manifest and resurrected a
  deliberately stopped offer fully live (reboot-resume was already
  safe: client-side apply never owned drainAt). The drain patch now
  refreshes the ledger like sell update does.

- agent-offer replay failed outright after a stack recreation: the
  bare manifest's namespace no longer exists and kubectl apply errors
  with 'namespaces not found' — the documented 'offer waits on the
  missing agent' behavior never happened. Both agent persist sites now
  store a v1 List bundling the agent NAMESPACE (canonical labels) with
  the offer; the Agent CR stays excluded so no fresh wallet is minted.

Plus the inference half of delete=>no-resume (minor): sell delete now
tombstones the inference descriptor (DeletedAt; kept for list/status
history, cleared by re-creating the offer) and resume filters
tombstoned descriptors via activeInferenceDeployments. Misleading
sell-http wording in delete output and the false 'CRs died with the
namespace' comments corrected; new tests pin every behavior (bundle
round-trip incl. no-Agent-CR assertion, stop/delete scope guards,
tombstone filter, branch placement of the agent-delete sweep).
…ference probe

Both release-smoke failures on the rc14 wopus run reduce to these two
flow bugs — no stack defect (reproduced live, full chain diagnosed):

- flow-16 §2.2 polled Ready=True for an offer created WITH registration
  enabled and no `obol sell register` submitted, which the controller
  keeps Ready=False / AwaitingExternalRegistration by design ('offer
  already serves paid traffic') — the gate could never pass as written,
  and only ever matched historically because 'Ready=True' substring-
  matched 'PaymentGateReady=True' when the ladder converged in time.
  Gate now polls the serving condition set (UpstreamHealthy +
  PaymentGateReady + RoutePublished, anchored greps) over 300s, which is
  exactly what §3's 402 probe exercises.

- flow-04 step 12 used `curl -sf --max-time 120`: too tight for the
  FIRST inference ever routed through the Hermes agent pipeline on a
  local Ollama model (the multi-thousand-token system prompt pays full
  prompt processing before the KV cache warms; ~150s observed for a 27B
  on an M-series host), and -f swallowed every diagnostic so the fail
  message was empty. Now 300s, no -f, and the fail message carries the
  HTTP status + body snippet.

Verified against a live cluster in the failing state: the new flow-16
gate passes where the old one cannot; the flow-04 call returns 200 with
correct content once warm.
Adds the only e2e coverage of `obol sell mcp` (paid MCP tool over x402
in-band _meta; shipped in rc14 with unit tests only). A reusable SDK
client (flows/clients/mcp-paid-client.go, the x402-foundation MCP client)
drives the full loop against a foreground `obol sell mcp` server backed
by a mock upstream, reusing flow-10's anvil fork + facilitator:

  free ping → requirements surfaced in _meta (payTo/asset/network/amount)
  → unpaid call rejected → auto-paid call (EIP-3009 in _meta) settles
  on-chain → seller API key injected upstream + invisible to the buyer
  → buyer balance delta == price.

Registered in release-smoke.sh after flow-16 (needs no cluster of its
own; runs while anvil + facilitator are up).

Two fork-specific footguns found and documented (CLAUDE.md pitfalls
17/18), both reproduced live:

- EIP-7702-contaminated test accounts: anvil/hardhat accounts #1-#9
  carry 0xef0100 delegation code from real-chain 7702 experiments on
  Base Sepolia. FiatTokenV2_2 verifies EIP-3009 via SignatureChecker,
  which routes any code-bearing `from` to EIP-1271 and rejects an
  otherwise-valid ECDSA signature ('invalid signature' → facilitator
  503). The buyer MUST be a fresh EOA — flow-17 generates fresh keys and
  preflights `cast code == 0x`. (Same reason flow-08 uses the agent's
  generated wallet.)
- x402 SDK signs validAfter=now with no past buffer; a long-lived anvil
  fork's block.timestamp lags real time → 'authorization is not yet
  valid'. flow-17 syncs the fork clock (evm_setNextBlockTimestamp+mine)
  before the paid call.
Automated by docker-publish-x402/repin-embedded-pins after the image build at 926620b. Committed via the GitHub API so the commit is verified.
@OisinKyne

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sell mcp (foreground process)

note to look into.

sell demo (ephemeral) stay
unrecorded by design.
probably need to remove the code around 'demo's specifically in a few versions

@OisinKyne

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The rc15 branch vs mine — and the rebase verdict

They're mostly complementary, not competing. rc15's offer work
(PR #619 and friends) is genuinely better than my sell-side
persistence: a type-aware ledger covering http/agent/demo
offers, sell update/stop refreshing the ledger so drainAt
survives, agent delete sweeping a namespace's offers, inference
tombstones, and — the thing my branch can't do at all —
host-reboot recovery via obol sell resume plus a systemd boot
unit with the cgroup/RemainAfterExit and wait-for-apiserver
details worked out. What rc15 completely lacks is everything
else my branch does: Agent CR persistence, model-config and
eRPC records, and stack export/import.

So: rebase feat/stack-export-import onto rc15, keep their
entire sell ledger, drop my one overlapping sell-side change,
and layer my record-on-write + stackbackup on top. Conflicts
are contained to ~5 files. One genuine bug to fix in their
branch during the rebase: obol sell resume replays offers
without restoring Agent CRs first, so after a cluster wipe
their boot unit replays agent-backed offers that dangle — my
agentcrd.ResumeAll needs wiring into sell resume too, not just
stack up.

Agent creation paths: seven, and the trap is inverted

There are 7 distinct creation paths but only 2 render
strategies: host-rendered helmfile (default stack agent, legacy
agent new, both openclaw paths) and controller-rendered CRD
(agent new , sell agent inline create, sell demo). Your
fear was that CR sub-agents wouldn't be sellable — it's the
opposite: only CR agents are sellable (sell agent resolves
spec.agent.ref), and the agent that can't be sold is the
flagship one stack up gives everyone. That's the biggest
UX/architecture misalignment.

On "is the CR work done": my record-on-write is done on the
branch — and it already gives you the declarative shift you
described: the CLI writes a small manifest file that is the
replayable source of truth, and stack up makes reality match
the files. The bigger migration that isn't done is moving the
default agent (and eventually the legacy paths) onto the
CR/controller path. Security-wise the declarative persistence
adds no new privilege (records are applied with your own
kubeconfig and still pass the ValidatingAdmissionPolicy); the
two real considerations are replay-resurrection (every delete
must clean its record — handled on both branches, kept in the
rebase) and the fact that the record files inherit ConfigDir
trust, same as your kubeconfig. UX gets simpler, not harder:
declare → sell → files are truth.

Multiple locked-down agent businesses: ~40% there

What already works: N ServiceOffers can route to one
agent/namespace today with per-offer pricing and per-offer
revenue metrics, signers are per-namespace, and the admission
policy + RBAC shape constraints are solid. The blocking gaps,
ranked:

  1. Zero NetworkPolicy — agent A can reach agent B's hermes API
    and signer today. The earlier attempt was reverted because of a
    k3d/Flannel apiserver-targeting problem, but that only affects
    policies needing apiserver egress — business-agent namespaces
    don't need the apiserver at all, so their policies can ship
    first.
  2. Remote-signer has no auth on port 9000 — combined with Bring obolup code to this repo #1,
    that's cross-business fund theft. Small fix:
    controller-injected bearer token.
  3. Every agent gets the LiteLLM master key. This is also your
    model-routing/cost answer: the control surface should be
    per-agent LiteLLM virtual keys, controller-generated at
    reconcile with budget, model allowlist, and rate limits driven
    by new Agent CRD fields (spec.models, spec.budget). That gives
    per-agent spend tracking for free and makes buy inference
    --agent properly scoped.
  4. Smaller: per-agent buyer-spend metrics, hermes/signer
    metrics export, and silent path-shadowing between offers
    that's cross-business fund theft. Small fix:
    controller-injected bearer token.
  5. Every agent gets the LiteLLM master key. This is also your
    model-routing/cost answer: the control surface should be
    per-agent LiteLLM virtual keys, controller-generated at
    reconcile with budget, model allowlist, and rate limits driven
    by new Agent CRD fields (spec.models, spec.budget). That gives
    per-agent spend tracking for free and makes buy inference
    --agent properly scoped.
  6. Smaller: per-agent buyer-spend metrics, hermes/signer
    metrics export, and silent path-shadowing between offers
    (controller should mark collisions Degraded).

This also crystallizes the three-tier trust model you
described: mother agent (factory RBAC, apiserver access),
business agents (no apiserver, locked egress), outside agents
(pure buyers over the tunnel).

The plan doc sequences it A→E: rebase now, isolation MVP
(signer auth + NetworkPolicies), cost surface (virtual keys),
unification (default agent → CR, deprecations), then the
Phase-3 sellable bundles which the declared-file model feeds
directly. Want me to execute the rebase (step A) now?

@OisinKyne OisinKyne force-pushed the feat/stack-export-import branch from 3238bf2 to a3fc3aa Compare June 11, 2026 12:56
@OisinKyne OisinKyne force-pushed the feat/stack-export-import branch from a3fc3aa to c525d10 Compare June 11, 2026 12:57
@OisinKyne OisinKyne changed the title WIP: feat: import/export persistence clean up feat: import/export persistence clean up Jun 11, 2026
bussyjd added 2 commits June 11, 2026 18:34
…bombs on import

obol stack import sanitized tar entry NAMES (sanitizeEntryName) but wrote
symlinks from the raw, unchecked Linkname. A malicious archive could ship a
clean-named symlink whose target points outside the extraction root (e.g.
link -> /etc, or ../../..), then a follow-up entry written THROUGH that link
lands at an arbitrary path — arbitrary file write as the importing user. The
only guard (name sanitization) does not help: the escape happens at OS
symlink-resolution time, not lexically.

- symlinkEscapesRoot rejects absolute and ..-walking symlink targets that
  resolve outside destRoot; in-root relative links (the common case) still
  work (TestArchiveRoundTrip unchanged).
- Add a decompression-ratio guard (countingReader + ratioGuard between gzip
  and tar): aborts when uncompressed:compressed exceeds 100:1 past a 64 MiB
  floor, so a tiny gzip can no longer inflate to a disk-filling tar. The
  floor keeps legitimate multi-GB agent-data restores (low, steady ratio)
  passing; thresholds are vars so tests can lower them.
- Tests: TestExtractRejectsSymlinkEscape (relative + absolute targets, no
  link created) and TestExtractRejectsDecompressionBomb.

Found in review of #624.
…trip flow

Fills the cheap, cluster-free coverage gaps found in review and adds the
end-to-end flow the unit tests cannot reach.

Unit tests (were 0%, now 100% on the targeted helpers):
- Manifest.component lookup (hit/present-excluded/miss)
- listInstances (absent dir -> nil; ignores non-dir entries)
- walkArchive rejects non-gzip input cleanly
- walletNote ok/FAILED formatting
- model.mapKeys

flow-18-stack-export-import.sh: seed recorded RPC + preferred model
(+ optional Agent CR) -> export -> purge -> import -> stack up -> cluster-only
re-apply -> assert the RPC, model_list head, and Agent CR all returned. This
exercises export quiesce/harvest, host restore, and the stack-up replay
ordering that only the source-level guard test touches today. Standalone +
destructive by design (purges/recreates), so it is NOT wired into the
release-smoke baseline; header documents the run recipe. Syntax + shellcheck
clean; needs one live-cluster run to validate before use as a gate.

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Approve — reviewed in depth, hardened, and coverage-filled

Read the full net-new persistence subsystem (stackbackup / agentcrd / model.record / network.record + the stack-up wiring). The design is sound — record-on-write with atomic 0600 writes, the agent-CRs-before-offers and model-reconcile-after-autoconfig ordering invariants, honest secret disclosure, and version gates on all three record formats. Test quality on the pure-logic layer is genuinely strong (real contracts asserted: 0600 perms, version rejection, merge ordering/dedup, unrecord-keeps-custom), not coverage padding.

Two things were addressed during review (pushed to this branch, both GitHub-verified):

  • 71b5848 — security: the import extractor sanitized entry names but wrote symlinks from the raw Linkname, allowing a symlink-target escape (clean-named link → /etc, then a write through it = arbitrary file write as the importing user). Fixed with symlinkEscapesRoot (in-root links still work) + a decompression-ratio guard against zip-bombs. Tests added; TestArchiveRoundTrip unchanged.
  • 975aefd — coverage: unit tests for the previously-0% pure helpers (Manifest.component, listInstances, non-gzip rejection, walletNote, mapKeys) and flow-18-stack-export-import.sh — the export→purge→import→up→verify round-trip the unit tests can't reach. The flow is standalone/destructive (not in the release-smoke baseline) and needs one live-cluster validation run before use as a gate.

Remaining items are design judgments, not blockers, left to you: RPC record fail-loud vs. model/agent best-effort; the cluster-dump-vs-recorded-models.yaml double path for LiteLLM config. Worth a rebase onto main once the rc15 train (#623) lands so the diff collapses to just the three persistence commits.

LGTM.

@OisinKyne OisinKyne merged commit 196dc08 into main Jun 11, 2026
9 checks passed
OisinKyne pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 11, 2026
…bombs on import

obol stack import sanitized tar entry NAMES (sanitizeEntryName) but wrote
symlinks from the raw, unchecked Linkname. A malicious archive could ship a
clean-named symlink whose target points outside the extraction root (e.g.
link -> /etc, or ../../..), then a follow-up entry written THROUGH that link
lands at an arbitrary path — arbitrary file write as the importing user. The
only guard (name sanitization) does not help: the escape happens at OS
symlink-resolution time, not lexically.

- symlinkEscapesRoot rejects absolute and ..-walking symlink targets that
  resolve outside destRoot; in-root relative links (the common case) still
  work (TestArchiveRoundTrip unchanged).
- Add a decompression-ratio guard (countingReader + ratioGuard between gzip
  and tar): aborts when uncompressed:compressed exceeds 100:1 past a 64 MiB
  floor, so a tiny gzip can no longer inflate to a disk-filling tar. The
  floor keeps legitimate multi-GB agent-data restores (low, steady ratio)
  passing; thresholds are vars so tests can lower them.
- Tests: TestExtractRejectsSymlinkEscape (relative + absolute targets, no
  link created) and TestExtractRejectsDecompressionBomb.

Found in review of #624.
@OisinKyne OisinKyne deleted the feat/stack-export-import branch June 11, 2026 17:09
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