Email security reports to AndrewMaxwellRobertson@gmail.com with the subject chromeflow security. Please include:

• A description of the vulnerability and its impact
• Reproduction steps (URL, tool call sequence, or extension interaction)
• Your affected chromeflow version (run chromeflow --version or check the plugin manifest)
• Whether you're willing to be credited in the fix announcement

I'll acknowledge within 72 hours and aim to ship a fix within 14 days for confirmed high-severity issues. Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.

In scope:

• The MCP server (packages/mcp-server) — credential leaks, command injection, privilege escalation, RCE via crafted page content
• The Chrome extension (packages/extension) — permission misuse, message-passing vulnerabilities, cookie/session token leaks
• The plugin packaging (packages/plugin) — supply-chain issues, install-time arbitrary code execution

Out of scope:

• Issues that require the user to install a malicious plugin manually
• Bugs that only affect users running unsupported Chrome versions
• Self-XSS that requires the user to paste attacker-controlled code into devtools
• Denial-of-service via making chromeflow drive a heavy page

• 2026-05-12 (v0.9.4): inspect_request_headers previously returned the raw cookie: header — including user_session and other bearer tokens — to the agent context. Fixed by redacting cookie values by default. (release)

Researchers who report a valid issue will be credited in the fix's commit message and in this file unless they request otherwise.