RelayNFC The New NFC Relay Malware Targeting Brazil #1607
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
The blog presents an in-depth technical analysis of RelayNFC, a newly observed Android malware family used for NFC relay attacks to perform fraudulent EMV contactless payments, currently targeting Brazilian users via localized phishing campaigns.
Campaign & delivery
CRIL tracked a coordinated phishing operation using Portuguese-language websites that impersonate card security services and prompt users to “secure” their payment cards by installing an Andro...
🔧 Technical Details
1. Turning an Android device into a remote EMV reader via WebSocket APDU relay
The key trick is to use a compromised Android phone as a network-controlled NFC reader. The malware opens a persistent WebSocket to a C2 server (over a non-standard port such as 3000) and identifies itself with a JSON
hellomessage includingrole: "reader"and a device UUID. The attacker’s POS emulator then sends"type": "apdu"messages like:{"type":"apdu","id":1,"sessionId":"abc","data":"00A40400"}The malware decodes
datafrom hex, forwards the APDU via the phone’s NFC subsystem to a tapped card, captures the response, and returns it as"apdu-resp"with matchingidandsessionId(e.g.,{"type":"apdu-resp","id":1,"sessionId":"abc","data":"9000"}). By maintaining this low-latency, bidirectional APDU tunnel, an attacker can drive the EMV state machine remotely while the...🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
android-hce-nfc-emv-relay-attacks.mdwith a detailed RelayNFC case study covering React Native/Hermes staging tricks, the reader-mode WebSocket APDU tunnel, GUI PIN phishing workflow, and the in-progress HCE relay implementation plus actionable detection guidance.Tests: Not run (documentation-only changes).
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).