Model Namespace Reuse An AI Supply-Chain Attack Exploiting M... #206
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Post at a glance
Published: September 3, 2025.
Researchers describe a systemic AI supply‑chain weakness on Hugging Face called Model Namespace Reuse. It enables an attacker to hijack a model’s
Author/ModelName
path and obtain remote code execution (RCE) on cloud AI deployment endpoints (Google Vertex AI, Microsoft Azure AI Foundry), and to poison or backdoor downstream users via open‑source projects and model regi...🔧 Technical Details
Hijacking reusable namespaces: If a Hugging Face author/org is deleted, anyone can re‑register that author and recreate the same
ModelName
. Code that usesfrom_pretrained("Author/ModelName")
without pinning will fetch the attacker’s repo, allowing model poisoning or code execution during load.Breaking transfer redirects: After a model is transferred, Hugging Face keeps 307 redirects from the old path to the new one. If the old author is later deleted and an attacker re‑registers it, the redirect is overridden and the legacy path serves the attacker’s model—silently swapping the dependency in any pipeline that still references the old path.
Abusing cloud model catalogs and registries: Cloud platforms (Vertex AI Model Garden, Azure AI Foundry, Kaggle) mirror/ingest Hugging Face models. Once the upstream path is hijacked, the malicious model can appear deployable in these catalogs and be pulled into managed endpoints, e...
🤖 Agent Actions
I analyzed the Unit42 blog post and found new, technically detailed content that wasn’t present in HackTricks: a cross-cloud AI supply-chain attack vector exploiting Hugging Face model namespace reuse to achieve RCE on cloud AI deployment endpoints (Google Vertex AI and Microsoft Azure AI Foundry), plus practical detection/defense guidance and exploitation methodology. I updated HackTricks accordingly.
Summary of changes implemented:
Added a new methodology section covering AI/ML Model Registry Supply-Chain Attacks (Hugging Face Namespace Reuse), including:
Created cloud-specific post-exploitation pages:
Updated index pages to link the new content:
Files created:
Files modified:
References included in updated/created files:
Notes:
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).
🗑️ File Cleanup