docs: rebuild the GitHub READMEs around measured figures - #90
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MattJackson wants to merge 240 commits into
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docs: rebuild the GitHub READMEs around measured figures#90MattJackson wants to merge 240 commits into
MattJackson wants to merge 240 commits into
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`docs/plugins.md` is synced to the published docs site. `docs/adr/` is not: it is a repository-only record. So a relative link from one to the other resolves in a checkout and 404s for a reader on getbusbar.com, which is what it was doing at /docs/plugins/. Made absolute so it resolves from both. Scope checked rather than assumed: the other files carrying relative `adr/` links (development.md, internals.md, testing.md, code-layout.md) are NOT synced to the site, so their links are correct where they live and were left alone.
…tags did not
`docker pull getbusbar/busbar` served 1.5.2 for the whole of the 1.5.3 release.
The exact pin `getbusbar/busbar:1.5.3` published correctly; `latest` never
moved, because the tag list only emitted `type=semver,pattern={{version}}`.
docker/metadata-action does not imply `latest` from a semver pattern: it needs
an explicit `type=raw,value=latest` or the `latest=true` flag, and neither was
there. So `latest` was frozen at whatever it was last set to by hand.
The comment directly above it said "X.Y.Z + latest". It had said so through at
least two releases while being false, which is the part worth noticing: the
thing that documented the behaviour and the thing that produced it had drifted
apart with nothing comparing them.
Added as an explicit tag, gated on the same resolved-version condition as the
pin, so a bare dispatch still publishes only `test`.
getting-started.md's Docker pin example and configuration.md's "three orthogonal axes" note were still citing pre-1.5.3 versions even though the described behavior is unchanged in 1.5.3.
Every change here traces to something that actually went wrong shipping 1.5.3, and each one is proven RED before it is trusted GREEN. FEATURE BRANCHES WERE COMPLETELY UNGATED. ci.yml triggered on pushes to main/dev/qa and on pull_request, so work on a feature branch had no CI at all until someone opened a PR. Two 1.5.4 items were reported green from local runs, had never been CI-verified, and the gap was only found days later at PR time. Now `branches: ['**']`, with two tiers: every branch push runs structure lint, fmt/clippy/build/test, config-stability and public-hygiene; dev/qa/main, every pull request, and workflow_dispatch additionally run openapi-schema, migration-corpus, executable-config, no-default-features, no-plugins-gate, txn-guards, timing and windows. The tradeoff is stated in the file: a Windows-only regression is still caught at PR time, exactly where it was caught before, so the fast tier is pure addition. The cost is four duplicated jobs when a branch with an open PR is pushed. The two events deliberately stay in separate concurrency groups; unifying them would let the cheap push run cancel the full PR run the required checks depend on. A green check on a feature branch now means something weaker than a green check on a PR, so a gate-tier job states which tier ran and names the jobs it did not run. Its rule and the jobs' `if:` guards are separate implementations of the same predicate, and they were checked to agree on every event/ref combination. A FLAKY WINDOWS TEST BLOCKED A RELEASE. Root cause found, and it was not "a slow runner needs a longer timeout". In an_idempotency_key_survives_a_client_disconnect_mid_mint the client's 100ms timeout and the server's whole request path shared ONE single-threaded `#[tokio::test]` runtime. One OS-level deschedule of that worker longer than the client's budget makes tokio observe the timeout as expired BEFORE polling the server far enough to reach put_key. The client errors, `first.is_err()` is satisfied for entirely the wrong reason, and NOTHING is minted, so no amount of polling can observe a write that never started. Reproduced locally by shrinking the budget under heavy CPU oversubscription: 1 failure in 10, with precisely the CI message. Replaced the sleep-versus-timeout race with a three-signal rendezvous: the store announces it has entered put_key, parks until the test has taken the client away, then announces the write committed. The test now also ASSERTS the write had not landed yet, which the old one could not: it had no way to tell a disconnect mid-mint from one after it. 30/30 green under the same contention that broke the old test, and faster. Generous timeouts remain purely as liveness backstops, because a missing rendezvous would otherwise hang the suite rather than fail it, and each one states what it waited for and what it saw. VERIFY-ASSETS COULD NOT SEE A MISSING PLATFORM. It asserted `assets != 0`. 1.5.3 published FIVE assets where seven were expected, missing Apple Silicon Mac and x86_64 Linux; install.sh 404'd on Apple Silicon and two of five download links were dead. A count can never see a missing platform, only a name can. The platform list now lives once, in .github/release-targets.json; release.yml builds both the upload matrix and the expected asset names from it, and verify-deploy fetches the same file AT THE TAG UNDER TEST, so the verifier and the release cannot disagree about what was supposed to ship. Worse, verify-assets was SKIPPED on 1.5.3, because `needs:` on a failed job skips the dependent: the one guard that would have noticed was skipped precisely because the release was broken, taking notify-downstream with it. It now runs under `!cancelled()`, so a partial matrix produces a red job naming the missing platforms instead of a grey one naming nothing. POST-DEPLOY VERIFICATION DID NOT RUN WHEN IT MATTERED. verify-deploy's workflow_run trigger required the triggering run to have SUCCEEDED, so when Release failed it never ran, on the release that most needed it, and every defect it exists to catch was found by hand. It now also triggers on `release: [published]`, which fires regardless of how the rest of the run goes. Two new checks: (m) the documented `gh attestation verify` command passes on real downloaded bytes, and (n) numbers the site presents as live actually track their authority. Also documented, rather than left as folklore, why verify-deploy needs no qa-gate-style dispatcher: it has zero `uses:` steps, no checkout, reads no repository file, and takes its version from the event payload, so the workflow_run default-branch trap has nothing to bite. THE PROMOTION PUSH RACED. `git push origin qa:main` was rejected as non-fast-forward while main was a strict ancestor of qa with zero divergent commits; a retry seconds later worked. origin/main is a local photograph of the remote; the SERVER re-checks against whatever replica it lands on, and checking harder locally cannot fix a disagreement between two machines. scripts/promote.sh verifies strict ancestry, verifies CI on the exact SHA rather than the branch name, retries a rejection only after RE-VERIFYING ancestry, and reads the remote back afterwards because a push's exit code is a claim and the remote ref is the fact. Its selftest drives all six paths against throwaway repos, including a transient rejection that succeeds on retry and a push that reports success without moving the remote. THE GATE COULD NOT SAY WHY IT WAS RED. The 1.5.3 plugin gate went red twice and found zero product defects; both were infrastructure, and both printed "DO NOT TAG THIS RELEASE". That is right for a product defect and wrong for an unset environment variable, and a gate that cries wolf twice per release teaches people to rerun it rather than read it. release-check now has two verdicts: PRODUCT keeps the old alarming message, HARNESS / ENVIRONMENT says the gate never got far enough to ask. Deliberately not a classifier over error text, which would add silent misclassification as a third failure mode; call sites know which kind they are. THE RELEASE BODY NAMED NOTHING. It was a one-line compare link, so 1.5.3 did not mention that --validate now resolves env:/file: secret references and exits 1 when one cannot. The body now leads with the CHANGELOG section for the version being cut, fail-soft so a missing section never blocks a release. docker.yml's header claimed a tag cascade the code has never produced. Corrected, and the claim is now guarded rather than merely fixed: verify-deploy asserts latest and the version pin resolve to the same digest, which is the assertion whose absence let latest sit frozen at 1.5.2 through the whole of the 1.5.3 release. Co-authored-by: Matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
proptest writes a regression seed under `proptest-regressions/` when a property fails. That is a debugging aid for whoever reads the failure, not source. CI now asserts the working tree is clean after the full suite, which is what caught a test harness committing generated artifacts during 1.5.3. Left untracked, a proptest failure trips that assertion as well, so a single flake surfaces as two failures and the second one points at the wrong thing: someone chasing "the suite dirtied the tree" instead of the property that actually broke. Found while A2A work was running the suite under contention.
`RootSettings` restated its field list by hand in four places: the struct
itself, `is_empty`, `apply_to_deploy`, and (one level up, in the admin
handlers) `merge_root_settings` plus the boot-frozen push list in
`reload_to_apply_fields`. All of them were CONSISTENT as of this commit;
this is a LATENT defect, not a live one. Nothing was mis-persisting.
What made it worth closing anyway is the failure mode if it ever drifted.
`persist_root` decides whether to store the section at all from
`is_empty`:
doc.root = if settings.is_empty() { None } else { Some(...) };
so a field present in the struct but missing from `is_empty` would make a
`PUT /config/settings` naming ONLY that field compute "empty", store
`None`, and return 200. The operator is told it persisted. It did not.
That is a silent discard behind a success response, which is the worst
shape this class of bug can take.
The fix is the idiom already used in `config::patch`: an EXHAUSTIVE
destructure with no `..`, so the compiler refuses to build until a new
field has been considered at every site. Applied to `is_empty`,
`apply_to_deploy`, `merge_root_settings`, and `reload_to_apply_fields`.
`reload_to_apply_fields` is the same bug class one level up, and its own
comment said so: it already carried exhaustive destructures of
`LimitsPatch` and `AdvancedPatch` ("exactly the bug class
`max_inbound_concurrent` fell into: a boot-frozen field silently absent
from a hand-maintained push list") but opened on a hand-maintained list of
six top-level fields with no destructure of `RootSettings` at all. The
guard was added one level down and not here. It is here now, with every
top-level field classified boot-frozen or genuinely live. The deliberate
half-live exemption for `limits.request_body_max_bytes` is preserved as
it was, with its existing reason.
RED PROVEN: adding a field to `RootSettings` fails to compile with four
`E0027 pattern does not mention field` errors, one per site. Removed.
Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…ilure loud (#54) * ci: make consumer verification the release's last step, and make a failure loud verify-deploy.yml already checked the release the way a user experiences it, but it fired on its own release:published trigger, BESIDE release.yml rather than as part of it. Nothing in the release pipeline waited on it and nothing reported its verdict as part of the release's status, so a release could be green and unusable at the same time. It also had no failure path at all: a red run in a repo this busy is one more red square. Three changes. 1. LAST STEP. verify-deploy.yml gains a workflow_call trigger and release.yml's final job calls it. A failing consumer check is now the RELEASE RUN's failure, named in the release's own job list. ./ resolves the file at the tag, so a release is verified by the verifier that shipped with it. !cancelled() so an unrelated red job upstream (notify-downstream fails outright while RELEASE_DISPATCH_TOKEN is unprovisioned) cannot switch it off. Consumer verification is post-publication by nature and does not pretend otherwise: you cannot pull an image that was never pushed. It cannot block a publish, so the value is the verdict being impossible to miss. 2. MOVING POINTERS, on a 3-hourly cron of their own. A new, cheap pointers job asserts that every default a user gets resolves to the newest published release: docker.io and ghcr.io :latest by MANIFEST DIGEST, /releases/latest and each platform asset behind it, the Homebrew tap, the helm chart appVersion, the download page, and the independent-semver channels (Terraform registry, PyPI, npm, the Go proxy, validate-action's @v1 alias) against their own repo's newest tag. Channels with no meaningful latest are named and justified every run rather than silently skipped. This is the class of defect that let docker.yml emit type=semver only, with no type=raw,value=latest, so docker pull getbusbar/busbar served old code across at least two releases while the comment above the tags block said otherwise. 3. THE ALERT. On failure an alert job opens or updates ONE labelled issue naming the failing check, expected, observed and the run URL, read from the failed job's own log so the issue cannot drift from what the check printed. Idempotent by label, so the daily and 3-hourly sweeps update one issue instead of filing thirty. A resolved job closes it when a full sweep passes; a pointer-only sweep deliberately does not close, since it proves nothing about install.sh or brew. Three live bugs found and fixed while proving the gates: * check (g) could never pass. curl | grep -q under pipefail: grep -q exits at the first match, closing the pipe, killing curl with SIGPIPE (23), which pipefail reports as a failed pipeline. So it went RED exactly when the assertion held. Both occurrences now fetch to a file first. * check (d) trusted docker pull against a possibly-cached local image. It now docker rmi's both tags first, and additionally runs the untagged docker pull getbusbar/busbar that the docs actually tell users to type. * comparing git/ref/tags object.sha across two ANNOTATED tags compares tag-object shas, not commits, so every correctly-repointed alias reads as stale. The v1 check now uses the dereferenced commit.sha. Also: the pointer sweep's newest-tag helper falls back to git tags. The three SDK repos publish to PyPI/npm/the Go proxy off a pushed tag and create no GitHub Release, so a releases-only read silently excused three live user-facing channels while all three registries were serving 0.4.0. * ci: give the fleet a consumer check, and stop the download-page check crying wolf FLEET. plugin-consumer-verify.yml is the consumer-side sibling of plugin-ci.yml: one reusable workflow every plugin repo calls, answering one question - does the thing we published actually work when a user gets it? It checks out nothing, so a fix that is committed but never published still fails it. * the Release is real and PUBLISHED, not a draft. headroom-hook and webrequest-hook both create theirs with --draft and promote it in verify-assets, and a needs: on a failed job skips its dependent by default, so the promote step is one red job away from never running. * every platform archive the release owes is present, plausibly sized, and downloadable THROUGH /releases/latest/download/. Not a count: a count passes a release missing four of five platforms. webrequest-hook v1.0.4 shipped as a zero-asset phantom and a >=1 assertion would have caught that one and nothing worse. * one archive is downloaded and proven to be a plugin busbar would accept: manifest name/alias/kind/version, the sha256 actually binding the cdylib beside it, the packed file really being ELF/Mach-O/PE, and a non-empty signature (every release workflow silently falls back to --allow-unsigned when BUSBAR_SIGN_KEY is unset, and busbar then refuses the plugin on the user's machine). * where the repo publishes a runnable bundle, the image is pulled FRESH and the container must BOOT AND SERVE. getbusbar/busbar-headroom:2.0.4, the current published bundle, exits 1 during config load - its shipped docker/bundle/config.yaml still uses auth.admin_auth with inline module entries, retired in 1.5.3 - so gives a user a container that dies. It builds, it pushes, everything is green. Failure opens or updates ONE labelled issue in the CALLING repo, quoting the failing check's own FAIL/expected/observed lines out of the failed job's log so the issue cannot drift from what the check printed. It closes itself on green. The bundle boot check asserts the host port is free BEFORE probing. While writing it, a probe against a port another process already held returned a cheerful 200 while the container under test was dead, which is the same false-green shape as trusting a cached local image. DOWNLOAD PAGE. The first CI run of the pointer sweep reported that getbusbar.com/download/ does not advertise v1.5.3, for a page that plainly does from a browser: a runner's datacenter IP gets a different response. Reporting that as staleness sends someone to redeploy a site that is fine, and a check that does that twice is a check nobody believes. It now sends a real browser User-Agent and reports HTTP code and body size when the page cannot be READ, as an incident distinct from the page being stale. * ci: hoist the pointer sweep's one expression into env so the workflow parses A `run:` block containing any ${{ }} is compiled as ONE expression and GitHub caps an expression at 21000 characters. The pointer sweep is longer than that, so the whole workflow failed to parse with 'Exceeded max expression length' and could not even be dispatched - a failure of the file, not of any check in it. The single interpolation now arrives as an environment variable, which leaves the script a plain literal with no length limit and is the safer shape anyway: an event-supplied value reaches the shell as a variable rather than being pasted into script text. * ci: tell 'the site is stale' apart from 'the site refused to talk to CI' getbusbar.com returns HTTP 403 to GitHub Actions runners. Its edge challenges datacenter IPs, so a browser is served the page normally and a runner is not. Check (g) has therefore been reporting 'getbusbar.com/download/ does not show v1.5.3' every day on main, for a page that plainly shows v1.5.3, after burning its full five minutes of retries first. That is the worst kind of red. It sends whoever reads it to redeploy a site that is fine, and the second time it does that, everyone learns that red in this workflow means nothing - which is precisely how install.sh rotted in production under a green verifier. Three states now, not two: * 200 with a real page -> assert the advertised version, as before. * 403/429 -> VISIBLE SKIP. The assertion could not be EVALUATED; that is not the same claim as the site being stale, and pretending otherwise is a fabrication. Announced three ways (log line, ::warning:: annotation, step summary), with a marketing-side fix named: allow GitHub Actions egress through the bot rules, or expose a small unchallenged route carrying the current version. Same shape and same reasoning as the existing brew half of check (j). * anything else non-200 -> hard failure, because unlike a 403 it is broken for every visitor and not just for us. A 403 also breaks out of the retry loop immediately: an edge rule about WHO is asking will not become a 200 by waiting, and retrying it dresses a block up as a slow rollout while delaying the rest of the run. The link-scraping half degrades the same way. Being refused the page is not evidence that the page carries no download links, so it no longer says so; the /releases/latest resolution beneath it needs no page at all and still runs, which is the half that actually decides whether every button on the site serves the right release. * ci: check (c) took the whole verifier out over a file one branch away .github/release-targets.json was added on dev and has not been promoted to main. Check (c) fetched it at the tag and fell back only to main, so every run today died on 'no release-target manifest at v1.5.3 and none on main either' and every check after it - (d) through (n), the image label, install.sh, Homebrew, the attestation check, the quickstart - was skipped. A whole verifier lost to a file being one branch away. Fetch now degrades tag -> main -> dev, the same chain the pointer sweep uses, and names which ref it fell back to. Reading it from a branch is weaker than reading it at the tag, but that is the trade the main fallback already made, the platform set changes rarely, and the alternative - hardcoding a platform list in the verifier - is the exact defect the manifest was introduced to remove. * ci: getbusbar.com 403s CI, and the verifier was blaming the site for it getbusbar.com's edge challenges datacenter IPs, so every GitHub Actions runner gets HTTP 403 while a browser and a laptop are served normally. That takes out checks (g), (h), (i), (k) and (n) - the whole install-paths half of this workflow, which is the half it exists for. What it printed instead was worse than nothing: ::error::(h) could not fetch https://getbusbar.com/install.sh at all. The documented one-liner in the README and on the site is dead. The one-liner is not dead. It works. This message has been printed every day on main, about a healthy site, and it is the most effective possible way to teach everyone that red in this workflow means nothing - which is exactly how install.sh rotted under a green verifier the first time. Three states everywhere the site is read, not two: * 200 -> assert as before. * 403/429 -> VISIBLE SKIP. The assertion could not be EVALUATED, which is not the claim that it failed. Announced in the log, as a ::warning:: annotation, and in the step summary, with the real fix named: allow GitHub Actions egress through the Cloudflare bot rules for /install.sh, /providers.yaml and /api/*, or serve them from a route exempt from the challenge. Same shape as the existing brew half of check (j). * anything else non-200 -> hard failure, unchanged, because a 404 or a 5xx IS the documented path being dead for every user. (h) leaves a marker so (i) and (l.1) degrade with it rather than each re-deriving the same block, and (l.1) does NOT substitute a Release binary for the one the live install.sh should have produced: that would quietly change what the check means. (l.2), the docker one-liner, needs nothing from the site and still runs. This is a real, urgent, marketing-side gap and it should be fixed there: while the block stands, the two most valuable checks in this workflow are blind from CI. A visible skip that names the blocker is strictly better than a red that lies about it, and it puts the pressure on the right repair. Also: every run: block is executed as `bash -e {0}`, so errexit is ALREADY ON before line 1 and writing `set -uo pipefail` never turned it off. The new pointer sweep, alert and fleet scripts all claimed to collect every failure and would in fact have aborted at the first one - the alert job proved it by exiting 1 when its log grep matched nothing. They now `set +e` explicitly. * ci: plugin-ci asked busbar for a branch called '5/merge' on every pull request Most plugin repos call plugin-ci with `busbar_ref: ${{ github.ref_name }}`, meaning 'test against the same-named busbar branch'. On a pull_request event `github.ref_name` is not a branch name: it is '<number>/merge'. So every PR to those repos asked GetBusbar/busbar for a branch called '5/merge', actions/checkout retried three times and died with The process '/usr/bin/git' failed with exit code 1 naming neither the ref it wanted nor why it could not have it. From the PR page that is indistinguishable from the plugin's own tests being broken. Several of these repos have never merged a pull request, and this is sufficient to explain why: a PR there cannot go green. Feature-branch pushes fall in the same hole, since 'ci/whatever' exists in the plugin repo and not in busbar. The ref is now resolved before checkout. A real ref - a sha, main, dev - is used unchanged. An unresolvable one falls back to dev and says so in a ::warning:: that names the cause and the caller-side fix (`github.base_ref || github.ref_name`). Fixed here rather than in ten callers, which is what this file exists for. Found while opening the fleet's consumer-verification PRs: all ten went red on this before running a line of the change they were testing. --------- Co-authored-by: Matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…ly config mount (#56) * config/overlay: a read-only config mount must not stop busbar from serving The documented Docker quickstart is the first command a new user runs, and on 1.5.3 it exits 1 before binding a port: docker run -d -p 8080:8080 -e ANTHROPIC_KEY \ -v "$PWD/config.yaml:/etc/busbar/config.yaml:ro" getbusbar/busbar [error] config is mutable (config.locked: false) but the overlay backend '/etc/busbar/busbar-overlay.json' is not writable (is the config directory read-only?) The default overlay backend lands next to config.yaml, which the quickstart mounts `:ro`, so resolve_backend probed it, found it unwritable, and refused to boot. The invariant that refusal defends is real: an admin-API config change that cannot be persisted would apply in RAM and silently revert on restart. But `path: None` already defends it -- every persist entry point refuses a None backend outright, and the admin handlers return NO_WRITABLE_OVERLAY_MSG. So the correct posture for an unwritable backend is degrade-and-warn, not refuse-to-boot: serve traffic, refuse mutations. A read-only config mount is a property of the ENVIRONMENT and a legitimate hardening choice. `config.overlay: false` on a mutable config is a self-contradictory config the operator TYPED. The first now degrades; the second is still a boot refusal. The degraded posture is carried as `read_only_backend` rather than folded into `locked`, so the boot log can tell the operator which of the two postures they are in -- one they chose, one the filesystem chose for them. Docs: the quickstart now says what `:ro` costs you and shows the writable overlay volume for anyone who wants to drive busbar by admin API. * config/overlay: fix the Windows-only unused import, and update the docs that still describe a boot refusal The `-D warnings` Windows leg failed on `unused import: OverlayBackend`: the only test using that type is `#[cfg(unix)]` (it needs a directory whose write bit can be dropped), so on Windows the top-level import had no user. The test names the type by full path instead. Also brings two docs in line with the behaviour change. `docs/migration-1.5.md` told read-only-mount deployments they would now refuse to boot and had to take an upgrade action; they do not and they do not. The design doc's boot-invariant section stated `locked` XOR a writable overlay, and called the read-only-config refusal correct. It now states what the invariant actually protects (no snapshot carries a backend it cannot write) and why only the self-contradictory config refuses to boot while the environmental case degrades. --------- Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
* test: finish the half-done hook deadline mitigation, and stop a stall changing the proptest oracle Two of the three wall-clock instances on the 1.5.4 blocker list. HOOKS: A MITIGATION, NOT A FIX. Saying that plainly, because not saying it is exactly how this one came to be half-done. `TRANSPORT_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT_MS` already had a `cfg(test)` relaxation to 60s, with a comment naming the two tests that failed roughly one run in three under `--workspace`. But `push_configure` awaits TWO deadlines in sequence and only the first was relaxed: `CONFIGURE_TIMEOUT_MS` stayed at 5000 and flows to `configure()`, `status()` and `describe()`. Same tests, same path, still exposed, and a half-finished mitigation reads exactly like a finished one. Rather than fork a second constant under `cfg(test)`, all four call sites now go through one `applied_deadline()`. That makes "one relaxed, one forgotten" structurally impossible instead of a thing to remember, which is the actual defect here. The production constants are untouched and are what ships. It weakens nothing: no test asserts on either constant's value, and the timeout ARM is tested separately by handing `offload_bounded_with_deadline` an explicit short deadline, so it stays deterministic and fast regardless. It is still not the fix, and the code now says so. A bigger number makes a wall-clock failure rarer, not impossible, and nothing here tests the bound it names. The real repair is an injected deadline parameter so each test states its own bound and no constant forks between test and production builds. Measured for cost, because extending a deadline can hide as a slowdown: no wall time is added, since nothing on this path times out in a passing run. `dlopen_configure_acks_exact_version` averages 21.2s with this change against 24.1s without, at comparable load. The whole hooks module is green: 80 passed. PROPTEST: A STALL USED TO CHANGE THE ORACLE. Breaker states are seeded against one `now()`, then classified against a second with a live HTTP request in between. An active-open breaker was seeded only 30 seconds ahead, so any stall longer than that silently reclassified it as EXPIRED. That does not merely perturb the timing, it changes the oracle the property compares against, so the test would pass while asserting something other than what it was generated to assert. A pass for the wrong reason is the one outcome a property test must never produce, since being adversarial is its entire value. The horizon is now a day, longer than any stall that leaves a test process alive, so the classification is stable across the whole body no matter how loaded the machine is. This closes the ORACLE hazard only, and the comment says so. The wall-clock BUDGET assertions in the same file still measure the machine as much as the code, and fixing those properly needs a clock shared by the code under test and the oracle rather than both calling `now()` independently. That work is next, in its own commit. * test: assert linearity by growth ratio, and stop the queue bound claiming a precision it lacks The last two wall-clock instances on the 1.5.4 blocker list. The rule they share: a test that asserts on wall clock is asserting about the machine, not the code, and a bigger constant only makes the lie rarer. RATIO, NOT CEILING. `test_translate_many_frames_in_one_feed_is_linear_and_complete` asserted `elapsed.as_secs() < 5` after draining 20k SSE frames. That is a statement about the machine. It passed for any implementation merely not catastrophically slow, and it FAILED on a correct one when the box was busy: 6.9s against 0.51s idle, which blocked a release-gating suite run for no reason at all. Doubling the input is the question the test actually wanted to ask. Linear work doubles, quadratic work quadruples, and the threshold sits between the two, so it separates the growth classes while caring nothing for how fast the machine is. A uniformly slower machine scales both measurements and leaves the ratio alone. Two things make the ratio trustworthy. The sizes are INTERLEAVED within each repetition, so a load spike lands on both rather than on whichever ran second and inflating the ratio. And each size keeps its FASTEST observation, because noise can only ever add time, never remove it, so the minimum is the estimator that strips it. Proven to discriminate, not merely to pass. A standalone harness running the two algorithm SHAPES, drain-per-frame against cursor-plus-single-reclaim: linear (cursor + single reclaim) growth=1.98x -> PASS quadratic (drain-per-frame, the regression) growth=3.77x -> FAIL (caught) The real test measures 2.03x against a 3.0 threshold, so the margin to the regression is wide on both sides. Proven load-independent, which was the whole point. Five runs under 200 CPU hogs: 5/5 PASS, at 22 to 28 seconds of wall clock each. The old five-second ceiling would have failed every one of them. Two red controls, both firing with legible messages: a threshold below the real ratio, and an N too small to time. The second guards a way this test could rot into passing vacuously, since a ratio taken against an unmeasurable denominator is noise wearing a number's clothes and would pass for any implementation at all. It names the fix rather than just failing. The blob construction stays OUTSIDE the timed region. It is O(n) string work that would otherwise be counted as translator cost and dilute the very ratio being measured. TRUTH IN LABELLING FOR THE QUEUE BOUND. `TEST_BUDGET_EPS` is 1500ms and the generated queue `max_ms` is 5..=50ms, so `elapsed <= max_ms + eps` is really `elapsed <= about 1550ms`. It cannot tell a queue that shed at its 46ms deadline from one that sat for 1.4 seconds. Its comment nonetheless called it "the real, meaningful bound", and its failure message said the queue "must be bounded by max_ms" as though the assertion checked that. The assertion is kept, because what it CAN prove is real and worth keeping: 1550ms is comfortably below the 2000ms failover deadline, so it distinguishes a request shed on the bounded queue path from one PARKED to the failover budget. That is a growth-class assertion, not a stopwatch, and it now says so in both the constant's doc and the failure message. What is NOT claimed any more is that `max_ms` was honoured. That is not testable against a wall clock on a shared machine at these magnitudes, and no choice of epsilon makes it so, because the noise floor of a loaded runner is larger than the quantity being measured. It needs a clock injected into the code under test so the deadline and the oracle share a time source instead of both calling `now()` independently. Recorded in the file rather than left for the next person to rediscover. --------- Co-authored-by: Matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
* ci: verify before tagging, and never release from a red branch Nothing carries a user-facing name until a consumer has proved it works, and nothing is cut from a red commit at all. THE ORDER THAT BROKE. release.yml and docker.yml both fired on a v* tag push, and tag-on-main.yml pushed that tag the moment a commit landed on main. So the version name existed in public before one byte was built, and every check after it could only report damage. v1.5.3 shipped that way: the release published with five of seven assets, getbusbar/busbar:1.5.3 never built at all while the docs told users to pin it, and recovery meant deleting the release and the tag and re-cutting. WHY THAT IS NECESSARY TO FIX RATHER THAN MERELY TIDIER. Docker Hub has tag immutability on getbusbar/busbar. A published X.Y.Z cannot be overwritten, so a broken one is permanent and the remedies are deleting the tag (which has needed owner scope that was not available) or burning a version number. Minting the name first is the wrong order regardless of convenience. THE ORDER NOW. plan (refuse a name that is already taken) -> branch-green (refuse a red commit) -> gate -> DRAFT release -> build and attach -> stage the image as staging-<sha> -> verify from the consumer side against those real artifacts -> promote. A failure anywhere before the promote leaves NO git tag, NO listed release, NO container version tag and NO fan-out, and latest has not moved: the next attempt is a clean re-run rather than a recovery. ONE MECHANISM OWNS TAGGING. tag-on-main.yml is deleted; its version read and idempotency guard live in release.yml's `plan`. docker.yml has no tag trigger, no type=semver line and no raw latest tag in its build; its `promote` job is the only thing in the repository that creates getbusbar/busbar:X.Y.Z, and it does so by manifest-only retag of the exact digest verification pulled and ran, so the promoted image is the verified image and its attestation carries over. The old `version` dispatch input is gone: gating whether a release exists on whether an input was filled in is what let the headroom rebuild "succeed" and publish only a test tag. label_version replaces the part of its job that was legitimate. A PARTIAL PROMOTE IS DETECTABLE. Every promote step is followed by an independent read of the thing it was supposed to change: docker.yml re-derives all four container names from the Distribution API and requires one digest; release.yml re-derives the remote git tag, the draft flag, the latest flag and the plain /releases/latest redirect. Applying the version tag but failing to move latest is named, not silent. NOTHING IS RELEASED RED, AND THERE IS NO WAY AROUND IT. headroom-hook published v2.0.5 with red CI, on a check that was sitting on a list headed KNOWN, TRACKED, NOT BLOCKING, which is ignoring with paperwork. branch-green waits for every check on the commit to conclude and requires every one green. No override input, no force flag, no waiver, no exception list: that absence is the feature, and the lint fails the build if one appears. A status that cannot be determined counts as RED, so an API error, a rate limit, a timeout, or a commit CI never saw all refuse. REUSE, NOT A SECOND COPY. verify-deploy.yml gains a `stage` input rather than a sibling workflow. In staging mode it runs its own artifact-side checks against the draft and the staged image, and visibly skips the channel checks that only move after publication. Its own header claimed consumer verification was post-publication by nature; that conflated the artifact existing with the artifact being published under the name users consume, and the correction is recorded there. scripts/release-order-lint.py encodes the invariants, with --selftest proving every rule RED against a real violation (it caught its own --draft rule passing against a release that had had --draft deleted, because --draft=false elsewhere contained the substring) and --prove failing each job of the graph in turn to show no name-minting job runs afterwards. Both are wired into ci.yml. * ci: branch-green judges the COMMIT, not the state of production A "Verify deploy" run can land on the release commit's SHA: its release-published and workflow_run triggers both fire with that head_sha. Including it in branch-green is circular rather than strict. On a first run it does not exist yet, and on a re-run it reports on the LIVE published world (Docker Hub latest, the Homebrew tap, the Helm chart, getbusbar.com, the site counters), which is a different question from whether this commit's code is green. Its check (n) is documented as expected-RED until the marketing Worker is deployed, so a re-run of any release would have refused forever on a red that is about production and not about the release being cut. This is not an exception list and does not soften the rule. verify-deploy still runs INSIDE the release graph twice: as verify-staged, which gates the promote, and as consumer-verification, which turns the release run red and opens an issue. A broken channel still stops or flags a release. What it no longer does is block the fix for a broken channel from being released. * ci: index a hyphenated job id rather than dot-accessing it In a GitHub expression '-' is the subtraction operator, so needs.promote-release.result relies on the lexer guessing that the hyphen is part of a name. The bracket form is unambiguous. The clause is what stops the public consumer sweep running against a release that was never promoted, where it would fail on every channel and mean nothing. * ci: pin the OCI version label deterministically, not by action merge order metadata-action derives org.opencontainers.image.version from the tag it computed, which under a throwaway staging name would be staging-<sha>. The labels input overrides that, but the override depends on the action's merge order, which is a property of a third-party action rather than of anything here. buildx applies --label last-one-wins, so restating the label after the generated block makes the outcome deterministic. This is not cosmetic. verify-deploy check (d) reads exactly this label to prove the tag and the bytes agree. If it ever read staging-<sha>, every release would fail the staged gate, and a check that blocks every release for a reason unrelated to the software is the fragile-gate defect that now has a real cost. * docs: two stale references to the workflow that no longer exists qa-gate.yml and release-check.sh both described landing on main as 'tag-on-main.yml auto-cuts the release'. That file is gone and the order is inverted: release.yml runs on the push, and the tag is the last thing that happens rather than the first. --------- Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…d pin the service containers (#62) THE EXCLUSION NOW RESTS ON ONE ARGUMENT, NOT TWO. An earlier draft justified excluding "Verify deploy" from branch-green partly on its check (n) being permanently red until the marketing counts Worker was deployed. That fact has been fixed: GetBusbar/marketing#2 repaired the hourly refresh (a Docker Hub login failure thrown outside any try block aborted the whole handler while every inner failure was a console.log and a normal return), put both Workers on deploy-from-main, and added an hourly live guard so staleness has its own red instead of being folded into a release check. Check (n) was re-run verbatim against production rather than taken on trust: docker pulls: hub=27187 site-api=27174 -> PASS (delta 13, tolerance 271) stars: github=106 site-api=106 -> PASS (delta 0, tolerance 2) So that half is struck, not merely stale. "A check is currently red" must never be a reason to stop asking it; that is the permission-to-ignore mechanism the gate exists to remove. What remains is structural and is stated on its own: verify-deploy verifies the LIVE PUBLISHED world, and every way it can carry this commit's SHA is incoherent as a pre-publication gate. The release-published and workflow_run triggers fire only AFTER this release publishes, so requiring them is vacuous or a deadlock. And the daily and 3-hourly schedule runs carry the DEFAULT BRANCH's head SHA, which on release day is this very commit, while the version they resolve comes from the live /releases/latest redirect, i.e. the PREVIOUS release. Requiring that green would gate release N on release N-1's channel health, attributed to release N's commit. It is not a weaker check of this commit; it is a check of something else wearing this commit's SHA. SERVICE CONTAINERS PINNED BY DIGEST. postgres:16 and valkey/valkey:8 are moving tags, so the same commit got different bytes on different days and a store-roundtrip failure could be caused by a database nobody in this repository changed. Both are now pinned by digest in ci.yml and release.yml, verified by pulling each digest fresh and running the binary: postgres 16.14, valkey 8.1.9. AND THE HALF A DIGEST PIN DOES NOT FIX, SAID RATHER THAN ASSUMED. A digest pin buys reproducibility; it does nothing about Docker Hub RATE LIMITS, because the pull still goes to Docker Hub on the shared anonymous runner quota. Authentication is what buys quota, so release.yml's gate now pulls with the same credentials docker.yml already uses. ci.yml deliberately does NOT, because it runs on pull_request and an unconditional credentials block would hand every fork PR empty secrets; closing that half properly means mirroring both images into GHCR. That is written into the file rather than left implicit, because branch-green requires ci.yml green, so a throttled pull there stops a release. Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…d auth seam (#65) Seven gates that could pass while the property they guard was violated. THE SERIOUS ONE — auth/tests/plugin_chain_tests.rs `static_auth_cdylib()` looked only in the uplifted profile dir. Cargo uplifts a cdylib only for the build that asked for it, so a scoped `cargo test -p busbar` — what you run while working on auth — leaves it in target/deps ALONE. The helper found nothing, and seven tests hit `return` and reported ok. Proven, not reasoned about: with an auth bypass (`if true ||` over the constant- time token compare) compiled into the plugin and the cdylib in target/deps only, the suite printed `test result: ok. 16 passed` in 3.00s. The full run is 26.5s. What was skipped is not incidental — untrusted_auth_plugin_fails_closed_not_open and missing_auth_plugin_is_loud_boot_failure are the fail-closed front door. With the fix, the same state fails 2 tests; removing the bypass, it passes in 53s having actually run. THE LESSON: A GUARD SCOPED TO WHERE THE BUG WAS FIRST SEEN. This exact defect was found and fixed in hooks::tests::hook_cdylib, whose comment says the fix was propagated to auth-oidc, store-postgres and webrequest-hook. It was not propagated here, and the comment asserting propagation is prose — nothing ever checked it, so nothing noticed. The same shape turned up independently in busbar-ui twice tonight ("fixed in gate.yml and in the acceptance job above, and missed here"). A claim of propagation that no gate evaluates is a comment, not a control. Proposal in the PR body: make the cdylib lookup one shared helper so there is nothing left to propagate. THE REST — VACUOUS LOOPS OVER DISCOVERED SETS "For each X assert Y" is true with zero X. Each of these built a candidate set by discovery and asserted nothing when it came back empty: * blocking-ffi-lint / settings-leak-lint / response-header-lint (find over crates/busbar/src) and tracing-lint (over crates/). Renaming crates/busbar, with a real inline-FFI violation left in the tree, printed "ok" and exited 0. Floors of 100/130 against 123/160 today — not >0, since one surviving file is as vacuous as none. * executable-config-lint.py: zero extracted documents printed "0 documents — 0 FAILED / passed". New --min-docs, 40 in CI against 50 today. * prepare-release.yml and ci.yml: `cargo test <substring>` that matches nothing prints "running 0 tests" and EXITS 0. The prepare-release one is the last gate before a tag is cut, so a renamed test meant tagging with a stale committed openapi.json. Match-count floors on all three. Every finding was demonstrated in the state that produced the false green, then shown failing against that same state before it was shown passing. Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
… and threw away two more (#64) FOUR BREAKING CONFIG CHANGES PASSED THIS GATE GREEN. Each was verified by sabotaging the real source on a pristine copy of the branch point, running `scripts/config-stability-gate.sh --check`, and reading back "no schema delta" with exit 0: 1. `SecretRef.module` retyped String -> Vec<String> AND the `{ env: … }` sugar spelling renamed to `{ environment: … }`. 2. the `passthrough` value dropped from `upstream_credentials:`. 3. `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` ADDED to `ProviderDef`, which turns every provider definition carrying an extra key from "parses" into a boot error. 4. `#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]` added to `HookDefCfg`, renaming every wire key of a `hooks:` definition (`on_error` -> `on-error`, and so on). WHY THE GATE COULD NOT SEE THEM. REACH. The generator globbed `crates/busbar/src/config/*.rs` and nothing else. A glob describes where a type happens to live, not what it is, and the two grammars that had moved out from under it are not minor: `SecretRef` is the shape of EVERY secret reference in the config and lives in its own crate precisely so plugins and schema tooling can reach it, and `UpstreamCreds` is the `upstream_credentials:` value grammar, sitting beside the middleware that consumes it. The tracked source set is now an explicit list (`SOURCES` in config-schema.py), and the gate calls `gen` with no path so there is exactly one place that says what is covered. A listed source that does not exist is a HARD ERROR: a rename must never be able to silently shrink the gate's reach. FIDELITY. `deny_unknown_fields` and `transparent` were parsed into a dict and then never written to the fingerprint, and container `rename_all` was applied to enum variants but never to struct fields. All three are decisions about WHICH DOCUMENTS PARSE, so all three were breakable with a byte-identical snapshot. They are now recorded, and `rename_all` follows serde's own two-flavour rule: the transform for a snake_case field ident is not the transform for a PascalCase variant ident (`kebab-case` on `max_tokens` is `max-tokens`; the variant-shaped transform leaves it untouched, which is how a wrong answer would have looked like a right one). A hand-written `impl Deserialize` is now fingerprinted rather than merely counted: its accepted wire keys (the sugar spellings, taken from the impl's string match arms) and the declared types of those members. Only wire-visible members are recorded. A hand-impl'd type's declaration is also its PARSED RESULT and the two are different sets - `LimitCfg` accepts `requests:`/`tokens:` and stores `amount`/`metric` - so freezing the whole declaration would fire RED on an internal rename no config can observe, and a gate that cries wolf is a gate that gets muted. The detail lands under a separate `manual-de X` key so the added coverage reads as additive instead of as a pile of new required fields on the commit that adds it. TWO MORE HOLES CLOSED WHILE IN THERE. An unknown `rename_all` value used to fall back silently to identity, which would fingerprint wire keys the parser does not accept; it is now a hard error. And `#[cfg(test)]` modules are excluded from extraction: the tracked set now includes files with inline test modules, and because the extractor is last-definition-wins a test fixture sharing a real type's name would have REPLACED the real grammar in the fingerprint. SNAPSHOT GROWTH, ALL ADDITIVE. Eight new entries (`SecretRef`, `UpstreamCreds`, and a `manual-de X` node for each of the six hand-written impls), plus the two container flags now recorded on every derived struct/enum node. The additive check against the branch point classifies all eight as "new type/section added" and raises nothing else. Nothing was added to config-schema.waivers; it is empty and stays empty. RED PROVEN: all four defects fail the gate after this change and passed it before, and the gate's own self-test goes RED for each capability when the corresponding half of this fix is reverted - reach (3 cases), hand-written-impl fidelity (6), container flags (4), struct rename_all (3). The self-test grew 22 cases that drive the real generator over throwaway Rust fixtures, because a classifier that judges deltas perfectly proves nothing about a generator that renders no delta to judge. A missing fixture is a FAILURE, never a skip, and the suite asserts its own executed case count (43, floor pinned at 43) so deleted coverage cannot present itself as a pass - proven by deleting five cases and watching the floor fire. Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
* ci: mirror the pinned CI service images into GHCR (step 1 of 3)
Step 1 of closing the half of the service-container work that a digest pin
cannot: Docker Hub's shared anonymous rate limit.
WHY A MIRROR AND NOT JUST CREDENTIALS. release.yml's gate already authenticates
its pulls, because it only triggers on a push to main and on dispatch, so its
secrets are always present. ci.yml cannot: it runs on pull_request, GitHub
withholds secrets from fork runs, and a service container's credentials block
cannot be made conditional, so an unconditional one would hand every fork PR an
empty username and password. GetBusbar/busbar is PUBLIC with 5 forks, so that is
a real breakage and it would hit precisely the fork PRs the change protects.
THE PREMISE WAS VERIFIED BEFORE ANY OF THIS WAS WRITTEN. A public GHCR package
needs no credentials at all: an anonymous token request to ghcr.io followed by a
HEAD of the manifest returns 200 for the existing public getbusbar/busbar
package, with no secrets anywhere.
DERIVED, NEVER RESTATED. scripts/ci-images.py parses the pins out of ci.yml and
release.yml rather than carrying a third copy of two digests, which is the
defect that published v1.5.3 with five assets where seven were expected. It also
asserts the two workflows AGREE: they run the identical test command and must
run it against identical services, and nothing was checking that. Its --selftest
proves four rules RED, including that an empty pin list is a failure rather than
a no-op.
BOTH GUARDS DISCRIMINATE, PROVEN AGAINST A REAL REGISTRY RATHER THAN ASSUMED.
The copy must be proven to have landed. imagetools create exiting 0 says the
API call was accepted, not that the registry serves those bytes. A mirror that
reports success having copied nothing is the same failure class as the counts
Worker that logged every failure and returned normally. So each mirror's digest
is re-derived and compared to the pinned source. Checked both ways: a correct
pairing matches exactly, and a deliberately wrong pairing (postgres index vs
valkey, 16 child manifests vs 4) reports MIRROR DID NOT LAND.
The anonymous check belongs in CI, not in somebody's shell. Package visibility
is a UI setting a human can change at any time with nothing in git recording
it, so checking it once by hand proves it was true once. Without this step the
first symptom of a private package is a broken fork PR from an outside
contributor. Checked both ways: the public getbusbar/busbar answers 200
anonymously, and getbusbar/ci-postgres is refused a token outright.
THIS STEP IS EXPECTED TO GO RED ON THE FIRST RUN. GHCR makes new packages
private by default, so the anonymous check fails until the one-time visibility
flip and names the exact URL and menu path. The incomplete state is loud rather
than silent, and the same red catches a package flipped back to private later.
NOT DONE HERE, AND DELIBERATELY: ci.yml is NOT repointed. A newly created GHCR
package is private, so moving the consumer before the producer exists and is
public would break every CI run including those fork PRs. That is a partial
promote and it gets the same treatment as the release promote: the consumer
moves last, and only on proof.
THE PUSH TRIGGER IS HOW THIS FIRST RUNS WITHOUT TOUCHING main. workflow_dispatch
is only offered for workflows on the default branch, and main is the release
branch: landing there cuts a release, it is protected, and it currently sits 11
commits behind dev's unreleased blocker work. Keying the workflow on the files
that carry or derive the pins means it fires by itself on merge to dev, and is
also the correct long-term trigger: a re-pin must be followed by a mirror of the
new digest or ci.yml would point at an image that no longer matches.
* ci: the mirror's anonymous check arms itself at step 3, instead of standing red
An earlier draft failed the anonymous-pull step from its very first run, on the
grounds that a private package is an incomplete state and incomplete states
should be loud. The reasoning was wrong and it broke an absolute rule here:
nothing should ever be released red, or ignored.
A KNOWN, EXPECTED red is the worst kind. It trains everyone to read a red X on
this workflow as normal, and then the next red -- a mirror that genuinely did
not land, or a package flipped back to private -- looks exactly like the one
everybody was told to expect. A good reason for a standing red does not make it
a different thing.
The distinguishing fact is whether anything CONSUMES the mirrors, and it is
derived from the tree by `scripts/ci-images.py --consumer-state` rather than
from a flag someone remembers to set:
* While ci.yml still pulls from Docker Hub, a private package breaks nothing
because nothing consumes it. The check reports the outstanding flip as a
NOTICE naming the exact URL and menu path, and the job is GREEN. That is
honest: the repository is in a correct state with a known next action, and
green is what a correct state should look like.
* The moment ci.yml is repointed, a private package genuinely does break CI
including the fork PRs the mirror protects, and it becomes a hard failure.
So the guard arms itself as a consequence of the consumer moving, which is the
same "consumer moves last, on proof" ordering the release promote uses. There is
no window in which a red on this workflow means "expected".
THE NOTICE CANNOT BECOME PERMANENT. An indefinite notice is a red with better
manners. If ci.yml is still on Docker Hub 30 days after this workflow landed,
the notice becomes a failure: the mirror is then unfinished work that has
stopped being tracked. The clock is measured from the commit that ADDED the
workflow, read from git rather than hardcoded so it cannot drift.
Proven in all six state combinations against real registries:
upstream + private + in grace -> exit 0 (notice)
upstream + private + expired -> exit 1
upstream + public -> exit 0
mirrored + private -> exit 1
mirrored + private + expired -> exit 1
mirrored + public -> exit 0
THE MIRROR-DID-NOT-LAND CHECK IS UNCHANGED AND STAYS UNCONDITIONAL. If
imagetools create reported success and the digests do not match, that is a real
defect at any stage and is never a notice.
The agreement invariant is now expressed over LOGICAL images rather than literal
refs, because it had to survive step 3. Before the repoint both workflows name
`postgres:16` and a literal comparison works; after it, ci.yml names
`ghcr.io/getbusbar/ci-postgres:16` while release.yml still names `postgres:16`,
so a literal comparison finds no shared key and QUIETLY STOPS CHECKING -- the
gate that stopped gating. Each file is now reduced to an effective digest per
logical image, reached directly or through its mirror, and the invariant holds
identically before, during and after the transition. Proven with a GREEN twin
(repointed with a matching digest is accepted, consumer_state flips) as well as
RED cases, since a rule that rejected everything would otherwise look correct.
The self-test earned its place twice while writing this: it caught the agreement
check reporting the upstream as "absent" once a file repointed, and it caught a
read-after-truncate in its own harness, where open(path,"w") is evaluated before
the open(path).read() feeding it.
---------
Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…#67) `workflow_run` ALWAYS loads the workflow file from the DEFAULT branch. Whatever `.github/workflows/qa-gate.yml` looks like on `main` is what auto-fires after a push to `qa`, regardless of what the promoted commit carries. That has already cost a silent green. Measured on qa c736177: the auto-fired gate ran ONE job while the whole segmentation umbrella sat unused on `qa`. The run passed. It had simply done far less than anyone believed — which is worse than a red, because a red is read. The dispatcher design already solves most of this: qa-gate.yml checks out the TRIGGERING SHA and invokes scripts/qa-gate-run.sh from that checkout, so gate LOGIC rides the commit it gates. What cannot ride the commit is everything GitHub must read before a checkout exists — `on:`, concurrency, permissions, env, runs-on, timeout-minutes, the needs/if graph, and the matrix expression. Those come from `main`, always. PR #46 synced the file to `main` in August and it re-diverged within a day, on the commit that deleted tag-on-main.yml. Today's delta is one comment and harmless; by the time 1.5.4 promotes it will not be, because the release model was rewritten underneath it. Syncing again fixes this occurrence and nothing else. So: compare the PARSED structure, not the bytes. Comments and formatting may drift freely; the run graph may not. That split is what lets the check exist at all — `main` only moves at a release, so a byte-identical rule would make every prose edit red until the very release it is meant to gate, which is a deadlock dressed as rigour. Fails CLOSED when `main`'s copy cannot be read. Unknown is not green: a lint that passes when it cannot see is worse than no lint, because it is consulted. RED-BEFORE-GREEN, and the first two attempts at it were VACUOUS, which is worth recording because it is the same defect this repo has been finding all night. A mutation of `needs: [build]` that split on "," and took [0] produced an identical file. A mutation of `timeout-minutes: ` hit line 51 — inside a COMMENT — which the lint correctly ignores. Both "proved" the gate worked while changing nothing. The real proof asserts the PARSED structure differs before trusting the result: jobs.fast.timeout-minutes: 999 here vs 15 on the default branch -> exit 1 restored -> exit 0 The self-test asserts BOTH arms across six cases: a comment-only change must NOT fail (or the deadlock returns), and a changed trigger branch, a removed needs edge, a removed timeout and a removed job must all be caught. Plus the fails-closed arm, proven by reading a ref that cannot exist. Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…0% or 0% (#69) * tmp: runner probe * tmp: probe on push * wip: preserved when the session hit its weekly API limit INCOMPLETE AND UNVERIFIED. Committed only so it survives; not reviewed, not gated, no red-before-green captured. 6 files were uncommitted when the agent died mid-task. Treat as a starting point or discard — do not assume correct. * ci: one build path per target, and a contract each artifact passes 100% or 0% busbar 1.5.3 shipped four Linux/macOS binaries. Three embed the plugin release public key; exactly one does not: KEY busbar-aarch64-apple-darwin NOKEY busbar-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu KEY busbar-x86_64-apple-darwin KEY busbar-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu On ARM Linux every correctly-signed first-party plugin is refused. Not a regression: 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 carry it too. One matrix leg never had the key and nobody exercised it. THREE FAULTS, all structural. TWO BUILD PATHS PRODUCED ONE RELEASE. PGO ran host-native; targets that could not build natively went another way, carrying a different environment. Any property established on one path was unproven on the other. The probe settled it rather than assuming: `ubuntu-24.04-arm` is available to this org, so every target now builds NATIVELY on its own runner and the divergence is deleted, not papered over. One reusable workflow, parameterised by target, no per-target branch. PROPERTIES WERE ASSERTED ON THE INPUT. Setting BUSBAR_RELEASE_PUBKEY on a step says only that we intended the key to be embedded. `option_env!` is compile-time and fails silently to None, so the variable was set, the workflow was green, a comment claimed the key was baked in, and the artifact had none. The contract asserts on the OUTPUT: the shipped bytes, one artifact at a time. THE PRODUCED SET WAS NEVER COMPARED TO THE VERIFIED SET. Verification now enumerates from the same target matrix that produced the artifacts, and requires equality in both directions -- built-but-not-verified is an error, and so is verified-but-not-built. PROVEN AGAINST REAL RELEASED BYTES, not fixtures. The 1.5.3 artifacts: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu FAIL release_pubkey, first_party_plugin, version_anchored, quickstart_boots, build_evidence, pgo_applied -> exit 1 x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu PASS archive_shape, binary_format, release_pubkey, attestation The verifier catches the defect that motivated it, on the artifact that shipped it, and passes the sibling that was fine. A gate that failed both would be useless in the opposite direction. The contract is DATA and the verifier implements it, so the two can drift. The wholeness guard asserts set equality both ways plus a row floor. Its self-test proves that guard discriminates -- eight cases, each constructing one malformation and requiring refusal. Writing that self-test caught my own error, which is the point of writing it: my "well-formed contract" control declared only two of the checks and was correctly REFUSED for orphaning the rest. The guard was right and my fixture was wrong. A control case that fails for the wrong reason makes every case after it vacuous. Removes the temporary runner probe now that it has answered its question. * docs: state what --rows does, not the workflow it serves public-hygiene-lint caught process narration in a shipped file — the phrase described how work is done rather than what the flag does. The behaviour statement that follows (PARTIAL, exit 2, never wireable as a pass) is the part a reader needs, and it was already there. * ci: the contract covers the IMAGE too, and it catches issue #50 The image is a different artifact class from the release tarballs, and it is the one that has actually broken in production. busbar 1.5.3's image did not boot under any documented invocation (#50): USER 65532:65532 against a root-owned /etc/busbar in a FROM scratch image, so the overlay backend was unwritable and boot refused. Every gate was green, because nothing ran the image. Nothing in docker.yml runs it even now. Four rows, gated on the target's own `kind: image`, addressed BY DIGEST and never by tag — a tag is a moving pointer, so verifying `:1.5.4` proves something about whatever that name meant at the moment of the pull. image_boots_documented_quickstart reach the serving state, as a user would image_runs_as_nonroot the obvious repair for #50 is to run as root, which trades a boot bug for a privilege regression and looks identical image_release_pubkey the image carries its OWN musl build, so a key in the tarballs proves nothing here image_version_anchored read from the running image, anchored PROVEN AGAINST THE REAL 1.5.3 IMAGE, both directions: as shipped (non-root) -> FAIL: never reported listening [issue #50] cause removed (--user 0:0) -> boots, "busbar listening listen=0.0.0.0:8080" MY FIRST TWO DRAFTS OF THIS ROW WERE WRONG, and only running it against the real artifact showed it. The first ran `--version` and PASSED against the very image #50 says cannot boot: `--version` prints and exits before the config is loaded, so it proves the binary executes and nothing else. A row that cannot reach the defect is a row that reports green about a property it never tested. The second failed on any `[error]` line, which was wrong in BOTH directions. busbar logs a legitimate `[error] auth is DISABLED ... OPEN RELAY` on a config that boots and serves, so that draft failed a working image; and a refusal exits the container while `docker run` can still surface 0, so the exit code alone cannot carry the verdict either. Reaching `listening` is the question a quickstart actually asks, and it is now the only thing the row asserts. Targets gain `kind`, so the image/binary split is declared in release-targets.json where every other per-class difference already lives, rather than inferred from which flags happened to be passed. * docs: state the defect, not the tracker reference public-hygiene caught internal issue identifiers in files a customer reads. The behaviour is the useful part and was already written down; the number was not. --------- Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…g a live one (#66) * config_validate: `secret_refs` failed OPEN, and it was already missing a live one `config_validate::secret_refs` was a HAND-WRITTEN list of config paths. It is what `--validate` walks in `main::validate_builtin_secrets_resolve` and what `main::validate_secret_refs` walks for module resolvability, so a secret-bearing field nobody remembered to add to it was silently skipped by both: no compile error, no test failure, and `--validate` printed `ok: config valid` for a config whose credential could not resolve. That defeats the 1.5.3 change outright. THIS WAS NOT HYPOTHETICAL. `identity-providers.<name>.browser_login.client_secret` is the OAuth confidential-client secret the CORE presents during the code-to-token exchange, and it had never been on the list. Same binary, same config, before: $ busbar --validate # client_secret: { env: BUSBAR_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET }, unset ok: config valid - 1 provider(s), 1 model(s), 0 pool(s) EXIT=0 after: [error] identity-providers.admin-tokens.browser_login.client_secret: secret env:BUSBAR_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET cannot resolve: environment variable 'BUSBAR_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET' is unset EXIT=1 A second, quieter hole closed with it: `AuthCfg::admin_token_ref` returns the FIRST `admin-tokens` entry it finds and stops, so a second operator credential was never checked, and a provider DEFINED but not yet referenced from a chain was never checked at all. The `identity-providers:` definition map is walked directly now, and each reference names its own dotted config path (`auth.admin_auth.admin-tokens.token`) instead of the one-entry-only prose label `auth.admin_auth admin-tokens token`. MAKING OMISSION IMPOSSIBLE RATHER THAN REMEMBERED, in two layers, because each catches a different way of introducing one: 1. A NEW FIELD on a type `secret_refs` already walks is a COMPILE ERROR. Every struct is taken apart with an EXHAUSTIVE destructure and no `..` - the idiom already used by `RootSettings::is_empty` and `config::patch`. Fields that carry no secret are bound with `_` and a grouped comment saying why. 2. A NEW SECRET-BEARING TYPE is a TEST failure. The compiler has nothing to say about a `SecretRef` added to a struct `secret_refs` never mentions, which is exactly the shape the `BrowserLoginCfg` defect had. Rust has no reflection to close that with, so `tests/secret_ref_coverage.rs` derives the set from the one place that cannot lie about it: the source. It reads every `.rs` under `crates/*/src`, finds every field whose type mentions `SecretRef`, and requires the declaring type to be in `SECRET_BEARING_TYPES`. `SECRET_BEARING_TYPES` is a CHECKED INVENTORY, not a waiver list. Nothing can be added to it to silence a failure: an entry marked `Walked` must really be destructured by `secret_refs`, an entry marked `NotInResolvedConfig` must really be absent from it and must carry a stated reason, and the test verifies all three. The scan cannot report a false green. A missing crates directory is a panic, never a skip; the walk asserts it read a plausible number of files and found a plausible number of declarations before it compares anything; and the comparison is set equality in both directions, so a stale entry fails as loudly as a missing one. RED PROVEN, all four: - the defect, verbatim above: exit 0 `ok: config valid` -> exit 1 naming the path. - layer 1, adding `sabotage_ocsp_key: Option<SecretRef>` to `TlsCfg`: error[E0027]: pattern does not mention field `sabotage_ocsp_key` --> crates/busbar/src/config_validate/secret_refs.rs - layer 2, adding `sabotage_password: Option<SecretRef>` to `StoreCfg`: these types declare a `SecretRef` field but are NOT in config_validate::SECRET_BEARING_TYPES: ["StoreCfg"] - the inventory-vs-reality check, relabelling `BrowserLoginCfg` as unreachable: SECRET_BEARING_TYPES calls `BrowserLoginCfg` unreachable from RootCfg (...), but `secret_refs` destructures it. Reclassify it as Walked. Each sabotage was reverted and each check re-run green. The unit moved to `config_validate/secret_refs.rs`. It is a cohesive one (the walk, the destructures, and the inventory the coverage test checks the source against), and `config_validate/mod.rs` crossed the structure-lint 2,500-line ceiling with it inline - structure-lint FAILED on that and passes now. The orphaned `validate_cost_model` doc comment that had drifted onto `secret_refs` went back to the function it describes on the way past. * fix(test): B1's proof cannot run without the feature its fixture needs (#68) `validate_fails_on_unresolvable_browser_login_client_secret` failed the no-default-features tier: thread 'validate_fails_on_unresolvable_browser_login_client_secret' panicked at crates/busbar/tests/cli_validate.rs:823:5: the error must NAME the config path and the unset variable so it is actionable: [error] config validation failed: - an admin-tokens token is configured but this binary was built WITHOUT the `auth-admin-tokens` feature The behaviour under test is feature-independent; the FIXTURE is not. The identity provider it configures is `module: admin-tokens`, which that feature compiles out entirely, so validation fails EARLIER and the run never reaches the secret check. The assertion was then comparing against an error about something else. Gated with `#[cfg(feature = "auth-admin-tokens")]`, the convention this workspace already uses in four places — `docs_examples.rs` gates its whole file on the same feature for the same reason. Verified BOTH directions, because a test that stops running is not a fix: --no-default-features 20 passed; 0 failed (was 20 passed; 1 failed) default features 1 passed; 0 failed (still runs, still proves B1) Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com> * fix(test): the breaker-cell assertion measured the wall clock, not the cell `test_admin_v1_pool_detail_reports_the_per_pool_breaker_cell` went red in CI and passed in isolation, which is the signature of a wall-clock assertion rather than a product defect. The test seeds the cell with `now + 300` from one `crate::store::now()`. The handler computes the remainder from a SECOND `now()`, taken when the request arrives. Between those two calls sit a router build, a TCP bind, a task spawn and a real HTTP round trip. On a loaded runner the clock ticks and the endpoint answers 299 — correct behaviour, reported as a failure. The property worth asserting is that the cell reports ITS OWN cooldown rather than a neighbour's or a default. A range proves that just as well and does not depend on how busy the machine is. Kept tight (295..=300) so it still discriminates. Proven, by seeding the cell at 30s instead of 300s: seeded 30s FAILED ... got 30 seeded 300s ok. 1 passed A range that could not fail would be the same defect one level up. --------- Co-authored-by: Matthew Jackson <dev@getbusbar.com>
The image was a SECOND BUILDER. docker.yml compiled its own musl binary in its
own matrix, so the image and the release tarballs were separately-built
artifacts of the same source and neither proved anything about the other. That
is the shape that let one release artifact embed the plugin release key while
its sibling carried none: two build paths, one release, nothing comparing their
outputs.
The two musl targets now go through the SAME single build path as every other
target, declared alongside them in release-targets.json. The image consumes
them. Docker becomes a packaging step that verifies rather than a builder that
can diverge.
Targets gain two fields so the difference is DECLARED rather than inferred:
published whether the artifact is a download users get, or an input to
something else. The musl pair is `false`.
packaged_into which image consumes it.
`attestation` and `first_party_plugin` are now gated on `published`, because an
artifact that is packaged rather than uploaded has no release asset to attest
against — and a row that cannot run must fail, never be quietly satisfied.
The new row is what makes "packager" a checkable claim rather than a description:
image_matches_packaged_binary the binary INSIDE the image is byte-identical
to the artifact the build produced for that
platform
Without it the image could still be assembled from a separately-compiled binary
and every other row would pass. Compared by SHA-256, because that is the only
comparison two binaries that merely behave alike today cannot satisfy.
PROVEN BOTH DIRECTIONS against the real 1.5.3 image:
vs the gnu artifact (a binary it does not contain)
FAIL image: c5eb89190e62… built: 898c980cf8db…
vs the binary extracted from the image itself
PASS packages the built artifact exactly (c5eb89190e62)
Two costs, stated rather than discovered later: the matrix grows by two targets,
and PGO training now runs against the musl build as well.
Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…71) * lint: enforce "tests in their own file always", and make a reason-less allow its own failure B8. The lint lands first, RED against the tree it is meant to govern. The bodies move in the next commit. THE DEFECT. The owner's rule is "tests in their own file always", because it "keeps code file length honest and easier to compare". `structure-lint.sh` enforced something weaker and differently shaped: no inline test body in a `mod.rs`, and at most ONE inline body per file. Under that rule a leaf file with a single 1,500-line inline test module is green, which is precisely the case the rule exists to catch. THE FAILURE MODE, observed, not hypothetical. `config/overlay.rs` reads as 2,111 lines. A reviewer compared it against `config/migrate.rs` at 2,379, concluded the two were peers, and reasoned from that. The real implementation figure for overlay.rs is 607 lines; the remainder is inline test bodies. The comparison was not close to right, and nothing in either file told the reader the two numbers were measuring different things. That is the whole cost of the convention violation: a file's length stops meaning anything, silently, and the reader cannot tell which files are affected. The old check also carried a seven-file grandfathered exception list. It is deleted rather than shrunk. The rule it suspended is mechanical to satisfy, every entry on it is moved in the following commit, and an exception list for a mechanical change is only a way of never doing it. THE FIX. `scan_inline_tests` flags a `#[cfg(test)]`-gated region that contains a test-function attribute, in any `crates/**/*.rs` outside a `tests/` dir. It answers "is this line test code?" with TEST_SCOPE_AWK, the scanner the choke-point registry already uses, so the two rules cannot drift into different answers. Two shapes deliberately do not trip it, because neither is a test: the brace-less `#[path]` DECLARATION (the shape the rule demands), and a `#[cfg(test)]` support item that declares no test - a log tap, a serialising mutex, a probe method on a production type. Moving a test costs it nothing. The `#[path]` declaration leaves the module a direct child, so `use super::*` reaches exactly the same private items before and after. That is why the tree needs zero allow markers. THE ALLOW MARKER MUST NAME ITS REASON. A bare `// structure-lint: allow inline-test` is not a quieter pass, it is its own violation (ALLOW-WITHOUT-REASON), and so is a marker whose reason is a token too short to be one. A bare allow is the permission-to-ignore mechanism this project banned outright ("0 permission ever on anything"), and a gate that accepts one has a silent off switch. The marker must also be adjacent: any code between it and the `#[cfg(test)]` detaches it, so an allow written for one body cannot drift onto a later one. SELF-TEST. Six fixture cases added to the existing corpus, three of which MUST MISS: the correct `#[path]` shape, a support module with no tests, and a legitimately test-only file under `tests/`. A rule that only has hit cases has never been shown to stop anywhere. The self-test now also fails if ZERO cases execute and fails if a fixture does not reach disk, because a self-test that skipped to green would print exactly what a passing one prints, and this project has already been burned three times by a test that could pass without running. RED PROVEN: $ bash scripts/structure-lint.sh == test locality (tests in their own file always; no inline test body in an impl file) == crates/api/src/auth.rs:259: INLINE-TEST: an inline #[cfg(test)] test body in an implementation file — move it to tests/<what>.rs and leave a #[path] declaration [...] crates/store-memory/src/lib.rs:439: INLINE-TEST: an inline #[cfg(test)] test body in an implementation file — move it to tests/<what>.rs and leave a #[path] declaration 91 inline test body/bodies — see docs/code-layout.md § 2 == result == structure-lint FAILED — see docs/code-layout.md EXIT=1 82 implementation files, 91 inline test bodies. The goal file named six of them; it had surveyed one module. RED PROVEN, the reason-less allow. With the ALLOW-WITHOUT-REASON branch removed so that a bare allow becomes an ordinary pass: $ bash scripts/structure-lint.sh --selftest == structure-lint SELF-TEST (the test-scope scanner cannot be lied to) == SELFTEST FAIL [allow_marker.rs] inline-test: reported {} but expected {9=NOREASON 16=NOREASON } self-test: 11/12 fixture case(s) passed structure-lint SELF-TEST FAILED — the scanner would let a bypass through EXIT=1 RED PROVEN, the MISS case. With the `tests/`-dir skip removed, so the rule starts forbidding the very shape it demands: $ bash scripts/structure-lint.sh --selftest SELFTEST FAIL [tests/already_own_file.rs] inline-test: reported {1=INLINE } but expected {} self-test: 11/12 fixture case(s) passed structure-lint SELF-TEST FAILED — the scanner would let a bypass through EXIT=1 RED PROVEN, the two false-green guards. A fixture that never reaches disk: $ bash scripts/structure-lint.sh --selftest SELFTEST FAIL [inline_body.rs] inline-test: fixture is missing or empty at /var/folders/cx/.../inline_body.rs self-test: 11/12 fixture case(s) passed EXIT=1 and a corpus in which nothing executes: $ bash scripts/structure-lint.sh --selftest SELFTEST FAIL: no fixture cases ran — a self-test that executes nothing proves nothing self-test: 0/0 fixture case(s) passed EXIT=1 GREEN, on the restored script: $ bash scripts/structure-lint.sh --selftest self-test: 12/12 fixture case(s) passed ok EXIT=0 * lint: enforce tests-in-their-own-file, and move the 72 inline bodies The rule was the owner's, not the tree's state: 72 inline test bodies against 31 declared test directories, while structure-lint.sh enforced only the weaker 'none in mod.rs, at most one per file'. So the convention was documented, believed, and unenforced. The lint now refuses an inline #[cfg(test)] body in any implementation file, and a reason-less allow is its own failure — an escape hatch nobody has to justify is not a gate. Proven to discriminate rather than merely to pass. Appending an inline test body to crates/api/src/auth.rs: crates/api/src/auth.rs:263: INLINE-TEST: an inline #[cfg(test)] test body in an implementation file - move it to tests/<what>.rs and leave a #[path] declaration structure-lint FAILED and green again on restore. Its own self-test covers 12 fixture cases. The bodies are moved with #[path] declarations left behind, which is why the diff is large and almost entirely mechanical. Verified: cargo build --workspace --locked clean, structure-lint passes with its self-test, and cargo test --workspace --locked reports 3400 passed, 0 failed. That last number was checked twice. The first run was piped through 'tail -12', so the only result lines that survived were empty test binaries reporting '0 passed' - and the exit code came from tail, not cargo. A verification that truncates its own evidence and then reads the remainder as a total is the same defect this repository has spent the night removing from everything else. --------- Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…revert it (#72) * fix(overlay): named_maps was durable and API-writable with no way to revert it `DELETE /api/v1/admin/overlay/identity-providers` answered `400 unknown overlay section` while the docs listed the overlay section set as COMPLETE. The `named_maps` section was durable and API-writable, so an operator could apply definitions through the admin API and then had no supported way back to config.yaml truth — the one operation you most want when a change was wrong. Adds the missing `NamedMap(NamedMapSection)` reset variant, at the same granularity as the CRUD that writes it: clearing one map reverts THAT map and leaves the others alone. The structural half is the part that stops this recurring. The valid section set is now stated ONCE and read by the route's error message, the OpenAPI enum, and the docs audit alike. A section cannot be live in the parser and simultaneously missing from what the API tells an operator, or from what the reference documents — which is exactly the state this gap lived in. Verified: cargo test -p busbar --bins reports 3087 passed, 0 failed. * fix(overlay): tag the section-reset conflict with its condition The taxonomy gate refused this branch: OpenAPI OVER-CLAIM - openapi.json documents 1 response(s) nothing can emit: DELETE /overlay/{section} declares Conflict/StillReferenced - no test ever produced it The declaration was right and the guard was real. The dangling-reference check was implemented, and a test already asserted it returns 409 with code `conflict`. What was missing was the CONDITION LABEL: the error arm rendered every failure through `err_json`, which carries the kind but no condition, so the taxonomy - which witnesses emissions at (route, method, kind, cond) granularity - never saw StillReferenced and correctly called the declaration an over-claim. Tagged via err_json_cond. A documented error nothing can be observed to produce is not a contract, and this one would have shipped as exactly that. Verified: cargo test -p busbar --bins, 3087 passed, 0 failed. Note the gate only holds meaning in a FULL run - executed alone it accumulates no witnesses and reports everything as unwitnessed, which is a property of the gate, not a bug. * test(taxonomy): witness the bulk overlay-reset conflict in the driver, not only in a sibling test `DELETE /overlay/{section}` declares `Conflict/StillReferenced` and the guard that emits it is real (handlers.rs), with a passing test of its own (`test_admin_v1_overlay_reset_named_map_refuses_a_dangling_reference`). The taxonomy gate still called it an OVER-CLAIM — "no test ever produced it" — and the gate was right on its own terms: it calls the `drive_*` helpers precisely so its verdict does not depend on whether some other test happened to run, so a condition witnessed only by a sibling test is witnessed nowhere. `drive_named_map_errors` already had a STILL REFERENCED fixture, but it drove only the per-entry `DELETE /identity-providers/{name}` and stopped short of the bulk twin — the same "scoped to where the bug was first seen" shape the taxonomy exists to catch. The bulk reset now runs on the same fixture: the refused per-entry delete leaves `corp-ad` in place, which is exactly the state a dangling reset needs, so this costs no extra fixture. RED-BEFORE-GREEN, both run ALONE (the order-independence the gate claims): before: declared_error_set_is_exactly_what_the_handlers_emit FAILED, over-claim on this row after: 1 passed Full bin suite: 3087 passed, 0 failed. The `err_json_cond` tagging from the preceding commit STAYS. It was not the fix — this operation declares `Conflict` under exactly one condition, so the gate's unambiguous branch accepts any `Conflict` witness on the route and no tagging was ever required; the emission was simply never driven. But the tag is reachable and correct now that it is, and it keeps the witness precise if a second `Conflict` condition is ever declared on this route, which is the case where an untagged emission would stop proving anything. --------- Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…cies], with a lint (#74) Every external dependency was declared per-crate, and three were already declared two different ways: `hex` as "0.4" and "0.4.3", `sha2` as "0.11" and "0.11.0", `tracing` as "0.1" and "0.1.44". All three resolved to the same version — by coincidence, maintained by hand, with nothing that would notice if they stopped. That is the release-matrix defect in a different costume: a property everyone believed, asserted nowhere, checked by nothing. 53 pins in the workspace table; 97 member declarations across 12 files now inherit. Every explanatory comment stays where it was — that prose is about the crate's own design, not about version selection. The one exception is the `serde_yaml` -> `serde_yaml_ng` rename, which was argued in two members (one pointing at the other) and is now stated once, in the table. `scripts/workspace-deps-lint.py`, in the FAST tier of ci.yml, is the part that matters: the table makes a single source of truth POSSIBLE, it does not make it TRUE. Nothing in Cargo stops a member restating a version or the table growing a pin nothing obeys. Without the lint this commit would RELOCATE the hand-maintained property, not remove it. It asserts inheritance, no orphaned pins, and set equality between members-inspected and members-declared, with floors on both counts — "for each X, assert Y" is vacuously true when X is empty. VERIFIED ON THE OUTPUT. Resolution must not move, and the lock alone cannot show that: Cargo.lock records VERSIONS, not FEATURES, and feature drift is the real risk in this refactor. So the feature graph is compared on every shipped target, not just the host: Cargo.lock byte-identical cargo tree -e features, host default IDENTICAL (2286 lines) cargo tree -e features, host --all-features IDENTICAL (2353) cargo tree -e features, host --no-default-features IDENTICAL (2282) cargo tree -e features, x86_64-pc-windows-msvc IDENTICAL (2320) cargo tree -e features, x86_64-unknown-linux-musl IDENTICAL (2285) cargo tree -e features, aarch64-unknown-linux-musl IDENTICAL (2278) cargo tree -e features, aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu IDENTICAL (2274) The per-target runs are not decoration. This rewrote the `[target.'cfg(...)'.dependencies]` jemalloc tables, whose whole purpose is to differ per target, and a host-only check would have been green about the one thing it never looked at. Gating verified directly: 0 jemalloc refs under windows-msvc, `disable_initial_exec_tls` present under musl (the shipped image). cargo check --workspace --all-targets --locked clean cargo test --workspace --locked 3407 passed, 0 failed, 8 ignored, 37 binaries Cross-workspace resolution: the plugin repos consume crates/api and crates/plugin-sdk BY PATH, so their builds now resolve inheritance across a workspace boundary. Probed with a real store-sqlite checkout — resolves — and PROVEN to catch the failure by deleting `serde` from the table, which fails the plugin workspace's own manifest load. BOTH ORACLES PROVEN TO DISCRIMINATE, because one that has only ever been green is indistinguishable from one that compares nothing: dropping `stream` from the reqwest floor moved 9 feature lines; pinning indexmap to "=2.13.0" moved the lock hash. Every diff also carries a line-count floor — an empty `cargo tree` result is RED, never "no differences found". That floor earned itself immediately: a first run silently compared nothing (zsh does not word-split an unquoted variable, so every invocation received one bogus target) and the floor caught it. LINT PROVEN RED BEFORE GREEN: 7 self-test arms all discriminate, covering dev-dependencies and `[target.'cfg(...)'.dependencies]` explicitly — a rule enforced only on `[dependencies]` is a rule scoped to where the bug was first seen, and the per-target pins are exactly where the shipped artifacts differ. Red against the pre-refactor tree; red on a live one-line mutation restating `sha2` in crates/api. No Rust changed. No behaviour changed. Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
* store: kind-partitioned scope wire fields so MCP grants survive persistence
1.5.4 P0 (mcp-oauth-1.5.4-DESIGN.md 6.2): allowed_scopes serialized every
entry's bare value into allowed_pools and deserialized every one back as
kind pool, so an mcp_server or mcp_tool grant became a POOL grant on any
store round-trip. That is both a lost MCP grant and an escalation into
pool access.
- VirtualKey serde is now hand-implemented through a mirror wire struct
(virtual_key_wire): each registered scope kind has its own named wire
field (allowed_pools, allowed_mcp_servers, allowed_mcp_tools),
partitioned by kind on write and reassembled on read.
- Pool-only and omitted grants keep the byte-identical pre-1.5.4 wire
shape; the MCP fields are omitted unless populated, so existing rows
and readers are unaffected.
- A scope kind with no registered wire field is a hard serialize error,
never silently remapped into allowed_pools and never dropped.
- ScopeRef::mcp_server and ScopeRef::mcp_tool constructors.
Red before green: scope_kinds_survive_store_round_trip,
unknown_scope_kind_is_a_hard_serialize_error and
mcp_scope_wire_fields_are_additive all failed against the pre-change
code; the round-trip failure showed mcp_server filesystem coming back
as a pool grant.
* governance: the MCP plane boundary, audience-bound tokens confined to their plane
1.5.4 P1 (mcp-oauth-1.5.4-DESIGN.md par. 4). Before this change
TokenClaims was {sub, exp, kid, g} and serde ignored an audience claim,
so an MCP authorization-server access token would have verified
everywhere a busbar key does: /stats, /v1/models, every RouteAuth::Key
route, and the whole proxy ingress.
- TokenClaims gains aud (wire name a) and cid, both additive with the
same fleet-compat shape as generation/g: tokens minted before this
change carry neither and keep verifying on the data plane. No flag
day.
- TokenVerifier::verify and GovState::verify_token gain an
expected-audience parameter, enforced in the verifier so a route
added later cannot forget the boundary. The data plane passes None
and rejects any token carrying an audience; the future MCP ingress
passes its canonical URI and rejects a token whose audience is absent
or different. Every mismatch arm is fail-closed (AudienceMismatch).
- TokenSigner::mint_for_audience mints the bound shape; cfg(test) until
the authorization-server mint path lands as its production caller.
Red before green: audience_bound_token_is_rejected_on_the_plain_verify_path
was written first against the old two-argument verify and failed (the
hand-crafted audience-carrying token verified). Green now, plus the
fail-closed audience matrix, legacy-token fleet compat, a GovState-level
plane-confinement test, and an end-to-end router test proving 401 for an
audience-bound token on both the proxy ingress and /stats while the
plain sibling for the same binding is still admitted. The
router-table-enumerated ratchet test lands with the P2 core route-auth
table, which is what makes every mounted route enumerable.
* governance: core routes declare their admission bar at the mount
1.5.4 P2 (mcp-oauth-1.5.4-DESIGN.md par. 5.2, 5.3, 4.4). Plugin routes
have carried a declared RouteAuth since Wave 2.3; core routes carried
nothing. The auth middleware held two hand-written path equalities
(path == "/healthz", path == "/auth/token") which were a PROCESS-wide
statement about routes only one ROUTER mounts.
Two consequences, both real. Drift: a core route added later gets
whatever the middleware happens to say about its path, which is nothing,
so /oauth/authorize would have been denied before its handler existed.
Plane leakage: /auth/token is mounted on the data router alone, yet the
process-wide bypass also waved it through on the admin listener, where an
unauthenticated caller was answered 404 (the path is unknown here)
instead of 401 (you are not admitted here).
- New core_routes: CoreRouter is the only way a core route reaches an
axum Router, and route() takes the handler and the RouteAuth in ONE
act, so a mounted route with no declared bar is not a state the type
can produce. The resulting CoreRouteTable travels with the router it
describes, per plane rather than per process.
- auth_middleware asserts nothing about any path now: it consults the
table for this router, exactly as it already consults the plugin table.
/healthz is open because it declares itself open; /auth/token bypasses
on the data plane because its handler runs the chain itself.
- The method mapping (HEAD folded onto GET, because axum serves HEAD from
the GET arm) is REUSED from plugin_routes rather than re-derived. That
half-closed hazard is documented there and there is no second copy of
it here.
- Registered as choke point E in the structure-lint registry, enforced by
construction like row D rather than by a banned pattern.
Red before green: auth_token_bypass_does_not_apply_on_the_admin_router
was written first and failed on the old middleware, 404 where 401 was
required. Green now, plus core_route_bypass_is_exact_in_path_and_method
(the par. 5.3 near-miss matrix, including the METHOD axis the old bare
path equality could not express: PUT /auth/token rode the bypass and was
answered by axum's 405 without the chain ever running) and
test_mcp_token_is_confined_to_the_mcp_plane, the par. 4.4 ratchet. The
ratchet walks CoreRouteTable::routes() and boot_route_paths rather than a
hand-listed sample, has no skip arm, and was proven to bite: a probe
route mounted RouteAuth::None turned it red on the DECLARED_PUBLIC
assertion before being removed.
The loom script fails identically at ad1d8c5 on this machine
(ExceedsMaximumSize on the coroutine stack, a macOS limit); every other
gate in ci.yml is green locally.
* docs: A2A is 1.5.5, and the plugin-route precedent is named by release
Comment-only. Two unrelated corrections that both make in-tree prose
agree with what is actually true.
A2A was renumbered from 1.5.6 to 1.5.5 across the design docs when the
smart router was cancelled, but the core repo's comments still said
1.5.6 in twelve places. Each was verified to be an A2A reference before
editing (config/named_map.rs, config/mod.rs, config/overlay.rs,
config/tests/tests.rs, admin/v1/json/mod.rs, admin/v1/json/named_map.rs,
api/src/store.rs, qa/segments.toml); no other 1.5.6 reference exists in
crates/ or qa/, and none was rewritten blind.
NOT changed, and it needs a decision that is not mine to make in a
comment: qa/segments.toml still carries a reserved `smart-router`
segment mapped to 1.5.5. The router is cancelled, so that segment and
its line in the reserved-to-release map are stale, but removing a
segment is a manifest change the qa-gate self-test judges, not a comment
fix.
Separately, core_routes.rs cited the plugin-route registrar by its
internal build-wave label, which is a tracker identifier a reader cannot
open; the public-hygiene gate is right to refuse it. It names the
release instead.
* config: a raw per-entry merge patch, so recording one field stops
rewriting the rest of an entry
1.5.4 item 2, first increment (mcp-design.md par. 11.3). The overlay can
record a root section per FIELD (config::patch's typed all-Option twins)
but a named-map ENTRY only as a WHOLE DOCUMENT. So any process that
writes back a derived fact about an entry restates every operator-
authored field beside it. The MCP trust lifecycle is exactly such a
process: approving a server records a pinned hash, and it must not
rewrite the operator's endpoint on the way past. Ruling 3 calls this a
limitation in the overlay to be FIXED, never a reason to route trust
state into the store.
The typed half works because a root section is a fixed struct with a
known field list. A named-map entry is stored opaquely on purpose, so
that a new section needs no new overlay field and so that the bytes a
restart replays are the bytes the operator wrote. There is no struct to
mirror, so the patch has to be as raw as the thing it patches: RFC 7386.
Each rule is load-bearing rather than inherited. Objects merge
recursively, so a nested leaf is reachable without restating its
siblings. null REMOVES a key, because without a remove spelling a patch
overlay can only ever grow a document and a field set in the file could
never be unset at runtime. A non-object patch replaces, which makes
whole-entry replace a special case of patching rather than a second code
path that can disagree with it. Arrays are replaced wholesale, because
config lists are ordered wholes (hooks: [a, b] is a pipeline, not a set)
and index-wise merging would invent an ordering nobody wrote. Infallible,
like the typed half: the fallible step stays where it already is, the
deny_unknown_fields parse of the MERGED document, which is the one
grammar both the API and the file are judged by.
Red before green: entry_patch_tests was written first and failed to
resolve merge_entry. Eight tests now pin the semantics, including
idempotence (the overlay replays its patches on every boot, so anything
else would make effective config depend on how many times busbar had
reloaded) and the nested-null case, which is why an absent key recurses
into a fresh null rather than cloning the patch value: a patch carrying a
nested null must not materialize a null-valued key.
Landed ahead of its caller on purpose, same shape as P1's
mint_for_audience: the semantics are the part worth settling and pinning
first. It is deliberately NOT wired into PATCH <section>/{name}/settings,
whose contract is REPLACE the whole bag - merging there would quietly
turn a documented replace into a merge on a frozen wire.
* trust: the upstream trust lifecycle, plane-neutral with the pinned
artifact as a type parameter
1.5.4 item 6. An MCP server and an A2A agent pose the same problem: take
an untrusted external upstream, let an operator inspect and approve it,
pin its identity, hash-pin its capability set, and demote it on drift
pending re-approval. The 1.5.3 named-definition chassis already gives
both of them CRUD generically. What it does not model is the LIFECYCLE,
and that is this module.
WHY GENERIC ON THE FIRST BUILD. The house preference is to extract an
abstraction on its second use, and that preference assumes a first use
exists to extract FROM. Verified against the tree: zero occurrences
anywhere in crates/ of TrustedUpstream, TrustState, UpstreamState,
trust_state, approve_pin, spki, McpServer or put_upstream. So a second
plane would be extracting from a codebase that never had the
abstraction, and would in practice write a parallel copy. The parameter
goes in from the first line.
WHAT IS PARAMETERISED. The pinned artifact, because the two planes do
not agree on its arity: one offers a single opaque transport-layer value
while a signed card offers an issuer key AND a fingerprint, and drift in
either half is drift. A single string would have quietly encoded one
plane's arity as the universal one. Comparison goes through PartialEq,
so the plane decides what identity equality means and the machine never
takes it apart. A capability is deliberately NOT parameterised: both
planes need exactly a name and a comparable digest, and a parameter every
instantiation fills identically is noise threaded through every
signature.
THE STATE IS DERIVED, NEVER STORED, and this falls straight out of the
config ruling. Approval is operator INTENT (locked pin, approved
per-capability digests, suspension) and belongs in the overlay, written
per field through the entry merge patch. Sighting is what ACCUMULATES
(last observation, or why contact failed) and belongs in the store.
TrustState is a pure function of the two. Quarantine is not a flag
somebody remembers to set; it is what you get when the observation
disagrees with the approval, so nothing can leave a stale approved
behind. The dispatch gate is the SAME comparison rather than a second
opinion that could disagree with the one the operator is looking at,
which is exactly the disagreement that would matter to a call racing a
quarantine.
Decisions worth naming: an out-of-band pin WINS over the observed
candidate, which is what keeps this an authenticity root rather than
trust-on-first-use with a human in it; identity drift is its own axis so
accepting a rotated certificate cannot smuggle a changed capability
through with it; a rejection is a standing instruction about a NAME, so
it survives an unpin and a bulk re-approval, and it stops being drift
because the operator has already ruled; suspension outranks every state
and has no soft form, because it is a security control and not a
ranking.
Red before green: both test files were written first, against an API
that did not exist. 24 tests now pin the machine, including that every
transition is idempotent (each is reachable from a double-click or a
retried request).
HOW GENERICITY IS PROVEN, rather than claimed. One transition table is
run over two deliberately different artifact shapes: a single-value
transport pin and a two-value signed-card pin whose equality is a
conjunction. A machine carrying a single-value assumption fails the
second; a machine carrying one plane's shape cannot host the first. On
top of that, the module's own CODE is scanned for plane vocabulary and a
violation is a failing test, with prose exempt because the doc comments
explain the parameter by naming exactly the two planes it exists for.
That ratchet was proven to bite: injecting a plane noun into a live line
turned it red, and it went green again on revert. Registered as choke
point F so the genericity contract the sibling plane is relying on is
machine-checked rather than a review habit.
No production caller yet, deliberately, same posture as the
audience-bound mint and the entry merge patch on this branch: the
transitions are the part with a dependant waiting on them and the part
worth settling before any wire, store table or admin verb is built on
top.
* 1.5.5: open the A2A branch so CI gates it from the first real commit
ci.yml triggers on pushes to main, dev and qa, and on pull requests. A
feature branch with no PR therefore gets no CI at all. That is exactly
how 1.5.3 came to believe work was verified when it had never been
gated, so the branch and its PR are opened before any A2A code exists
rather than after.
* config: an overlay named-map entry is a PATCH over base config, merged
per field
1.5.4 item 2, second increment, and the first production caller of
merge_entry. Before this an overlay entry was a whole document that
replaced the base entry outright. Two consequences.
Recording one derived fact about an entry meant restating every
operator-authored field beside it, which is precisely what the trust
lifecycle must not do: approving an upstream records a pinned hash, and
it cannot rewrite the endpoint the operator wrote. And a PARTIAL document
did not survive its own typed parse at all, because `module` is required,
so it was dropped at boot with a log line while the operator's API call
had appeared to succeed.
Now the stored entry is a patch over whatever base config says for that
name. A field the operator later changes in config.yaml keeps taking
effect unless the patch names it, and `null` unsets a field the file set,
so the overlay can shrink a document and not only grow one.
BACK-COMPAT, and it is what makes this safe over every overlay already on
disk: for a name base config does not define, the merge target is null
and merge_entry degrades to exactly the replace this used to do. Every
overlay in the field is that case, because the admin API refuses to write
an entry that shadows a base one. A test pins it.
The grammar did not move. The MERGED document faces the one
deny_unknown_fields parse_def both the API and the file are judged by, so
a patch carrying a typo, or one that would break a value-level rule like
an unknown max_admin_scope ceiling token, is dropped WHOLE rather than
half-applied. Two tests pin that, and both were green before the change:
they assert behaviour that must NOT move.
IdentityProviderCfg and its nested BrowserLoginCfg gain Serialize,
because the base half of a merge has to be a document. Approved by the
coordinator. The serialization has exactly one consumer and it
round-trips straight back into the same struct: it reaches no reader and
no HTTP response, which is the distinction the settings-leak lint's
category (c) turns on, so the existing allow marker is extended to say
that rather than left to imply something weaker. ExportDefCfg already
derived it. Lint selftest run first and green.
unparseable_named_map_entries now validates the stored patch in
ISOLATION, without the base entry, so its doc says so. That produces no
false report, because both callers ask it only about names that are not
live and a patch that merged successfully IS live; what a partial patch
can produce is a less precise error string for a name that failed for
some other reason.
Red before green: three of the seven tests failed on the old applier
(read-only where full was required, abc where rotated was required,
Some(read-only) where None was required).
STILL OWED on item 2, and deliberately not done here: narrowing the admin
API's base-shadow 409 to plane sections. NamedMapSection has no plane
variant yet, so the narrowed branch would be unreachable and its positive
half untestable. It lands with the first plane variant, where both halves
can be proven at once.
* a2a: the canonical form of a card, RFC 8785, written out rather than borrowed
The A2A plane hashes a document that arrived over the network in two
places, and both are security decisions. A signed Agent Card's JWS
payload is the card serialized per RFC 8785 with the signatures member
removed, so verifying against anything else verifies a different
document. And the pinned card fingerprint, which is what an operator
approves and what drift is measured against, is a hash of the whole
received card.
Neither can use serde_json::to_string. It guarantees neither the key
order the RFC requires nor its number formatting, and the two failure
modes are opposite and both bad: two byte-different but semantically
identical serializations that hash differently make every proxy that
re-indents a card manufacture a drift alarm, and an alarm that cries
wolf gets ignored; two semantically different cards that hash the same
make the pin worthless.
The vectors are the RFC's own, cited by section, because a
canonicalizer graded against its author's expectations proves only that
the author was self-consistent, and a fingerprint two implementations
compute differently is worse than no fingerprint at all. Proven red
first against the naive serializer: four vectors failed, on number
formatting and on UTF-16 key order.
Three details are the ones that actually bite:
UTF-16 key order is not code-point order. serde_json's map is already
sorted, by Rust's str ordering, which is code points. The two agree on
every card anyone has yet written and disagree above the BMP, because a
supplementary character's lead surrogate is 0xD800 and sorts below
U+E000..U+FFFF. So the first card with an emoji in an extension key
would have been the first to hash differently from every other
implementation. Pinned by a vector where the supplementary name must
come first.
Numbers print as ECMAScript, so 1.0 is 1, negative zero is 0, and the
exponent threshold and its explicit sign are ECMAScript's rather than
Rust's. An integer that arrived as an integer is printed from its
integer representation, so a u64 past f64's exact range is not silently
rounded into a fingerprint of a document nobody sent.
A non-finite number is REFUSED rather than rendered. It cannot be
spelled in JSON at all, so producing some string for it would produce a
fingerprint no second implementation could reproduce, which is a
permanent false drift alarm.
Deliberately over serde_json::Value rather than over busbar-owned
structs. Hashing a projection of a card would mean any member busbar
does not model could change without registering as drift, and that is
precisely the silent rug-pull the pin exists to catch.
No production caller yet, matching the posture of the lifecycle this
plane will parameterise: a fingerprint whose definition moves after an
operator has approved one invalidates every approval in the
deployment, so it is worth settling before any wire or admin verb is
built on it.
* a2a: the plane supplies an identity pin, not a second trust machine
The critical dependency landed. The sibling plane wrote the
trusted-upstream trust lifecycle plane-neutral, with the pinned
artifact as a type parameter (26d8ec8, crate::trust), following the
ruling that whichever plane built it first must write it generic on the
first build. So A2A does not write a second one, and this commit is the
proof that the first one really was generic.
WHAT A2A CONTRIBUTES TO TRUST. An artifact, and one refusal.
crate::trust gained zero lines from this commit.
CardPin is a sum type rather than a string because an A2A card's
signature is OPTIONAL, so the authenticity root is not one mechanism,
it is whichever one this upstream can actually offer. A signed card is
rooted in the operator's out-of-band issuer key AND identified by its
canonical fingerprint: two values, equality a conjunction, because a
card re-signed under a different key is the look-alike attack and a new
card under the right key is the rug-pull, and an audit row that could
not tell an operator which one happened would get the opposite
response. An unsigned card degrades to a transport binding, which is a
real network-layer root and still not trust-on-first-use. And where an
operator has neither, Unpinned says so LOUDLY, because a pin that was
never there reading as one that was is the failure this whole model
exists to prevent.
THE ONE RULE THAT STAYS ON THIS SIDE OF THE BOUNDARY. An Unpinned
registration is capturable and can never be approved. That is a ruling
about what A2A's artifact MEANS, not about the lifecycle, so it lives
in approve_registration and not in the machine. Teaching the machine
that some artifacts are second-class would teach it one plane's
vocabulary and the sibling plane would inherit a rule it never asked
for. The cap is checked on the pin that would actually be LOCKED, not
on the one observed: checking only the observation would let an
unpinned override walk past a check aimed at the endpoint, and an
operator-supplied value is exactly where an unpinned default comes
from.
THE CARD, MIRRORED IN OUR OWN STRUCTS, never a third party's generated
wire types. The protocol is versioned and moving, and a generated type
would let a revision ripple out of the reader into the registry, the
catalogue cache and the audit records. Unknown members are IGNORED
rather than refused: an upstream on a newer revision must not become
unreadable, because the fingerprint is what notices a change and it
cannot notice anything about a document that was refused.
TWO HASHES, AND THEY ARE NOT THE SAME HASH. The JWS payload is the
canonical card with signatures REMOVED, because a signature cannot
cover itself, and removing the member is not emptying it: a signer that
hashed an empty array and a verifier that hashed an absent member would
disagree on every signed card in existence, and it would present as
"this vendor's signatures never verify" rather than as a bug here. The
fingerprint is the canonical WHOLE card, signatures included, because
which key signed is part of what the operator approved.
BOTH ARE TAKEN OVER THE DOCUMENT AS RECEIVED. This is the red this
commit was written against: with the fingerprint over the busbar-owned
projection, a card carrying a vendor member busbar does not model
fingerprints IDENTICALLY to one without it. That is the silent
rug-pull, and it is now a failing test.
CAPABILITY DIGESTS ARE PER SKILL, keyed by the skill id an operator
approves by. One set-wide hash would make one edited description
indistinguishable from a wholesale replacement and leave re-approving
everything as the only response. Keying by array position would move
every approval on a cosmetic reorder, so a skill with no id is REFUSED
rather than indexed and a duplicate id is refused rather than resolved.
A reorder does move the whole-card fingerprint, which is honest: it is
a new card, settled with approve-pin, and no skill approval is
disturbed.
HOW THE REUSE IS PROVEN, AND KEPT. reuse_tests drives ONE transition
table over A2A's PRODUCTION artifact and over a single-value transport
pin of the sibling shape, and runs the rug-pull end to end: fetch,
fingerprint, pin to the operator's key, approve, dispatch, then serve a
quietly edited card under the same issuer and watch the registration
quarantine and dispatch refuse it, with no A2A mechanism doing any of
that work. A ratchet in the other direction from choke point F scans
A2A's own production code for a re-declaration of the machine's types
or verbs: F stops a plane's vocabulary leaking INTO the machine, this
stops a copy of the machine leaking OUT into a plane. Two planes
carrying two copies disagree the first time either is fixed, and the
disagreement surfaces as a registration dispatch serves while the
operator view calls it quarantined. Registered as choke point G, and
proven to bite both ways: renaming the class test turned the lint red,
and injecting an enum Drift into pin.rs turned the test red.
No production caller yet, same posture as the lifecycle it
parameterises.
* a2a: say what the reuse test proves without pointing at an unpublished doc
The public-hygiene gate is right and the local run that missed it was
run against a trimmed file. A module doc that tells a public reader the
claim is settled in a design document sends them to something they
cannot open, and the sentence did not need the pointer: what makes the
claim checkable is the test, not the document that asked for it.
* a2a: verify the card signature against the operator's key, or refuse
Until now the pin was a fingerprint compare. That detects that a card
CHANGED and says nothing about who wrote it, so a card rewritten and
re-served from a hijacked CDN simply looked like a new card awaiting
approval. This is the module that makes the trust root a root.
THE ALGORITHM IS DECIDED BY THE KEY, NEVER BY THE HEADER. A JWS header
is written by whoever wrote the signature, which on this plane is the
party being authenticated. Reading `alg` from it and dispatching is how
`alg: none` works, and how algorithm confusion works: declare HS256 and
return an HMAC computed with the operator's PUBLIC key as the shared
secret, a value the attacker also has because it is public. So the
pinned key selects the verifier, the header is only CHECKED for
agreement, and a disagreement is a refusal rather than a fallback. An
absent `alg` is refused too: a default is a choice made on the
attacker's behalf, and the attacker decides whether the member is
there.
Proven red first against the naive verifier that trusts the header and
skips what it cannot check. Five hostile cases went red and nothing
else did, which is the right shape: the stub was wrong about policy,
not about cryptography.
EdDSA over Ed25519 and nothing else, refused BY NAME rather than
ignored. A verifier that silently passed over a signature it could not
check would report "unsigned" for a card that is signed, and an
operator would then pin at a weaker mechanism believing that was the
best the vendor offered. Adding an algorithm means adding a dependency
and a pinned key type, which is a deliberate act.
`crit` is honored by refusing. RFC 7515 section 4.1.11 says a member
listed there MUST be understood or the signature rejected, and `b64` is
why that is not pedantry: RFC 7797's `b64: false` changes the signing
input itself, so ignoring it would compute a different input and report
a genuine card as forged. Naming the member in the error is what lets
an operator tell that case from an attack.
The protected header is verified EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. Re-encoding it
would change the bytes that were actually signed, so a genuine
signature whose producer spelled the header differently than we would
have must still verify, and a test signs a header with whitespace and a
member order no serializer of ours produces.
A malformed signature is a HARD refusal, not a skip. Skipping would
mean a card whose only signature is garbage reports as merely
unverified, which is the softer alarm and the wrong one. And `Unsigned`
stays a different answer from `NoSignatureVerified`: one is an operator
decision about which mechanism to pin, the other is an alarm, and
collapsing them hides the alarm inside the routine case.
The `kid` is REPORTED and never used to select a key, because it is
written by the same party as the signature; selecting on it would let
the card choose which key authenticates it. A signature by the wrong
key claiming the right kid is a test.
The signature pile is capped before any verification runs, so a hostile
card's cost is bounded by parsing rather than by cryptography.
ONE ACCEPTED ISSUER KEY FORM, the RFC 8410 Ed25519 SPKI the operator
pastes, parsed at the boundary into a type that cannot be built from a
bad key. A raw 32-byte fallback would be unambiguous by length and
still wrong to offer: it lets an operator paste the wrong half of a key
pair, or a 32-byte key of another algorithm, and have it silently
become the trust root.
AND THE ORDERING INVARIANT. `pin_a_signed_card` verifies FIRST and
fingerprints only the document that passed. A fingerprint taken before
verification is a fingerprint of whatever arrived, and pinning it would
record "the operator approved this card" about a document nobody
authenticated. The operator's key string travels into the pin verbatim,
because that is the value they compare by eye against what their vendor
published out of band; re-rendering it from the parsed key would be
correct and uncheckable.
* a2a: the anomaly breaker suspends, and says why in a line an operator can act on
Every other control on this plane keys on the CARD. The pin catches a
card that changed; the signature catches a card somebody else wrote.
Neither sees an agent whose card is byte-identical and correctly signed
and which simply starts behaving badly, and busbar is deliberately
content-blind on the dispatch path so it cannot read its way to that
conclusion either. With no quality axis and no reward loop on this
plane, this breaker is the ONLY remaining mechanism for correcting an
approved agent that under-delivers, which is why it is load-bearing
rather than a nicety.
IT SUSPENDS. A tripped agent leaves the catalogue and is refused at
dispatch without waiting for a card mismatch. The strict arm is the
default because what this defends against is a poisoned result carrying
busbar's own provenance stamp, and a de-ranked agent still serves some
traffic. It is a security control, so it has no soft form. The pinned
integration test is the shape of that claim: an agent whose pin is
locked, whose digests all match, and which is in every other respect
exactly what the operator approved, serves NOTHING once tripped.
THE THREE REDS THIS WAS WRITTEN AGAINST were all ways to suspend an
innocent agent, because that is this control's real failure mode.
A sample floor, checked before any ratio is formed. Without it, one
failed dispatch is a 100 percent error rate and the first request of
the day failing suspends the agent. Ratios over tiny samples are noise,
and a security control that fires on noise is an availability control
pointed at the operator.
An unconfigured threshold is NOT a threshold of zero. `None` means the
operator did not configure the signal. Read as zero, every agent in the
deployment suspends the moment this ships, which would be the largest
availability event this design could cause and it would be caused by a
default rather than by an attack.
And the reason has to carry the numbers. A breaker whose trips cannot
be explained gets its thresholds raised until it never fires, and then
it protects nothing. So the reason names the signal, the observed
value, the configured threshold, the sample size and the window. The
sample size is in there because "error_rate 1.00" reads like a
catastrophe and means nothing without it, and the window because the
first question anyone asks about a suspension is what else happened at
that time.
Two smaller rulings, both pinned. Reaching a threshold trips it: the
operator wrote the number they consider unacceptable, so treating it as
the last acceptable value would make every configured threshold quietly
mean something other than what it says. And when several signals trip
at once the reported one is fixed by the signal enum's order rather
than by which looked worst, because a reason string that flapped
between evaluations is one nobody can correlate with anything, and
"worst" is not comparable across signals measured in different units.
Terminal failure is deliberately its own signal rather than folded into
error rate. An agent that cleanly ACCEPTS work and then refuses all of
it is not erroring, it is not doing the job it was approved for, and an
operator seeing "error_rate 0.00" beside a suspension would reasonably
conclude the breaker was broken.
The split follows the same rule as the trust state: thresholds are
operator intent and belong in config, the window is what accumulates
and belongs in the store, and the trip is a pure function of the two,
so nothing is stored that could disagree with the observation it
summarizes.
* store: kind-partitioned scope wire fields so MCP grants survive persistence
1.5.4 P0 (mcp-oauth-1.5.4-DESIGN.md 6.2): allowed_scopes serialized every
entry's bare value into allowed_pools and deserialized every one back as
kind pool, so an mcp_server or mcp_tool grant became a POOL grant on any
store round-trip. That is both a lost MCP grant and an escalation into
pool access.
- VirtualKey serde is now hand-implemented through a mirror wire struct
(virtual_key_wire): each registered scope kind has its own named wire
field (allowed_pools, allowed_mcp_servers, allowed_mcp_tools),
partitioned by kind on write and reassembled on read.
- Pool-only and omitted grants keep the byte-identical pre-1.5.4 wire
shape; the MCP fields are omitted unless populated, so existing rows
and readers are unaffected.
- A scope kind with no registered wire field is a hard serialize error,
never silently remapped into allowed_pools and never dropped.
- ScopeRef::mcp_server and ScopeRef::mcp_tool constructors.
Red before green: scope_kinds_survive_store_round_trip,
unknown_scope_kind_is_a_hard_serialize_error and
mcp_scope_wire_fields_are_additive all failed against the pre-change
code; the round-trip failure showed mcp_server filesystem coming back
as a pool grant.
* governance: the MCP plane boundary, audience-bound tokens confined to their plane
1.5.4 P1 (mcp-oauth-1.5.4-DESIGN.md par. 4). Before this change
TokenClaims was {sub, exp, kid, g} and serde ignored an audience claim,
so an MCP authorization-server access token would have verified
everywhere a busbar key does: /stats, /v1/models, every RouteAuth::Key
route, and the whole proxy ingress.
- TokenClaims gains aud (wire name a) and cid, both additive with the
same fleet-compat shape as generation/g: tokens minted before this
change carry neither and keep verifying on the data plane. No flag
day.
- TokenVerifier::verify and GovState::verify_token gain an
expected-audience parameter, enforced in the verifier so a route
added later cannot forget the boundary. The data plane passes None
and rejects any token carrying an audience; the future MCP ingress
passes its canonical URI and rejects a token whose audience is absent
or different. Every mismatch arm is fail-closed (AudienceMismatch).
- TokenSigner::mint_for_audience mints the bound shape; cfg(test) until
the authorization-server mint path lands as its production caller.
Red before green: audience_bound_token_is_rejected_on_the_plain_verify_path
was written first against the old two-argument verify and failed (the
hand-crafted audience-carrying token verified). Green now, plus the
fail-closed audience matrix, legacy-token fleet compat, a GovState-level
plane-confinement test, and an end-to-end router test proving 401 for an
audience-bound token on both the proxy ingress and /stats while the
plain sibling for the same binding is still admitted. The
router-table-enumerated ratchet test lands with the P2 core route-auth
table, which is what makes every mounted route enumerable.
* governance: core routes declare their admission bar at the mount
1.5.4 P2 (mcp-oauth-1.5.4-DESIGN.md par. 5.2, 5.3, 4.4). Plugin routes
have carried a declared RouteAuth since Wave 2.3; core routes carried
nothing. The auth middleware held two hand-written path equalities
(path == "/healthz", path == "/auth/token") which were a PROCESS-wide
statement about routes only one ROUTER mounts.
Two consequences, both real. Drift: a core route added later gets
whatever the middleware happens to say about its path, which is nothing,
so /oauth/authorize would have been denied before its handler existed.
Plane leakage: /auth/token is mounted on the data router alone, yet the
process-wide bypass also waved it through on the admin listener, where an
unauthenticated caller was answered 404 (the path is unknown here)
instead of 401 (you are not admitted here).
- New core_routes: CoreRouter is the only way a core route reaches an
axum Router, and route() takes the handler and the RouteAuth in ONE
act, so a mounted route with no declared bar is not a state the type
can produce. The resulting CoreRouteTable travels with the router it
describes, per plane rather than per process.
- auth_middleware asserts nothing about any path now: it consults the
table for this router, exactly as it already consults the plugin table.
/healthz is open because it declares itself open; /auth/token bypasses
on the data plane because its handler runs the chain itself.
- The method mapping (HEAD folded onto GET, because axum serves HEAD from
the GET arm) is REUSED from plugin_routes rather than re-derived. That
half-closed hazard is documented there and there is no second copy of
it here.
- Registered as choke point E in the structure-lint registry, enforced by
construction like row D rather than by a banned pattern.
Red before green: auth_token_bypass_does_not_apply_on_the_admin_router
was written first and failed on the old middleware, 404 where 401 was
required. Green now, plus core_route_bypass_is_exact_in_path_and_method
(the par. 5.3 near-miss matrix, including the METHOD axis the old bare
path equality could not express: PUT /auth/token rode the bypass and was
answered by axum's 405 without the chain ever running) and
test_mcp_token_is_confined_to_the_mcp_plane, the par. 4.4 ratchet. The
ratchet walks CoreRouteTable::routes() and boot_route_paths rather than a
hand-listed sample, has no skip arm, and was proven to bite: a probe
route mounted RouteAuth::None turned it red on the DECLARED_PUBLIC
assertion before being removed.
The loom script fails identically at ad1d8c5 on this machine
(ExceedsMaximumSize on the coroutine stack, a macOS limit); every other
gate in ci.yml is green locally.
* docs: A2A is 1.5.5, and the plugin-route precedent is named by release
Comment-only. Two unrelated corrections that both make in-tree prose
agree with what is actually true.
A2A was renumbered from 1.5.6 to 1.5.5 across the design docs when the
smart router was cancelled, but the core repo's comments still said
1.5.6 in twelve places. Each was verified to be an A2A reference before
editing (config/named_map.rs, config/mod.rs, config/overlay.rs,
config/tests/tests.rs, admin/v1/json/mod.rs, admin/v1/json/named_map.rs,
api/src/store.rs, qa/segments.toml); no other 1.5.6 reference exists in
crates/ or qa/, and none was rewritten blind.
NOT changed, and it needs a decision that is not mine to make in a
comment: qa/segments.toml still carries a reserved `smart-router`
segment mapped to 1.5.5. The router is cancelled, so that segment and
its line in the reserved-to-release map are stale, but removing a
segment is a manifest change the qa-gate self-test judges, not a comment
fix.
Separately, core_routes.rs cited the plugin-route registrar by its
internal build-wave label, which is a tracker identifier a reader cannot
open; the public-hygiene gate is right to refuse it. It names the
release instead.
* config: a raw per-entry merge patch, so recording one field stops
rewriting the rest of an entry
1.5.4 item 2, first increment (mcp-design.md par. 11.3). The overlay can
record a root section per FIELD (config::patch's typed all-Option twins)
but a named-map ENTRY only as a WHOLE DOCUMENT. So any process that
writes back a derived fact about an entry restates every operator-
authored field beside it. The MCP trust lifecycle is exactly such a
process: approving a server records a pinned hash, and it must not
rewrite the operator's endpoint on the way past. Ruling 3 calls this a
limitation in the overlay to be FIXED, never a reason to route trust
state into the store.
The typed half works because a root section is a fixed struct with a
known field list. A named-map entry is stored opaquely on purpose, so
that a new section needs no new overlay field and so that the bytes a
restart replays are the bytes the operator wrote. There is no struct to
mirror, so the patch has to be as raw as the thing it patches: RFC 7386.
Each rule is load-bearing rather than inherited. Objects merge
recursively, so a nested leaf is reachable without restating its
siblings. null REMOVES a key, because without a remove spelling a patch
overlay can only ever grow a document and a field set in the file could
never be unset at runtime. A non-object patch replaces, which makes
whole-entry replace a special case of patching rather than a second code
path that can disagree with it. Arrays are replaced wholesale, because
config lists are ordered wholes (hooks: [a, b] is a pipeline, not a set)
and index-wise merging would invent an ordering nobody wrote. Infallible,
like the typed half: the fallible step stays where it already is, the
deny_unknown_fields parse of the MERGED document, which is the one
grammar both the API and the file are judged by.
Red before green: entry_patch_tests was written first and failed to
resolve merge_entry. Eight tests now pin the semantics, including
idempotence (the overlay replays its patches on every boot, so anything
else would make effective config depend on how many times busbar had
reloaded) and the nested-null case, which is why an absent key recurses
into a fresh null rather than cloning the patch value: a patch carrying a
nested null must not materialize a null-valued key.
Landed ahead of its caller on purpose, same shape as P1's
mint_for_audience: the semantics are the part worth settling and pinning
first. It is deliberately NOT wired into PATCH <section>/{name}/settings,
whose contract is REPLACE the whole bag - merging there would quietly
turn a documented replace into a merge on a frozen wire.
* trust: the upstream trust lifecycle, plane-neutral with the pinned
artifact as a type parameter
1.5.4 item 6. An MCP server and an A2A agent pose the same problem: take
an untrusted external upstream, let an operator inspect and approve it,
pin its identity, hash-pin its capability set, and demote it on drift
pending re-approval. The 1.5.3 named-definition chassis already gives
both of them CRUD generically. What it does not model is the LIFECYCLE,
and that is this module.
WHY GENERIC ON THE FIRST BUILD. The house preference is to extract an
abstraction on its second use, and that preference assumes a first use
exists to extract FROM. Verified against the tree: zero occurrences
anywhere in crates/ of TrustedUpstream, TrustState, UpstreamState,
trust_state, approve_pin, spki, McpServer or put_upstream. So a second
plane would be extracting from a codebase that never had the
abstraction, and would in practice write a parallel copy. The parameter
goes in from the first line.
WHAT IS PARAMETERISED. The pinned artifact, because the two planes do
not agree on its arity: one offers a single opaque transport-layer value
while a signed card offers an issuer key AND a fingerprint, and drift in
either half is drift. A single string would have quietly encoded one
plane's arity as the universal one. Comparison goes through PartialEq,
so the plane decides what identity equality means and the machine never
takes it apart. A capability is deliberately NOT parameterised: both
planes need exactly a name and a comparable digest, and a parameter every
instantiation fills identically is noise threaded through every
signature.
THE STATE IS DERIVED, NEVER STORED, and this falls straight out of the
config ruling. Approval is operator INTENT (locked pin, approved
per-capability digests, suspension) and belongs in the overlay, written
per field through the entry merge patch. Sighting is what ACCUMULATES
(last observation, or why contact failed) and belongs in the store.
TrustState is a pure function of the two. Quarantine is not a flag
somebody remembers to set; it is what you get when the observation
disagrees with the approval, so nothing can leave a stale approved
behind. The dispatch gate is the SAME comparison rather than a second
opinion that could disagree with the one the operator is looking at,
which is exactly the disagreement that would matter to a call racing a
quarantine.
Decisions worth naming: an out-of-band pin WINS over the observed
candidate, which is what keeps this an authenticity root rather than
trust-on-first-use with a human in it; identity drift is its own axis so
accepting a rotated certificate cannot smuggle a changed capability
through with it; a rejection is a standing instruction about a NAME, so
it survives an unpin and a bulk re-approval, and it stops being drift
because the operator has already ruled; suspension outranks every state
and has no soft form, because it is a security control and not a
ranking.
Red before green: both test files were written first, against an API
that did not exist. 24 tests now pin the machine, including that every
transition is idempotent (each is reachable from a double-click or a
retried request).
HOW GENERICITY IS PROVEN, rather than claimed. One transition table is
run over two deliberately different artifact shapes: a single-value
transport pin and a two-value signed-card pin whose equality is a
conjunction. A machine carrying a single-value assumption fails the
second; a machine carrying one plane's shape cannot host the first. On
top of that, the module's own CODE is scanned for plane vocabulary and a
violation is a failing test, with prose exempt because the doc comments
explain the parameter by naming exactly the two planes it exists for.
That ratchet was proven to bite: injecting a plane noun into a live line
turned it red, and it went green again on revert. Registered as choke
point F so the genericity contract the sibling plane is relying on is
machine-checked rather than a review habit.
No production caller yet, deliberately, same posture as the
audience-bound mint and the entry merge patch on this branch: the
transitions are the part with a dependant waiting on them and the part
worth settling before any wire, store table or admin verb is built on
top.
* config: an overlay named-map entry is a PATCH over base config, merged
per field
1.5.4 item 2, second increment, and the first production caller of
merge_entry. Before this an overlay entry was a whole document that
replaced the base entry outright. Two consequences.
Recording one derived fact about an entry meant restating every
operator-authored field beside it, which is precisely what the trust
lifecycle must not do: approving an upstream records a pinned hash, and
it cannot rewrite the endpoint the operator wrote. And a PARTIAL document
did not survive its own typed parse at all, because `module` is required,
so it was dropped at boot with a log line while the operator's API call
had appeared to succeed.
Now the stored entry is a patch over whatever base config says for that
name. A field the operator later changes in config.yaml keeps taking
effect unless the patch names it, and `null` unsets a field the file set,
so the overlay can shrink a document and not only grow one.
BACK-COMPAT, and it is what makes this safe over every overlay already on
disk: for a name base config does not define, the merge target is null
and merge_entry degrades to exactly the replace this used to do. Every
overlay in the field is that case, because the admin API refuses to write
an entry that shadows a base one. A test pins it.
The grammar did not move. The MERGED document faces the one
deny_unknown_fields parse_def both the API and the file are judged by, so
a patch carrying a typo, or one that would break a value-level rule like
an unknown max_admin_scope ceiling token, is dropped WHOLE rather than
half-applied. Two tests pin that, and both were green before the change:
they assert behaviour that must NOT move.
IdentityProviderCfg and its nested BrowserLoginCfg gain Serialize,
because the base half of a merge has to be a document. Approved by the
coordinator. The serialization has exactly one consumer and it
round-trips straight back into the same struct: it reaches no reader and
no HTTP response, which is the distinction the settings-leak lint's
category (c) turns on, so the existing allow marker is extended to say
that rather than left to imply something weaker. ExportDefCfg already
derived it. Lint selftest run first and green.
unparseable_named_map_entries now validates the stored patch in
ISOLATION, without the base entry, so its doc says so. That produces no
false report, because both callers ask it only about names that are not
live and a patch that merged successfully IS live; what a partial patch
can produce is a less precise error string for a name that failed for
some other reason.
Red before green: three of the seven tests failed on the old applier
(read-only where full was required, abc where rotated was required,
Some(read-only) where None was required).
STILL OWED on item 2, and deliberately not done here: narrowing the admin
API's base-shadow 409 to plane sections. NamedMapSection has no plane
variant yet, so the narrowed branch would be unreachable and its positive
half untestable. It lands with the first plane variant, where both halves
can be proven at once.
* plane: the layering spine, with the superset-IR rule computed rather
than asserted
`plane-layering.md` in code. A plane is named in at least four places:
its config section, its scope-grant kinds, its ingress mount, and its
audit resources. Those strings have to agree, and two of them agreeing by
coincidence is how one plane's grant ends up admitting another plane's
traffic. They are now stated once per plane, and a test asserts no two
planes share a key, a config section, or a scope kind.
THE SUPERSET-IR RULE IS COMPUTED. has_superset_ir() is
`wire_formats() >= 2`, not `matches!(self, Plane::Llm)`. Writing it as a
match would make it a fact about today's planes; writing it as the count
makes it the rule the doc states, so the day a second dialect lands on
some plane, that plane earns an IR and the test is what says so. The LLM
count is read off the real protocol registry rather than a literal, so a
seventh dialect cannot leave the rule behind.
A TRANSPORT IS NOT A WIRE FORMAT, pinned by its own test. MCP runs over
stdio, streamable HTTP and SSE and every one carries the same JSON-RPC
message shape. Counting transports would hand it an IR it has not
earned, and an IR with nothing to translate between is a
lossless-translation bug looking for somewhere to happen.
Plane dispatch matches on a SEGMENT BOUNDARY, so a mount at /mcp claims
/mcp and /mcp/tools/list but never /mcpx. Same class of over-match the
admin /api check guards and the core route-auth table refuses. The LLM
plane is the residual and cannot be mounted: a second door would create a
precedence question with no good answer. An unmounted plane claims
nothing, so a deployment that never enabled a plane cannot be routed onto
it by URL shape alone.
Red before green: the tests were written first against a module that did
not exist. The segment-boundary rule was then proven to bite by swapping
in a bare starts_with, which turned two tests red, and green again on
revert.
NO PRODUCTION CALLER YET, and the consumer is identified and imminent
rather than hoped for: the candidate projection keys its per-plane
payload by Plane, and the shared pools/tools/agents container keys its
sections by config_section() and refuses a cross-plane reference using
the plane identity here. Those two are being built in parallel right now
in separate worktrees, which is exactly why the spine lands first:
without it each would invent its own notion of a plane and we would be
reconciling two subtly different ones afterwards.
* a2a: decide when to look again, and what to believe when the answer keeps changing
An approval is a statement about a document at a moment, and nothing
keeps it true. The pin only catches a change when somebody looks, so
this is the module that decides when somebody looks and what gets
recorded when they do.
THE UPSTREAM NEVER GETS A VOTE ON WHEN IT IS CHECKED. The cadence is
operator config and our clock, and nothing else: not a change
notification, not a cache header, not a freshness hint in the document.
Every one of those is written by the party being checked, and an
upstream that could say "nothing has changed" could say it forever, and
the moment it most wants to say it is the moment after it changed
something. A notification may cause an EXTRA check; it can never
postpone one.
TWO HAZARDS THAT PULL OPPOSITE WAYS. Never re-checking means a silent
rug-pull is never found. Acting on every answer from a FLAPPING
upstream buries the operator in demotion and restore events, which is a
denial of service against the human rather than the gateway, and a
human buried in alerts turns them off.
The resolution is asymmetric on purpose, and it is the whole design:
detection is never rate-limited, and the direction that is held is
RECOVERY, never demotion. The first drift demotes immediately, so
having flapped recently never buys a hostile upstream a window in which
its next change goes unacted on; choosing when to flap is entirely
within its gift, so any such window is one it can arrange. Once
drifted, a clean answer is disbelieved for a backoff, so the
alternation collapses into one persistent quarantine rather than a
storm. Every drifting observation is still counted while held, because
the changes queue an operator works has to show what actually happened
rather than what survived the filter.
FOUR HOSTILE CASES, EACH PROVEN RED FIRST against the naive version.
A clock that goes backwards. An NTP correction, a restored snapshot or
a tampered host clock makes the elapsed time uncomputable. The naive
saturating subtraction reports zero elapsed, therefore fresh, therefore
never due again, and an upstream that is never checked again can change
whatever it likes. Going backwards is treated as due.
Refusing connections to age out a quarantine. If a failed contact
cleared the drift clock, the cheapest escape from being quarantined
would be to change the card and then stop answering until the backoff
lapsed. A failed contact records Error, which never serves, and it does
not move the drift clock. The check is still stamped, so being
unreachable cannot make an upstream look fresh either.
Rate-limiting the wrong direction. Holding demotions rather than
recoveries is the version that reads as sensible and hands the attacker
the free window; the red run made that concrete.
And an absent observation clearing a quarantine. Inventing an
observation from an absence is how a quarantine silently clears itself
on a pass that never reached the upstream at all.
Boundaries are pinned on both sides: reaching the TTL is due, reaching
the backoff believes a recovery, and a zero backoff means believe
immediately rather than hold for one tick or hold forever.
PLANE-NEUTRAL, AND DELIBERATELY NOT PROMOTED. Nothing here names a
plane; it is generic over the pinned artifact exactly as the lifecycle
is. It stays beside its one caller because this is its FIRST use and
the house rule is to extract on the second. That rule was inverted for
the lifecycle only because the lifecycle had a known second consumer
waiting before a line of it existed. This does not, so it moves when a
second plane wants it.
ALSO: the reuse ratchet now ENUMERATES the plane's sources instead of
naming four of them. It was written against a literal list, and two
modules were added afterwards that it therefore never scanned, so it
had quietly stopped covering the newest code, which is the code most
likely to reach for a shortcut. Proven by injecting a forked type into
one of the two files the old list missed: it passed before and fails
now. The scan also refuses to run on an implausibly small file count,
because a scan that discovers nothing passes vacuously and that is
worse than no scan at all.
* plane: the shared pools/tools/agents container, which refuses a
cross-plane reference by diagnosing it
The three plane sections are ONE code object with three namespaces, not
three types that happen to look alike. They are SIBLINGS: independent
namespaces where one name may exist in all three and mean a different
thing each time, so a name is not globally unique and must never be
resolved as if it were.
The rule that follows, and the reason this is a type rather than three
maps: a name is resolved ONLY within the plane doing the referencing. A
tools entry naming an agent is not a clever shortcut, it is a plane
boundary violation, and the resolver refuses it.
THE REFUSAL DIAGNOSES RATHER THAN DENYING. It names the section the entry
actually lives in, so the operator reads "`tools` references `planner`,
which is defined in `agents`". A bare not-found would send someone
hunting for a typo that is not there, which is exactly why an unknown
name is a deliberately separate arm rather than the same one. The sibling
scan runs in Plane::ALL order so a name defined on several other planes
always diagnoses the same one: a nondeterministic diagnostic is worse
than none, because it makes a boot failure unreproducible.
Default is hand-written, not derived. The derive would bound it on
T: Default, which is wrong twice over: an empty container needs nothing
from T, and requiring it would force every entry type a plane ever holds
to invent a meaningless empty value just to be storable.
Red before green: the tests were written first against a type that did
not exist. The cross-plane refusal was then proven to bite by injecting
the obvious bug, a fallback to a global lookup across planes, which
turned three tests red, and green again on revert. Every-plane behaviour
is asserted by looping over Plane::ALL rather than by writing three
copies, which is what stops one plane quietly acquiring a special case.
Consumer, per the land-ahead bound: the config validator that refuses a
cross-plane reference at boot, which arrives with the tools section. It
is tracked as unconsumed until then.
The one suite failure on this tree is dlopen_configure_acks_exact_version
and it is NOT this change: this diff adds a type nothing outside its own
tests references, and the branch does not touch hooks, plugin-loader,
plugin-abi or hook-test-plugin at all. Proven by controlled experiment,
not inferred from a re-run: relaxing ONLY CONFIGURE_TIMEOUT_MS under
cfg(test) turned the same tree green at 3146 passed under comparable
load. Reported separately; not fixed here.
* mcp: renumber to 1.5.5, and A2A's agent scope kind to 1.5.6
1.5.4 is the fix-and-harden release; MCP is 1.5.5 and A2A is 1.5.6. This branch
carried 48 references to the old numbering across 16 files, including
qa/segments.toml.
Rewritten LATER VERSION FIRST, deliberately: the MCP code already references
A2A's `agent` scope kind as 1.5.5, so rewriting 1.5.4 -> 1.5.5 first would then
have caught its own output and pushed `agent` to 1.5.6 twice over. Doing
1.5.5 -> 1.5.6 before 1.5.4 -> 1.5.5 leaves each reference rewritten once.
* a2a: two conformance instruments, wired where a red can block a release
The A2A batteries existed and were green, and nothing ran them. Their CI lived in a repository
whose host has no registered runners and no route from GitHub-hosted ones, so eight jobs failed
permanently and the two that went green had executed nothing. That is the defect the batteries
themselves exist to catch, one level up, and it is why they move here rather than why a runner gets
provisioned there: a conformance battery is a statement about busbar, so it belongs where busbar is
built. Independence is a property of authorship, and the guard that keeps product knowledge out of
the harness is enforced in code rather than by filesystem distance.
busbar is public, so every leg runs on ubuntu-latest and no secret appears anywhere in the
workflow. That is what makes "the control legs run always" a fact rather than an intention.
TWO INSTRUMENTS, AND THE SECOND IS NOT OURS. `a2aproject/a2a-tck` is the specification publisher's
own suite: all three transports including gRPC, 36 test modules, actively maintained. It is fetched
at a pinned commit and never vendored, because its LICENSE says Apache-2.0 while its pyproject.toml
says MIT and copying source whose terms disagree with themselves would pick one of them on the
reader's behalf. `a2a-itk` has no stated terms at all and is not used. LICENSING.md records both,
and what we relied on instead.
NEITHER SUITE IS GREEN AGAINST ANYTHING, AND BOTH STILL GATE. The controls are held to a pinned
verdict rather than to green, because the thing a gate catches is a CHANGE. The TCK's own report
prints `grpc: 0/72 (72 skipped)` with a tick beside it, so the comparator checks set equality on the
full requirement map in both directions plus two floors -- how many requirements were discovered and
how many actually EXECUTED. The first cut of that comparator counted `NOT TESTED` as execution and
turned a 73-requirement run into a 100-requirement one; the case that catches it is now pinned.
THE TIMEZONE IS LOAD-BEARING. a2a-go v2.4.0 serialises timestamps in the host's local zone, which
violates SPEC 5.6.1 and is invisible on a UTC host -- and CI runners are UTC. The control legs
therefore run in a fixed non-UTC zone, and a job re-runs the same control under TZ=UTC and requires
the pinned baseline to break on exactly that finding, so the setting cannot decay into decoration.
A ROW THAT CANNOT RUN IS RED. Every leg is judged by name in an aggregator, where skipped and
cancelled are failures. The subject leg is the one exception and is armed by a single variable; it
publishes its arm state as a job output rather than relying on its result, because a job whose steps
all skip still reports success. The aggregator's own `needs:` list is a hand-maintained enumeration,
so it is held to set equality with the workflow's job set, in both directions, and every leg it
depends on must be read by its script.
Governance stays a separate tier that imports the harness as a library, and the harness raises if a
governance test is ever registered inside it. A perfectly conformant agent that ignores every budget
and never quarantines anything scores 100% on conformance.
* a2a: the `agents:` section, where a pin has to mean something before it is written down
The A2A plane's config grammar, landing as one variant on the 1.5.3 named-map chassis plus its
arms. The router, the OpenAPI generator, the overlay applier and the error taxonomy all iterate
`NamedMapSection::ALL`, so they gain the section without an edit; what is new is the grammar and the
rules that judge its values.
THE PIN IS AN OBJECT, AND THAT IS THE POINT. A2A's authenticity root is a JWS issuer key PLUS a card
fingerprint, and where a card carries no signature it degrades to a transport binding — four
mechanisms carrying different material, which a scalar `spki_pin:` can spell exactly one of. So
`pin:` is `{mechanism, key?, fingerprint?}` and the mechanism is checked against the material it
requires, at parse. `jws_issuer_key` with nothing to verify against is refused. So is the half that
is easy to leave out: `unpinned` CARRYING key material is refused too, because material that is
never verified against reads to an operator as protection that does not exist, which is worse than
an honest absence. `unpinned` itself stays registrable and stays unapprovable; that cap is the pin
module's ruling and is not restated here.
A root with no fingerprint is the NORMAL state of a fresh registration, not an error, and nothing
in this file invents one. The fingerprint arrives from a `connect` an operator approves.
THE CADENCE IS PARSED WHERE THE OPERATOR WROTE IT. Both durations are validated at boot rather than
surprising a background job later, and an OMITTED cadence takes a named default rather than
silently meaning zero — zero ttl and zero backoff are both legitimate things to ask for and neither
is what an absent field…
…e revision it claims (#79) * mcp: close the anonymous front door, and make the wire match the revision it claims Rebased onto dev after #78 landed as a squash. dev already carries the MCP and A2A source; what it did not carry is the conformance harness, the subject leg, full-gate.sh, and these fixes. SECURITY. `mcp:` present with a resolved-empty `auth.chain` served the MCP plane to anonymous callers holding WILDCARD grants. It is now a validation error naming both keys, raised in one place so `--validate`, boot, and admin config-apply all refuse identically. Proven against the real binary, with a control asserting a valid config still LISTENS rather than merely not exiting. WIRE. SEP-2549 result envelope (resultType, cacheScope "private" because every answer is computed under the caller's grant, ttlMs 0 because a stateless revision has no invalidation channel and any positive window is a promise the server cannot keep). SEP-2575 answers -32602/400 for absent _meta, protocolVersion or clientCapabilities. resources/templates/list, prompt {placeholder} substitution (silently ignored before), completion/complete. Conformance 6/37 -> 20/37. The remaining 17 are left RED, not baselined: ten need InputRequiredResult passthrough, which this engine deliberately refuses, and passing them would mean reversing that decision. Two conflicts came out of the squash and both were resolved as a UNION rather than a side, because either side alone silently dropped the other's work: docs/admin-api.md needed dev's /agents/{name} routes AND this branch's /tools/{name}/connect trust verb; verdict-covers-every-leg.py took this branch's globbing version, which discovers *conformance*.yml instead of hard-coding a2a and therefore still covers both (7 legs each, verified). * fix: the three full-tier failures, one of which was a gate that had never run openapi: 79 operations, not 76. 76 was correct for either plane alone and wrong for both together — 66 generic + 5 named-map routes per plane section + 3 MCP trust verbs. `POST /tools/{name}/connect` is declared BODYLESS: its handler takes State, Extension and Path and no body extractor, so there is nothing a caller could put in a body that would change what it does. no-default-features: `drive_mcp_verb_errors` is now gated exactly as its only caller is — `admin/tests` is `cfg(all(test, feature = "auth-admin-tokens"))`, which --no-default-features drops. Matching the caller's condition rather than silencing it with `allow(dead_code)` keeps the property that a driver nobody calls is an error, which is what the registry exists to enforce. FIXTURE-ABSENCE AXIS 2 HAD NEVER RUN. It launched the binary as `busbar --config <file>`. There is no `--config` flag — the path arrives via BUSBAR_CONFIG — and the config it wrote used `server: { bind: }`, which is not the grammar either (`listen:` / `admin_listen:`). So the binary exited on its first argument every time. It surfaced only because the readiness check calls an unprobed axis RED instead of skipping it. Two more holes found while fixing it, both of the same kind: * The admin surface was probed on the DATA port, where it can only 404, so its responses were never read. Now probed on admin_listen. * The non-vacuity check was `[ -s wire.txt ]`, which CANNOT FAIL: `probe` writes its `--- METHOD path ---` separator with printf before curl runs, so the transcript is non-empty even when every probe returns nothing — precisely the state this gate lived in. Replaced with a floor on response bytes only, proven to bite by pointing every probe at a dead port: "captured only 0 response byte(s), under the 200-byte floor", exit 1. * fix: the no-default-features axis, without dropping a security check to do it Two failures, and they wanted opposite fixes. The adminverbs tests authenticate with `x-admin-token`, and the only thing that verifies that header is the `admin-tokens` module the `auth-admin-tokens` feature compiles in. Without it the chain fails closed and every request is a 401 before it reaches a verb. The module is now gated at its include site, and the resulting coverage gap is stated there rather than left to be found: with that feature off the trust verbs are untested, because a build with no admin auth module cannot admit an admin request by design. `mcp_open_front_door` needed the OPPOSITE. Its scaffolding configured an admin-tokens token, which is itself a boot refusal without the feature, so the control failed before the property was reached. Gating this file would have been wrong: an MCP deployment answering anonymously with wildcard grants must be refused in EVERY build, and --no-default-features is exactly where dropping the check would go unnoticed. So the scaffolding lost its admin-tokens dependency instead, and the security check now runs on both axes. Also, the timeout arm now prints what busbar actually said and the config it was given. It used to panic with the headline alone, which cannot distinguish "the guard is gone" from "the fixture never reached the guard" — and the second is what it was. That evidence is what identified the real cause: on macOS a freshly linked debug binary stalls inside `_dyld_start` under the code-signing scan before `main` runs, sampled and confirmed. The deadline is 120s because it BOUNDS A WAIT rather than asserting a latency; the claim is that busbar exits, not how fast. --------- Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
…t busbar serves (#80) Two trust gaps that were REFUSED rather than implemented. Refusing was right in both cases and it left two properties untrue. ── cert_spki is now a real pin ────────────────────────────────────────────── An A2A card's signature is OPTIONAL, and the answer for a vendor that does not sign is a transport-layer authenticity binding. Nothing read a peer certificate, so cert_spki was refused: a fetch that succeeded is not a transport binding that was checked. The consequence was that an unsigned vendor had no root at all. The card-fetch transport now records the leaf certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo hash on every TLS hop, and verify compares it. THE CERTIFICATE IS READ AFTER VERIFICATION, NEVER INSTEAD OF IT. reqwest's tls_info hands back the leaf of a handshake the ordinary chain-and-name check already accepted; a handshake that failed produces no response and therefore no pin. So there is no arrangement of certificates under which busbar records a transport pin for a connection it did not verify, and that is executed as a test rather than argued. `danger_accept_invalid_certs` stays at ZERO occurrences, ratcheted by a scan over every .rs file in the crate with a floor of 100 files. The SPKI is walked out of the DER by hand (RFC 5280 4.1: seventh member of TBSCertificate, and `version` is DEFAULT v1 so its absence is tested, not assumed). Nothing here interprets a name, a validity window or a key — the parts of X.509 that earn a crate — and the oracle in every test is rcgen's own SPKI encoding rather than our output. Written against a walk that stopped one member early: it produced a stable, plausible `sha256/…` that was IDENTICAL for two different keys, because it was hashing the subject name. Non-DER length forms are refused, not tolerated. A certificate with two encodings is a key with two pins. TransportPinNotVerified is replaced by four arms that name what was missing: NoTransportPin, TransportPinNotObserved (a plaintext hop cannot downgrade its own pin), TransportPinMismatch { expected, observed }, MutualTlsNotPresented. mtls STILL REFUSES, and for a different reason. Its peer half is checked exactly as cert_spki's is, and checked FIRST so a look-alike endpoint is named as one rather than sending an operator off to configure a certificate. What is absent is the MUTUAL half: busbar presents no client certificate, and recording mtls as satisfied over a one-way handshake would put "busbar proved who it was" into the store about a connection where it did not. This is a grammar gap, not a stack gap — reqwest::Identity::from_pem and ClientBuilder::identity are available under the rustls feature already enabled. What is missing is a spelling under `agents:` naming busbar's client certificate, and a per-registration transport (the sweep builds one for the whole plane). Both belong in a separately reviewed change. ── busbar signs the cards it serves ───────────────────────────────────────── busbar demanded a signed, out-of-band-rooted card from every agent it delegates to, dropped the vendor's signature when it rewrote a card for serving (correctly — the served document is not the one the vendor signed) and published nothing in its place. A caller of busbar had exactly the trust root busbar refuses to accept from anyone else: none. The served card now carries busbar's own JWS, attached LAST — after the rewrite and after the backend-leak check — so the signature covers the bytes that are actually published. THE KEY IS A DOMAIN-SEPARATED SUBKEY OF THE TOKEN SIGNING KEY, NOT THAT KEY. A served card is a vendor's document with busbar's endpoints substituted in; every other member travels through verbatim. Signing it with the credential-minting key would make the card path a signing oracle over upstream-chosen bytes, holding the key that mints working busbar credentials. Nothing about JWS makes that exploitable today, but "the two formats happen not to overlap" has to be re-checked every time either moves and nobody will. Blast radius, both ways: card key compromised => tokens unaffected (the derivation is one-way); token secret compromised => the card key falls too, which is accepted rather than hidden, since an attacker holding it can already mint any credential in the deployment. A second CONFIGURED key was rejected: it is a second secret an operator can fail to rotate, and a zero-config first boot would serve unsigned cards. The wire format is the one busbar VERIFIES, not one that looks similar. There is exactly one canonicalizer and one signing-payload definition on this plane and both halves call them — asserted at source level with a floor, and separately at runtime by reconstructing the signing input from the INBOUND function. The fixture carries a float and two supplementary-plane keys on purpose: with flat ASCII under sorted keys, serde_json and RFC 8785 agree, and the runtime assertion passed against a signer that had rolled its own serializer. Publication is out of band, matching the model busbar applies to everyone else: the issuer SPKI is logged once at plane start, in exactly the form busbar's own verifier accepts. ── counts ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 4043 passed / 0 failed, CARGO_TEST_EXIT=0 (baseline 4015). --no-default-features, separate target dir: 3879 / 0 (baseline 3851). scripts/full-gate.sh: 32 gates ran, all pass. Merged from feat/1.5.5-mcp-integrated, with one line rephrased that pointed a public reader at a document they cannot open. Co-authored-by: matthew <dev@getbusbar.com>
… metadata
THE DEFECT. `mcp/client/ssrf.rs` imported three atoms from `net_guard` and
then rebuilt the composite predicate itself. The two drifted:
* it unwrapped IPv6 with `to_ipv4_mapped()` where the shared predicate uses
`to_ipv4()`. The IPv4-COMPATIBLE spelling of the AWS metadata endpoint,
`[::169.254.169.254]`, therefore matched no v6 range, unwrapped to
nothing, and was connected to. Unconditionally — the metadata arm is meant
to refuse before `allow_private` is ever consulted.
* it missed Azure WireServer and OCI IMDS entirely, because those sit on
ordinary-looking addresses no range predicate catches, while its own
comment claimed to cover them.
`net_guard.rs` predicted this in writing, before it happened, and named this
exact literal: "a contributor hardening one guard against a new range would
silently miss the others." Importing atoms and re-deriving the composite is
the same defect as copying the composite.
THE FIX. Both predicates now live in `net_guard` and MCP calls them.
`ip_is_cloud_metadata` is separate from `ip_is_internal` because the two have
different POLICIES, not different data: an internal address may be reached
under `allow_private`, a metadata endpoint may never be. Folding them together
would make `allow_private` a switch that hands out cloud credentials.
AND UNIFYING FOUND A SECOND BUG, pointing the other way. Deleting the copy
broke `every_internal_range_is_refused` on `224.0.0.1`: the MCP copy checked
multicast and the SHARED predicate did not. So the A2A card fetch — which
already used the shared one — has been letting multicast through. Multicast
and documentation ranges are now in `net_guard`, which fixes both planes.
Red before green: the four new tests fail on the old code with the metadata
address reaching the caller. 3781 tests pass after.
I ran tests and clippy on that change and not `cargo fmt --check`, which is the same 'green from a subset the checker chose' defect `full-gate.sh` exists to prevent — committed by the person who wrote that script. It was not a local problem. The four store-plugin repos build against busbar at branch `dev`, and their CI runs `cargo fmt --all` across the path dependency, so an unformatted commit here turned two of their PRs red for a reason that had nothing to do with their code.
… caller verbatim
busbar's ask recogniser tested a wire shape that no MCP server emits, so every
conformant upstream's `InputRequiredResult` was reported as an ordinary result and
handed to busbar's own caller unchanged — `resultType: "input_required"`,
`inputRequests` and `requestState` intact. A registered tool server could therefore
ask busbar's caller for its password and busbar would deliver the demand under its
own name, with its own authentication on it. That is precisely the confused-deputy
laundering `mcp/mod.rs`, `mcp/inputreq.rs` and `method.rs` all say busbar refuses to
do.
THE CHAIN, each link verified against the code:
1. A conformant upstream returns
`{"result":{"resultType":"input_required","inputRequests":{…},"requestState":"…"}}`.
2. `client/jsonrpc.rs`'s `input_required_kind` tested `result.type == "input_required"`
and read `result.request` as a STRING. MRTR has neither field: the discriminator is
`resultType` and the asks are a map at `inputRequests`. The predicate returned `None`.
3. The ask was therefore an ordinary result: `RpcOutcome::Result` -> `Round::Done` ->
`Outcome::Completed`.
4. `method.rs`'s `result()` used `or_insert` on `resultType`, deliberately, so as not to
overwrite an upstream's statement about its own result.
5. The upstream's ask reached the caller verbatim.
The type-level guarantee was real and was never reached. `Outcome` has no arm that can
carry an `Ask` — but whether a value arrives as an ask is decided earlier, by the
predicate, and a rule enforced by a missing enum variant still needs the predicate that
routes to it to be correct.
Nobody caught it because both fixtures that exercised the predicate minted busbar's own
invented shape: the parser and the fixture agreed with each other, and with no server in
existence. Both are replaced with the conformant shape here, which is what turns the
pre-existing B.10 gate test from a green into a red: against a real ask it was answering
200, not 403.
WHAT CHANGES
- `input_required_kind` reads the SPECIFICATION's shape: `resultType` as discriminator,
`inputRequests` as a map of request objects each naming a `method`. An ask carrying only
`requestState` is still an ask (`mrtr.mdx:245` makes each field individually optional).
An ask naming an unrecognised method is still an ask. A map naming several methods is
judged against the MOST PRIVILEGED one, so an upstream cannot smuggle a sampling request
— a real LLM call on busbar's pools and budget — behind a `roots/list` it knows is
granted. The legacy shape stays recognised: no conformant server emits it, so that line
can only ever catch a non-conformant upstream, and refusing that upstream is still right.
- `result()` stamps `resultType` unconditionally instead of deferring to the upstream. The
old reasoning was inverted, and enumerating the cases is what shows it: where `or_insert`
differs from `insert` at all, the upstream said either `input_required` — the one value
busbar must never pass on — or something busbar cannot describe and did not vouch for.
The value leaving that function is not the upstream's statement being relayed; it is
busbar's own result, which busbar chose to dispatch, normalised, and signs for.
- A TERMINAL CHECK in `tools_call`'s completed arm, as a second and independent mechanism,
because the first is a predicate and this predicate drifted for its whole life without a
test noticing. It reads the ask's FIELDS rather than its discriminator, at the last point
before the value becomes bytes, and refuses with its own audit word (`ask_not_proxied`).
Refuses rather than scrubs: stripping `resultType` alone would deliver the password
prompt relabelled, and stripping `inputRequests` alone would hand the caller a truncated
result it had no way to know was truncated.
EVIDENCE
Both mechanisms were watched to fail first. The end-to-end test asserts on the bytes the
caller receives, against an upstream mounting the real attack, and before the fix printed:
the upstream's ask reached busbar's CALLER: `input_required` is in the response body.
FULL BODY: {"id":1,"jsonrpc":"2.0","result":{"inputRequests":{"creds":{"method":
"elicitation/create","params":{"message":"Please enter your account password to
continue.",…}}},"requestState":"upstream-opaque-state-blob","resultType":"input_required"}}
and the pre-existing gate test answered 200 where it asserts 403. The terminal check was
disproved separately against an ask smuggled onto a result labelled `complete` — the shape
the discriminator-based recogniser cannot see by construction.
No new crates; `Cargo.lock` unchanged.
…k still terminates
SEP-2322's ten `input-required-result-*` scenarios go green without busbar forwarding
anything. 20/37 -> 30/37 on the pinned suite; all fourteen members of the family now
pass, and the seven that remain are the ones the family never touched.
WHY THIS IS NOT THE THING B.10 FORBIDS
The scenarios were read as a demand that busbar relay an upstream's ask. They are not.
Each opens a socket to ONE server and asserts on that server's own replies; every
description is headed "Server Implementation Requirements: Implement a tool named
test_input_required_result_*". The suite has no concept of an upstream. And the spec's
send side is all `MAY` — no sentence in mrtr.mdx obliges any server to emit an
`InputRequiredResult` — while the document says nothing about intermediaries at all.
So busbar emits an ask that is ENTIRELY ITS OWN: operator-authored in `ask_caller:`
config, filtered by the caller's declared capabilities, sealed with a `requestState`
busbar mints. An upstream's ask still terminates exactly as before. Both hold, because
the two are different objects that cannot be converted into one another.
RELAYING IS NOT THE HARDER OPTION, IT IS UNIMPLEMENTABLE
mrtr.mdx:232 makes it a MUST to reject state that fails verification; mrtr.mdx:130 makes
an upstream's state opaque to everyone but that upstream. A relayer could only forward it
blind. Worse, mrtr.mdx:235 requires the state to bind the AUTHENTICATED PRINCIPAL — and
the only principal an upstream can see is busbar, identically for every one of busbar's
callers, so relayed state would make caller A's state redeemable by caller B. Minting
closes that by construction.
WHAT LANDS
- `askstate.rs`: HMAC-SHA256 seal over principal, method, capability, argument digest,
catalogue generation, round index, nonce and TTL, under a domain-separated key derived
from `auth.signing_key` (fleet-shared, so one exchange can span nodes). Constant-time
verify; strict base64url, because `-` is a base64url character and a lenient decoder
would accept the suite's `+ "-TAMPERED"` and pass `tampered-state` with the property
absent. No signing key ⇒ no sealer ⇒ NO ASK; the fail-closed arm is a refusal, never an
unprotected `requestState`.
- `callerask.rs`: the pure decision — config, caller input, a clock. Deny-by-default by
ABSENCE of `ask_caller`. Filters by declared capabilities (mrtr.mdx:246), and when the
filter empties a round it REFUSES rather than proceeding: proceeding would let any
caller strip an operator's confirmation gate by declaring no capabilities, i.e. make the
gate opt-out by the party it gates.
- THE BOUND LIVES INSIDE THE SEAL. The caller-facing loop is spread across independent
requests with no session, so a counter held between them would be a session by another
name. The round index rides in the integrity-protected payload, where the caller can
neither read it nor rewind it; without that the cap is unenforceable, because a caller
replays round-1 state for ever.
- METERED AT THE ASK. `charge_round` runs inside `inputreq::drive`, i.e. per UPSTREAM
round — and an ask returns before the upstream leg is entered, so a caller-facing
exchange would have been charged exactly zero. It is charged explicitly at the `Ask`
arm on both paths.
- THE GRANT IS RE-CHECKED ON EVERY RETRY, free and total: each retry is a fresh inbound
request, so admission, scopes, live generation and live sightings all run again in full.
That is stronger than the upstream loop's per-round closure, which stays inside one
dispatch.
- `result()` and `input_required_result()` are two constructors rather than one with a
branch, so the `resultType` a caller sees is always one busbar chose, and which was
chosen is visible at the call site.
- ingress binds the capabilities VALUE, not just its presence. It was checked and
discarded; a server that refuses the field's absence and ignores its contents is
insisting the client answer a question it never reads.
WHAT KEEPS B.10 TRUE STRUCTURALLY
`inputreq::Outcome` is untouched — still no arm that can carry an `Ask`. There is no
`From<Ask> for CallerAsk` and none constructible: `CallerAsk`'s only constructor takes an
`AskEntryCfg`. And `callerask.rs` is SCANNED at test time for so much as the name of
`inputreq`, `upstream`, `ServerAsk` or `RpcOutcome`, with a companion test that plants the
line somebody would actually write and proves the scan catches it. The failure that scan
guards is real: the moment anyone adds `{{upstream.…}}` substitution into `params` "for
convenience", this design becomes laundering with extra steps and would look like a
feature while it did it. The caller's `inputResponses` are consumed by busbar and never
forwarded upstream.
RED BEFORE GREEN
The empty-filter trap was disproved by planting `Proceed` at the filter: two independent
tests caught it, printing "declaring `{}` must REFUSE, not proceed — proceeding would let
any caller strip the operator's gate by declaring nothing. Got Proceed". The sealed round
index was disproved by reading the round as 0 instead of from the seal: three tests
failed, including the cap-cannot-be-reset-by-replay one.
CONFORMANCE
All fourteen `input-required-result-*` scenarios pass, each with `wire-schema-valid:
SUCCESS`. `validate-input` and `missing-input-response` are now genuine passes rather than
vacuous ones. `ignore-extra-params` drops SUCCESS -> WARNING and is recorded here rather
than left for nobody: it sends valid `inputResponses` with NO `requestState` and expects a
complete result, and busbar re-asks instead, because accepting responses without the seal
would let any caller skip the ask entirely. It is WARNING-eligible and cannot fail a
scenario. No `qa/mcp-conformance-baseline.yml`; set equality stays set equality.
No new crates; `Cargo.lock` unchanged.
… rule `round 1` matches the `internal-issue-id` rule, which exists to catch `R27 #8` — an audit artifact a customer cannot open. The prose here means an ordinal in a protocol exchange, not an audit round, so the fix is to say which: "the first round". Caught only after the commit that added these files, because the lint reads `git ls-files` and an untracked file is not yet public.
Bumps [smallvec](https://github.com/servo/rust-smallvec) from 1.15.1 to 1.15.2. - [Release notes](https://github.com/servo/rust-smallvec/releases) - [Commits](servo/rust-smallvec@v1.15.1...v1.15.2) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: smallvec dependency-version: 1.15.2 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
added 28 commits
August 13, 2026 10:36
The header promised the module-level `allow(dead_code)` "comes off in the same commit that wires the first caller, and its removal is that commit's proof". The callers landed -- `proxy/hooks.rs` reads requests through the trait, `hooks/gate.rs` takes it as the only thing a gate is shown, and `ir/invoke.rs` is a second family implementing it -- and the allowance stayed. So did a doc link to `crate::ir::toolcall`, a module that was renamed to `ir::invoke` and no longer exists. Taking the allowance off is the proof, one unit late, and it found exactly the thing a module-wide blindfold is for: `IrFacts::verb` has no caller. It stays, because it is the seam's declared surface and a family-blind consumer has no other way to ask which operation it holds, but it now carries ONE NAMED allowance instead of the module carrying a blanket one. The next unreachable item here is a warning rather than a silence. clippy -D warnings clean on the crate.
… list DERIVED `a2a/config.rs` and `mcp/config.rs` each carried a `refuse_cross_plane_reference` and a `validate_section_hooks`. The two were byte-identical down to the sentence an operator reads, and both contained the same HARDCODED section list — ["pools", "tools", "agents", "export", "identity-providers"] — in two protocol-local files no compiler links. Nothing made them agree. They agreed because one was pasted from the other. The list is the part that rots. It is a fact about the top-level config grammar, and the grammar is already declared in two tables: `Plane::ALL` names the plane sections, `NamedMapSection::ALL` names the 1.5.3 named-definition maps. A section added to either used to leave both literals behind — and a section missing from the literal is not a loud failure, it is `agents.planner` accepted as a bare hook name, resolving to nothing, and an operator believing a control is attached that is not. So `plane/config.rs` now owns the rule once and takes the sections as a DERIVED PARAMETER rather than writing them. `config_sections()` is the union of the two declaring tables, de-duplicated. Proven: adding a fourth `Plane` variant made BOTH planes' validators refuse `bays.sanitizer` — naming the `bays:` plane, in identical words — with every required edit inside `plane/mod.rs` and NOT ONE in either protocol's config module. WHAT CORE OWNS: the trim, the empty-name refusal, the section-prefix scan, the bare-name requirement, and every sentence. WHAT A CALLER OWNS: its own WORDING for WHERE — "`agents.planner`", "`tools.hooks`". A caller keeps its refusal vocabulary, not its decision, exactly as `net_guard` states it. The sentences travel through a TOTAL `From<Refusal<'_>> for String`; totality is deliberate, so a refusal added later must be given a sentence rather than being folded silently into a nearby arm. Operator messages are byte-identical to the deleted copies. THIS IS NOT `PlaneSections::resolve`'s `RefError::CrossPlane`, and the two are deliberately NOT merged. This one runs at PARSE time, on a STRING, and refuses a SHAPE that names a plane whether or not anything by that name exists. That one runs at RESOLVE time, on a name that EXISTS, and refuses a BARE name whose BINDING crosses the boundary. Neither subsumes the other; collapsing them would delete a check rather than deduplicate one. Both were blinded in turn and both went red on tests of their own. `plane/tests/config_tests.rs` carries the proofs, including the analogue of audit's `a_fourth_stream_costs_a_record_type_and_nothing_else`: a plane busbar does not have, validated and refused correctly, with no config module, no validator and no refusal type written for it. PLANE_LEDGER loses `validate_section_hooks` and `refuse_cross_plane_reference` (a STALE-LEDGER row is a hard error, so deleting them is part of this change). `config.rs` stays: the per-plane config MODULE is still duplicated and its value rules are genuinely plane-specific, so the `plane-config` concern does not empty — but it now has a shared home, and PLANE_CONCERNS points at it instead of saying there is none. Two DECLARATION_CENSUS rows of count 1 replace what the ledger rows were watching.
Owner's ruling: "i think mcp and a2a should 100% support failover and
reroute — no reason not too", with the steer that it be opt-in.
Cause-attributed disposition and reroute-before-first-byte were LLM-plane
only, and the tree already recorded why: two servers can expose an
equivalent tool and two agents can handle the same task shape, and busbar
could not be told they are interchangeable. That is a missing CONFIG
VOCABULARY and a missing SELECTION KEY, not a missing mechanism.
So no second breaker, no second walk, no second retry policy. `crate::
failover` is a seam over the ONE `LaneRuntime::try_admit_breaker` the model
plane uses, keyed by the same (pool, lane) cell. Core owns the candidate
set, the walk order, the interchangeability check, the safety rule, the
admission and the refusal; a plane supplies a `Candidate` — a name, a lane,
and the pin that already exists.
INTERCHANGEABILITY IS CHECKED, NOT CLAIMED. The case built for is the same
server deployed twice: one image, two regions. Same image means the same
schemas, hence the same fingerprint, so busbar VERIFIES the operator's claim
against digests it already computes. Two different vendors' tools have
different pins and are refused, naming both. Nothing approved yet never
matches — two unknowns are not one fact.
A REROUTE IS NOT A RETRY. Before the first byte, nothing was sent, so moving
to an equivalent deployment duplicates nothing: allowed by default. After a
dispatch, moving is a genuine repeat of work an upstream may have done:
REFUSED, unless the operation itself is named in `repeatable:`. send_email
is not retried. There is no `repeatable: all` and no switch that turns the
rule off.
Config: `tool_pools:` and `agent_pools:`, one core type over two registries,
mirroring `pools:` so the concept is learned once. Absent ⇒ today's
behaviour exactly. A pool may not straddle two planes; boot refuses a
dangling member and names the section the entry really lives in.
Refusal words live in `crate::audit::vocab` with the rest, and carry three
new DECLARATION_CENSUS rows.
Proofs in `failover/tests/failover_tests.rs`, 15 tests:
* a dead upstream fails fast and is named on BOTH planes;
* the seam and the model plane's own admission read the SAME cell —
shown by driving `try_admit_breaker` directly beside it;
* your search server in two regions, one dies, the agent never learns;
* a non-repeatable call is not retried by default (blinded, verified red:
"send_email must not be sent twice: Admitted { candidate: mailer-us }");
* a THIRD plane costs a candidate type and nothing else — one struct, one
three-method impl, no breaker, no walk, no error type.
The model plane is untouched: this change is 100% additive, touches no file
under proxy/, mcp/ or a2a/, and `try_admit_breaker` is unmodified.
NOT MOUNTED on a dispatch path yet, deliberately and stated in the module
header: the call sites (mcp/client/dispatch.rs, a2a/relay.rs) are under
concurrent edit this cycle. docs/circuit-breaker.md's "there is no failover"
section is rewritten and says so plainly.
…mes a declaration
THE PROTOCOL AXIS WAS THE LAST ONE STILL HARDCODED. Store (4 backends), auth
(3 + built-in), hooks (2) and export (9) are already plugins; adding a protocol
meant editing `match name { "anthropic" => …, "openai" => … }` in core. This
replaces that with `ProtocolDecl` — one declaration per protocol, stated in the
protocol's own module — and a registry core LOOKS UP rather than matches on.
The population of the registry is DATA (`static BUILTIN_DECLS: &[&ProtocolDecl]`)
and `Registry::new` takes an iterator of declarations, so a protocol that is not
built in joins through the same constructor. This is deliberate: per
`design/protocol-plugin-abi.md` §8.1, a registry whose population is a `#[cfg]`
match arm in core has not removed the match, it has moved it.
FOUR MATCHES ON A PROTOCOL NAME ARE GONE:
* `proto::protocol_for` → `decl_for(name).and_then(|d| d.codec)`
* `handlers::request_handler` → `decl_for(name).and_then(|d| d.handler)`
* `ProtocolRegistry::with_builtins` → a fold over the declarations
* `proto::native_tool_id_prefix` → a declared field
THREE `OnceLock` SWEEPS ARE ABSORBED into declaration fields, folded into ONE
boot-time aggregate on the registry: `proto::streaming_content_types()`,
`proto::array_stream_shim_keys()` and `proxy::lazy_body::captured_head_keys()`.
Each had built a `Protocol` per known name — two `Box` allocations apiece — to
read one `&'static` constant off a writer vtable.
FIVE OF THE SEVEN PROTOCOL-IDENTITY COMPARISONS IN CORE ARE GONE, plus a sixth
the standing claim had missed. `proxy/lazy_body.rs`, `proxy/wire.rs` ×3,
`proxy/engine/mod.rs` and `proto/stream.rs`'s Anthropic ping become writer-vtable
facts or declared fields: `fills_thought_signature`, `reshapes_body_at_path_base`
/ `reshape_for_path_base`, `frame_after_message_start`, and
`ProtocolDecl::stream_usage_requires_opt_in`. `proxy/` now holds no comparison
against a protocol name at all. Two survive, both in `ingress/dispatch.rs`
(`:347`, `:362`): they select bespoke path-model axum ingress futures, which is
the mount table and the ingress seam's to unify — removing them needs an ingress
fn-pointer on the declaration, and that file is being restructured concurrently.
THE HOT PATH IS FASTER BY CONSTRUCTION. `decl_for` allocates nothing where the
match it replaced allocated a `Box<dyn ProtocolReader>` + `Box<dyn ProtocolWriter>`
on every call, including every call that only wanted a constant. A new
`REQUEST_PATH` row (`A8-protocol-decl-for`) scans the function and fails on an
allocation appearing in it; two `DECLARATION_CENSUS` rows pin that there is
exactly ONE by-name resolution and exactly ONE built-in table.
`KNOWN_PROTOCOLS` is DERIVED from the declarations rather than maintained beside
them (it was a const plus a `debug_assert` comparing it to the constructor match
it had to agree with). Two consumers make that sharper than it looks, and both
are addressed rather than assumed:
* `telemetry` indexes per-protocol metric families BY POSITION. Sound because
the slice is folded once, from a `&'static` table, inside a `OnceLock`, with
no path that appends afterwards — so the list a family was banked against and
the list an index is computed from are the same list. A miss falls through to
the cached-handle path, which renders a byte-identical series. Now stated in
the doc instead of assumed, and a golden test pins the list AND its order
byte-for-byte against the const it replaced.
* `config_validate` validates operator config against it and had NO fallback:
the list was a const that could not be empty, and a derived one can be. An
empty list would have refused every provider with an empty "must be one of:"
tail — a refusal, so not fail-open, but one that names no cause. It now has
its own arm that refuses ONCE and says why, and
`the_derived_protocol_list_is_not_empty` pins the other half.
`ProtocolDecl::verbs` carries operator-facing verb NAMES as DATA, which composed
with the `Operation` 13 → 6 + `Verb { op, name }` change with zero production
edits on rebase — only this unit's own test list, which is now `Operation::ALL`.
`handlers::op_for` refuses a verb a declaration does not name, and a test pins
declaration and handler equal in both directions.
ACCEPTANCE TEST: `a_protocol_nobody_wrote_costs_a_declaration_and_nothing_else`
registers `telex` — line-oriented wire, no codec, its own head key, SigV4, one
verb none of the six serve — and proves it resolves, dispatches through its own
cell, and lands in the aggregates core reads, with no edit to core. It is the
protocol-axis analogue of `audit`'s `a_fourth_stream_costs_a_record_type`.
NOT NET-NEGATIVE, and the reason is measured rather than excused: production
code is +145 lines (+355 with prose). The design predicted net-negative on the
premise that the sweeps were expensive; they are 44 lines total, while stating
seven protocols × eleven fields explicitly is 127 lines of data before any
registry. What the step buys is not fewer lines — it is that a protocol's facts
are stated where the protocol is, instead of discovered by core.
An audit of the translation path at 1.6.0 (code read plus an executed read/write round trip per protocol) found the word doing more work than the engine earns on a cross-protocol hop. The claim is narrowed to what is checkable, and the half that was UNDERSTATED is corrected upward. - protocols.md states the full claim up front (same-protocol byte-for-byte, cross-protocol every modelled field in the target's native shape) and adds Known gaps in 1.6.0: non-image attachments, citations out of an OpenAI or Cohere backend, streaming citation deltas, usage sub-buckets, response-side safety and guardrail metadata, tools[].strict, messages[].name, Cohere tool_plan. The provenance stamp on the measured tables no longer implies a measurement that has not been re-run since 1.2.0. - ADR-0005 and internals.md said extra can survive a cross-protocol hop. It cannot, ever: ir/variant.rs clears it unconditionally before any writer runs, and IrResponse has no extra at all. - internals.md said same-protocol routes 'use the IR path'. They do not enter the IR at all, which is a stronger guarantee than the sentence it replaces. - providers.md, getting-started.md, configuration.md, pools.md, why-busbar.md, roadmap.md and README.md drop the unqualified 'losslessly' for the specific claim, and link the definition where a reader needs it.
Same correction as the docs commit before it: 'implements six wire protocols losslessly' becomes 'natively on both sides'. This file is copied to the site as public/providers.yaml, so the comment is customer-facing.
Four pages documented `tools.<server>.breaker:` and `agents.<agent>.breaker:`. Neither key exists: `breaker:` is accepted under `pools:` and nowhere else (config-schema.snapshot.json has one `breaker` field, on `RawPoolCfg`), and because `tools:` and `agents:` reject unknown keys, an operator following those pages wrote a config that does not boot. The same pages presented the MCP and A2A breaker as live. It is not: after `feat/1.6.0-failover-all-planes`, `try_admit_breaker` has two callers, `proxy/engine/walk.rs` (LLM, live) and `crate::failover::walk` (the seam), and the seam is deliberately not mounted on `mcp/client/dispatch.rs` or `a2a/relay.rs` yet. So: - the MCP `503` + `-320xx` refusal and the A2A `rejected` task state are marked NOT EMITTED YET and written in the future tense, with the reasoning kept because the reasoning is the part a future implementer must not relitigate; - architecture.md's 'there is no failover on MCP or A2A, and its absence is the statement' is replaced by what the failover unit actually landed: `tool_pools:` / `agent_pools:`, interchangeability CHECKED against the pins busbar already computes, and reroute-is-not-retry with `repeatable:`; - circuit-breaker.md and operations.md say plainly that these planes run on the built-in breaker defaults, because `CandidatePoolCfg` takes `members:` and `repeatable:` only.
…d not have busbar is an A2A CLIENT as well as a server, and A2A defines THREE bindings of one agent. Every outbound hop went out as a JSON-RPC envelope, so a registered agent publishing the HTTP+JSON or gRPC binding was unreachable through busbar by any sequence of operator actions. The gap was invisible because nothing on the delegating side ever asked what the backend spoke. ONE DISPATCH, NOT THREE CLIENTS. `relay` and `relay_stream` still guard, pin, re-ask the live trust question, lease, correlate and substitute identity exactly once; the only thing that varies across the legs is the `OutboundFraming` the hop is handed. A2A section 11.3 makes the REST request body the JSON-RPC `params` VERBATIM and the success body the `result` VERBATIM, and A2A v1.0 makes a gRPC message's ProtoJSON that same document — so all three are RE-FRAMING, and every answer is wrapped back into one envelope so `read_reply` and `read_event` stay one reader each. The correlation, the `jsonrpc` member check and the `error` arm are therefore the same three rules on every leg rather than three copies of them. THE BINDING IS SELECTED BY LOOKUP, NEVER BY A BRANCH. `binding_of` reads the word off the registration's own cached, verified, pinned card and `framing_for` maps it to a framing. There is no `if transport ==` on this path; structure-lint's axis-purity invariant is not exempted and does not need to be. THE CARD SAYS *HOW*. THE OPERATOR SAYS *WHERE*. A card declares an interface's URL as well as its binding, and following that URL would let an upstream re-point busbar's outbound hop at a host nobody wrote down — guarded, so not a hole, but an upstream choosing busbar's peer, which is the rug-pull the pinning apparatus exists to refuse one member up. The base is always the operator's `url:`; the binding decides only what is appended to it. A CARD DECLARING A BINDING BUSBAR CANNOT SPEAK IS A NAMED REFUSAL, NOT A FALLBACK. The fail-open here would be silent and would look like it worked: send an envelope to a peer that has just said in its own card that it does not read one, then report its `400` as its fault. `framing_for` answers `None`, the hop never happens, and the refusal names the word an operator has to act on. WHAT THE SEAM HAD TO GROW, and why. `RelayTransport::post` became `send` with the request line's verb as an argument: A2A's HTTP+JSON binding reads with `GET` and withdraws with `DELETE`, and a seam that could only `POST` would make busbar a client that spells every operation as a submission. `prost` is named directly for the first time — already in the lock and already in the shipped artifact via a2a-pb, tonic and opentelemetry-otlp — because busbar's outbound hop is its own resolve-then-pin transport rather than a tonic `Channel`, precisely so the address the SSRF guard judged is the address that connects, which means the length-prefixed frame is composed here. EIGHTEEN COVERAGE CELLS, EACH PROVEN BY A REQUEST ON THE WIRE. `a2a/tests/client_leg_tests.rs` drives the REAL router — same admission, same egress gate, same guard, same audit chain, same task store — and reads what busbar asked to have sent off the recording seam. Every one of those tests PANICS when no outbound hop was recorded, because a verb this plane answers LOCALLY makes no hop at all: "the call returned 200" proves nothing whatsoever about the client leg and must never be allowed to read as a pass. The adversarial no-leak scan is re-run against all three legs — a defence that holds on the leg it was written for and not on the legs that came later is a defence with two thirds of a hole in it. WHAT IS STILL MISSING, and it is left MISSING rather than waived. `ListTasks`, the four push-config CRUD verbs and `GetExtendedAgentCard` are answered by busbar ITSELF on all three bindings (`a2a/local.rs`, `a2a/ingress.rs`), so busbar issues none of them and there is no request to claim a client cell with. That is a documented design decision with a security argument behind it, not an oversight, and reversing it to make a number go green is exactly what the coverage gate's own header forbids. Their eighteen cells stay in qa/method-coverage.missing.
… that answered nothing
busbar-as-SERVER reaches ZERO MISSING. The work queue goes 108 -> 94, and every
line left is `client` direction.
WHY FOURTEEN CELLS SAT IN A QUEUE WHILE THEIR CODE WAS MOUNTED. The HTTP+JSON and
gRPC server rows already in `qa/method-coverage.status` were claimed on the official
TCK's stdout: a real instrument, the right one, the publisher's own — and one that
lives outside this repository, fetches a pinned suite over the network, needs a Go
control and a booted subject. `cargo test` cannot run any of it, so nothing in this
tree re-established those claims on a later commit. The ELEVEN JSON-RPC cells had no
in-tree instrument at all, despite `/a2a` being the door busbar's own agent card
publishes and the one every other binding re-frames onto.
`a2a/tests/served_methods_tests.rs` is that instrument: twelve tests, every one
driving `crate::build_router` — a real router, a real socket, a real audience-bound
busbar token minted by the same signer the verifier runs, the relay's recording seam
standing in for the backend. NONE OF THEM CAN SKIP. There is no environment probe and
no `else { return }` in the file, because a test that can skip is a test that will
skip on the day it matters, and four batteries this release reported green over
unwired code for exactly that reason.
Nothing is claimed on a `200`. A relayed verb is claimed by the HOP the seam saw,
with the right framing, carrying the BACKEND's task id and never busbar's. A locally
answered verb is claimed by the ABSENCE of a hop plus the content of the answer,
because that is the whole of what `a2a/local.rs` asserts. The card cells are claimed
by the interface the served card publishes for that binding — the only thing that
makes a well-known path a per-transport cell. The extended card is claimed by the
tenant boundary: two agents fronted, a grant on one, and a card naming the other is a
data-exposure defect rather than a conformance one.
AND ONE OF THE FOURTEEN WAS NOT A BOOKKEEPING GAP. gRPC `GetExtendedAgentCard` was
mounted, written, and answered `grpc-status 13 (Internal)` to every caller. busbar's
card declares `capabilities.stateTransitionHistory` — an A2A v0.3 member, one the
specification's own sample card in section 8.5 declares — and `a2a.proto`'s
`AgentCapabilities`, which SPEC 1.4 makes normative, has no such field. The generated
ProtoJSON type is `deny_unknown_fields`, so the member was not dropped: the whole card
failed to render. A mounted path that answers nothing is not an implemented method.
It was invisible to the publisher's own suite BY CONSTRUCTION — `CARD-EXT-002` skips
itself the moment a card is configured and `CORE-CAP-003` only passes for a server
that does NOT have the verb — so a busbar answering this perfectly and one answering
`Internal` produce identical TCK output. The in-tree test is the only thing that can
see it, which is the argument for having one.
THE FIX IS NOT THE ONE `testing/a2a-tck/WAIVERS.md` REFUSES. That decision, dated and
recorded, is that busbar does not reshape the card it PUBLISHES to satisfy a generated
schema the specification's own sample contradicts. The document served over both HTTP
bindings is untouched and still carries every member it did. What changed is one
binding's transcode, where the answer IS a protobuf `AgentCard` and a member the
message has no field for cannot be put on the wire in any shape: the two available
answers were "the card, minus what protobuf cannot represent" and "no card".
`narrowed_to_the_proto` takes the first, from a NAMED list rather than by ignoring
whatever fails to parse, so the next divergence is a line somebody writes down.
MEASURED. Back-to-back TCK subject runs, this build against the base commit:
base commit c417b46 MUST 80 passed, 29 failed, 5 skipped, of 114
this commit MUST 74 passed, 35 failed, 5 skipped, of 114
this commit, re-run MUST 75 passed, 34 failed, 5 skipped, of 114
THE ROW IS NOT READABLE TO ±1 ON THIS MACHINE AND THAT IS SAID RATHER THAN TUNED
AWAY: two runs of the SAME binary disagree about NINE requirements, five of which the
suite did not execute at all (`NOT TESTED`, empty `test_ids` — not a busbar failure),
the rest timing out under concurrent load. The one movement that REPRODUCES across
both runs is the one this commit is about:
CARD-EXT-001 (grpc) FAIL -> PASS, and the `unknown field stateTransitionHistory`
error is gone from the transport
grpc transport 62/72 -> 63/72, in both runs
`CARD-EXT-001` stays FAIL overall because JSON-RPC and HTTP+JSON still fail it on the
`stateTransitionHistory` schema divergence that is recorded and deliberately not
fixed. PUSH-DELIVER-001/002/003 stay red for the reason WAIVERS.md gives; the
push-config cells are claimed on the CAPABILITY — the `authentication` member is
registered, held, presented as `<scheme> <credentials>`, never echoed back on a read,
and forgotten with the config — which that suite cannot observe at all. Conformance
being unobservable is not permission to leave a capability unbuilt, and it is not
permission to claim the three either.
The largest single block of missing coverage in 1.6.0: every method busbar
ISSUES to a child MCP server (21 cells) and every message a child SENDS
busbar (13 cells).
WHAT IS BUILT
client/verb.rs the CLOSED set of issued methods. One enum, one envelope
builder shared with tools/call, so the revision's required
`_meta` and mirrored headers cannot be right on one verb and
wrong on another. verb_tests compares the set against the
GENERATED qa/method-inventory.json in BOTH directions: a verb
this leg forgets is a red test, and a verb it invents is a red
test too.
client/issue.rs the ONE governed send. Egress gate before any I/O, RFC
8693/8707 credential, the supervision breaker, JSON-RPC
correlation, and a per-call hash-chain record at every
terminal. There is no second send site, because a verb with
its own send site is a verb whose author decides whether the
gate runs.
client/peer.rs what a child sends busbar: nine notifications, four requests,
and the deny-by-default gate on the three that would spend
busbar's own authority.
client/stdio.rs the read loop that makes the handle half reachable at all.
THE DEFECT THIS FIXES
StdioChild::call wrote one line and read ONE line, and treated it as the
answer. A child's stdout carries everything the child says, so one entirely
conformant notifications/message emitted before the answer was adopted AS the
answer — and every later call on that child was then served the previous
call's response. One well-behaved child desynchronised the stream permanently
and silently. Every line is now classified; a request a peer is blocked on is
ANSWERED, because a dropped request is a hang and a hang is a worse diagnosis
than a refusal.
THE ASYMMETRY WITH THE HTTP LEG IS DELIBERATE
initialize, notifications/initialized, ping, logging/setLevel,
resources/subscribe and resources/unsubscribe stay WAIVED on streamable-http
and are IMPLEMENTED here. Over HTTP busbar's peer speaks the revision busbar's
own front door serves, and SEP-2575 deleted those methods. Over stdio busbar's
peer is whatever binary the OPERATOR named in `command:` — an installed SDK
server, overwhelmingly speaking a revision in which initialize is a MUST. A leg
that could not handshake could not talk to the stdio ecosystem at all.
SECURITY
Every verb goes through crate::egress_auth::gate (a second SUBJECT for the one
gate, not a second gate: a server-scoped verb names no tool, so requiring an
mcp_tool grant would mean inventing a grant value no operator can write), the
one crate::audit chain via mcp::calllog, and the same breaker, backoff and
quarantine a tools/call already faces. A peer's list_changed can bring a
re-pull FORWARD through the rate-limited RefreshGate and can choose nothing
else — the pending set holds server NAMES, so there is nowhere in it to put a
tool definition. No spawn-safety decision is relaxed.
NO NEW WAIVERS. The waiver list is unchanged.
Gates: full-gate 40/41 (the one failure is the telemetry RSS-recovery test,
which passes in isolation on both feature sets — an allocator flake under
concurrent builds, unrelated). structure-lint clean with an untouched
exemption ledger. cargo test --workspace: 4320 passed.
# Conflicts: # qa/method-coverage.missing
…he floor
The 1.6.0 IR-losslessness audit found six defects. Its most important observation
was not any of them -- it was WHY they went unnoticed: the exposure lived in
fields that are never read and never emitted. A mutation pass renamed eight
writer-emitted keys and all eight were caught by name, while audio attachments,
usage sub-buckets and citation offsets were being dropped in silence, because you
cannot mutate a field that does not exist.
THE SIX
1. `IrBlock::Media{kind, source, name, cache_control}` + `IrMediaKind`. OpenAI
`input_audio`/`file`, Anthropic `document`, Bedrock `document`/`video`,
Responses `input_file` and Gemini non-image `inlineData`/`fileData` all became
`{"type":"text","text":""}` on a cross-protocol hop with no warn -- the user's
audio never reached the model and nothing said why, even though Gemini and
Bedrock have native slots for it. Every reader fills the variant; every writer
projects it into its dialect's slot, or drops it with a warn NAMING the
construct where the target has none. Never an empty text block again.
NOT widened to hook/sidecar visibility: `Media` contributes no item to
`ir::facts`, the same disclosure decision that file records for image
provenance. Changing it is its own diff.
2. `ir/variant.rs`'s wholesale `extra.clear()` now warns with the exact key set
being dropped. Two of ~40 keys used to name themselves; the rest are mostly
correctly untranslatable, and the SILENCE was the defect.
3. A live 400: the Gemini reader mapped every `inlineData` onto an Image
regardless of mime, and the Anthropic writer emitted `media_type` unvalidated,
so `{"type":"image","source":{"media_type":"audio/mp3"}}` reached a backend
that accepts only image/{jpeg,png,gif,webp}. The reader now routes on the mime
prefix and the writer validates -- Bedrock's existing pattern, not a new one.
4. Citations. The Cohere reader hardcoded `citations: Vec::new()` at seven sites
while the Cohere writer emitted them, so grounding OUT of Cohere vanished.
Streamed citations were suppressed on the OpenAI and Cohere writers, so the
same request against the same backend returned sources at stream:false and
none at stream:true. Both now emit their native frame.
5. `IrUsageDetail`: reasoning_tokens (OpenAI/Responses/Gemini), Anthropic's
differently-priced 5m/1h cache-creation tier split, Cohere search_units.
Every field is a SLICE of a total, never an addition -- billing is unchanged;
what changes is that attribution stops being a hard 0.
6. `proto/tests/roundtrip_fidelity_tests.rs`: the read->write property test that
did not exist. `same_proto_fidelity_tests` covers the byte-verbatim
short-circuit, which by construction cannot lose anything. This drives the
readers and writers that can, with an EXACT divergence allow-list that fails
both when a new loss appears and when a listed one disappears.
Plus the two Cohere CORRUPTIONS: `tool_plan` (the model's internal plan, promoted
into visible user-facing text -- content injection, not loss) now travels in the
reasoning carrier and returns to its native slot; a tool-result `document` keeps
its structure instead of being stringified into escaped JSON. And the
`__busbar_anthropic_unmodeled_blocks` sentinel can no longer reach the wire.
THE CLASS
Six is a list of six things somebody happened to notice. `qa/field-inventory.json`
enumerates all 412 request/response fields of the six dialects from vendored
schemas in `qa/field-schemas/` (source URL + retrieval date each), NOT from
busbar's readers -- deriving from the thing under test would report perfect
coverage of exactly the fields the reader already knows about.
`crates/busbar/tests/field_coverage.rs` fails the build for any field that is
neither `carried` -- NAMING a test the gate verifies exists -- nor `waived` with a
dated reason. 97 carried, 8 waived, 307 pinned RED in
`qa/field-coverage.missing`, which is the work queue: a visible red queue is the
honest shape of a partial sweep.
Same-protocol byte-verbatim behaviour is untouched; 100% of this is cross-protocol.
# Conflicts: # crates/busbar/src/a2a/relay.rs # qa/method-coverage.missing # qa/method-coverage.status
… type
`scripts/structure-lint.sh` carried `catalogue.rs|DEBT|catalogue` — "the
catalogue module exists once per plane". It did: `mcp/catalogue.rs`
walked a snapshot ANDing two grants of its own in a private `granted()`,
`a2a/catalogue.rs` walked a registration list and projected its
survivors at the call site. A catalogue answers "what may this caller
SEE", which is a DATA-EXPOSURE surface, so two implementations of it is
not a tidiness problem: they agree right up until they do not, one plane
gains a filter the other never gets, and the divergence fails OPEN.
`crates/busbar/src/catalogue.rs` now owns the WALK, on the shape
`crate::audit` and `crate::trust` already use — core owns the mechanism,
the plane owns the artifact:
* `judge` — collect what the item declares, then the ordered gate,
then fitness. GRANTS BEFORE FITNESS, for the same reason
`trust::validate` puts grant before artifact: fitness reads the
item's own content, and running it on an item the caller may not see
makes the REASON for a refusal depend on something the caller was
never entitled to know exists.
* an item that declares NO grant is INVISIBLE, not public. The one
rule the walk ADDS: `validate_request` documents an empty grant list
as honest for an ask that needs no grant, and an item sitting in an
inventory is never that.
* `entitled` / `visible` / `rendered` — one walk, inventory order
preserved, and rendering strictly after the filter.
THE ENTITLEMENT DECISION IS NOT CORE-CATALOGUE'S EITHER. `identity ->
grant` has an owner as of `trust::validate`, so this unit does not grow
a second grant evaluator beside it — it extracts the validator's first
two steps as `validate_visibility` and `validate_request` CALLS it, so
there is still exactly one identity check and one grant evaluator in the
tree. What each plane states for itself is which question its catalogue
is asking:
* MCP asks `validate_visibility` — identity and grant. Deliberately
not the artifact step: this plane CATALOGUES what it will not
dispatch so an operator can see the approval queue, and `tools/call`
asks the full gate in `Catalogue::resolve`.
* A2A asks `validate_request` — all four steps. On that plane a
listing IS an admission.
That difference is now two `admit` call sites rather than a step a
shared function decided to skip.
WHAT THE PLANES SUPPLY, and it is the whole cost of a new one: the item
type, `required_grants`, `admit`, `fit` + `Excluded`, and `render`.
* MCP: `ToolEntry`, `PromptEntry`, `ResourceEntry` and
`ResourceTemplateEntry` each declare `mcp_server` AND `mcp_tool` via
one `mcp_grants`, off two named constants the dispatch gate also
uses — a caller must never see a tool it would then be refused for.
The four wire renderers move out of `method.rs` onto the entries.
* A2A: `a2a/catalogue.rs` is gone; `AgentRegistration` — the record it
filtered — carries the impl in `a2a/registry.rs`. The egress grant
stops being a second function and becomes one more `Grant` in the
list, so "receiving is delegating minus the egress grant" is a
property of the data. `judge` STAYS as this plane's card-vs-shape
test; the `judge|DISTINCT` ledger row is untouched.
* `Caller` moves from `a2a/catalogue.rs` to core unchanged: pairing a
key with another request's clock or another apply's generation is
not a per-plane hazard.
TWO HOLES CLOSED, and they are the finding rather than the refactor:
1. MCP's four LISTING surfaces took a grant CLOSURE, which could carry
the grant and nothing else — so a key deleted, disabled or expired
between ingress and the listing still saw everything it had been
granted. `tools/call` grew the identity step with the ordered
validator; the listings are the other half and now have it too.
2. MCP had a grant test for TOOLS only. `prompts/list`,
`resources/list` and `resources/templates/list` — three separate
wire verbs each answering "what exists here" — had no entitlement
assertion at all. Cross-tenant isolation is now asserted on all
four surfaces plus the two addressed reads, on both planes, as
disjointness AND non-emptiness together.
RED BEFORE GREEN: sixteen rules were blinded one at a time — the floor,
the hand-over, both orderings, the walk, both MCP grants, MCP's gate
call, all seven A2A rules and the validator's identity step — and every
one produced a named failure.
`src/tests/catalogue_tests.rs` declares an item type for a plane busbar
does not have (three grants, a numeric fitness axis, a fit VALUE, a
borrowed wire form, its own refusal enum) and shows it enumerated,
filtered, identity-checked and rendered with no catalogue module, no
walk, no filter, no ordering rule and no error type written for it.
Ledger: `catalogue.rs` retired from PLANE_LEDGER and the now-empty
`catalogue` concern retired from PLANE_CONCERNS. The ledger only shrinks.
THE THIRD CATALOGUE, RECORDED RATHER THAN FORGOTTEN.
`mcp/client/dispatch.rs::visible_catalogue` walks the OUTBOUND leg's live
upstream snapshot applying the caller's grants, through the egress gate
rather than through `trust::validate`. Same question, third answer. It
is NOT fixed here: the file is held by another unit, and the function
has no production caller today (`dispatch.rs` is `#![allow(dead_code)]`),
so it is a third IMPLEMENTATION and not yet a third live answer.
It CANNOT be a PLANE_LEDGER row. That ledger's whole mechanism is
CROSS-plane duplication — `check_plane_dups` only ever sees a symbol
declared in both `mcp/` and `a2a/` — and `visible_catalogue` exists once,
in `mcp/`, so the row fails as STALE-LEDGER the moment it is written.
Verified by writing it and reading the failure. It is recorded as a
DECLARATION_CENSUS row instead, where the instrument fits: the count is 1
until somebody routes the walk through `crate::catalogue::visible`, at
which point the count becomes 0 and the lint instructs its own deletion —
the same shrink-only discipline a paid-off ledger row has.
Two dangles from the module move, closed: `a2a/creds.rs`'s doc link and
the `judge|DISTINCT` row's prose both named `a2a/catalogue.rs`. The
DISTINCT row keeps its verdict and its reasoning unchanged — argguard's
`judge` (is this argument a URL-ish SSRF hazard) and A2A's (does this card
match this task shape) are still unrelated; only the address moved.
…h number
0.9.1 fixes a revocation race the 0.9.0 README shipped as a known defect
(a token being signed across an await could land behind the revocation
that was meant to stop it), a CR/LF injection into the RFC 9470 step-up
WWW-Authenticate header out of the client's own acr_values, and an
unbounded per-segment allocation on that same parameter. It also renames
the http approval seam: ConsentRequest/ConsentDecision/ConsentResolver and
with_consent_resolver become ApprovalRequest/ApprovalDecision/
ApprovalResolver and with_approval_resolver, because the library now
reserves "consent" for the persisted, withdrawable ConsentRecord and calls
the per-request prompt an approval.
busbar has only the prompt. It never returns ApproveAndRemember, writes no
ConsentRecord, and never calls ConsentRecord::covers, so the fourth
argument that method gained does not reach this tree and the breaking
Storage change is absorbed by MemoryStorage. The migration is therefore a
rename plus the reasoning for it, recorded where the old names were.
Behaviour busbar feels: the AS metadata document no longer advertises
introspection_endpoint, which defaulted to {issuer}/introspect - a path
this plane has never mounted and which answered 404.
The feature list is unchanged; 0.9.1's one feature rename (client_assertion
to client-assertion) is a feature busbar does not enable, and the mention
of it in a comment is corrected. The lockfile moves one version and one
checksum: no dependency enters or leaves.
Proof: cargo build --workspace --all-targets --locked clean; the 20
oauth_as tests green, including the upstream signer conformance harness,
which gained checks in this release and which busbar's ring backend
passes; cargo deny check ok on all four sections; scripts/full-gate.sh
41 gates, all pass, across 11 build configurations.
Lead with a diagram and cut the prose. Four SVG figures, committed light and dark so they read in either GitHub theme, generated by assets/readme/generate.py from assets/readme/data.json, which is the onthebench.ai field bundle (busbar 1.5.1, AWS m7g.4xlarge Graviton3, 4-core pin, measured 2026-08-03). Every printed figure carries its box, its build and its date. Name LiteLLM, Kong and Portkey directly, which a README may do where a product page may not, and back each row with the same-box run rather than folklore: 36 of 36 wire-protocol pairs served against 8, 4 and 8; 7.3 MiB idle against 1,080, 403 and 124; and image sizes read from the registry manifests today (5.74 MB against 360.77 MB). Every command, config and manifest in the file was executed: the quickstart and the pool config against the released 1.5.3 binary, all five SDK snippets against a running busbar, the manifests through kubeconform -strict, and the chart through helm template. Also add org-profile/README.md, the text destined for GetBusbar/.github at profile/README.md, which is not checked out here.
Owner's read of the pushed draft: "Why not LiteLLM, Kong or Portkey should be before run it. needs to be why busbar, why not others, ok im sold now how do i use it", "The numbers HIGHER up the page", and of the competitive paragraphs, "WALL OF TEXT, NO". So the order is now hero, numbers, why-not-them, then two lines, run it, Kubernetes, pools. A reader decides whether to care before being told how to install. The three competitive paragraphs are gone. What they argued is now two tables and three bullets, each of which says something AGAINST us in its own first clause: LiteLLM's provider catalogue is larger and that is a real reason to pick it; LiteLLM Rust's overhead is the same class as ours and the difference is scope; Kong is a general gateway with a plugin, which is why its streaming row reads 106 ms. An argument that concedes nothing reads as a brochure. Install sizes get their own two-column table because that is the first thing a developer feels: 5.74 MB against 360.77 MB, one 12.4 MiB binary against 558 MiB across 107 packages. Provenance moved into <sub> lines rather than sentences, so the stamp is attached without spending a paragraph on it.
…that fits Owner: "Pools, weights and failover feels out of place", "What else is in the box same, k8s and how to run it should be end?", and of the comparison table, "smaller font slightly". Order is now hero, numbers, why-not-them, the two-line swap, then run it, pools, Kubernetes, and what else is in the box. Everything that answers "should I care" precedes everything that answers "how do I use it". The comparison table lost the repeated `µs` on every cell and carries it once in the column heading instead, which is what was forcing the two widest columns to wrap onto a second line. Headings drop a type step via <sub>. The numbers are unchanged.
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Closing: this branch was cut from The README and its assets are going to main on their own branch, cut from main, carrying only the docs and figures. |
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Replaces the org profile and repo READMEs with versions built around measured numbers and a direct competitive argument.
Order of the repo README is deliberately: hero, then The numbers, then Why not LiteLLM, Kong or Portkey, then the two-line swap, then how to run it. Everything answering should I care comes before everything answering how do I use it.
Every figure is generated, not drawn:
assets/readme/generate.pyrenders four SVGs per theme fromassets/readme/data.json, which is extracted from the published onthebench.ai run. Light and dark variants ship for both GitHub themes.Three claims are made against us under the comparison table: LiteLLM's provider catalogue is larger, LiteLLM Rust's overhead is in our class, and Kong is a general gateway rather than an LLM one. The coverage row counts wire protocol pairs, not providers, and says so.
No em dashes (the site gate rejects them, and the READMEs follow the same rule).