-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 7
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Merge 1.15.10 #578
Merge 1.15.10 #578
Conversation
- ft/v1.15/** | ||
|
||
# If the cache was cleaned we should re-build the cache with the latest commit | ||
workflow_run: |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Dangerous GitHub actions trigger (...read more)
Workflows triggered by the pull_request_target
trigger can read secrets and edit code in the repository that the PR is targeting. This is a dangerous trigger that must be used with caution. For security reasons, GitHub runs these workflows using the code from the base branch, rather than the code from the PR.
If you use this trigger you must not checkout the code of the PR, otherwise anyone can simply write malicious code and get it to run in a context that has access to your secrets, in addition to write access to the repository.
This type of attack is sometimes referred to as “pwn request”.
Note that if you use the "workflow_call" trigger, your workflow is callable by other workflows, so possibly by a workflow using the pull_request_target
trigger.
Learn More
- v1.15 | ||
|
||
# If the cache was cleaned we should re-build the cache with the latest commit | ||
workflow_run: |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Dangerous GitHub actions trigger (...read more)
Workflows triggered by the pull_request_target
trigger can read secrets and edit code in the repository that the PR is targeting. This is a dangerous trigger that must be used with caution. For security reasons, GitHub runs these workflows using the code from the base branch, rather than the code from the PR.
If you use this trigger you must not checkout the code of the PR, otherwise anyone can simply write malicious code and get it to run in a context that has access to your secrets, in addition to write access to the repository.
This type of attack is sometimes referred to as “pwn request”.
Note that if you use the "workflow_call" trigger, your workflow is callable by other workflows, so possibly by a workflow using the pull_request_target
trigger.
Learn More
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
👍 LGTM
DD changes:
.gitlab-ci.yml