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Currently it is not possible to verify the authenticity or cryptographic integrity of the downoads from github.com because the releases are not cryptographically signed.
This makes it hard for users to safely obtain the AppImage releases, and it introduces them (and potentially their downstream users' data) to watering hole attacks.
Look for the hash digest file and the signature of the hash digest file
???
Get confused and open ticket
Expected behavior: [What you expected to happen]
A few things are expected:
I should be able to download the appimagetool PGP key out-of-band from popular third-party keyservers (eg https://keys.openpgp.org/)
I should be able to download a cryptographic signature of the release (or, better, the releases' digest file, such as a SHA256SUMS.asc file) along with the release itself
The downloads page itself should include a link to the documentation page that describes how to do the above two steps
Actual behavior: [What actually happened]
There's just literally no information on verifying downloads, and it appears that it is not possible to do so.
appimagetool is anyway built on GitHub actions with their public runners. Signing does not really add a lot of benefit. You already need to trust GitHub along the supply chain. Downloading straight from GitHub releases is good enough.
Activity
maltfield commentedon Jun 15, 2026
For best-practices, see also:
TheAssassin commentedon Oct 19, 2026
appimagetool is anyway built on GitHub actions with their public runners. Signing does not really add a lot of benefit. You already need to trust GitHub along the supply chain. Downloading straight from GitHub releases is good enough.