Please do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report them responsibly:

1. GitHub: Use GitHub Security Advisories

• Description of the vulnerability
• Steps to reproduce
• Impact assessment
• Suggested fix (if any)

• Acknowledgment: Within 48 hours
• Assessment: Within 1 week
• Fix: Within 2 weeks for critical issues

OpenClaw on Android runs standard Linux binaries on Android without proot-distro. The security model is shaped by this unique execution environment.

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Android Kernel (SELinux enforced)            │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Termux sandbox (/data/data/com.termux)  │ │
│ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ │ glibc-runner (ld.so userspace only) │ │ │
│ │ │ Node.js → OpenClaw                  │ │ │
│ │ └─────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘

1. Android app sandbox — Termux runs in its own Linux user namespace; no access to other app data
2. SELinux — Android's mandatory access control applies to all Termux processes
3. No root required — The entire stack runs as a regular unprivileged user
4. No proot — No filesystem translation layer; glibc-runner provides only the dynamic linker
5. Path conversion — Standard Linux paths (/tmp, /bin/sh) are mapped to Termux equivalents at install time, not at runtime via syscall interception

• Unauthorized access to Android system or other app data (enforced by Android sandbox)
• Arbitrary code execution outside Termux (prevented by SELinux + app sandbox)
• Path traversal from Termux into Android system paths (Termux prefix isolation)

• Vulnerabilities in OpenClaw core (report to OpenClaw upstream)
• Vulnerabilities in Termux (report to Termux)
• Vulnerabilities in glibc-runner (report to termux-pacman)
• Device-level security (rooted devices, unlocked bootloaders)