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chore: authorize v0.78.1 release source - #2857
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🦞👀 Pull request received. I will update this pull request when review starts. ClawSweeper review completeClawSweeper finished reviewing this revision. The review result is being finalized. |
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Codex review: needs real behavior proof before merge. What this changesThis PR adds the protected source authorization record for v0.78.1. Example: Produce a candidate for v0.78.1 from de31234.
Review scores
ProductKind: Maintenance · Worth it: Yes · Fix scope: Complete Merge readiness⛔ Blocked before merge - 3 items remain Keep this PR open: main lacks the v0.78.1 authorization record, and its pinned identity matches GitHub’s verified signed tag; no introduced code defect was found. Priority: P3 Before merge
FindingsNone. Tests
Agent review detailsHow this fits togetherRelease tooling consumes protected JSON records and signed tag identities before candidate production and publication. flowchart LR
A[Signed version tag] --> C[Source identity guard]
B[Protected release record] --> C
C --> D[Candidate production]
D --> E[Native verification]
E --> F[Publication checks]
B --> F
F --> G[GitHub release]
Technical reviewBest possible solution: Retain this exact identity record and complete the existing protected release gates with scoped authorization-boundary evidence. Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue? This PR authorizes a release source rather than reporting a runtime bug. Is this the best way to solve the issue? The existing protected-record mechanism is the appropriate implementation, and the added values match the verified tag without changing release tooling. AGENTS.md: found and applied where relevant. Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning medium; reviewed against de312343dba7. Merge-risk optionsMaintainer options:
TestingProof path: in-process harness. SecurityNeeds attention: The identity binding is correct, with no concrete bypass found, but final-effect authorization proof remains incomplete. EvidenceWhat I checked:
Likely related people:
LabelsLabel changes:
Label justifications:
Rank-up movesOptional improvements that raise the rating; they are not merge blockers.
Rating scale6/6 🦀 challenger crab · 5/6 🦞 diamond lobster · 4/6 🐚 platinum hermit · 3/6 🦐 gold shrimp · 2/6 🦪 silver shellfish · 1/6 🧂 unranked krab. Overall follows the weaker of proof and patch quality; ✨ marks media proof (a screenshot, video, or linked artifact) that directly shows the changed behavior. WorkflowClawSweeper edits this one comment on every review. Comment Reviewed October 15, 2026, 10:34 AM ET / 14:34 UTC. |
Authorize the immutable source identity for v0.78.1. The annotated SSH-signed tag is verified by GitHub and binds tag object
3c9f395ce03e738e47b6c5a684ba4b7ff58afa9dto sourcede312343dba72e14dfddee46189a8aaac48f3fbc. Exact-source CI, coordinator health, run/attach/events/logs and confirmed lease cleanup passed.This record permits candidate production; it does not publish a release. The full release is explicitly authorized. No credentials or runtime configuration change.
Validation: exact-source CI https://github.com/openclaw/crabbox/actions/runs/38747275812, connector E2E https://github.com/openclaw/crabbox/actions/runs/38747275730, CodeQL https://github.com/openclaw/crabbox/actions/runs/38747275871, and coordinator deployment https://github.com/openclaw/crabbox/actions/runs/38747275709 passed. Coordinator smoke
run_12d5fd52497442e8c3301b99b635db50verified run, attach, events, logs, and released/complete cleanup.