diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index d683bfb..c877cab 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -4,6 +4,19 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format is based on
 [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and this project
 adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [Unreleased]
+
+### Fixed
+- **A trailing root-label dot on an allow-list ENTRY no longer silently blocks everything.**
+  `isAllowedHost` normalized the incoming hostname (trim, case-fold, strip the trailing dot) but
+  only trimmed and case-folded the configured entries, so
+  `LEXWARE_UPLOAD_ALLOWED_HOSTS=sharepoint.com.` matched nothing and blocked the very host it was
+  meant to allow. Both sides now go through the same normalization, so they cannot drift again. This
+  is the same failure mode as the leading dot fixed in 0.1.12, arriving from the other end of the
+  name; raised by the review bot on [#39] and not carried over at the time. A double trailing dot is
+  deliberately NOT folded — that is an empty DNS label, i.e. a malformed name rather than another
+  spelling of the same one.
+
 ## [0.1.13]
 
 Robustness fixes surfaced by a full security audit and code-review pass of the server. No
diff --git a/src/uploads/fetch-url.ts b/src/uploads/fetch-url.ts
index aec8e82..a1bcdb3 100644
--- a/src/uploads/fetch-url.ts
+++ b/src/uploads/fetch-url.ts
@@ -14,17 +14,31 @@ const DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
  */
 export const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HOSTS = ["sharepoint.com", "onedrive.live.com", "1drv.ms", "graph.microsoft.com"];
 
+/**
+ * A host name reduced to its comparable form: trimmed, case-folded, and with the
+ * trailing root-label dot removed (`example.com.` and `example.com` are the same name;
+ * `new URL()` keeps the dot, so it reaches here).
+ *
+ * Used on BOTH sides of the comparison in {@link isAllowedHost}. A normalization applied
+ * to only one side is one that fails whenever the *other* side carries the odd spelling.
+ *
+ * Exactly one trailing dot, not `/\.+$/`: a second dot makes an empty DNS label, so
+ * `example.com..` is not another spelling of the same name and must not be folded into
+ * one — this step exists to equate equivalent names, not to repair malformed ones.
+ */
+function normalizeHostForMatch(value: string): string {
+  return value.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
+}
+
 /**
  * True when `hostname` is exactly one of `allowed`, or a subdomain of one of them
  * (matched on a dot boundary — "evilsharepoint.com" must NOT match "sharepoint.com").
- * Case-insensitive; a trailing dot on `hostname` (a valid DNS root-label terminator) is
- * stripped before comparison.
+ * Case-insensitive, and a trailing root-label dot on either side is ignored.
  */
 export function isAllowedHost(hostname: string, allowed: string[]): boolean {
-  let host = hostname.trim().toLowerCase();
-  if (host.endsWith(".")) host = host.slice(0, -1);
+  const host = normalizeHostForMatch(hostname);
   for (const entry of allowed) {
-    const suffix = entry.trim().toLowerCase();
+    const suffix = normalizeHostForMatch(entry);
     if (!suffix) continue;
     if (host === suffix || host.endsWith(`.${suffix}`)) return true;
   }
diff --git a/tests/uploads-fetch-url.test.ts b/tests/uploads-fetch-url.test.ts
index 7d0cb2d..aba1d0d 100644
--- a/tests/uploads-fetch-url.test.ts
+++ b/tests/uploads-fetch-url.test.ts
@@ -75,6 +75,31 @@ describe("isAllowedHost", () => {
     expect(isAllowedHost("FOO.SharePoint.COM", DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HOSTS)).toBe(true);
     expect(isAllowedHost("sharepoint.com.", DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HOSTS)).toBe(true);
   });
+
+  it("ignores a trailing root-label dot on a CONFIGURED ENTRY too, not only on the hostname", () => {
+    // The normalization used to run on the hostname alone, so an operator who wrote the
+    // fully-qualified form in LEXWARE_UPLOAD_ALLOWED_HOSTS silently blocked the very host
+    // they meant to allow — the same failure mode as the leading dot fixed in 0.1.12,
+    // arriving from the other end of the name.
+    expect(isAllowedHost("contoso.sharepoint.com", ["sharepoint.com."])).toBe(true);
+    expect(isAllowedHost("sharepoint.com", ["sharepoint.com."])).toBe(true);
+    // Odd spelling on both sides at once still resolves to the same name.
+    expect(isAllowedHost("contoso.sharepoint.com.", ["sharepoint.com."])).toBe(true);
+    expect(isAllowedHost("  SharePoint.COM.  ", ["  .. "])).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("still refuses a lookalike when the entry carries a trailing dot — the dot is not a wildcard", () => {
+    expect(isAllowedHost("evilsharepoint.com", ["sharepoint.com."])).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAllowedHost("sharepoint.com.evil.com", ["sharepoint.com."])).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("does not fold a DOUBLE trailing dot into the same name — that is an empty label, not a spelling", () => {
+    // `example.com..` is malformed rather than equivalent, and this step exists to equate
+    // equivalent names, not to repair broken ones. Widening it would quietly grow what the
+    // allow-list accepts.
+    expect(isAllowedHost("sharepoint.com..", DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HOSTS)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAllowedHost("sharepoint.com", ["sharepoint.com.."])).toBe(false);
+  });
 });
 
 describe("fetchRemoteFile", () => {