Support async payments in BOLT 12

02-peer-protocol.md

@@ -2222,6 +2222,17 @@ is destined, is described in [BOLT #4](04-onion-routing.md).
     1. type: 0 (`blinded_path`)
     2. data:
         * [`point`:`path_key`]
+    3. type: 2 (`hold_htlc`)
+    4. data:
+
+#### TLV fields for `held_htlc_available`
+        1. `tlv_stream`: `held_htlc_available`
+        2. types:
+
+#### TLV fields for `release_held_htlc`
+
+        1. `tlv_stream`: `release_held_htlc`
+        2. types:
 
 #### Requirements
 
@@ -2260,6 +2271,10 @@ A sending node:
   - MUST increase the value of `id` by 1 for each successive offer.
   - if it is relaying a payment inside a blinded route:
     - MUST set `path_key` (see [Route Blinding](04-onion-routing.md#route-blinding))
+  - MUST NOT include a `hold_htlc` TLV unless the sending node expects the
+    final recipient of the HTLC to be offline at the time the HTLC would arrive
+  - MUST NOT include a `hold_htlc` TLV unless the sending node expects to be
+    offline for an extended duration starting soon.
 
 `id` MUST NOT be reset to 0 after the update is complete (i.e. after `revoke_and_ack` has
 been received). It MUST continue incrementing instead.
@@ -2291,6 +2306,11 @@ A receiving node:
     - MUST respond with an error as detailed in [Failure Messages](04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages)
   - Otherwise:
     - MUST follow the requirements for the reader of `payload` in [Payload Format](04-onion-routing.md#payload-format)
+  - if the `hold_htlc` TLV is present:
+    - MUST NOT forward the HTLC until a corresponding `release_held_htlc` onion
+      message is received.
+    - Upon receipt of a corresponding `release_held_htlc` onion message the HTLC SHOULD be treated
+      as any HTLC without the `hold_htlc` TLV and forwarded as usual.
 
 The `onion_routing_packet` contains an obfuscated list of hops and instructions for each hop along the path.
 It commits to the HTLC by setting the `payment_hash` as associated data, i.e. includes the `payment_hash` in the computation of HMACs.
@@ -2326,6 +2346,19 @@ maintaining its channel reserve (because of the increased weight of the
 commitment transaction), resulting in a degraded channel. See [#728](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/728)
 for more details.
 
+For often-offline recipients, e.g. mobile clients, nodes can use the
+`hold_htlc` TLV to prevent further forwarding of an HTLC until the recipient
+comes online. As long as the final recipients' counterparty is online and
+storing onion messages for the recipient, the recipient can reply to the onion
+message when they come online, unblock the HTLC, and expect to receive it
+quickly thereafter.
+
+Note that if the sender expects to be online when the recipient comes online,
+they can utilize the `release_held_htlc` onion message without utilizing the
+`hold_htlc` TLV - they can simply send a `held_htlc_available` onion message
+to the final recipient and wait to send any HTLC at all until they receive a
+`release_held_htlc` message back.
+
 ### Removing an HTLC: `update_fulfill_htlc`, `update_fail_htlc`, and `update_fail_malformed_htlc`
 
 For simplicity, a node can only remove HTLCs added by the other node.
@@ -2511,6 +2544,13 @@ The description of key derivation is in [BOLT #3](03-transactions.md#key-derivat
    * [`channel_id`:`channel_id`]
    * [`32*byte`:`per_commitment_secret`]
    * [`point`:`next_per_commitment_point`]
+   * [`revoke_and_ack_tlvs`:`tlvs`]
+
+1. `tlv_stream`: `revoke_and_ack_tlvs`
+2. types:
+    1. type: 0 (`release_held_htlc_message_paths`)
+    2. data: 
+        * [`...blinded_path`:`paths`]
 
 #### Requirements
 
@@ -2519,13 +2559,25 @@ A sending node:
   the previous commitment transaction.
   - MUST set `next_per_commitment_point` to the values for its next commitment
   transaction.
+  - If `hold_htlc` was set in the preceding `update_add_htlc` and `option_htlc_hold` was advertised
+    by this node:
+    - MUST set `release_held_htlc_message_paths` to at least 1 blinded path that can be used for
+      the ultimate payment recipient to eventually send `release_held_htlc` onion messages over
 
 A receiving node:
   - if `per_commitment_secret` is not a valid secret key or does not generate the previous `per_commitment_point`:
     - MUST send an `error` and fail the channel.
   - if the `per_commitment_secret` was not generated by the protocol in [BOLT #3](03-transactions.md#per-commitment-secret-requirements):
     - MAY send a `warning` and close the connection, or send an
       `error` and fail the channel.
+  - If `release_held_htlc_message_paths` are present and `hold_htlc` was set in the preceding `update_add_htlc`:
+    - MUST immediately send at least two onion messages across at least two
+      different paths to the final HTLC recipient.
+    - Each onion message MUST contain a `held_htlc_available` TLV.
+    - Each onion message MUST contain a unique `reply_path`s which terminates
+      at the receiver of the preceding `update_add_htlc` message.
+    - Each `reply_path` MUST contain a `release_held_htlc` TLV for the
+      `update_add_htlc` recipient in the `encrypted_data_tlvs`
 
 A node:
   - MUST NOT broadcast old (revoked) commitment transactions,

04-onion-routing.md

@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ This is formatted according to the Type-Length-Value format defined in [BOLT #1]
 
 1. `tlv_stream`: `payload`
 2. types:
+    1. type: 1 (`invoice_request`)
+    2. data:
+        * [`...*byte`:`invoice_request_tlv_stream`]
     1. type: 2 (`amt_to_forward`)
     2. data:
         * [`tu64`:`amt_to_forward`]
@@ -214,6 +217,9 @@ This is formatted according to the Type-Length-Value format defined in [BOLT #1]
     1. type: 18 (`total_amount_msat`)
     2. data:
         * [`tu64`:`total_msat`]
+    1. type: 5482373484 (`sender_provided_payment_preimage`)
+    2. data:
+        * [`32*byte`:`payment_preimage`]
 
 `short_channel_id` is the ID of the outgoing channel used to route the
 message; the receiving peer should operate the other end of this channel.
@@ -240,6 +246,11 @@ The requirements ensure consistency in responding to an unexpected
 `outgoing_cltv_value`, whether it is the final node or not, to avoid
 leaking its position in the route.
 
+`sender_provided_payment_preimage` and `invoice_request` are set in the case 
+that the recipient is often-offline and another node provided a static BOLT 12 
+invoice on their behalf, where `invoice_request` is the sender's originl 
+invoice request corresponding to this HTLC.
+
 ### Requirements
 
 The creator of `encrypted_recipient_data` (usually, the recipient of payment):
@@ -273,6 +284,14 @@ The writer of the TLV `payload`:
         - MUST use the current block height as a baseline value. 
         - if a [random offset](07-routing-gossip.md#recommendations-for-routing) was added to improve privacy:
           - SHOULD add the offset to the baseline value.
+      - if paying to a static BOLT 12 invoice:
+        - MUST set `sender_provided_payment_preimage` to randomly generated unique bytes.
+        - MUST set `update_add_htlc.payment_hash` to match the SHA256 hash of
+          `sender_provided_payment_preimage`.
+        - MUST set `invoice_request` to the BOLT 12 invoice request
+          corresponding to this HTLC.
+      - otherwise:
+        - MUST NOT set `sender_provided_payment_preimage`.
     - MUST NOT include any other tlv field.
   - For every node outside of a blinded route:
     - MUST include `amt_to_forward` and `outgoing_cltv_value`.
@@ -324,6 +343,7 @@ The reader:
       - MUST return an error if `amt_to_forward` is below what it expects for the payment.
       - MUST return an error if incoming `cltv_expiry` < `outgoing_cltv_value`.
       - MUST return an error if incoming `cltv_expiry` < `current_block_height` + `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`.
+      - MUST use `sender_provided_payment_preimage` when claiming the HTLC, if present
   - Otherwise (it is not part of a blinded route):
     - MUST return an error if `path_key` is set in the incoming `update_add_htlc` or `current_path_key` is present.
     - MUST return an error if `amt_to_forward` or `outgoing_cltv_value` are not present.
@@ -1519,6 +1539,9 @@ even, of course!).
     1. type: 68 (`invoice_error`)
     2. data:
         * [`tlv_invoice_error`:`inverr`]
+    1. type: 70 (`static_invoice`)
+    2. data:
+    * [`tlv_static_invoice`:`static_inv`]
 
 #### Requirements
 

09-features.md

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ The Context column decodes as follows:
 | 46/47 | `option_scid_alias`               | Supply channel aliases for routing                        | INT      |                             | [BOLT #2][bolt02-channel-ready]                                       |
 | 48/49 | `option_payment_metadata`         | Payment metadata in tlv record                            | 9        |                             | [BOLT #11](11-payment-encoding.md#tagged-fields)                      |
 | 50/51 | `option_zeroconf`                 | Understands zeroconf channel types                        | INT      | `option_scid_alias`         | [BOLT #2][bolt02-channel-ready]                                       |
+| 52/53 | `option_htlc_hold`               | Hold HTLCs and forward on receipt of an onion message     | IN       | `option_onion_messages`                                   |
 | 60/61 | `option_simple_close`             | Simplified closing negotiation                            | IN       | `option_shutdown_anysegwit` | [BOLT #2][bolt02-simple-close]                                        |
 
 ## Requirements

12-offer-encoding.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Here we use "user" as shorthand for the individual user's lightning
 node and "merchant" as the shorthand for the node of someone who is
 selling or has sold something.
 
-There are two basic payment flows supported by BOLT 12:
+There are three basic payment flows supported by BOLT 12:
 
 The general user-pays-merchant flow is:
 1. A merchant publishes an *offer*, such as on a web page or a QR code.
@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@ The merchant-pays-user flow (e.g. ATM or refund):
 3. The merchant confirms the *invoice_node_id* to ensure it's about to pay the correct
    person, and makes a payment to the invoice.
 
+The pay-mobile-user flow (e.g. paying a friend back to their mobile node):
+1. The mobile user supplies some always-online node with a static (i.e. 
+   `payment_hash`-less) invoice to return on its behalf. This always-online node may 
+   be the mobile user's channel counterparty, wallet vendor, or another node on the 
+   network that it has an out-of-band relationship with.
+2. The mobile user publishes an offer that contains blinded paths that terminate
+   at the always-online node.
+3. The payer sends an `invoice_request` to the always-online node, who replies with the static
+   invoice previously provided by the mobile user and forwards the `invoice_request` to the mobile
+   user in case they happen to be online.
+4. The payer makes a payment to the mobile user as indicated by the invoice.
+
 ## Payment Proofs and Payer Proofs
 
 Note that the normal lightning "proof of payment" can only demonstrate that an
@@ -70,6 +82,9 @@ to request the invoice.  In addition, the Merkle construction of the BOLT 12
 invoice signature allows the user to reveal invoice fields in case
 of a dispute selectively.
 
+Payers will not get proofs in the case that they received a static invoice from the 
+payee, see the pay-mobile-user flow above.
+
 # Encoding
 
 Each of the forms documented here are in
@@ -126,7 +141,7 @@ Each form is signed using one or more *signature TLV elements*: TLV
 types 240 through 1000 (inclusive).  For these,
 the tag is "lightning" || `messagename` || `fieldname`, and `msg` is the
 Merkle-root; "lightning" is the literal 9-byte ASCII string,
-`messagename` is the name of the TLV stream being signed (i.e. "invoice_request" or "invoice") and the `fieldname` is the TLV field containing the
+`messagename` is the name of the TLV stream being signed (i.e. "invoice_request", "invoice", or "static_invoice") and the `fieldname` is the TLV field containing the
 signature (e.g. "signature").
 
 The formulation of the Merkle tree is similar to that proposed in
@@ -261,8 +276,9 @@ A writer of an offer:
       after midnight 1 January 1970, UTC that invoice_request should not be
       attempted.
   - if it is connected only by private channels:
-    - MUST include `offer_paths` containing one or more paths to the node from
-      publicly reachable nodes.
+    - MUST include `offer_paths` containing one or more paths to the node
+      that will reply to the `invoice_request`, using introduction nodes that are
+      publicly reachable.
   - otherwise:
     - MAY include `offer_paths`.
   - if it includes `offer_paths`:
@@ -282,6 +298,8 @@ A writer of an offer:
       - MUST set `offer_quantity_max` to 0.
   - otherwise:
     - MUST NOT set `offer_quantity_max`.
+  - if it is often-offline and the invoice may be provided by another node on their behalf:
+    - MUST NOT include more than 1 chain in `offer_chains`.
 
 A reader of an offer:
   - if the offer contains any TLV fields outside the inclusive ranges: 1 to 79 and 1000000000 to 1999999999:
@@ -543,6 +561,9 @@ The reader:
   - if `invreq_bip_353_name` is present:
     - MUST reject the invoice request if `name` or `domain` contain any bytes which are not
       `0`-`9`, `a`-`z`, `A`-`Z`, `-`, `_` or `.`.
+  - if receiving the `invoice_request` on behalf of an often-offline payee:
+    - SHOULD forward the `invoice_request` to the payee
+    - SHOULD reply with the static invoice previously provided by the payee
 
 ## Rationale
 
@@ -573,10 +594,11 @@ The requirement to use `offer_paths` if present, ensures a node does not reveal
 
 # Invoices
 
-Invoices are a payment request, and when the payment is made, 
-the payment preimage can be combined with the invoice to form a cryptographic receipt.
+Invoices are a payment request. If `invoice_payment_hash` is set, then when the
+payment is made, the payment preimage can be combined with the invoice to form a
+cryptographic receipt.
 
-The recipient sends an `invoice` in response to an `invoice_request` using
+The recipient creates an `invoice` for responding to an `invoice_request` using
 the `onion_message` `invoice` field.
 
 1. `tlv_stream`: `invoice`
@@ -671,6 +693,9 @@ the `onion_message` `invoice` field.
     1. type: 176 (`invoice_node_id`)
     2. data:
         * [`point`:`node_id`]
+    1. type: 178 (`static_invoice_message_paths`)
+    2. data:
+        * [`...*blinded_path`:`paths`]
     1. type: 240 (`signature`)
     2. data:
         * [`bip340sig`:`sig`]
@@ -709,17 +734,28 @@ may (due to capacity limits on a single channel) require it.
 A writer of an invoice:
   - MUST set `invoice_created_at` to the number of seconds since Midnight 1
     January 1970, UTC when the invoice was created.
-  - MUST set `invoice_amount` to the minimum amount it will accept, in units of 
-    the minimal lightning-payable unit (e.g. milli-satoshis for bitcoin) for
-    `invreq_chain`.
-  - if the invoice is in response to an `invoice_request`:
+  - if `invoice_payment_hash` is set and the invoice is in response to an `invoice_request`:
     - MUST copy all non-signature fields from the invoice request (including unknown fields).
     - if `invreq_amount` is present:
       - MUST set `invoice_amount` to `invreq_amount`
     - otherwise:
       - MUST set `invoice_amount` to the *expected amount*.
-  - MUST set `invoice_payment_hash` to the SHA256 hash of the
-    `payment_preimage` that will be given in return for payment.
+    - if the expiry for accepting payment is not 7200 seconds after `invoice_created_at`:
+      - MUST set `invoice_relative_expiry`.`seconds_from_creation` to the number of
+        seconds after `invoice_created_at` that payment of this invoice should not be attempted.
+  - if the invoice is intended to be provided by a node other than the recipient (i.e. a static
+    invoice):
+      - MUST NOT set `invoice_payment_hash`.
+      - MUST NOT set `invoice_amount`.
+      - MUST include `static_invoice_message_paths` containing at least two paths to
+        the recipient.
+      - MUST NOT set any `invoice_request` TLV fields
+      - if the expiry for accepting payment is not 2 weeks after `invoice_created_at`:
+        - MUST set `invoice_relative_expiry`.`seconds_from_creation` to the number of
+          seconds after `invoice_created_at` that payment of this invoice should not be attempted.
+  - otherwise:
+      - MUST set `invoice_payment_hash` to the SHA256 hash of the
+        `payment_preimage` that will be given in return for payment.
   - if `offer_issuer_id` is present:
     - MUST set `invoice_node_id` to the `offer_issuer_id`
   - otherwise, if `offer_paths` is present:
@@ -730,9 +766,6 @@ A writer of an invoice:
     - MUST set `invoice_features`.`features` bit `MPP/compulsory`
   - or if it allows multiple parts to pay the invoice:
     - MUST set `invoice_features`.`features` bit `MPP/optional`
-  - if the expiry for accepting payment is not 7200 seconds after `invoice_created_at`:
-    - MUST set `invoice_relative_expiry`.`seconds_from_creation` to the number of
-      seconds after `invoice_created_at` that payment of this invoice should not be attempted.
   - if it accepts onchain payments:
     - MAY specify `invoice_fallbacks`
     - SHOULD specify `invoice_fallbacks` in order of most-preferred to least-preferred
@@ -745,11 +778,11 @@ A writer of an invoice:
     - MUST include `invoice_blindedpay` with exactly one `blinded_payinfo` for each `blinded_path` in `paths`, in order.
     - MUST set `features` in each `blinded_payinfo` to match `encrypted_data_tlv`.`allowed_features` (or empty, if no `allowed_features`).
     - SHOULD ignore any payment which does not use one of the paths.
+  - if providing invoices on behalf of an often offline recipient:
+    - MAY reuse the previous invoice.
 
 A reader of an invoice:
-  - MUST reject the invoice if `invoice_amount` is not present.
   - MUST reject the invoice if `invoice_created_at` is not present.
-  - MUST reject the invoice if `invoice_payment_hash` is not present.
   - MUST reject the invoice if `invoice_node_id` is not present.
   - if `invreq_chain` is not present:
     - MUST reject the invoice if bitcoin is not a supported chain.
@@ -771,7 +804,9 @@ A reader of an invoice:
     - MUST NOT use the corresponding `invoice_paths`.`path` if `payinfo`.`features` has any unknown even bits set.
     - MUST reject the invoice if this leaves no usable paths.
   - if the invoice is a response to an `invoice_request`:
-    - MUST reject the invoice if all fields in ranges 0 to 159 and 1000000000 to 2999999999 (inclusive) do not exactly match the invoice request.
+    - if `invoice_payment_hash` is set:
+      - MUST reject the invoice if `invoice_amount` is not present.
+      - MUST reject the invoice if all fields in ranges 0 to 159 and 1000000000 to 2999999999 (inclusive) do not exactly match the invoice request.
     - if `offer_issuer_id` is present (invoice_request for an offer):
       - MUST reject the invoice if `invoice_node_id` is not equal to `offer_issuer_id`
     - otherwise, if `offer_paths` is present (invoice_request for an offer without id):
@@ -800,6 +835,10 @@ A reader of an invoice:
     - MUST reject the invoice if it arrived via a blinded path.
   - otherwise (derived from an offer):
     - MUST reject the invoice if it did not arrive via invoice request `onionmsg_tlv` `reply_path`.
+  - if `invoice_payment_hash` is unset:
+    - MUST reject the invoice if `static_invoice_message_paths` is not present or is empty.
+    - MUST pay asynchronously using the `held_htlc_available` onion message
+      flow, where the onion message is sent over `static_invoice_message_paths`.
 
 ## Rationale