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67 lines (63 loc) · 3.41 KB
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deployment_type: smart-contract
environment: on-chain
access_roles:
- name: anyone
trust: none
description: "Permissionless caller — any EOA or contract on L1/L2"
designed_authority:
- "Deposit ETH/tokens via L1 gateways"
- "Initiate L2→L1 withdrawals via L2 gateways"
- "Relay finalized L2→L1 messages after proof window"
- name: sequencer
trust: medium
description: "Scroll sequencer submitting batches to ScrollChain"
designed_authority:
- "Sign fast withdrawal claims in FastWithdrawVault (sole authorization mechanism)"
- "Commit batches to ScrollChain via commitBatches()"
- "Order L2 transactions within batches"
- name: prover
trust: medium
description: "ZK prover submitting proofs for batch finalization"
designed_authority:
- "Submit validity proofs via finalizeBatchWithProof()"
- "Trigger state root finalization on ScrollChain"
- name: owner
trust: high
description: "Proxy admin / ScrollOwner multisig"
designed_authority:
- "Register/replace ERC20 gateways via setERC20Gateway — registered gateways are trusted to faithfully relay sender identity"
- "Upgrade proxy implementations"
- "Pause contracts"
- "Grant/revoke roles (sequencer, prover)"
- "Update rate limiter parameters"
- name: messenger
trust: high
description: "Cross-layer messenger contracts (L1ScrollMessenger, L2ScrollMessenger)"
designed_authority:
- "Relay cross-layer messages with sender aliasing"
- "Enforce gas limits on relayed messages"
- "Drop messages that fail execution (no automatic retry)"
boundaries:
- "L1 to L2 message relay (deposit path)"
- "L2 to L1 withdrawal proof verification"
- "Gateway ↔ Messenger trust boundary (gateways trust messenger for cross-layer calls)"
- "Rollup verifier ↔ ScrollChain (proof acceptance gates finalization)"
- "Rate limiter enforcement on ETH/token gateways"
- "Proxy upgrade boundary (owner-only)"
known_constraints:
- "Upgradeable proxies — owner can pause/upgrade within 1 hour"
- "ETH and token rate limiters cap per-period bridge volume"
- "L1 message queue enforces gas limits and sender aliasing"
- "Batch codec versions (V0, V1, V3) must be backward compatible"
- "Withdrawal proofs verified against finalized state roots"
- "USDC gateway has special burn/mint flow via CCTP"
- "Lido gateway has dedicated wstETH wrapping logic"
- "Max realistic single-tx value: 10000 ETH (total ETH supply ~120M)"
- "Deployment-only functions: importGenesisBatch, initialize"
design_specs:
- "FastWithdrawVault.claimFastWithdraw: sequencer signature is the sole authorization — no on-chain L2 state verification by design (that's what makes it 'fast')"
- "L1GatewayRouter.requestERC20: only callable by registered gateways (gatewayInContext); gateways are owner-registered trusted code"
- "L1GatewayRouter.setERC20Gateway: owner-only; registered gateways have full authority over token transfers for their mapped tokens"
- "ScrollChain.commitBatch: sequencer-only; batch ordering is trusted to the sequencer by design"
- "L1ScrollMessenger.relayMessageWithProof: permissionless relay of finalized L2→L1 messages; caller identity is irrelevant (message was already committed on L2)"
- "EnforcedTxGateway.sendTransaction: allows EOAs to force-include L2 transactions via L1 when sequencer is censoring — permissionless by design"