draft-gont-opsec-ip-options-filtering-00.txt

Operational Security Capabilities                                F. Gont
for IP Network Infrastructure                                    UTN/FRH
(opsec)                                                        S. Fouant
Internet-Draft                                       Shortest Path First
Intended status: BCP                                       February 2010
Expires: August 5, 2010


                  IP Options Filtering Recommendations
              draft-gont-opsec-ip-options-filtering-00.txt

Abstract

   This document document provides advice on the filtering of packets
   based on the IP options they contain.  Additionally, it discusses the
   operational and interoperability implications of such filtering.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 5, 2010.

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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  IP Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Processing requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Advice on handling of specific IP Options  . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  End of Option List (Type = 0)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       4.1.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       4.1.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.1.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.1.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . .  7
       4.1.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  No Operation (Type = 1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.2.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.2.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.2.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.2.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . .  7
       4.2.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.3.  Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR) (Type = 131)  . . . .  7
       4.3.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.3.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.3.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.3.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . .  9
       4.3.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.4.  Strict Source and Record Route (SSRR) (Type = 137) . . . .  9
       4.4.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.4.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.4.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.4.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . .  9
       4.4.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.5.  Record Route (Type = 7)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.5.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.5.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.5.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.5.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 10
       4.5.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.6.  Stream Identifier (Type = 136) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.6.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.6.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.6.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11



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       4.6.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 11
       4.6.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.7.  Internet Timestamp (Type = 68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.7.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.7.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.7.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.7.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 12
       4.7.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.8.  Router Alert (Type = 148)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.8.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.8.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.8.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.8.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 12
       4.8.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.9.  Probe MTU (Type = 11) (obsolete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.9.1.  Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.9.2.  Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.9.3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.9.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 13
       4.9.5.  Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.10. Reply MTU (Type = 12) (obsolete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.10.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.10.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.10.3. Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.10.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 13
       4.10.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.11. Traceroute (Type = 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.11.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.11.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.11.3. Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       4.11.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 14
       4.11.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.12. DoD Basic Security Option (Type = 130) . . . . . . . . . . 14
       4.12.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       4.12.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       4.12.3. Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.12.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 15
       4.12.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.13. DoD Extended Security Option (Type = 133)  . . . . . . . . 15
       4.13.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.13.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.13.3. Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.13.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 15
       4.13.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.14. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) (Type = 134) . . . . 15
       4.14.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.14.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       4.14.3. Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16



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       4.14.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 16
       4.14.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.15. Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery (Type = 149)  . 16
       4.15.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       4.15.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       4.15.3. Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       4.15.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 16
       4.15.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Appendix A.  Changes from previous versions of the draft (to
                be removed by the RFC Editor before publishing
                this document as an RFC)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27


































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1.  Introduction

   This document document provides advice on the filtering of IP Options
   within IPv4 headers.  Various protocols may use IP Options to some
   extent, therefore the filtering of such options may have implications
   on proper functioning of the protocol.  As such, this document
   attempts to discuss the operational and interoperability implications
   of such filtering.  Additionaly, this document will outline what a
   network operator might do in a typical enterprise or Service Provider
   environment.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


2.  IP Options

   IP options allow for the extension of the Internet Protocol

   There are two cases for the format of an option:

   o  Case 1: A single byte of option-type.

   o  Case 2: An option-type byte, an option-length byte, and the actual
      option-data bytes.

   In the Case 2, the option-length byte counts the option-type byte and
   the option-length byte, as well as the actual option-data bytes.

   All current and future options except "End of Option List" (Type = 0)
   and "No Operation" (Type = 1), are of Class 2.

   The option-type has three fields:

   o  1 bit: copied flag.

   o  2 bits: option class.

   o  5 bits: option number.

   The copied flag indicates whether this option should be copied to all
   fragments in the event the packet carrying it needs to be fragmented:

   o  0 = not copied.

   o  1 = copied.




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   The values for the option class are:

   o  0 = control.

   o  1 = reserved for future use.

   o  2 = debugging and measurement.

   o  3 = reserved for future use.

   This format allows for the creation of new options for the extension
   of the Internet Protocol (IP).

   Finally, the option number identifies the syntax of the rest of the
   option.

   [IANA2006b] contains the list of the currently assigned IP option
   numbers.


3.  Processing requirements

   Router manufacturers tend to do IP option processing on the main
   processor, rather than on line cards.  Unless special care is taken,
   this represents Denial of Service (DoS) risk, as there is potential
   for overwhelming the router with option processing.

   The following sections contain a description of each of the IP
   options that have so far been specified, a discussion of possible
   interoperability implications if packets containing such options are
   filtered, and specific advice on whether to filter packets containing
   these options in a typical enterprise or Service Provider
   environment.


4.  Advice on handling of specific IP Options

4.1.  End of Option List (Type = 0)

4.1.1.  Uses

   This option is used to indicate the "end of options" in those cases
   in which the end of options would not coincide with the end of the
   Internet Protocol Header.







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4.1.2.  Option specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.1.3.  Threats

   TBD

4.1.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   Packets containing any IP options are likely to include an End of
   Option List.  Therefore, if packets containing this option are
   filtered, it is very likely that legitimate traffic is filtered.

4.1.5.  Advice

   Do not filter packets containing this option.

4.2.  No Operation (Type = 1)

4.2.1.  Uses

   The no-operation option is basically meant to allow the sending
   system to align subsequent options in, for example, 32-bit
   boundaries.

4.2.2.  Option specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.2.3.  Threats

   TBD

4.2.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

4.2.5.  Advice

   Do not filter packets containing this option.

4.3.  Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR) (Type = 131)

   RFC 791 states that this option should appear, at most, once in a
   given packet.  Thus, if a packet contains more than one LSRR option,
   it should be dropped, and this event should be logged (e.g., a
   counter could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).
   Additionally, packets containing a combination of LSRR and SSRR
   options should be dropped, and this event should be logged (e.g., a



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   counter could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).

4.3.1.  Uses

   This option lets the originating system specify a number of
   intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the
   destination host.  Additionally, the route followed by the packet is
   recorded in the option.  The receiving host (end-system) must use the
   reverse of the path contained in the received LSRR option.

   The LSSR option can be of help in debugging some network problems.
   Some ISP (Internet Service Provider) peering agreements require
   support for this option in the routers within the peer of the ISP.

4.3.2.  Option specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.3.3.  Threats

   The LSRR option has well-known security implications.  Among other
   things, the option can be used to:

   o  Bypass firewall rules

   o  Reach otherwise unreachable internet systems

   o  Establish TCP connections in a stealthy way

   o  Learn about the topology of a network

   o  Perform bandwidth-exhaustion attacks

   Of these attack vectors, the one that has probably received least
   attention is the use of the LSRR option to perform bandwidth
   exhaustion attacks.  The LSRR option can be used as an amplification
   method for performing bandwidth-exhaustion attacks, as an attacker
   could make a packet bounce multiple times between a number of systems
   by carefully crafting an LSRR option.

      This is the IPv4-version of the IPv6 amplification attack that was
      widely publicized in 2007 [Biondi2007].  The only difference is
      that the maximum length of the IPv4 header (and hence the LSRR
      option) limits the amplification factor when compared to the IPv6
      counter-part.






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4.3.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.3.5.  Advice

   All systems should, by default, drop IP packets that contain an LSRR
   option.

4.4.  Strict Source and Record Route (SSRR) (Type = 137)

4.4.1.  Uses

   This option allows the originating system to specify a number of
   intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the
   destination host.  Additionally, the route followed by the packet is
   recorded in the option, and the destination host (end-system) must
   use the reverse of the path contained in the received SSRR option.

   This option is similar to the Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR)
   option, with the only difference that in the case of SSRR, the route
   specified in the option is the exact route the packet must take
   (i.e., no other intervening routers are allowed to be in the route).

   The SSSR option can be of help in debugging some network problems.
   Some ISP (Internet Service Provider) peering agreements require
   support for this option in the routers within the peer of the ISP.

4.4.2.  Option specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.4.3.  Threats

   The SSRR option has the same security implications as the LSRR
   option.  Please refer to Section 4.3 for a discussion of such
   security implications.

4.4.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.4.5.  Advice

   All systems should, by default, drop IP packets that contain an SSRR
   option.





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4.5.  Record Route (Type = 7)

4.5.1.  Uses

   This option provides a means to record the route that a given packet
   follows.

4.5.2.  Option specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.5.3.  Threats

   This option can be exploited to map the topology of a network.
   However, the limited space in the IP header limits the usefulness of
   this option for that purpose.

4.5.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.5.5.  Advice

   Drop IP packets that contain a Record Route option.

4.6.  Stream Identifier (Type = 136)

   The Stream Identifier option originally provided a means for the 16-
   bit SATNET stream Identifier to be carried through networks that did
   not support the stream concept.

   However, as stated by Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 [RFC1812], this
   option is obsolete.  Therefore, it must be ignored by the processing
   systems.

   In the case of legacy systems still using this option, the length
   field of the option should be checked to be 4.  If the option does
   not pass this check, it should be dropped, and this event should be
   logged (e.g., a counter could be incremented to reflect the packet
   drop).

   RFC 791 states that this option appears at most once in a given
   datagram.  Therefore, if a packet contains more than one instance of
   this option, it should be dropped, and this event should be logged
   (e.g., a counter could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).

4.6.1.  Uses




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4.6.2.  Option specification

   Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.6.3.  Threats

4.6.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

4.6.5.  Advice

4.7.  Internet Timestamp (Type = 68)

4.7.1.  Uses

   This option provides a means for recording the time at which each
   system processed this datagram.

4.7.2.  Option specification

   Specified by RFC 791 [RFC0791].

4.7.3.  Threats

   The timestamp option has a number of security implications.  Among
   them are:

   o  It allows an attacker to obtain the current time of the systems
      that process the packet, which the attacker may find useful in a
      number of scenarios.

   o  It may be used to map the network topology, in a similar way to
      the IP Record Route option.

   o  It may be used to fingerprint the operating system in use by a
      system processing the datagram.

   o  It may be used to fingerprint physical devices, by analyzing the
      clock skew.

   [Kohno2005] describes a technique for fingerprinting devices by
   measuring the clock skew.  It exploits, among other things, the
   timestamps that can be obtained by means of the ICMP timestamp
   request messages [RFC0791].  However, the same fingerprinting method
   could be implemented with the aid of the Internet Timestamp option.







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4.7.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD.

4.7.5.  Advice

   Filter IP packets that contain an Internet Timestamp option.

4.8.  Router Alert (Type = 148)

4.8.1.  Uses

   The Router Alert option has the semantic "routers should examine this
   packet more closely, if they participate in the functionality denoted
   by the Value of the option".

4.8.2.  Option specification

   The Router Alert option is defined in RFC 2113 [RFC2113] and later
   updates to it have been clarified by RFC 5350 [RFC5350].  It contains
   a 16-bit Value governed by an IANA registry (see [RFC5350]).

4.8.3.  Threats

   TBD.

4.8.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.8.5.  Advice

   TBD

4.9.  Probe MTU (Type = 11) (obsolete)

4.9.1.  Uses

   This option originally provided a mechanism to discover the Path-MTU.
   It has been declared obsolete.

4.9.2.  Option specification

   This option was defined in RFC 1063 [RFC1063].  This option is
   obsolete.






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4.9.3.  Threats

   None

4.9.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   None

4.9.5.  Advice

   Filter IP packets that contain a Probe MTU option.

4.10.  Reply MTU (Type = 12) (obsolete)

4.10.1.  Uses

   This option and originally provided a mechanism to discover the Path-
   MTU.  It is now obsolete.

4.10.2.  Option specification

   This option was originally specified by RFC 1063 [RFC1063], and is
   now obsolete.

4.10.3.  Threats

   None.

4.10.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   None

4.10.5.  Advice

   Filter IP packets that contain a Reply MTU option.

4.11.  Traceroute (Type = 82)

4.11.1.  Uses

   This option originally provided a mechanism to trace the path to a
   host.

4.11.2.  Option specification

   This option was originally specified by RFC 1393 [RFC1393].  It has
   been declared obsolete.




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4.11.3.  Threats

   None

4.11.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   None

4.11.5.  Advice

   Filter IP packets that contain a Traceroute option.

4.12.  DoD Basic Security Option (Type = 130)

4.12.1.  Uses

   This option is used by Multi-Level-Secure (MLS) end-systems and
   intermediate systems in specific environments to [RFC1108]:

   o  Transmit from source to destination in a network standard
      representation the common security labels required by computer
      security models,

   o  Validate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from the
      source and delivery to the destination, and,

   o  Ensure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to the
      level required by all protection authorities indicated on the
      datagram.

   The DoD Basic Security Option is currently implemented in a number of
   operating systems (e.g., [IRIX2008], [SELinux2008], [Solaris2008],
   and [Cisco2008]), and deployed in a number of high-security networks.

4.12.2.  Option specification

   It is specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108] (which obsoletes RFC 1038
   [RFC1038]).

      RFC 791 [RFC0791] defined the "Security Option" (Type = 130),
      which used the same option type as the DoD Basic Security option
      discussed in this section.  The "Security Option" specified in RFC
      791 is considered obsolete by Section 3.2.1.8 of RFC 1122, and
      therefore the discussion in this section is focused on the DoD
      Basic Security option specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108].

   Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 states that routers "SHOULD implement
   this option".



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4.12.3.  Threats

   TBD.

4.12.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.12.5.  Advice

   TBD

4.13.  DoD Extended Security Option (Type = 133)

4.13.1.  Uses

   This option permits additional security labeling information, beyond
   that present in the Basic Security Option (Section 4.12), to be
   supplied in an IP datagram to meet the needs of registered
   authorities.

4.13.2.  Option specification

   This option is specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108].

4.13.3.  Threats

   TBD

4.13.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.13.5.  Advice

   TBD

4.14.  Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) (Type = 134)

4.14.1.  Uses

   This option was proposed by the Trusted Systems Interoperability
   Group (TSIG), with the intent of meeting trusted networking
   requirements for the commercial trusted systems market place.

   It is currently implemented in a number of operating systems (e.g.,
   IRIX [IRIX2008], Security-Enhanced Linux [SELinux2008], and Solaris
   [Solaris2008]), and deployed in a number of high-security networks.



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4.14.2.  Option specification

   This option is specified in [CIPSO1992] and [FIPS1994].

4.14.3.  Threats

   TBD

4.14.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.14.5.  Advice

   TBD

4.15.  Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery (Type = 149)

4.15.1.  Uses

   This option originally provided unreliable UDP delivery to a set of
   addresses included in the option.  It is currently obsolete.

4.15.2.  Option specification

   This option is defined in RFC 1770 [RFC1770].

4.15.3.  Threats

   TBD

4.15.4.  Operational/interoperability impact if blocked

   TBD

4.15.5.  Advice

   TBD


5.  Security Considerations

   This document provides advice on the filtering of IP packets that
   contain IP options.







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6.  Acknowledgements

   Part of this document is based on the document &Security Assesment of
   the Internet Protocol& [CPNI2008] that is the result of a project
   carried out by Fernando Gont on behalf of UK CPNI (formerly NISCC).

   Fernando Gont would like to thank UK CPNI (formerly NISCC) for their
   continued support.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC0826]  Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
              converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
              address for transmission on Ethernet hardware", STD 37,
              RFC 826, November 1982.

   [RFC1038]  St. Johns, M., "Draft revised IP security option",
              RFC 1038, January 1988.

   [RFC1063]  Mogul, J., Kent, C., Partridge, C., and K. McCloghrie, "IP
              MTU discovery options", RFC 1063, July 1988.

   [RFC1108]  Kent, S., "U.S", RFC 1108, November 1991.

   [RFC1112]  Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5,
              RFC 1112, August 1989.

   [RFC1122]  Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989.

   [RFC1191]  Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
              November 1990.

   [RFC1349]  Almquist, P., "Type of Service in the Internet Protocol
              Suite", RFC 1349, July 1992.

   [RFC1393]  Malkin, G., "Traceroute Using an IP Option", RFC 1393,
              January 1993.

   [RFC1770]  Graff, C., "IPv4 Option for Sender Directed Multi-
              Destination Delivery", RFC 1770, March 1995.




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   [RFC1812]  Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
              RFC 1812, June 1995.

   [RFC2113]  Katz, D., "IP Router Alert Option", RFC 2113,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2474]  Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
              "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
              Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
              December 1998.

   [RFC2475]  Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
              and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
              Services", RFC 2475, December 1998.

   [RFC2644]  Senie, D., "Changing the Default for Directed Broadcasts
              in Routers", BCP 34, RFC 2644, August 1999.

   [RFC3927]  Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic
              Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927,
              May 2005.

   [RFC4821]  Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
              Discovery", RFC 4821, March 2007.

   [RFC5735]  Cotton, M. and L. Vegoda, "Special Use IPv4 Addresses",
              BCP 153, RFC 5735, January 2010.

7.2.  Informative References

   [Anderson2001]
              Anderson, J., "An Analysis of Fragmentation Attacks",
              Available at: http://www.ouah.org/fragma.html , 2001.

   [Arkin2000]
              Arkin, "IP TTL Field Value with ICMP (Oops - Identifying
              Windows 2000 again and more)",  http://
              ofirarkin.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/
              ofirarkin2000-06.pdf, 2000.

   [Barisani2006]
              Barisani, A., "FTester - Firewall and IDS testing tool",
              Available at: http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/ftester ,
              2001.




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   [Bellovin1989]
              Bellovin, S., "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol
              Suite", Computer Communication Review Vol. 19, No. 2, pp.
              32-48, 1989.

   [Bellovin2002]
              Bellovin, S., "A Technique for Counting NATted Hosts",
              IMW'02 Nov. 6-8, 2002, Marseille, France, 2002.

   [Bendi1998]
              Bendi, "Boink exploit", http://www.insecure.org/sploits/
              95.NT.fragmentation.bonk.html , 1998.

   [Biondi2007]
              Biondi, P. and A. Ebalard, "IPv6 Routing Header Security",
              CanSecWest 2007 Security Conference http://www.secdev.org/
              conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf, 2007.

   [CERT1996a]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1996-01: UDP Port Denial-of-
              Service Attack",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-01.html, 1996.

   [CERT1996b]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1996-21: TCP SYN Flooding and IP
              Spoofing Attacks",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-21.html, 1996.

   [CERT1996c]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1996-26: Denial-of-Service Attack
              via ping",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-26.html, 1996.

   [CERT1997]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1997-28: IP Denial-of-Service
              Attacks",  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1997-28.html,
              1997.

   [CERT1998a]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1998-01: Smurf IP Denial-of-
              Service Attacks",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-01.html, 1998.

   [CERT1998b]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1998-13: Vulnerability in Certain
              TCP/IP Implementations",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-13.html, 1998.




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   [CERT1999]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1999-17: Denial-of-Service Tools",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-17.html, 1999.

   [CERT2001]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-2001-09: Statistical Weaknesses in
              TCP/IP Initial Sequence Numbers",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-09.html, 2001.

   [CERT2003]
              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-2003-15 Cisco IOS Interface
              Blocked by IPv4 Packet",
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-15.html, 2003.

   [CIPSO1992]
              CIPSO, "COMMERCIAL IP SECURITY OPTION (CIPSO 2.2)", IETF
              Internet-Draft (draft-ietf-cipso-ipsecurity-01.txt), work
              in progress , 1992.

   [CIPSOWG1994]
              CIPSOWG, "Commercial Internet Protocol Security Option
              (CIPSO) Working Group",  http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/
              94jul/charters/cipso-charter.html, 1994.

   [CPNI2008]
              Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol",
               http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Docs/InternetProtocol.pdf, 2008.

   [Cerf1974]
              Cerf, V. and R. Kahn, "A Protocol for Packet Network
              Intercommunication", IEEE Transactions on
              Communications Vol. 22, No. 5, May 1974, pp. 637-648,
              1974.

   [Cisco2003]
              Cisco, "Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Interface
              Blocked by IPv4 packet",  http://www.cisco.com/en/US/
              products/products_security_advisory09186a00801a34c2.shtml,
              2003.

   [Cisco2008]
              Cisco, "Cisco IOS Security Configuration Guide, Release
              12.2",  http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_2/security/
              configuration/guide/scfipso.html, 2003.

   [Clark1988]
              Clark, D., "The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet
              Protocols", Computer Communication Review Vol. 18, No. 4,



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              1988.

   [Ed3f2002]
              Ed3f, "Firewall spotting and networks analisys with a
              broken CRC", Phrack Magazine, Volume 0x0b, Issue 0x3c,
              Phile #0x0c of 0x10 http://www.phrack.org/
              issues.html?issue=60&id=12&mode=txt, 2002.

   [FIPS1994]
              FIPS, "Standard Security Label for Information Transfer",
              Federal Information Processing Standards Publication. FIP
              PUBS 188 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips188/
              fips188.pdf, 1994.

   [Fuller2008a]
              Fuller, V., Lear, E., and D. Meyer, "240.0.0.0/4: The
              Future Begins Now", Routing SIG Meeting, 25th APNIC Open
              Policy Meeting, February 25 - 29 2008, Taipei, Taiwan http
              ://www.apnic.net/meetings/25/program/routing/
              fuller-240-future.pdf, 2008.

   [Fyodor2004]
              Fyodor, "Idle scanning and related IP ID games",
               http://www.insecure.org/nmap/idlescan.html, 2004.

   [GIAC2000]
              GIAC, "Egress Filtering v 0.2",
               http://www.sans.org/y2k/egress.htm, 2000.

   [Gont2006]
              Gont, F., "Advanced ICMP packet filtering",
               http://www.gont.com.ar/papers/icmp-filtering.html, 2006.

   [Haddad2004]
              Haddad, I. and M. Zakrzewski, "Security Distribution for
              Linux Clusters", Linux
              Journal http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6943, 2004.

   [Humble1998]
              Gont, F., "Nestea exploit",
               http://www.insecure.org/sploits/linux.PalmOS.nestea.html,
              1998.

   [I-D.fuller-240space]
              Fuller, V., "Reclassifying 240/4 as usable unicast address
              space", draft-fuller-240space-02 (work in progress),
              March 2008.




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   [I-D.ietf-tcpm-icmp-attacks]
              Gont, F., "ICMP attacks against TCP",
              draft-ietf-tcpm-icmp-attacks-11 (work in progress),
              February 2010.

   [I-D.templin-mtuassurance]
              Templin, F., "Requirements for IP-in-IP Tunnel MTU
              Assurance", draft-templin-mtuassurance-02 (work in
              progress), October 2006.

   [I-D.wilson-class-e]
              Wilson, P., Michaelson, G., and G. Huston, "Redesignation
              of 240/4 from "Future Use" to "Private Use"",
              draft-wilson-class-e-02 (work in progress),
              September 2008.

   [IANA2006a]
              Ether Types,
              "http://www.iana.org/assignments/ethernet-numbers".

   [IANA2006b]
              IP Parameters,
              "http://www.iana.org/assignments/ip-parameters".

   [IANA2006c]
              Protocol Numbers,
              "http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers".

   [IRIX2008]
              IRIX, "IRIX 6.5 trusted_networking(7) manual page",  http:
              //techpubs.sgi.com/library/tpl/cgi-bin/
              getdoc.cgi?coll=0650&db=man&fname=/usr/share/catman/a_man/
              cat7/trusted_networking.z, 2008.

   [Jones2002]
              Jones, R., "A Method Of Selecting Values For the
              Parameters Controlling IP Fragment Reassembly",  ftp://
              ftp.cup.hp.com/dist/networking/briefs/ip_reass_tuning.txt,
              2002.

   [Kenney1996]
              Kenney, M., "The Ping of Death Page",
               http://www.insecure.org/sploits/ping-o-death.html, 1996.

   [Kent1987]
              Kent, C. and J. Mogul, "Fragmentation considered harmful",
              Proc. SIGCOMM '87 Vol. 17, No. 5, October 1987, 1987.




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   [Klein2007]
              Klein, A., "OpenBSD DNS Cache Poisoning and Multiple O/S
              Predictable IP ID Vulnerability",  http://
              www.trusteer.com/files/
              OpenBSD_DNS_Cache_Poisoning_and_Multiple_OS_Predictable_IP
              _ID_Vulnerability.pdf, 2007.

   [Kohno2005]
              Kohno, T., Broido, A., and kc. Claffy, "Remote Physical
              Device Fingerprinting", IEEE Transactions on Dependable
              and Secure Computing Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005.

   [LBNL2006]
              LBNL/NRG, "arpwatch tool",  http://ee.lbl.gov/, 2006.

   [Linux2006]
              The Linux Project, "http://www.kernel.org".

   [Microsoft1999]
              Microsoft, "Microsoft Security Program: Microsoft Security
              Bulletin (MS99-038). Patch Available for "Spoofed Route
              Pointer" Vulnerability",  http://www.microsoft.com/
              technet/security/bulletin/ms99-038.mspx, 1999.

   [NISCC2004]
              NISCC, "NISCC Vulnerability Advisory 236929: Vulnerability
              Issues in TCP",
               http://www.uniras.gov.uk/niscc/docs/
              re-20040420-00391.pdf, 2004.

   [NISCC2005]
              NISCC, "NISCC Vulnerability Advisory 532967/NISCC/ICMP:
              Vulnerability Issues in ICMP packets with TCP payloads",
               http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20050412-00303.pdf,
              2005.

   [NISCC2006]
              NISCC, "NISCC Technical Note 01/2006: Egress and Ingress
              Filtering",  http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/
              re-20060420-00294.pdf?lang=en, 2006.

   [Northcutt2000]
              Northcut, S. and Novak, "Network Intrusion Detection - An
              Analyst's Handbook", Second Edition New Riders Publishing,
              2000.

   [Novak2005]
              Novak, "Target-Based Fragmentation Reassembly",



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               http://www.snort.org/reg/docs/target_based_frag.pdf,
              2005.

   [OpenBSD-PF]
              Sanfilippo, S., "PF: Scrub (Packet Normalization)",
               http://www.openbsd.org/faq/pf/scrub.html, 2010.

   [OpenBSD1998]
              OpenBSD, "OpenBSD Security Advisory: IP Source Routing
              Problem",
               http://www.openbsd.org/advisories/sourceroute.txt, 1998.

   [Paxson2001]
              Paxson, V., Handley, M., and C. Kreibich, "Network
              Intrusion Detection: Evasion, Traffic Normalization, and
              End-to-End Protocol Semantics",  USENIX Conference, 2001,
              2001.

   [Ptacek1998]
              Ptacek, T. and T. Newsham, "Insertion, Evasion and Denial
              of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection",
               http://www.aciri.org/vern/Ptacek-Newsham-Evasion-98.ps,
              1998.

   [RFC0815]  Clark, D., "IP datagram reassembly algorithms", RFC 815,
              July 1982.

   [RFC1858]  Ziemba, G., Reed, D., and P. Traina, "Security
              Considerations for IP Fragment Filtering", RFC 1858,
              October 1995.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2544]  Bradner, S. and J. McQuaid, "Benchmarking Methodology for
              Network Interconnect Devices", RFC 2544, March 1999.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [RFC3056]  Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
              via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

   [RFC3128]  Miller, I., "Protection Against a Variant of the Tiny
              Fragment Attack (RFC 1858)", RFC 3128, June 2001.




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   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, September 2001.

   [RFC3530]  Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R.,
              Beame, C., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System
              (NFS) version 4 Protocol", RFC 3530, April 2003.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.

   [RFC4459]  Savola, P., "MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the-
              Network Tunneling", RFC 4459, April 2006.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.

   [RFC4963]  Heffner, J., Mathis, M., and B. Chandler, "IPv4 Reassembly
              Errors at High Data Rates", RFC 4963, July 2007.

   [RFC4987]  Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
              Mitigations", RFC 4987, August 2007.

   [RFC5082]  Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., and C.
              Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
              (GTSM)", RFC 5082, October 2007.

   [RFC5350]  Manner, J. and A. McDonald, "IANA Considerations for the
              IPv4 and IPv6 Router Alert Options", RFC 5350,
              September 2008.

   [RFC5570]  StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common
              Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)",
              RFC 5570, July 2009.

   [SELinux2008]
              Security Enhanced Linux, "http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/".

   [Sanfilippo1998a]
              Sanfilippo, S., "about the ip header id", Post to Bugtraq
              mailing-list, Mon Dec 14
              1998 http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/papers/ipid.html, 1998.

   [Sanfilippo1998b]
              Sanfilippo, S., "Idle scan", Post to Bugtraq mailing-
              list http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/papers/dumbscan.html,
              1998.



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   [Sanfilippo1999]
              Sanfilippo, S., "more ip id", Post to Bugtraq mailing-
              list http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/papers/moreipid.html,
              1999.

   [Shankar2003]
              Shankar, U. and V. Paxson, "Active Mapping: Resisting NIDS
              Evasion Without Altering Traffic",
               http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/activemap-oak03.pdf,
              2003.

   [Shannon2001]
              Shannon, C., Moore, D., and K. Claffy, "Characteristics of
              Fragmented IP Traffic on Internet Links", 2001.

   [Silbersack2005]
              Silbersack, M., "Improving TCP/IP security through
              randomization without sacrificing interoperability",
              EuroBSDCon 2005 Conference http://www.silby.com/
              eurobsdcon05/eurobsdcon_slides.pdf, 2005.

   [Solaris2008]
              Solaris Trusted Extensions - Labeled Security for Absolute
              Protection, "http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/ds/
              trusted_extensions.jsp#3", 2008.

   [Song1999]
              Song, D., "Frag router tool",
               http://www.anzen.com/research/nidsbench/.

   [US-CERT2001]
              US-CERT, "US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#446689: Check
              Point FireWall-1 allows fragmented packets through
              firewall if Fast Mode is enabled",
               http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/446689, 2001.

   [US-CERT2002]
              US-CERT, "US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#310387: Cisco IOS
              discloses fragments of previous packets when Express
              Forwarding is enabled",
               http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/310387, 2002.

   [Watson2004]
              Watson, P., "Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset Attacks",
              2004 CanSecWest Conference , 2004.

   [Zakrzewski2002]
              Zakrzewski, M. and I. Haddad, "Linux Distributed Security



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              Module",  http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6215, 2002.

   [daemon91996]
              daemon9, route, and infinity, "IP-spoofing Demystified
              (Trust-Relationship Exploitation)", Phrack Magazine,
              Volume Seven, Issue Forty-Eight, File 14 of
              18 http://www.phrack.org/phrack/48/P48-14 , 1988.


Appendix A.  Changes from previous versions of the draft (to be removed
             by the RFC Editor before publishing this document as an
             RFC)


Authors' Addresses

   Fernando Gont
   Universidad Tecnologica Nacional / Facultad Regional Haedo
   Evaristo Carriego 2644
   Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires  1706
   Argentina

   Phone: +54 11 4650 8472
   Email: fernando@gont.com.ar
   URI:   http://www.gont.com.ar


   Stefan Fouant
   Shortest Path First

   Email: sfouant@shortestpathfirst.net
   URI:   http://www.shortestpathfirst.net



















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