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privilege_escalation_root_crontab_filemod.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/01/27"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/02/22"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies modifications to the root crontab file. Adversaries may overwrite this file to gain code execution with root
privileges by exploiting privileged file write or move related vulnerabilities.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Privilege Escalation via Root Crontab File Modification"
references = [
"https://phoenhex.re/2017-06-09/pwn2own-diskarbitrationd-privesc",
"https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42146",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "0ff84c42-873d-41a2-a4ed-08d74d352d01"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Privilege Escalation"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and not event.type:deletion and
file.path:/private/var/at/tabs/root and not process.executable:/usr/bin/crontab
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1053"
name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1053.003"
name = "Cron"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"