persistence_crontab_creation.toml

[metadata]
creation_date = "2022/04/25"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/02/22"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not crontab (i.e python, osascript, etc.). This
activity should not be highly prevalent and could indicate the use of cron as a persistence mechanism by a threat actor.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious CronTab Creation or Modification"
references = [
    "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf",
    "https://theevilbit.github.io/beyond/beyond_0004/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "530178da-92ea-43ce-94c2-8877a826783d"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "deletion" and process.name != null and
  file.path : "/private/var/at/tabs/*" and not process.executable == "/usr/bin/crontab"
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1053"
name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1053.003"
name = "Cron"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"