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Fix typos (#1189)
Signed-off-by: chloefeal <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Aditya <[email protected]>
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spec/eureka/README.md

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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ The IBC eureka protocol must have the same security properties as IBC, and must
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The light client module can be implemented exactly as-is with regards to its functionality. It **must** have external endpoints for relayers (off-chain processes that have full-node access to other chains in the network) to initialize a client, update the client, and submit misbehaviour in case the trust model of the client is violated by the counterparty consensus mechanism (e.g. committing to different headers for the same height).
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The implementation of each of these endpoints will be specific to the particular consensus mechanism targetted. The choice of consensus algorithm itself is arbitrary, it may be a Proof-of-Stake algorithm like CometBFT, or a multisig of trusted authorities, or a rollup that relies on an additional underlying client in order to verify its consensus. However, a light client must have the ability to define finality for a given snapshot of the state machine, this may be either through single-slot finality or a finality gadget.
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The implementation of each of these endpoints will be specific to the particular consensus mechanism targeted. The choice of consensus algorithm itself is arbitrary, it may be a Proof-of-Stake algorithm like CometBFT, or a multisig of trusted authorities, or a rollup that relies on an additional underlying client in order to verify its consensus. However, a light client must have the ability to define finality for a given snapshot of the state machine, this may be either through single-slot finality or a finality gadget.
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Thus, the endpoints themselves should accept arbitrary bytes for the arguments passed into these client endpoints as it is up to each individual client implementation to unmarshal these bytes into the structures they expect.
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Suppose the RecvPacket is sent to a chain other than the one identified by the sourceClient on the source chain.
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In the packet flow messages sent to the receiver (RecvPacket), the packet send is verified using the client on the destination chain (retrieved using destination identifier) with the packet commitment path derived by the source identifier. This verification check can only pass if the chain identified by the destination client committed the packet we received under the source channel identifier. This is only possible if the destination client is pointing to the original source chain, or if it is pointing to a different chain that committed the exact same packet. Pointing to the original source chain would mean we sent the packet to the correct . Since the sender only sends packets intended for the desination chain by setting to a unique source identifier, we can be sure the packet was indeed intended for us. Since our client on the reciver is also correctly pointing to the sender chain, we are verifying the proof against a specific consensus algorithm that we assume to be honest. If the packet is committed to the wrong key path, then we will not accept the packet. Similarly, if the packet is committed by the wrong chain then we will not be able to verify correctly.
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In the packet flow messages sent to the receiver (RecvPacket), the packet send is verified using the client on the destination chain (retrieved using destination identifier) with the packet commitment path derived by the source identifier. This verification check can only pass if the chain identified by the destination client committed the packet we received under the source channel identifier. This is only possible if the destination client is pointing to the original source chain, or if it is pointing to a different chain that committed the exact same packet. Pointing to the original source chain would mean we sent the packet to the correct . Since the sender only sends packets intended for the destination chain by setting to a unique source identifier, we can be sure the packet was indeed intended for us. Since our client on the reciver is also correctly pointing to the sender chain, we are verifying the proof against a specific consensus algorithm that we assume to be honest. If the packet is committed to the wrong key path, then we will not accept the packet. Similarly, if the packet is committed by the wrong chain then we will not be able to verify correctly.

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