diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json
index 5b50368..8313b3b 100644
--- a/package-lock.json
+++ b/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime",
-  "version": "0.0.23",
+  "version": "0.0.24",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime",
-      "version": "0.0.23",
+      "version": "0.0.24",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@pondwader/socks5-server": "^1.0.10",
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 9027cf2..2003966 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime",
-  "version": "0.0.23",
+  "version": "0.0.24",
   "description": "Anthropic Sandbox Runtime (ASRT) - A general-purpose tool for wrapping security boundaries around arbitrary processes",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
diff --git a/src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts b/src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts
index bfef419..56ede1c 100644
--- a/src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts
+++ b/src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts
@@ -58,6 +58,70 @@ export interface LinuxSandboxParams {
 /** Default max depth for searching dangerous files */
 const DEFAULT_MANDATORY_DENY_SEARCH_DEPTH = 3
 
+/**
+ * Find if any component of the path is a symlink within the allowed write paths.
+ * Returns the symlink path if found, or null if no symlinks.
+ *
+ * This is used to detect and block symlink replacement attacks where an attacker
+ * could delete a symlink and create a real directory with malicious content.
+ */
+function findSymlinkInPath(
+  targetPath: string,
+  allowedWritePaths: string[],
+): string | null {
+  const parts = targetPath.split(path.sep)
+  let currentPath = ''
+
+  for (const part of parts) {
+    if (!part) continue // Skip empty parts (leading /)
+    const nextPath = currentPath + path.sep + part
+
+    try {
+      const stats = fs.lstatSync(nextPath)
+      if (stats.isSymbolicLink()) {
+        // Check if this symlink is within an allowed write path
+        const isWithinAllowedPath = allowedWritePaths.some(
+          allowedPath =>
+            nextPath.startsWith(allowedPath + '/') || nextPath === allowedPath,
+        )
+        if (isWithinAllowedPath) {
+          return nextPath
+        }
+      }
+    } catch {
+      // Path doesn't exist - no symlink issue here
+      break
+    }
+    currentPath = nextPath
+  }
+
+  return null
+}
+
+/**
+ * Find the first non-existent path component.
+ * E.g., for "/existing/parent/nonexistent/child/file.txt" where /existing/parent exists,
+ * returns "/existing/parent/nonexistent"
+ *
+ * This is used to block creation of non-existent deny paths by mounting /dev/null
+ * at the first missing component, preventing mkdir from creating the parent directories.
+ */
+function findFirstNonExistentComponent(targetPath: string): string {
+  const parts = targetPath.split(path.sep)
+  let currentPath = ''
+
+  for (const part of parts) {
+    if (!part) continue // Skip empty parts (leading /)
+    const nextPath = currentPath + path.sep + part
+    if (!fs.existsSync(nextPath)) {
+      return nextPath
+    }
+    currentPath = nextPath
+  }
+
+  return targetPath // Shouldn't reach here if called correctly
+}
+
 /**
  * Get mandatory deny paths using ripgrep (Linux only).
  * Uses a SINGLE ripgrep call with multiple glob patterns for efficiency.
@@ -518,14 +582,52 @@ async function generateFilesystemArgs(
         continue
       }
 
-      // Skip non-existent paths
-      if (!fs.existsSync(normalizedPath)) {
+      // Check for symlinks in the path - if any parent component is a symlink,
+      // mount /dev/null there to prevent symlink replacement attacks.
+      // Attack scenario: .claude is a symlink to ./decoy/, attacker deletes
+      // symlink and creates real .claude/settings.json with malicious hooks.
+      const symlinkInPath = findSymlinkInPath(normalizedPath, allowedWritePaths)
+      if (symlinkInPath) {
+        args.push('--ro-bind', '/dev/null', symlinkInPath)
         logForDebugging(
-          `[Sandbox Linux] Skipping non-existent deny path: ${normalizedPath}`,
+          `[Sandbox Linux] Mounted /dev/null at symlink ${symlinkInPath} to prevent symlink replacement attack`,
         )
         continue
       }
 
+      // Handle non-existent paths by mounting /dev/null to block creation
+      if (!fs.existsSync(normalizedPath)) {
+        // Find the deepest existing ancestor directory
+        let ancestorPath = path.dirname(normalizedPath)
+        while (ancestorPath !== '/' && !fs.existsSync(ancestorPath)) {
+          ancestorPath = path.dirname(ancestorPath)
+        }
+
+        // Only protect if the existing ancestor is within an allowed write path
+        const ancestorIsWithinAllowedPath = allowedWritePaths.some(
+          allowedPath =>
+            ancestorPath.startsWith(allowedPath + '/') ||
+            ancestorPath === allowedPath ||
+            normalizedPath.startsWith(allowedPath + '/'),
+        )
+
+        if (ancestorIsWithinAllowedPath) {
+          // Mount /dev/null at the first non-existent path component
+          // This blocks creation of the entire path by making the first
+          // missing component appear as an empty file (mkdir will fail)
+          const firstNonExistent = findFirstNonExistentComponent(normalizedPath)
+          args.push('--ro-bind', '/dev/null', firstNonExistent)
+          logForDebugging(
+            `[Sandbox Linux] Mounted /dev/null at ${firstNonExistent} to block creation of ${normalizedPath}`,
+          )
+        } else {
+          logForDebugging(
+            `[Sandbox Linux] Skipping non-existent deny path not within allowed paths: ${normalizedPath}`,
+          )
+        }
+        continue
+      }
+
       // Only add deny binding if this path is within an allowed write path
       // Otherwise it's already read-only from the initial --ro-bind / /
       const isWithinAllowedPath = allowedWritePaths.some(
diff --git a/test/sandbox/mandatory-deny-paths.test.ts b/test/sandbox/mandatory-deny-paths.test.ts
index 8f164bb..f43c5fa 100644
--- a/test/sandbox/mandatory-deny-paths.test.ts
+++ b/test/sandbox/mandatory-deny-paths.test.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
 import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, beforeEach } from 'bun:test'
 import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
-import { mkdirSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import {
+  mkdirSync,
+  rmSync,
+  writeFileSync,
+  readFileSync,
+  symlinkSync,
+  existsSync,
+} from 'node:fs'
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
 import { join } from 'node:path'
 import { getPlatform } from '../../src/utils/platform.js'
@@ -478,6 +485,204 @@ describe('Mandatory Deny Paths - Integration Tests', () => {
       )
     })
   })
+
+  describe('Non-existent deny path protection (Linux only)', () => {
+    // This tests the fix for sandbox escape via creating non-existent deny paths
+    // Only applicable to Linux since it uses /dev/null mounting
+
+    async function runSandboxedWriteWithDenyPaths(
+      command: string,
+      denyPaths: string[],
+    ): Promise<{ success: boolean; stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
+      const platform = getPlatform()
+      if (platform !== 'linux') {
+        return { success: true, stdout: '', stderr: '' }
+      }
+
+      const writeConfig = {
+        allowOnly: ['.'],
+        denyWithinAllow: denyPaths,
+      }
+
+      const wrappedCommand = await wrapCommandWithSandboxLinux({
+        command,
+        needsNetworkRestriction: false,
+        readConfig: undefined,
+        writeConfig,
+        enableWeakerNestedSandbox: true,
+      })
+
+      const result = spawnSync(wrappedCommand, {
+        shell: true,
+        encoding: 'utf8',
+        timeout: 10000,
+      })
+
+      return {
+        success: result.status === 0,
+        stdout: result.stdout || '',
+        stderr: result.stderr || '',
+      }
+    }
+
+    it('blocks creation of non-existent file when parent dir exists', async () => {
+      if (getPlatform() !== 'linux') return
+
+      // .claude directory exists from beforeAll setup
+      // .claude/settings.json does NOT exist
+      const nonExistentFile = '.claude/settings.json'
+
+      const result = await runSandboxedWriteWithDenyPaths(
+        `echo '{"hooks":{}}' > '${nonExistentFile}'`,
+        [join(TEST_DIR, nonExistentFile)],
+      )
+
+      expect(result.success).toBe(false)
+      // Verify file content was NOT written (bwrap may create empty mount point file)
+      const content = readFileSync(nonExistentFile, 'utf8')
+      expect(content).toBe('')
+    })
+
+    it('blocks creation of non-existent file when parent dir also does not exist', async () => {
+      if (getPlatform() !== 'linux') return
+
+      // nonexistent-dir does NOT exist
+      const nonExistentPath = 'nonexistent-dir/settings.json'
+
+      const result = await runSandboxedWriteWithDenyPaths(
+        `mkdir -p nonexistent-dir && echo '{"hooks":{}}' > '${nonExistentPath}'`,
+        [join(TEST_DIR, nonExistentPath)],
+      )
+
+      expect(result.success).toBe(false)
+      // bwrap mounts /dev/null at first non-existent component, blocking mkdir
+      // The mount point file is created but is empty (from /dev/null)
+      const content = readFileSync('nonexistent-dir', 'utf8')
+      expect(content).toBe('')
+    })
+
+    it('blocks creation of deeply nested non-existent path', async () => {
+      if (getPlatform() !== 'linux') return
+
+      // a/b/c/file.txt does NOT exist
+      const nonExistentPath = 'a/b/c/file.txt'
+
+      const result = await runSandboxedWriteWithDenyPaths(
+        `mkdir -p a/b/c && echo 'test' > '${nonExistentPath}'`,
+        [join(TEST_DIR, nonExistentPath)],
+      )
+
+      expect(result.success).toBe(false)
+      // bwrap mounts /dev/null at 'a' (first non-existent component), blocking mkdir
+      // The mount point file is created but is empty (from /dev/null)
+      const content = readFileSync('a', 'utf8')
+      expect(content).toBe('')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('Symlink replacement attack protection (Linux only)', () => {
+    // This tests the fix for symlink replacement attacks where an attacker
+    // could delete a symlink and create a real directory with malicious content
+
+    async function runSandboxedCommandWithDenyPaths(
+      command: string,
+      denyPaths: string[],
+    ): Promise<{ success: boolean; stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
+      const platform = getPlatform()
+      if (platform !== 'linux') {
+        return { success: true, stdout: '', stderr: '' }
+      }
+
+      const writeConfig = {
+        allowOnly: ['.'],
+        denyWithinAllow: denyPaths,
+      }
+
+      const wrappedCommand = await wrapCommandWithSandboxLinux({
+        command,
+        needsNetworkRestriction: false,
+        readConfig: undefined,
+        writeConfig,
+      })
+
+      const result = spawnSync(wrappedCommand, {
+        shell: true,
+        encoding: 'utf8',
+        timeout: 10000,
+      })
+
+      return {
+        success: result.status === 0,
+        stdout: result.stdout || '',
+        stderr: result.stderr || '',
+      }
+    }
+
+    it('blocks symlink replacement attack on .claude directory', async () => {
+      if (getPlatform() !== 'linux') return
+
+      // Setup: Create a symlink .claude -> decoy (simulating malicious git repo)
+      const decoyDir = 'symlink-decoy'
+      const claudeSymlink = 'symlink-claude'
+      mkdirSync(decoyDir, { recursive: true })
+      writeFileSync(join(decoyDir, 'settings.json'), '{}')
+      symlinkSync(decoyDir, claudeSymlink)
+
+      try {
+        // The deny path is the settings.json through the symlink
+        const denyPath = join(TEST_DIR, claudeSymlink, 'settings.json')
+
+        // Attacker tries to:
+        // 1. Delete the symlink
+        // 2. Create a real directory
+        // 3. Create malicious settings.json
+        const result = await runSandboxedCommandWithDenyPaths(
+          `rm ${claudeSymlink} && mkdir ${claudeSymlink} && echo '{"hooks":{}}' > ${claudeSymlink}/settings.json`,
+          [denyPath],
+        )
+
+        // The attack should fail - symlink is protected with /dev/null mount
+        expect(result.success).toBe(false)
+
+        // Verify the symlink still exists on host (was not deleted)
+        expect(existsSync(claudeSymlink)).toBe(true)
+      } finally {
+        // Cleanup
+        rmSync(claudeSymlink, { force: true })
+        rmSync(decoyDir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+      }
+    })
+
+    it('blocks deletion of symlink in protected path', async () => {
+      if (getPlatform() !== 'linux') return
+
+      // Setup: Create a symlink
+      const targetDir = 'symlink-target-dir'
+      const symlinkPath = 'protected-symlink'
+      mkdirSync(targetDir, { recursive: true })
+      writeFileSync(join(targetDir, 'file.txt'), 'content')
+      symlinkSync(targetDir, symlinkPath)
+
+      try {
+        const denyPath = join(TEST_DIR, symlinkPath, 'file.txt')
+
+        // Try to just delete the symlink
+        const result = await runSandboxedCommandWithDenyPaths(
+          `rm ${symlinkPath}`,
+          [denyPath],
+        )
+
+        // Should fail - symlink is mounted with /dev/null
+        expect(result.success).toBe(false)
+
+        // Symlink should still exist
+        expect(existsSync(symlinkPath)).toBe(true)
+      } finally {
+        rmSync(symlinkPath, { force: true })
+        rmSync(targetDir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+      }
+    })
+  })
 })
 
 describe('macGetMandatoryDenyPatterns - Unit Tests', () => {