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Security model

READMEs are untrusted code. readme2demo executes them, so isolation is a core design concern, not an afterthought.

The sandbox is the boundary

The agent and verify stages run inside hardened Docker containers (Sandbox.start()):

  • --cap-drop ALL and --security-opt no-new-privileges
  • non-root user (USER demo in the base image)
  • memory, CPU, and PID limits
  • the repo is mounted read-only; the agent works on a writable copy

The verify stage then replays the distilled commands.sh in a separate, fresh container with no model credentials and no state carried over from the agent's run.

For a claims-vs-roadmap table (enforced today vs planned v0.8 vs known limitations, each with code pointers), see the root SECURITY.md. That table is the source of truth; this page is the short summary.

Known tradeoffs

  • Render container is not fully hardened like agent/verify. render.py runs its own docker run with memory/CPU/network limits only (no cap-drop / no-new-privileges / pids-limit). See the root SECURITY.md table.

  • API key in the sandbox (MVP): the model credential currently enters the sandbox (and the docker run argv). Use a dedicated, low-limit key. A host-side, key-injecting egress proxy is planned so the credential never crosses the boundary (#64; argv exposure tracked in #51).

  • --allow-docker-socket is off by default. Enabling it mounts the host Docker socket into the sandbox so demos that manage containers work — but the socket pierces isolation. Only enable it for repositories you trust.

  • Network egress is open bridge networking today, not allowlisted. The sandbox defaults to Docker --network bridge so package installs and git clones work. Domain allowlisting is planned for v0.8 (#64). Until then, treat outbound network from a compromised agent as possible.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report vulnerabilities privately, not in public issues. See SECURITY.md in the repository for the full threat model and the private reporting channel (GitHub Security Advisories).