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45 changes: 44 additions & 1 deletion skills/vuln-management/scanner-tuning/SKILL.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ phase: [operate]
frameworks: [CVSS-4.0, CWE]
difficulty: intermediate
time_estimate: "30-60min"
version: "1.0.0"
version: "1.1.0"
author: unitoneai
license: MIT
allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ Before starting, collect or confirm:
- [ ] **Authentication status:** Are scans currently authenticated (credentialed) or unauthenticated?
- [ ] **False positive examples:** Specific findings suspected or confirmed as false positives, with evidence
- [ ] **Scan frequency:** Current scan schedule and any performance constraints
- [ ] **Production safety constraints:** Change window, target owner, fragile systems, account lockout thresholds, API quotas, and abort contacts
- [ ] **Result volume:** Approximate number of findings per scan cycle and false positive rate if known
- [ ] **Compliance requirements:** Whether scans must meet specific compliance mandates (PCI ASV, DISA STIG, CIS Benchmark)
- [ ] **Multi-scanner context:** If using multiple scanners, which ones and how results are currently correlated
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -138,6 +139,34 @@ Configure or optimize scan policies to balance detection coverage, accuracy, and
| **Time-based exclusions** | Systems that cannot be scanned during business hours | Scan scheduling adjustment (see Step 6) |
| **Credential exclusions** | Systems where credentialed scanning is not permitted by policy | Documented reason; accept reduced detection accuracy |

##### 2d. Production Scan Safety Gate

Before recommending any production scan policy, verify that the scan can run without creating avoidable operational impact. Disabling explicitly dangerous plugins is necessary but not sufficient: credentialed checks, web crawling, API enumeration, and high-concurrency probes can still cause account lockouts, service degradation, quota exhaustion, or state changes.

| Safety Control | Required Evidence | Failure Mode Prevented |
|---|---|---|
| **Target owner approval** | Change ticket, maintenance window, escalation contact | Uncoordinated scan during business-critical activity |
| **Canary scan** | Successful pre-flight against representative hosts/apps | Fleet-wide failure from untested credentials or plugin set |
| **Lockout-safe authentication** | AD/IdP lockout thresholds, retry limits, credential success-rate threshold | Service account lockout, password-spray alerting, scanner source block |
| **State-changing web/API controls** | Test tenant, safe account, route/method allowlist, destructive action blocklist | DAST crawl disabling users, sending transactions, rotating keys, mutating records |
| **Target health monitoring** | CPU/load, application 5xx rate, queue depth, DB connections, EDR crash/restart signals | Scanner-induced outage or degraded service |
| **Abort thresholds** | Stop conditions for auth failures, error rates, latency, health checks, IDS/IPS blocks | Scan continues after it is clearly harming targets |
| **Allowlist governance** | Time-bound scanner exception, owner, expiry, compensating SIEM monitoring | Scanner allowlist hides real impact or becomes permanent bypass |
| **Fragile system handling** | Passive assessment, vendor-approved profile, or explicit risk acceptance | Legacy SCADA, medical, lab, appliance, or OT systems crash under active probes |
| **Cloud/API quota budget** | Rate limit, retry budget, provider quota headroom, backoff settings | API throttling, cost spikes, or control-plane denial of service |

**Production scan safety findings:**

```
SCAN-SAFE-01: No lockout-safe retry limits for authenticated scan credentials
SCAN-SAFE-02: Production DAST crawl can submit state-changing actions
SCAN-SAFE-03: Scan policy lacks target-health monitoring and abort thresholds
SCAN-SAFE-04: Scanner source allowlist has no expiry, owner, or compensating monitoring
SCAN-SAFE-05: Fragile or regulated systems lack passive or vendor-approved scan profile
SCAN-SAFE-06: Cloud/API scans have no quota-aware rate limit or retry budget
SCAN-SAFE-07: No canary scan before broad production rollout
```

### Step 3: Authenticated vs. Unauthenticated Scanning

Evaluate and configure credential-based (authenticated) scanning for improved accuracy.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -175,6 +204,7 @@ Authentication Configuration:
- Cloud/API Auth: [API key with read-only role | N/A]
- Credential Rotation: [Every N days]
- Last Verification: [YYYY-MM-DD, success rate: [N]%]
- Lockout Guardrails: [Max retries, failure threshold, abort action]
```

### Step 4: Severity Override Criteria
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -322,6 +352,17 @@ Highlight the most impactful tuning recommendations.]
| Scan Frequency | [Current schedule] | [Recommended schedule] | [Priority] |
| Port Range | [Current range] | [Recommended range] | [Priority] |

### Production Scan Safety

| Control | Current State | Risk | Required Evidence | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auth retry / lockout limits | [Configured / Missing] | [Risk] | [AD/IdP policy, canary result] | [Owner] |
| State-changing web/API actions | [Controlled / Uncontrolled] | [Risk] | [route allowlist, test tenant, rollback plan] | [Owner] |
| Health and abort thresholds | [Configured / Missing] | [Risk] | [CPU/5xx/error/lockout thresholds, escalation path] | [Owner] |
| Scanner allowlists | [Time-bound / Permanent / None] | [Risk] | [exception ticket, SIEM monitoring, expiry] | [Owner] |
| Fragile system handling | [Passive / Vendor profile / Active scan / Excluded] | [Risk] | [vendor guidance or risk acceptance] | [Owner] |
| Cloud/API quota controls | [Configured / Missing / N/A] | [Risk] | [rate limits, retry budget, quota headroom] | [Owner] |

### False Positive Analysis

| Plugin/Check ID | CVE ID | FP Pattern | Affected Assets | Evidence | Recommendation |
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -399,6 +440,8 @@ Common Weakness Enumeration. A community-developed list of software and hardware

5. **Not correlating results across scanners.** Organizations running multiple scanners often treat each scanner's output independently, leading to duplicate remediation efforts for the same vulnerability and missed findings that only one scanner detects. Establish a correlation process using CVE ID as the primary key and CWE as a fallback for non-CVE findings.

6. **Assuming non-DoS credentialed scans are production-safe.** Account lockouts, scanner allowlist side effects, state-changing web crawls, API quota exhaustion, and fragile endpoint load can still create outages. Require canary scans, target-health monitoring, and abort thresholds before broad production runs.

---

## Prompt Injection Safety Notice
Expand Down