Skill Being Reviewed
Skill name: rbac-design
Skill path: skills/identity/rbac-design/
False Positive Analysis
Benign policy pattern that should remain allowed:
allow {
input.subject.role == finance-reader
input.resource.type == finance-report
input.resource.tenant == input.subject.tenant
}
Why this is not a finding: A role grant plus tenant match is a normal RBAC/ABAC hybrid pattern. The issue is not the existence of permit rules; the issue is when the design does not define how broad permits interact with high-risk deny rules.
Coverage Gaps
Missed variant 1: broad permit overrides account suspension
allow {
input.subject.role == finance-reader
input.action == read
}
deny {
input.subject.status == suspended
}
Why it should be caught: Without a documented combining algorithm, one PDP or gateway may treat allow as sufficient even when a high-risk deny condition exists.
Missed variant 2: missing attribute fails open
allow {
input.subject.role == support-admin
}
# device_compliance is unavailable during IdP outage
Why it should be caught: Missing PIP attributes should not silently permit sensitive actions. The review should require fail-closed behavior for high-risk resources.
Missed variant 3: tenant admin bypasses tenant boundary
{
role: tenant-admin,
tenant: A,
requested_resource_tenant: B
}
Why it should be caught: Tenant isolation denies must take precedence over broad admin role grants.
Edge Cases
- First-match policies can be safe only if ordering is versioned, reviewed, and covered by conflict tests.
- Break-glass roles may intentionally override normal rules, but they need ticket, expiry, logging, and approval obligations.
- Different enforcement layers can disagree: application code, API gateway, PDP, and database RLS may not use the same precedence model.
Remediation Quality
Comparison to Other Tools
| Tool |
Catches this? |
Notes |
| Semgrep |
Partial |
Can flag some policy anti-patterns if rules exist, but does not validate the authorization design model. |
| CodeQL |
Partial |
Can analyze application authorization paths, but policy precedence across PDP/PEP layers is an architecture review concern. |
| OPA/Rego tests |
Partial |
Can prove expected decisions when tests exist; the current skill does not require those conflict tests. |
| XACML policy tooling |
Partial |
Supports combining algorithms, but reviewers must verify the chosen algorithm and fail-closed behavior. |
Overall Assessment
Strengths: The skill already covers RBAC levels, SoD constraints, permission boundaries, ABAC architecture, role mining, and conflict detection at a high level.
Needs improvement: It says policy conflicts should be detected, but it does not require a documented combining algorithm, deny precedence, missing-attribute behavior, or negative tests that prove high-risk denies cannot be bypassed by broad permits.
Priority recommendations:
- Add a policy precedence and conflict-resolution section to the ABAC process.
- Add
RBAC-PREC-* findings for missing combining algorithm, broad permit override, fail-open missing attributes, mutable first-match order, and break-glass bypasses.
- Extend the output template with policy conflict test evidence so reviews produce auditable results.
Bounty Info
Skill Being Reviewed
Skill name:
rbac-designSkill path:
skills/identity/rbac-design/False Positive Analysis
Benign policy pattern that should remain allowed:
allow { input.subject.role == finance-reader input.resource.type == finance-report input.resource.tenant == input.subject.tenant }Why this is not a finding: A role grant plus tenant match is a normal RBAC/ABAC hybrid pattern. The issue is not the existence of permit rules; the issue is when the design does not define how broad permits interact with high-risk deny rules.
Coverage Gaps
Missed variant 1: broad permit overrides account suspension
allow { input.subject.role == finance-reader input.action == read } deny { input.subject.status == suspended }Why it should be caught: Without a documented combining algorithm, one PDP or gateway may treat
allowas sufficient even when a high-risk deny condition exists.Missed variant 2: missing attribute fails open
allow { input.subject.role == support-admin } # device_compliance is unavailable during IdP outageWhy it should be caught: Missing PIP attributes should not silently permit sensitive actions. The review should require fail-closed behavior for high-risk resources.
Missed variant 3: tenant admin bypasses tenant boundary
{ role: tenant-admin, tenant: A, requested_resource_tenant: B }Why it should be caught: Tenant isolation denies must take precedence over broad admin role grants.
Edge Cases
Remediation Quality
Comparison to Other Tools
Overall Assessment
Strengths: The skill already covers RBAC levels, SoD constraints, permission boundaries, ABAC architecture, role mining, and conflict detection at a high level.
Needs improvement: It says policy conflicts should be detected, but it does not require a documented combining algorithm, deny precedence, missing-attribute behavior, or negative tests that prove high-risk denies cannot be bypassed by broad permits.
Priority recommendations:
RBAC-PREC-*findings for missing combining algorithm, broad permit override, fail-open missing attributes, mutable first-match order, and break-glass bypasses.Bounty Info