From 0ea371fac52aac2e97117b264d60d55c630739cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Albert Hui Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 09:19:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ci: repin fleet-ci so this repo's own deny.toml is used again MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The shared workflow's `deny-config-repo` input defaulted to SecurityRonin/fleet-config, so adopting it silently replaced this repo's supply-chain policy with the shared one. That is a real change to what `cargo deny` accepts, and no adoption PR disclosed it — nobody involved knew. Measured across the fleet when it was found: 61 of 65 adopted repos had a stricter local config. The shared one carries 21 advisory ignores against their `ignore = []`, every one a bare RUSTSEC id with no reason and no removal condition — which the fleet's own suppression rule forbids. Among them RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (rsa, Marvin timing attack). Several repos also went from `bans.multiple-versions = "deny"` to `"warn"` and gained nine allowed licences. fleet-ci now defaults to the repository's own deny.toml; opting into the shared config is explicit. This repin picks that up, restoring the policy this repo actually wrote. Reassuring rather than alarming: before this fix all 65 adopted repos were re-checked against their OWN deny.toml and all 65 passed. The gate was weakened, but nothing was hiding behind it. If this repin does turn a check red, that is a true finding this repo's own policy always meant to catch — fix it rather than re-pointing at the shared config. Only the pinned SHA changes. --- .github/workflows/ci.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index c0ba617..88532ac 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs: # and MSRV is read from rust-version. Anything that needed configuring would be # a behaviour change smuggled in by an adoption PR, so there is nothing here. ci: - uses: SecurityRonin/fleet-ci/.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml@a62ab10603151071744cec0b4e3638aa6406d4e4 + uses: SecurityRonin/fleet-ci/.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml@f9802dca64a95eb881fd05dd3f4f16e53b97f2b3 with: # CARRIED ACROSS. The replaced workflow gated on --fail-under-functions # 100 (functions, no line gate). The shared default is 100% per LINE — a From 8336c9a2ac61182ca9be044ee70cc7911d1e47a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Albert Hui Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 17:45:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] fix(tests): stop git corrupting the decmpfs fixtures on Windows checkout Seven decmpfs tests failed only on windows-latest. Decompression itself was fine -- the output was the expected perl script -- so the corruption was in the fixture bytes, not the decoder. Cause: the repo had no .gitattributes, so git applied its text/binary autodetection to byte-exact forensic evidence. core.autocrlf is true by default on windows-latest, so every file git judged "text" had its LF bytes rewritten to CRLF at checkout, and the tests then compared against corrupted evidence. Git scans only the first 8000 bytes for a NUL when making that call, so this was not confined to the .expected files -- it also hit a compressed INPUT whose first NUL falls past that window. Comparing a simulated windows-latest checkout against the stored blobs shows 7 of 15 decmpfs fixtures altered: lzvn.expected 80000 -> 87855 zlib.expected 150000 -> 164122 real_zlib_inline.expected 2000 -> 2218 zlib_inline.expected 3000 -> 3325 tahoe_type8.expected 1936 -> 1994 zlib_type3_stored.payload tahoe_type9.expected 63 -> 71 3001 -> 3326 Marking the data trees -text fixes the class rather than the seven failing tests, and covers fixtures added later. No test or source file is touched. Verified against git's own mechanism rather than by waiting on CI, since the mechanism is git's and not the OS's -- `git -c core.autocrlf=true clone` reproduces the runner's checkout on any platform: before 7 fixtures differ from their stored blobs; 19 passed, 7 failed after 0 fixtures differ; 26 passed, 0 failed The seven altered fixtures correspond one-to-one with the seven failing tests. Both runs use --no-fail-fast: without it cargo abandons the remaining targets after the first failure, and the broken tree reports 19 tests against the fixed tree's 26, which would have compared two different test sets. Corruption is detected by comparing each file against `git cat-file blob`, NOT by counting CRLF sequences -- compressed data legitimately contains 0D 0A, and a counting check falsely flagged lzvn.rsrc and real_zlib_rsrc.rsrc, which are intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 --- .gitattributes | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .gitattributes diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60aab31 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Forensic fixtures are byte-exact evidence: a test asserts on the exact bytes +# a real macOS volume contained. Git's text/binary autodetection only scans the +# first 8000 bytes for NUL, so a compressed payload whose first NUL falls later +# is classified as text and gets its LF bytes rewritten to CRLF on checkout +# under core.autocrlf=true -- the default on GitHub's windows-latest runners. +# That silently corrupted both the .expected files and several .rsrc/.payload +# inputs, which is why the decmpfs tests failed only on Windows. +# +# Never let git translate anything under a data directory. +tests/data/** -text +fuzz/corpus/** -text