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# PostgreSQL connection string for a local or hosted PostgreSQL 17 database.
OVERFLOW_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://<username>:<password>@<host>:5432/<database>
# Auth.js session signing and GitHub OAuth application credentials.
# Generate AUTH_SECRET with: openssl rand -base64 32
AUTH_SECRET=<random-secret>
AUTH_GITHUB_ID=<github-oauth-client-id>
AUTH_GITHUB_SECRET=<github-oauth-client-secret>
# 32 random bytes encoded as unpadded base64url for AES-256-GCM OAuth token encryption.
# Generate with: node -e "process.stdout.write(require('node:crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
OVERFLOW_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<base64url-32-byte-key>
# Optional decrypt-only previous key, set only during a key rotation (deploy/README.md section 11); leave it commented out otherwise.
# OVERFLOW_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS=
# Public application and HTTPS forge webhook callback configuration.
# The ORIGIN of OVERFLOW_APP_URL — its scheme, host and port, with any path ignored — is
# the only origin Overflow accepts browser mutations from: a cookie-authenticated
# POST or PATCH, and every sign-in/sign-out server action, whose Origin header is
# absent or does not match that origin is refused, and a missing or malformed
# OVERFLOW_APP_URL refuses every one of them.
# The same origin is also what Auth.js trusts for sign-in: the Auth.js
# configuration derives its trusted host from OVERFLOW_APP_URL, so this file alone
# signs in. An operator-set AUTH_URL or AUTH_TRUST_HOST still decides trust
# by itself, taking precedence over the derivation.
OVERFLOW_APP_URL=https://<public-host>
OVERFLOW_GITHUB_WEBHOOK_URL=https://<public-host>/api/github/webhooks
OVERFLOW_GITLAB_WEBHOOK_URL=https://<public-host>/api/gitlab/webhooks
# Controller identity and request channels the legal pages (/account-data,
# /terms) render. The DEFAULTS are the hosted instance's — the maintainer
# personally, the project's public issue tracker, and GitHub's private
# vulnerability reporting form — and they render ONLY where OVERFLOW_APP_URL's origin is
# https://overflow.nitjsefni.eu. On any other origin the pages render the plain
# self-hosted statement and exactly the channels configured here; a variable
# left unset publishes nothing, so an unconfigured copy invents no contact
# detail. Set these on a deployment that operates under its own controller.
# CONTROLLER_NAME=Jane Doe
# CONTROLLER_ISSUES_URL=https://github.com/your-org/your-requests-tracker
# CONTROLLER_SENSITIVE_URL=https://requests.example.org/sensitive
# Comma-separated GitHub account ids granted the moderator role at sign-in.
# Ids, not logins — logins can be renamed and reused. Find one with: gh api users/<login> --jq .id
OVERFLOW_MODERATOR_GITHUB_USER_IDS=<github-user-id-1>,<github-user-id-2>
# Shared secret for the privileged-action journal's client-address
# verification: the proxy echoes it in the x-privileged-proxy-secret header
# on every proxied request (deploy/README.md section 13), and a journal
# entry's address is recorded verified only when that header carries exactly
# this value. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
# Unset or empty stays fail-safe: every address is still recorded, marked
# unverified, until the operator steps land.
# OVERFLOW_PRIVILEGED_PROXY_SECRET=
# Admission threshold for new reconciliation passes per sponsor, not a guaranteed
# remaining balance: an admitted pass can spend past it. 0 disables the hold;
# missing, blank or malformed values fall back to 500. A very large nonnegative
# integer deliberately makes admission very restrictive.
# The process-local per-account observations appear at /moderation and clear on restart.
# For production, edit /etc/overflow/overflow.env and restart overflow.service;
# locally, update .env and restart pnpm dev. See OPERATING.md's Reconciliation
# section for quota ownership and deferral behavior.
OVERFLOW_GITHUB_GRAPHQL_BUDGET_RESERVE=500
# Any non-empty value turns off the reconciliation worker and its sweep — the
# whole of automatic reconciliation: jobs still accumulate, and nothing drains
# them. Leave it commented out to keep reconciliation running.
# OVERFLOW_DISABLE_RECONCILIATION_SWEEP=
# Per-identity hourly bounds for the expensive routes: account export, the
# repository changes (register, catalog change, unregister), API-token
# minting, forge-identity link and unlink, and settlement-correction requests.
# Each value is one acting identity's burst per hour, refilled steadily at
# value/60 per minute, keyed by the credential that acts — the session's
# account id, or the API token's issuance id — and shared with the MCP
# dispatch of the same operation. Non-finite, non-numeric and below-one
# values fall back to the default: a capacity below one would decline forever.
# The defaults' basis: export is heavy and needed only
# exceptionally (post-compromise hygiene, a copy before deletion);
# registration and its kin each cost a GitHub round trip, a hook write and a
# reconciliation enqueue and are occasional administration; token rotation,
# forge-identity linking (an outbound call to the member-chosen instance) and
# sponsor overrides are rare.
# OVERFLOW_RATE_LIMIT_EXPORT_PER_HOUR=3
# OVERFLOW_RATE_LIMIT_REPOSITORIES_PER_HOUR=10
# OVERFLOW_RATE_LIMIT_TOKENS_PER_HOUR=5
# OVERFLOW_RATE_LIMIT_FORGE_IDENTITIES_PER_HOUR=5
# OVERFLOW_RATE_LIMIT_OVERRIDES_PER_HOUR=5
# Extra destinations refused for the outbound fetches to member-supplied
# instances: comma-separated CIDR subnets or bare IPs, denied on top of the
# non-public address class. The default without it is the host's own public
# interface addresses, and an empty value disables the extra denials. Where
# the serving unit denies interface enumeration (a RestrictAddressFamilies
# pin without AF_NETLINK), the default is empty instead — the server starts
# with a warning — so the host's public addresses must be carried here
# explicitly. Leave it commented out to keep the default where enumeration
# works.
# PUBLIC_DESTINATION_DENY_CIDRS=
# Contributor work mail: members opt in to at most one email a day when work
# they can take appears. Off unless all three are set and valid; a partial or
# invalid set stays off and logs a startup warning naming the variable. Use a
# dedicated sending identity and SMTPS transport (implicit TLS, default port
# 465) — never the alert mailbox, the host's mail relay or smtp.gmail.com — and
# a daily limit below the provider's. See OPERATING.md "Contributor work mail".
# OVERFLOW_CONTRIBUTOR_MAIL_SMTP_URL=smtps://<user>:<password>@<smtp-host>
# OVERFLOW_CONTRIBUTOR_MAIL_FROM=<work-mail-sender-address>
# OVERFLOW_CONTRIBUTOR_MAIL_DAILY_LIMIT=<positive-integer>