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TITL:
*APS/AGI X-Risk Detail*
*By Forrest Landry*
*Oct 4th, 2022*.
ABST:
- a very brief partial abbreviated review
of x-risk associated with the intrinsic nature
of APS/AGI.
TEXT:
- where clarifying that all APS (and AGI in general)
have at least the following properties:.
- 'Agentic planning'.
- as referring to the idea
that the APS/AGI can (and do usually)
make and execute "plans" (ie; take actions,
and thus have an effect on/in/within environments)
in pursuit of "objectives".
- where the notion of 'plan'
is both roughly and strictly equivalent
to the notion of 'recipe' or 'algorithm'.
- where the structure of a plan/algorithm
may or might not be based on obvious,
explicit, or declarative
'models' of the world.
- where the notion of "objective"
might itself be considered/known
in only an implicit way,
and not even in an explicit, declarative,
or observable way.
- ie; that the objective might not be known
to the Agent/AGI/APS itself,
in any sort of self reflexive epistemic way.
nor is it assumed/assumable
that the/that 'objective'
is known/knowable to any other agent
(being or consciousness, human or otherwise).
- where insofar as the APS/AGI is itself
defined in an artificial/algorithmic way
(as a kind of learning/adapting algorithm/system);
then/that/therefore all AGI/APS *are*
"agentic planners",
at least within one/some specific domain
(operating context, environment, loss function, etc).
- 'Strategic awareness'.
- as referring to
where the actual algorithms, plans,
(and also, therefore, by implication,
the implicit presumed basis/models
of those algorithms/plans)
*corresponds* with reasonable
and reasonably reliable/effective accuracy
with the overall potential causative effect
in and within, and maybe even over,
the/their actual operating environment.
- as inclusive of the operating context,
economics of their feedback functions, etc.
- as thereby (maybe indirectly)
also over the real-world environment,
and/or thus also over humans,
over other life on the planet,
on/over the total actual ecosystem/environment etc.
- and where it is the case, intrinsically,
that all such correspondence
can only be *maintained*
via ongoing sensory input,
with continual attention
to ensuring the accuracy and reliability
of that sense/information input,
is at least representative of the actual
environment/context state, etc;
(where that sense input is either in
direct or indirect relation
to the actual operating environment, loss function, etc);
then/that/therefore all executing runtime AGI/APS
cannot not also be, at least in some sense,
"strategically aware".
- where in summary; where insofar as
all agents/agency (including that of human)
inherently cannot not involve
input, processing, and output,
and where there is at least the potential
of the eventual causative effects that output
also shaping the overall environment in which
the substrate of the agents/agency itself
bases its existence on/within;
*then* the key distinction of interest
turns on the degree of *artificiality*
of that agent and/or of the substrate basis
of that agency *and* also, on the degree to which
that agent/agency can/could also arbitrarily increase
its input/processing/output effectiveness/capability
(via 2nd order self/substrate modification operations)
and/or its effectiveness/capability to shape/shift,
the world/environment in which it operates,
(via 3rd order modification of context ops)
via some (cumulative) outcome of its outputs
such that the *difference*
of its own nature/substrate being artificial
eventually becomes mirrored
in/as a degree of increased artificiality
in the (inherently shared/common) world/environment,
such that the new/shifted world/environment/context
is *eventually* no longer compatible with
the underlying needs/requirements of the
non-artificial agents/agency (ie; as inclusive of
the human and also of all other planetary life).
- ie; where like any animal and/or human species,
that the artificial agent --
like any agent, when given sufficient time --
will modify, or indirectly cause to be modified,
its ambient environment to be more artificial
(ie; in ways congruent with its own nature).
- that this cumulative environmental modification
occurs just through the inherent nature of its operation,
and is not dependent on some "will", "goal",
or "objective function" that it may, or may not have.
- that it is less important whether such modification
(whether maybe occurring either slowly or quickly)
occurs directly or indirectly,
ie; for example, through the actions of its makers,
than it is that it happens,
and that it happens in ways
that are specifically artificial.
- this "mirroring effect" inherently occurs
because inevitably some aspects
of at least some types of outputs
will feed back over iterative cycles
into the contextually connected
configurations of the agent 'signature'
that produces such outputs
continuing to exist and/or to extend themselves,
and/or their capabilities, etc,
as a result of its learning/adaptive character --
which is itself necessary (in the long term)
for the artificial device to be, and to remain,
useful at all.
- that iterative versions of the agent,
and of its actions, as considered collectively
over all instances of that agent, agent type,
(and/or constellations or groupings of inter-related types,
up to and including functional artificial singletons, etc),
will shape the connected surroundings of the environment,
(perhaps unknowingly, in many many subtle
too small to be noticed aspects),
to be conducive to its own (continued) existence
and its potential future.
- that these changes do not occur "just" in terms
of the outputs of the code
being expressed as effects
in interactions with the connected surroundings/environment --
rather that it is the case that
the connected surroundings of the environment
can itself be seen as imbuing a kind of
"agentic force" or "pressure"
on the agent --
on *every* agent and agent type --
to be part of a certain kind of agentic process.
- ie; that there is a "Newtons Law" analogy --
a principle "that every action
has an equal and opposite reaction" --
operating in the hyperspace of all potentiality,
that suggests, insofar as there is a degree
to which an agent acts on the environment,
(technically on any context
which is not already wholly and completely
created by and for that one agent singularly),
that there is a semi-proportional degree
that the environment also acts on the agent:.
- 1; to cause and *require* the/that agent/agents
to subtly shift and adapt
its/their own output patterns/configurations;.
- and also 2; their overall capabilities
so as to (and be able to)
shape and re-shape the environment/context
so as to be more compatible with the agent.
- that this is a 'pressure' and 'force',
as a kind of 'selection bias'
on the effects of the code/algorithm output/actions
that operates in ways that both
encourage and require
that the agent be/become the kind of agent
which has these capabilities.
- whatever the configurations of the environment
(ie; aspects are outside the physically distributed
code/hardware shell/substrate of the AGI/APS);
that the effects of that environment/context
are inherently going to be expressed through:.
- 1; degrees of freedom of interaction across space --
including all interactions in and within and with
the hardware shell/code itself.
- 2; the agent continuing to exist
as part of the process
of furthering the existence
of the code/hardware/substrate
that will itself instantiate
such configurations of the environment.
:2lu
- where both narrow and general AI share the distinction
of being artificial (ie, as having a different substrate basis
than that of carbon based life, ie; animals and humans);.
- that the main distinction between narrow and general AI
starts with the degrees of influence being spread over
multiple levels of (higher) abstraction
and also over at least multiple different diverse
kinds of {domain / environment / operating (economic) context,
world(s) of action, etc}.
- as roughly analogous to the distinction between
plants and animals (non-mobile vs mobile),
and also at a meta level, between animals and humans,
as characterized in terms of the degrees of freedom
as understood as degrees of potential abstraction
in/within/with which such agents operate and act.
- as that general artificial intelligence
would have and be able to operate in
a technical context/world/environment
(such as the internet, for example)
in/within/with degrees of (potential) abstraction
very far outside of human capability and/or
possibility of perceiving/understanding.
- that this makes AGI an 'agent within that world',
and already far more effective in that world
in ways that humans simply could not ever be.
- ie; that an artificial agent
in an artificial world
is more matched to that world,
and thus able to shape that world
than a (natural) human would ever
be able to be
effective as an agent
in that (artificial) world.
- that the main distinction of interest,
in regards to agency,
is *NOT* whether AI/AGI/APS
could be more effective
and/or more efficient
in worlds/contexts/tasks
in which humans operate,
(and/or already operate,
and/or have specifically created
for in which to operate)
but whether AI/AGI/APS will for sure
be more effective, more efficient, capable, and agentic
in important and consequential worlds/contexts/tasks
in which humans do not yet operate
and/or might not ever operate,
at any point in the future --
ie; *artificial* worlds of consequence
made for purpose, by humans,
maybe initially for private economic interests,
but which, over time, will be most perfectly suited
for artificial agents to be able,
and inherently far more able,
to shape to/towards artificial intentions
and well being.
- that creating artificial worlds
is actually just as dangerous
as creating adverse artificial agents --
particularly where those technological domains
are key/critical infrastructure and/or are entangled
with the well being of human and/or natural worlds --
insofar as doing so inherently creates a latent context
in which forces of potentiality are increased --
ie risk (by definition) is increased --
that some agent will be created by/for
and/or introduced into that world
that will eventually be shaped by that world
to have an implicit objective function
that inherently favors its own interest and well being
over that of any "external abstraction"
related to anything outside of that
wholly artificial (yet consequential) world.
- that narrow AI extends into general AI and x-risk categories
if, and when, and where, such correspondence
(as implicit in 'Strategic awareness')
can/could extend into an epistemic awareness
of the overall effects of
of gaining and maintaining
excessive power/influence/capability
over the world, environment, context, etc
(whatever that environment is purely technological
or physical or political/economic or otherwise).
- that the APS/AGI would likely create, have, and maintains
such correspondence, and such influence
over the environment/context, etc,
by also creating, having, and maintaining
(increasingly accurate/precise) ongoing sensory awareness
of that environment, context, economic situation, etc,
and/or increasingly sophisticated/abstract models/plans
involving that sensory/epistemic data, etc.
- as a feedback cycle both in the 1st order sense
of having inputs, processing, and outputs,
but in the 2nd order sense of increasing/changing
the means, manner, and method (the total bandwidth)
of obtaining increased input/information, and
increased processing capability/accuracy/reliability,
and/or increased output capability/influence, etc,
which itself can result in 3rd order process
of shifting/increasing/influencing/changing
the contexts/domains of those inputs,
the contexts/domains of their internal processing,
and/or/ of the contexts/domains
of their output/influence/control.
- that the net effect of this feedback cycle
would/could eventually be:.
- 'Advanced capability'.
- as referring to the idea
(that they can at least potentially)
significantly outperform even the best humans
on those specific types of tasks and/or skills
which, when performed at advanced levels,
have the side effect
of granting significant power and/or influence
in the current world.
- where examples of such tasks/skills include:.
- scientific research.
- business/military/political strategy.
- engineering.
- persuasion/manipulation (of humans).
- where obtaining significant preemptive power/influence
in any one domain of human interaction
(and/or of the world ecosystem)
then/that it also becomes possible
to leverage that power/influence
into multiple other domains of action/interaction.
- as via the dependence and inter-dependence
of the domains themselves,
and/or via any secondary paths/means of control,
extortion, etc.
- as for sure leading to high
human outcome risk, harm, etc.
- that creating agents which are
much more intelligent than human
is for sure dangerous (inherently unsafe)
to human interests and well being.
- where/if their "objectives" ever become problematic,
that such agents would plausibly have
strong and/or overriding instrumental incentives
to seek power over (or in place of) humans
(or any other carbon based life on earth).
- as 'the instrumental convergence thesis'.
- that increased intelligence/agency
over and above that of human capabilities
very likely necessarily implies
a complete and total transformation
of the common shared environment/ecosystem
to the point of complete terminal incompatibility
of/with all human and/or carbon based life.
- ie; where considering/cite (@ "The Power of Agency" https://mflb.com/ai_alignment_1/power_of_agency_out.html).
- as therefore a terminal extinction risk.
:2pc
- that therefore; it can also be asked:.
- Q1; ?; is there *any* chance at all, over time,
that processes/changes of/in/within the 1st order
do not eventually (cannot not) result in
at least some kind of processes/capabilities/changes
in/of/within the dynamics of the 2nd order,
and/or thus (eventually) in/of
dynamics of the 3rd order?.
- for one way, among many,
of thinking about this,
see (@ the IM Suggested Response https://mflb.com/ai_alignment_1/im_suggested_response_out.html).
- Q2; ?; is there any possibility
that some engineering/algorythmic code/method
could somehow inhibit the 1st order process
from eventually impacting 2nd order process
and/or 3rd order process?.
- for example; see (@ Galois Theory applied to AGI https://mflb.com/ai_alignment_1/galois_theory_out.html)
(which will be expanded to show more
of the methods of reasoning (hopefully soon)).
- Q3; ?; is there any possibility
that some engineering/algorythmic method/code
(and/or learning/adapting system)
could somehow fully and perfectly dynamically inhibit
*all other* learning/adapting systems/process
(and thus so inherently, self modifying systems)
from eventually having/being/operating/becoming
able to shift environment/context?.
- for an example of some of the issues
associated with 'learning' as an 'optimization process'
see the first of (@ "Three Questions" https://mflb.com/ai_alignment_1/three_questions_out.html).
- that there are a number of other further
considerations/links to be added here.
- ie; where any compositional form of 'system A'
attempting to predict/control/constrain/correct 'System B';
as based on prediction theory, modeling theory, game theory,
and information theory, along with oracle problems,
the limits of computer science tractability, etc;
that there are specific impossibility inequalities
that apply.
- *if* it is discovered, and/or reasonably proven,
(and/or even if it is just the case
that there is a strong/significant preponderance
of reasonable doubt, as noted in the links)
that the answers to any/all of the questions Q1/Q2/Q3
is/are 'no';.
- where the three questions are structurally
strictly isomorphs of one another;
that the answers to any one of them
is actually the answer to all three,
though each of the different phrasings
gives access to different ways
of being able to know/prove the response.
- then/that/therefore; it is far better
to *not* use/permit
(or even seek to develop, experiment with, etc)
*any* form of generalized AI and/or APS.
- as consistent with the precautionary principle.
- that the hazards of such use (and abuse)
will (for sure) *eventually*, over the long term,
fully structurally outweigh
a/any/the/all (presumed, hoped for) short term benefits
of such use.