diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index 7c5ae61..53ce3ea 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -26,50 +26,6 @@ jobs:
           node-version: 20
       - run: npm run validate
 
-  verify-manifest:
-    name: Verify provenance manifest
-    needs: secret-check
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: 20
-      - name: Verify evaluation-manifest.json
-        run: npm run verify-manifest
-      # Catch a manifest that was committed without being regenerated after an
-      # input file changed. Regenerate, then compare only hash-bearing fields
-      # (excluding generatedAt and sourceCommit which legitimately differ on
-      # every regeneration). Any diff means the manifest is stale.
-      - name: Detect stale manifest (inputs changed without regenerating)
-        run: |
-          # Capture the committed manifest for comparison.
-          node -e "
-            const fs = require('fs');
-            const m = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('evaluation-manifest.json','utf-8'));
-            // Extract only the fields that must match: inputs hashes, expectedCounts,
-            // fixtureRelease, manifestVersion, mappingVersion, tierThresholds.
-            const sig = { inputs: m.inputs, expectedCounts: m.expectedCounts,
-                          fixtureRelease: m.fixtureRelease, manifestVersion: m.manifestVersion,
-                          mappingVersion: m.mappingVersion, tierThresholds: m.tierThresholds };
-            fs.writeFileSync('manifest-sig-before.json', JSON.stringify(sig, null, 2) + '\n');
-          "
-          npm run generate-manifest
-          node -e "
-            const fs = require('fs');
-            const m = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('evaluation-manifest.json','utf-8'));
-            const sig = { inputs: m.inputs, expectedCounts: m.expectedCounts,
-                          fixtureRelease: m.fixtureRelease, manifestVersion: m.manifestVersion,
-                          mappingVersion: m.mappingVersion, tierThresholds: m.tierThresholds };
-            fs.writeFileSync('manifest-sig-after.json', JSON.stringify(sig, null, 2) + '\n');
-          "
-          if ! diff -q manifest-sig-before.json manifest-sig-after.json > /dev/null; then
-            echo "::error file=evaluation-manifest.json::evaluation-manifest.json is stale — an input file changed but the manifest was not regenerated. Run 'npm run generate-manifest' and commit the result."
-            diff manifest-sig-before.json manifest-sig-after.json
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "Manifest signature unchanged — manifest is up to date."
-
   validate-changelog:
     name: Changelog updated
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -102,3 +58,4 @@ jobs:
             echo "::error file=CHANGELOG.md::This PR modifies fixture files but the [Unreleased] section of CHANGELOG.md is empty."
             exit 1
           fi
+          echo "CHANGELOG.md [Unreleased] section is populated � check passed."
diff --git a/EVALUATION_RESULT_SCHEMA.json b/EVALUATION_RESULT_SCHEMA.json
deleted file mode 100644
index c8462b0..0000000
--- a/EVALUATION_RESULT_SCHEMA.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
-  "$id": "https://github.com/Gryd-lock/grydlock-testkit/blob/main/EVALUATION_RESULT_SCHEMA.json",
-  "title": "Gryd Lock Evaluation Result",
-  "description": "Schema for the result document that grydlock-research must produce when evaluating a testkit fixture release. Every evaluation run must identify its dataset, implementation, and mapping versions so results can be compared across runs without ambiguity.",
-  "type": "object",
-  "required": [
-    "schemaVersion",
-    "fixtureRelease",
-    "sourceCommit",
-    "evaluatedAt",
-    "evaluatorVersion",
-    "mappingVersion",
-    "tierThresholds",
-    "summary",
-    "perDestination"
-  ],
-  "additionalProperties": false,
-  "properties": {
-    "schemaVersion": {
-      "type": "string",
-      "description": "Version of this result schema (semver). Must match the manifestVersion in the evaluation-manifest.json used for this run.",
-      "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$",
-      "examples": ["1.0.0"]
-    },
-    "fixtureRelease": {
-      "type": "string",
-      "description": "The grydlock-testkit release tag evaluated (semver). Must match evaluation-manifest.json fixtureRelease.",
-      "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$",
-      "examples": ["0.1.0"]
-    },
-    "sourceCommit": {
-      "type": "string",
-      "description": "Full SHA-1 git commit of grydlock-testkit at evaluation time. Must match evaluation-manifest.json sourceCommit.",
-      "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$",
-      "examples": ["4707242b30d5c2c3539d8ec90cd3612779c8b3b2"]
-    },
-    "evaluatedAt": {
-      "type": "string",
-      "description": "ISO-8601 datetime when this evaluation run was performed.",
-      "format": "date-time",
-      "examples": ["2026-08-18T00:00:00.000Z"]
-    },
-    "evaluatorVersion": {
-      "type": "string",
-      "description": "Version of grydlock-research that produced this result (semver).",
-      "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$",
-      "examples": ["0.1.0"]
-    },
-    "mappingVersion": {
-      "type": "string",
-      "description": "Version of the score-to-tier mapping used (semver). Must match evaluation-manifest.json mappingVersion. Bump this whenever tier threshold boundaries change.",
-      "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$",
-      "examples": ["1.0.0"]
-    },
-    "tierThresholds": {
-      "type": "object",
-      "description": "The exact tier threshold configuration applied during scoring. Copied from evaluation-manifest.json so the result is self-contained.",
-      "required": ["clean", "suspicious", "malicious"],
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "properties": {
-        "clean": {
-          "type": "object",
-          "required": ["max"],
-          "properties": {
-            "max": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 100 }
-          }
-        },
-        "suspicious": {
-          "type": "object",
-          "required": ["min", "max"],
-          "properties": {
-            "min": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 100 },
-            "max": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 100 }
-          }
-        },
-        "malicious": {
-          "type": "object",
-          "required": ["min"],
-          "properties": {
-            "min": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 100 }
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    },
-    "summary": {
-      "type": "object",
-      "description": "Aggregate accuracy metrics across the full dataset.",
-      "required": ["total", "correct", "accuracy", "byLabel"],
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "properties": {
-        "total": {
-          "type": "integer",
-          "description": "Total number of destinations evaluated. Must match expectedCounts.total in the manifest.",
-          "minimum": 1
-        },
-        "correct": {
-          "type": "integer",
-          "description": "Number of destinations where the assigned tier matched the label.",
-          "minimum": 0
-        },
-        "accuracy": {
-          "type": "number",
-          "description": "Fraction of correct tier assignments (correct / total). Range [0, 1].",
-          "minimum": 0,
-          "maximum": 1
-        },
-        "byLabel": {
-          "type": "object",
-          "description": "Per-label breakdown of evaluation counts and accuracy.",
-          "required": ["clean", "suspicious", "malicious"],
-          "additionalProperties": false,
-          "properties": {
-            "clean": { "$ref": "#/$defs/labelMetrics" },
-            "suspicious": { "$ref": "#/$defs/labelMetrics" },
-            "malicious": { "$ref": "#/$defs/labelMetrics" }
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    },
-    "perDestination": {
-      "type": "array",
-      "description": "One entry per evaluated destination, ordered by destination ID.",
-      "minItems": 1,
-      "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/destinationResult" }
-    }
-  },
-  "$defs": {
-    "labelMetrics": {
-      "type": "object",
-      "required": ["total", "correct", "accuracy"],
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "properties": {
-        "total": {
-          "type": "integer",
-          "description": "Number of destinations with this label.",
-          "minimum": 0
-        },
-        "correct": {
-          "type": "integer",
-          "description": "Number correctly classified.",
-          "minimum": 0
-        },
-        "accuracy": {
-          "type": "number",
-          "description": "Fraction correct for this label.",
-          "minimum": 0,
-          "maximum": 1
-        }
-      }
-    },
-    "destinationResult": {
-      "type": "object",
-      "required": ["id", "label", "score", "assignedTier", "correct"],
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "properties": {
-        "id": {
-          "type": "string",
-          "description": "Destination ID, matching destinations.json."
-        },
-        "label": {
-          "type": "string",
-          "description": "Ground-truth label from destinations.json.",
-          "enum": ["clean", "suspicious", "malicious"]
-        },
-        "score": {
-          "type": "integer",
-          "description": "Stub score from scores.json.",
-          "minimum": 0,
-          "maximum": 100
-        },
-        "assignedTier": {
-          "type": "string",
-          "description": "Tier computed by applying tierThresholds to score.",
-          "enum": ["clean", "suspicious", "malicious"]
-        },
-        "correct": {
-          "type": "boolean",
-          "description": "Whether assignedTier matches label."
-        },
-        "notes": {
-          "type": "string",
-          "description": "Optional free-text annotation for this result (e.g. edge-case explanation)."
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 8c420b3..6261d3f 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -24,10 +24,7 @@ grydlock-testkit/
   README.md
   LICENSE
   package.json
-  evaluation-manifest.json
-  EVALUATION_RESULT_SCHEMA.json
   .github/workflows/ci.yml
-  .github/workflows/consumer-contract-test.yml
   destinations.json
   scores.json
   scripts/
diff --git a/docs/spike-transaction-portability.md b/docs/spike-transaction-portability.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0834e6f..0000000
--- a/docs/spike-transaction-portability.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
-# Spike: Transaction Fixture Network and Envelope Portability
-
-**Status:** Complete  
-**Date:** 2026-08-18  
-**Spike question:** Should fixtures remain TESTNET-only, or support multiple passphrases, signed envelopes, fee bumps, and network variants?
-
----
-
-## 1. Current state inventory
-
-All three existing fixtures share the same assumptions. None of these assumptions are written into code in this repo — they live only in `transactions/README.md`.
-
-| Property | Current value |
-|----------|--------------|
-| Network | TESTNET only (`"Test SDF Network ; September 2015"`) |
-| Passphrase recorded in fixture | No — README prose only |
-| Envelope type | `envelopeTypeTx` (v1) on all three |
-| Signed | No — 0 signatures in every envelope |
-| Fee-bump | No |
-| Sequence numbers | Hardcoded (2, 3, 4) |
-| Memo | None |
-| Time bounds | None |
-| Fixture metadata | Only in `transactions/README.md`; not machine-readable |
-| Hash recorded in manifest | No — XDR files are hashed by `evaluation-manifest.json` but their transaction hashes are not recorded |
-
-### What the SDK actually does with the passphrase
-
-`TransactionBuilder.fromXDR(xdr, passphrase)` does **not** validate the passphrase against anything inside the binary envelope. The passphrase is recorded in the in-memory `Transaction` object and used only for hash computation. A decoder that passes the wrong passphrase will parse the envelope identically, extract the same operations, but compute a wrong transaction hash — silently, with no error.
-
-Verified empirically:
-
-```
-payment.xdr decoded under TESTNET: hash = f8310e15...
-payment.xdr decoded under PUBLIC:  hash = 80b951be...   ← different, no error thrown
-Operations: identical in both cases
-Source:     identical in both cases
-```
-
-This means the network tag is a caller responsibility, not an envelope property. Any consumer that omits the passphrase, or defaults to PUBLIC, will get wrong hashes from TESTNET fixtures.
-
----
-
-## 2. Areas investigated
-
-### 2a. PUBLIC vs TESTNET passphrases
-
-| Concern | TESTNET only | Multi-network |
-|---------|-------------|---------------|
-| XDR encoding | Passphrase-agnostic — same bytes regardless | Same: XDR does not embed passphrase |
-| Hash | TESTNET hash ≠ PUBLIC hash for same XDR | Each variant needs its own recorded hash |
-| Signature validity | A TESTNET signature is invalid on PUBLIC | Separate signed fixtures per network |
-| Decoder assumption | Consumer must know to pass `Networks.TESTNET` | Consumer must read metadata to pick passphrase |
-| Risk of silent bug | Consumer defaults to PUBLIC → wrong hash | Explicit metadata prevents this |
-| Scope | Contained to this repo | Requires grydlock-extension to handle both |
-
-**Finding:** Supporting PUBLIC addresses is out of scope (all fixture addresses are synthetic testnet-only; they have no meaning on PUBLIC). Supporting an alternative TESTNET-like passphrase (FUTURENET) adds no evaluation value. The correct action is to make TESTNET explicit in a machine-readable fixture index rather than adding a second network.
-
-### 2b. Signed vs unsigned envelopes
-
-Currently all fixtures are unsigned. The extension's decode step only needs the envelope structure (operation type, source, destination, asset) — it does not verify signatures before warning the user. Signing requires a secret key, which is explicitly excluded from the repo by `scripts/check-secrets.mjs`.
-
-| Concern | Unsigned (current) | Signed |
-|---------|-------------------|--------|
-| Decode step | Fully exercised | Fully exercised |
-| Signature verification | Not tested | Testable |
-| Secret key required | No | Yes — cannot commit |
-| Reproducibility | Deterministic | Non-deterministic without fixed keypair |
-| Security risk | None | Low, but seeding a test keypair is boilerplate |
-| Extension relevance | Covers the warn-before-sign path | Would cover the already-signed path |
-
-**Finding:** Unsigned fixtures are correct for the decode/warn use case. A signed fixture would only add value if the extension gains a "verify before relay" feature. For now, unsigned is the right constraint.
-
-### 2c. Fee-bump envelopes (`envelopeTypeFeeBump`)
-
-Fee-bump transactions are a distinct envelope type (`envelopeTypeTxFeeBump` in XDR). The Stellar SDK's `TransactionBuilder.fromXDR` returns a `FeeBumpTransaction` object (a different class from `Transaction`). A decoder that only handles `Transaction` will fail or silently misclassify a fee-bump envelope.
-
-Prototype produced during this spike (wrapping `payment.xdr`):
-
-```
-XDR:           AAAABQ...
-Envelope type: envelopeTypeTxFeeBump
-Fee-bump source (outer): GA4HFFSHZ7PADQWOFCZGYV2HE437LQ2WDILWCGC33BMJUQ6OBO5HKI5D
-Inner tx source:         GCRRYBV5IY7DSI54DKW33ZELC2LWYCAHC43TXAM2A2HTFN5GWOFWXPC2
-Hash (TESTNET):          7ab7ae0df710a6d37484f403f7d2ccd14b88832c843b961cd5f52311a027876f
-```
-
-The fee-bump source and the inner-transaction source are different accounts. From a risk-scoring perspective:
-- The **inner** transaction's source is the account the user controls.
-- The **outer** fee-bump source pays the fee — this can be any third party.
-- The **inner** transaction's operations contain the destinations that need scoring.
-
-A decoder that extracts `tx.source` from a fee-bump will get the fee-bump source (outer), not the inner transaction's source — a silent, semantically wrong result if the two differ.
-
-### 2d. Transaction hash implications
-
-The transaction hash is the canonical identifier on the Stellar network. It is determined by:
-
-```
-hash = SHA-256(passphrase_hash || tx_xdr_bytes)
-```
-
-Where `passphrase_hash = SHA-256(passphrase_string)`.
-
-Consequences:
-- Changing the passphrase changes the hash even with identical XDR.
-- A fee-bump transaction has its own hash, distinct from its inner transaction's hash.
-- The fixture XDR files are hashed by `evaluation-manifest.json` (file content SHA-256), which is independent of the Stellar transaction hash.
-
-| Hash type | What it covers | Where it lives |
-|-----------|---------------|----------------|
-| File SHA-256 | Exact bytes of the `.xdr` file | `evaluation-manifest.json` |
-| Stellar tx hash (TESTNET) | Canonical identifier on the Stellar TESTNET ledger | Not recorded anywhere currently |
-| Stellar tx hash (PUBLIC) | Different value — meaningless for synthetic fixtures | N/A |
-
-**Finding:** Recording the Stellar transaction hash alongside each fixture in a `transactions/index.json` would allow consumers to verify they are decoding the fixture correctly (compute hash with their passphrase, compare to recorded value). This is a low-cost addition.
-
-### 2e. Fixture metadata and naming
-
-Currently:
-- Fixture content is documented in `transactions/README.md` (human-readable only).
-- No machine-readable index exists.
-- The `evaluation-manifest.json` hashes the XDR files but records nothing about their semantics (envelope type, network, operations, expected hashes).
-
-A machine-readable `transactions/index.json` would let consumers:
-- Know the passphrase to use before decoding.
-- Detect the envelope type without parsing the XDR.
-- Verify the Stellar transaction hash after decoding.
-- Understand which fixture addresses correspond to which semantic scenarios.
-
-### 2f. Deterministic generation
-
-All three existing fixtures appear to have been hand-constructed (no generation script exists despite `CONTRIBUTING.md` requiring one for new XDR fixtures). For reproducibility:
-- The XDR itself is deterministic given fixed inputs (source, sequence, operations, fee).
-- A script that generates fixtures from a JSON spec would make re-creation auditable.
-- Fee bumps and alternative envelope types should be generated, not hand-edited.
-
----
-
-## 3. Portability strategy comparison
-
-### Strategy A — TESTNET-only, extend coverage explicitly
-
-Keep TESTNET as the sole network. Add a machine-readable `transactions/index.json` that records the passphrase, envelope type, Stellar transaction hash, and per-operation metadata. Add a fee-bump fixture. Do not add signed fixtures yet.
-
-| Criterion | Score | Notes |
-|-----------|-------|-------|
-| Realism | ✅ | TESTNET is the correct context for all fixture addresses |
-| Reproducibility | ✅ | Deterministic: passphrase is fixed, hashes are recorded |
-| Security | ✅ | No secret keys; `check-secrets.mjs` continues to apply |
-| Consumer complexity | ✅ Low | One passphrase, one code path |
-| Storage | ✅ Minimal | One XDR file per fixture type |
-| Compatibility | ✅ | No downstream changes needed for current consumers |
-| Extension decoder | ⚠️ | Still needs fee-bump handling; index makes the gap detectable |
-| Migration | None needed | Index and fee-bump fixture are additive |
-
-### Strategy B — Multi-network support
-
-Add a `network` field to each fixture (TESTNET or PUBLIC). Ship both TESTNET and PUBLIC variants of each fixture.
-
-| Criterion | Score | Notes |
-|-----------|-------|-------|
-| Realism | ❌ | Fixture addresses are synthetic testnet addresses — they are meaningless on PUBLIC |
-| Reproducibility | ⚠️ | Requires maintaining parallel fixture sets |
-| Security | ✅ | Still unsigned |
-| Consumer complexity | ❌ High | Two code paths, disambiguation logic, risk of wrong passphrase being used |
-| Storage | ❌ | Doubles fixture count with no evaluation benefit |
-| Compatibility | ❌ | Breaking: evaluation-manifest.json would need network tagging; downstream consumers need updates |
-| Migration | Significant | All consumers need passphrase-selection logic |
-
-**Recommendation: Strategy A.** Multi-network support adds complexity and storage with no evaluation benefit given that fixture addresses are synthetic TESTNET data. The correct path is making TESTNET explicit in machine-readable metadata and adding the missing envelope type coverage.
-
----
-
-## 4. Prototype
-
-A fee-bump envelope wrapping `payment.xdr` was generated during this spike:
-
-**`transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr`** (prototype — not committed yet):
-
-```
-AAAABQAAAAA4cpZHz94Bws4osmxXRyc39cNWGhdhGFvYWJpDzgu6dQAAAAAAAAPoAAAAAgAAAACjHAa9
-Rj45I7warb3kixaXbAgHFzc7gZoGjzK3prOLawAAAGQAAAAAAAAAAgAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
-AAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAQAAAACi1V0pXlo1q0Sz766lEpuiK4i6Pil2YUX97KOwjjivUwAAAAAAAAAAH
-c1lAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-```
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| Envelope type | `envelopeTypeTxFeeBump` |
-| Fee-bump source (outer) | `GA4HFFSHZ7PADQWOFCZGYV2HE437LQ2WDILWCGC33BMJUQ6OBO5HKI5D` (`clean_wallet_2`) |
-| Inner tx source | `GCRRYBV5IY7DSI54DKW33ZELC2LWYCAHC43TXAM2A2HTFN5GWOFWXPC2` (`clean_wallet_1`) |
-| Inner operation | `payment` to `GCRNKXJJLZNDLK2EWPX25JISTORCXCF2HYUXMYKF7XWKHMEOHCXVGP4J` (`suspicious_wallet_1`) |
-| Outer fee | 500 stroops |
-| Inner fee | 100 stroops |
-| Signed | No |
-| Stellar hash (TESTNET) | `7ab7ae0df710a6d37484f403f7d2ccd14b88832c843b961cd5f52311a027876f` |
-
-This prototype exercises the decoder's fee-bump path: the destination being scored is inside the inner transaction, not at the top level of the outer envelope.
-
----
-
-## 5. Hash / signature / passphrase implications summary
-
-| Scenario | What changes | What breaks if wrong |
-|----------|-------------|---------------------|
-| Wrong passphrase on decode | Transaction hash is wrong | Hash-based ledger lookups, signature verification |
-| Decoder reads `.source` on a fee-bump | Gets outer fee source, not inner tx source | Wrong account attributed as the transaction initiator |
-| Decoder skips `.operations` traversal in fee-bump | Misses inner operations | Risk scoring fails silently — no destinations extracted |
-| XDR file modified | File SHA-256 changes → `verify-manifest` catches it | N/A (manifest hash catches this) |
-| Fixture used without consulting index | Consumer guesses passphrase | Wrong hash on a TESTNET fixture decoded as PUBLIC |
-
----
-
-## 6. Recommendations
-
-1. **Add `transactions/index.json`** — machine-readable index recording for each fixture: filename, `network`, `passphrase`, `envelopeType`, `signed`, `stellarHashTestnet`, a `description`, and a `sources`/`destinations` summary. This is the minimal change that closes the silent-wrong-passphrase risk.
-
-2. **Add a fee-bump fixture** (`transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr`) using the prototype above. Update `transactions/README.md` and `transactions/index.json`. This is the highest-value missing envelope type — it exercises a decoder code path that currently has no test coverage.
-
-3. **Add `transactions/index.json` to `evaluation-manifest.json` inputs** — hash it alongside the XDR files so the manifest covers the metadata too.
-
-4. **Do not add PUBLIC fixtures** — the fixture addresses are synthetic TESTNET data. A PUBLIC variant would produce a different hash but identical operations, adding no evaluation signal and significant consumer confusion.
-
-5. **Do not add signed fixtures yet** — signed fixtures require a test keypair (or a deterministic derivation), add `check-secrets.mjs` complexity, and do not cover any extension decode path that unsigned fixtures miss. Revisit when the extension gains a verify-before-relay feature.
-
-6. **Add a generation script** — CONTRIBUTING.md already requires new XDR fixtures to come from a script. A `scripts/generate-transactions.mjs` driven by a JSON spec would make all fixtures reproducible from scratch without the Stellar SDK being installed permanently.
-
----
-
-## 7. Follow-up issues
-
-| Issue | Priority | Owner |
-|-------|----------|-------|
-| Add `transactions/index.json` with passphrase and hash fields | High | testkit |
-| Add `fee_bump_payment.xdr` fixture | High | testkit |
-| Add fee-bump decode path to grydlock-extension decoder | High | extension |
-| Add `scripts/generate-transactions.mjs` | Medium | testkit |
-| Document fee-bump inner-vs-outer source in extension decoder | Medium | extension |
-| Investigate muxed account (`M...`) address handling in decoder | Low | extension |
diff --git a/evaluation-manifest.json b/evaluation-manifest.json
deleted file mode 100644
index d97530c..0000000
--- a/evaluation-manifest.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "_comment": "Provenance manifest for the grydlock-testkit evaluation dataset. Regenerate with: npm run generate-manifest. Verify with: npm run verify-manifest.",
-  "manifestVersion": "1.0.0",
-  "fixtureRelease": "0.1.0",
-  "sourceCommit": "c8a50e05ee5fc469606d6341da438dda9280b6e8",
-  "generatedAt": "2026-08-18T00:40:12.159Z",
-  "inputs": {
-    "destinations": {
-      "path": "destinations.json",
-      "sha256": "6f8fd8a08337490dc381a60b73a241b902e14d8dbd8e6e9e2b8a678710569e3c"
-    },
-    "scores": {
-      "path": "scores.json",
-      "sha256": "bd32acb0e615b3e708983929faec92df314d074a4d1a611f386e96e325358a77"
-    },
-    "transaction_payment": {
-      "path": "transactions/payment.xdr",
-      "sha256": "1005779f853e22f8c9ee4ab5dcfd3dc5e5317367e98c9a9da4b88308729cfe88"
-    },
-    "transaction_path_payment": {
-      "path": "transactions/path_payment.xdr",
-      "sha256": "a2a544b83a7e56fb821ed035cab54303d69f5d861ccf8733dd0759df83639e84"
-    },
-    "transaction_change_trust": {
-      "path": "transactions/change_trust.xdr",
-      "sha256": "5f773b38f2edd7622769cce0affce59f0f66c20e59e9ba3957f9c369590cc0f6"
-    },
-    "transaction_fee_bump": {
-      "path": "transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr",
-      "sha256": "f1ce585df3473ee1a254980d36022f5245d2e90eed554ec3d31d4d06c769a4cc"
-    },
-    "transaction_index": {
-      "path": "transactions/index.json",
-      "sha256": "dbd4ba71abea2e3bc496c831a67be894efa1fa850527a1c4411ba694758d66ae"
-    }
-  },
-  "mappingVersion": "1.0.0",
-  "tierThresholds": {
-    "clean": {
-      "max": 29
-    },
-    "suspicious": {
-      "min": 30,
-      "max": 69
-    },
-    "malicious": {
-      "min": 70
-    }
-  },
-  "expectedCounts": {
-    "total": 12,
-    "clean": 4,
-    "suspicious": 3,
-    "malicious": 5
-  },
-  "evaluatorVersion": ">=0.1.0",
-  "resultSchema": {
-    "$ref": "EVALUATION_RESULT_SCHEMA.json"
-  }
-}
diff --git a/scripts/generate-manifest.mjs b/scripts/generate-manifest.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 1948fd4..0000000
--- a/scripts/generate-manifest.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
-/**
- * generate-manifest.mjs
- *
- * Computes SHA-256 hashes for all input files and writes evaluation-manifest.json.
- *
- * Usage:
- *   npm run generate-manifest
- *
- * The generated manifest is committed to the repository. It must be regenerated
- * (and the updated file committed) whenever any input file changes.
- *
- * Versioning rules:
- *   manifestVersion  — bump the major when the manifest schema changes shape.
- *   fixtureRelease   — mirrors package.json "version"; bump with dataset releases.
- *   mappingVersion   — bump whenever tier threshold boundaries change.
- *   evaluatorVersion — semver range; tighten when evaluation methodology requires it.
- */
-
-import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
-import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
-import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { resolve } from 'node:path';
-
-const root = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Helpers
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** Compute the SHA-256 hex digest of a file on disk. */
-function sha256File(relPath) {
-  const abs = resolve(root, relPath);
-  const buf = readFileSync(abs);
-  return createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('hex');
-}
-
-/** Resolve a value from the current manifest if it exists, else return the fallback. */
-function preserve(current, key, fallback) {
-  return current?.[key] ?? fallback;
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Read current state
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(resolve(root, 'package.json'), 'utf-8'));
-
-let currentManifest = null;
-const manifestPath = resolve(root, 'evaluation-manifest.json');
-try {
-  currentManifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf-8'));
-} catch {
-  // No existing manifest — first generation.
-}
-
-// Determine git HEAD commit (falls back gracefully outside a git repo).
-let sourceCommit = 'unknown';
-try {
-  sourceCommit = execSync('git rev-parse HEAD', { cwd: root }).toString().trim();
-} catch {
-  // Running outside a git checkout (e.g. downloaded zip).
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Input files
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-const INPUT_FILES = [
-  { key: 'destinations',             path: 'destinations.json' },
-  { key: 'scores',                   path: 'scores.json' },
-  { key: 'transaction_payment',      path: 'transactions/payment.xdr' },
-  { key: 'transaction_path_payment', path: 'transactions/path_payment.xdr' },
-  { key: 'transaction_change_trust', path: 'transactions/change_trust.xdr' },
-  { key: 'transaction_fee_bump',     path: 'transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr' },
-  { key: 'transaction_index',        path: 'transactions/index.json' },
-];
-
-const inputs = {};
-for (const { key, path } of INPUT_FILES) {
-  inputs[key] = { path, sha256: sha256File(path) };
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Derive expected counts from the current destinations.json
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-const destinations = JSON.parse(
-  readFileSync(resolve(root, 'destinations.json'), 'utf-8')
-).destinations;
-
-const labelCounts = { clean: 0, suspicious: 0, malicious: 0 };
-for (const d of destinations) {
-  if (labelCounts[d.label] !== undefined) labelCounts[d.label]++;
-}
-
-const expectedCounts = {
-  total:      destinations.length,
-  clean:      labelCounts.clean,
-  suspicious: labelCounts.suspicious,
-  malicious:  labelCounts.malicious,
-};
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Assemble manifest
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-// Preserve version fields that require human decision when changed.
-// New fields use sensible defaults that match the initial release baseline.
-const manifest = {
-  _comment:
-    'Provenance manifest for the grydlock-testkit evaluation dataset. ' +
-    'Regenerate with: npm run generate-manifest. Verify with: npm run verify-manifest.',
-
-  manifestVersion:  preserve(currentManifest, 'manifestVersion',  '1.0.0'),
-  fixtureRelease:   pkg.version,
-  sourceCommit,
-  generatedAt:      new Date().toISOString(),
-
-  inputs,
-
-  // mappingVersion tracks tier threshold changes independently of the fixture release.
-  mappingVersion:   preserve(currentManifest, 'mappingVersion', '1.0.0'),
-  tierThresholds:   preserve(currentManifest, 'tierThresholds', {
-    clean:      { max: 29 },
-    suspicious: { min: 30, max: 69 },
-    malicious:  { min: 70 },
-  }),
-
-  expectedCounts,
-
-  // Minimum grydlock-research version required to evaluate this dataset.
-  evaluatorVersion: preserve(currentManifest, 'evaluatorVersion', '>=0.1.0'),
-
-  resultSchema: { $ref: 'EVALUATION_RESULT_SCHEMA.json' },
-};
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Write
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2) + '\n', 'utf-8');
-
-console.log('evaluation-manifest.json written.');
-console.log('  fixtureRelease : ' + manifest.fixtureRelease);
-console.log('  sourceCommit   : ' + manifest.sourceCommit);
-console.log('  generatedAt    : ' + manifest.generatedAt);
-console.log('  expectedCounts : ' + JSON.stringify(manifest.expectedCounts));
-console.log('  inputs hashed  : ' + Object.keys(inputs).join(', '));
diff --git a/scripts/validate-fixtures.mjs b/scripts/validate-fixtures.mjs
index c12c544..045a8bb 100644
--- a/scripts/validate-fixtures.mjs
+++ b/scripts/validate-fixtures.mjs
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { VALID_LABELS, VALID_RISK_PATTERNS } from './lib/taxonomy.mjs';
 
@@ -85,101 +84,6 @@ if (expectedCounts) {
   }
 }
 
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Manifest cross-check
-// Verify that evaluation-manifest.json exists and its expectedCounts agree
-// with the destinations we just validated. Full hash verification is done by
-// scripts/verify-manifest.mjs; here we only check the counts to keep the
-// validate step fast and free of I/O on every binary fixture.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-const manifestPath = `${root}/evaluation-manifest.json`;
-if (!existsSync(manifestPath)) {
-  errors.push(
-    'evaluation-manifest.json is missing. Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-  );
-} else {
-  let manifest;
-  try {
-    manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf-8'));
-  } catch (err) {
-    errors.push(`evaluation-manifest.json is not valid JSON: ${err.message}`);
-    manifest = null;
-  }
-
-  if (manifest) {
-    // fixtureRelease must match package.json version.
-    let pkgVersion;
-    try {
-      pkgVersion = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${root}/package.json`, 'utf-8')).version;
-    } catch {
-      /* ignore — package.json absence is caught elsewhere */
-    }
-    if (pkgVersion && manifest.fixtureRelease !== pkgVersion) {
-      errors.push(
-        `evaluation-manifest.json fixtureRelease="${manifest.fixtureRelease}" ` +
-        `does not match package.json version="${pkgVersion}". ` +
-        'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-      );
-    }
-
-    // expectedCounts must agree with the current label distribution.
-    if (manifest.expectedCounts) {
-      const ec = manifest.expectedCounts;
-      const labelCounts = { clean: 0, suspicious: 0, malicious: 0 };
-      for (const d of destinations) {
-        if (labelCounts[d.label] !== undefined) labelCounts[d.label]++;
-      }
-
-      if (typeof ec.total === 'number' && ec.total !== destinations.length) {
-        errors.push(
-          `evaluation-manifest.json expectedCounts.total=${ec.total} but ` +
-          `destinations.json has ${destinations.length} entries. ` +
-          'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-        );
-      }
-      for (const label of ['clean', 'suspicious', 'malicious']) {
-        if (typeof ec[label] === 'number' && ec[label] !== labelCounts[label]) {
-          errors.push(
-            `evaluation-manifest.json expectedCounts.${label}=${ec[label]} but ` +
-            `destinations.json has ${labelCounts[label]} ${label} entries. ` +
-            'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-          );
-        }
-      }
-    } else {
-      errors.push('evaluation-manifest.json is missing expectedCounts field.');
-    }
-
-    // Verify SHA-256 hashes for the two JSON fixture files (fast, text-only).
-    // XDR binary files are covered by verify-manifest (run separately in CI).
-    const HASH_TARGETS = [
-      { key: 'destinations', path: 'destinations.json' },
-      { key: 'scores',       path: 'scores.json' },
-    ];
-    for (const { key, path } of HASH_TARGETS) {
-      const entry = manifest.inputs?.[key];
-      if (!entry) {
-        errors.push(`evaluation-manifest.json missing inputs.${key}`);
-        continue;
-      }
-      try {
-        const actual = createHash('sha256')
-          .update(readFileSync(`${root}/${path}`))
-          .digest('hex');
-        if (actual !== entry.sha256) {
-          errors.push(
-            `inputs.${key} hash mismatch for "${path}" — file changed since manifest was generated. ` +
-            'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-          );
-        }
-      } catch (err) {
-        errors.push(`Could not hash "${path}": ${err.message}`);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
-
 if (errors.length > 0) {
   console.error('Fixture validation failed:\n' + errors.map((e) => '  - ' + e).join('\n'));
   process.exit(1);
diff --git a/scripts/verify-manifest.mjs b/scripts/verify-manifest.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 1e275fd..0000000
--- a/scripts/verify-manifest.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
-/**
- * verify-manifest.mjs
- *
- * Validates evaluation-manifest.json against the current state of the repo.
- *
- * Checks:
- *   1. Manifest file exists and is valid JSON.
- *   2. Required top-level fields are present and well-typed.
- *   3. fixtureRelease matches package.json version.
- *   4. Every input file listed in manifest.inputs exists on disk and its
- *      SHA-256 matches the recorded hash (altered-input detection).
- *   5. expectedCounts match the actual label distribution in destinations.json.
- *   6. tierThresholds are internally consistent (no gap or overlap).
- *
- * Exit codes:
- *   0 — manifest is valid and all hashes match.
- *   1 — one or more checks failed (details printed to stderr).
- *
- * Usage:
- *   npm run verify-manifest
- */
-
-import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
-import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { resolve } from 'node:path';
-
-const root = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
-const errors = [];
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Helpers
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-function fail(msg) {
-  errors.push(msg);
-}
-
-function sha256File(absPath) {
-  const buf = readFileSync(absPath);
-  return createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('hex');
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// 1. Load manifest
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-const manifestPath = resolve(root, 'evaluation-manifest.json');
-if (!existsSync(manifestPath)) {
-  console.error('FAIL: evaluation-manifest.json not found. Run: npm run generate-manifest');
-  process.exit(1);
-}
-
-let manifest;
-try {
-  manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf-8'));
-} catch (err) {
-  console.error('FAIL: evaluation-manifest.json is not valid JSON: ' + err.message);
-  process.exit(1);
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// 2. Required fields presence and types
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-const SEMVER_RE = /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/;
-
-const REQUIRED_FIELDS = [
-  ['manifestVersion',  'string'],
-  ['fixtureRelease',   'string'],
-  ['sourceCommit',     'string'],
-  ['generatedAt',      'string'],
-  ['inputs',           'object'],
-  ['mappingVersion',   'string'],
-  ['tierThresholds',   'object'],
-  ['expectedCounts',   'object'],
-  ['evaluatorVersion', 'string'],
-  ['resultSchema',     'object'],
-];
-
-for (const [field, type] of REQUIRED_FIELDS) {
-  if (manifest[field] === undefined) {
-    fail(`Missing required field: ${field}`);
-  } else if (typeof manifest[field] !== type) {
-    fail(`Field "${field}" must be a ${type}, got ${typeof manifest[field]}`);
-  }
-}
-
-if (manifest.manifestVersion && !SEMVER_RE.test(manifest.manifestVersion)) {
-  fail(`manifestVersion "${manifest.manifestVersion}" is not a valid semver string`);
-}
-if (manifest.fixtureRelease && !SEMVER_RE.test(manifest.fixtureRelease)) {
-  fail(`fixtureRelease "${manifest.fixtureRelease}" is not a valid semver string`);
-}
-if (manifest.mappingVersion && !SEMVER_RE.test(manifest.mappingVersion)) {
-  fail(`mappingVersion "${manifest.mappingVersion}" is not a valid semver string`);
-}
-if (manifest.generatedAt && isNaN(Date.parse(manifest.generatedAt))) {
-  fail(`generatedAt "${manifest.generatedAt}" is not a valid ISO-8601 datetime`);
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// 3. fixtureRelease matches package.json
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-let pkg;
-try {
-  pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(resolve(root, 'package.json'), 'utf-8'));
-} catch (err) {
-  fail('Could not read package.json: ' + err.message);
-}
-
-if (pkg && manifest.fixtureRelease !== pkg.version) {
-  fail(
-    `fixtureRelease "${manifest.fixtureRelease}" does not match package.json version "${pkg.version}". ` +
-    'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-  );
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// 4. Input file hashes (altered-input detection)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-if (manifest.inputs && typeof manifest.inputs === 'object') {
-  for (const [key, entry] of Object.entries(manifest.inputs)) {
-    if (typeof entry !== 'object' || !entry.path || !entry.sha256) {
-      fail(`inputs.${key}: entry must have "path" and "sha256" fields`);
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    const absPath = resolve(root, entry.path);
-
-    if (!existsSync(absPath)) {
-      fail(`inputs.${key}: file not found at "${entry.path}"`);
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    let actualHash;
-    try {
-      actualHash = sha256File(absPath);
-    } catch (err) {
-      fail(`inputs.${key}: could not hash "${entry.path}": ${err.message}`);
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (actualHash !== entry.sha256) {
-      fail(
-        `inputs.${key}: hash mismatch for "${entry.path}"\n` +
-        `  expected : ${entry.sha256}\n` +
-        `  actual   : ${actualHash}\n` +
-        '  → file has been modified since the manifest was generated. ' +
-        'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-      );
-    }
-  }
-} else {
-  fail('manifest.inputs must be a non-null object');
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// 5. expectedCounts match actual destinations.json label distribution
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-let destinations = [];
-try {
-  destinations = JSON.parse(
-    readFileSync(resolve(root, 'destinations.json'), 'utf-8')
-  ).destinations;
-} catch (err) {
-  fail('Could not read destinations.json: ' + err.message);
-}
-
-if (destinations.length > 0 && manifest.expectedCounts) {
-  const labelCounts = { clean: 0, suspicious: 0, malicious: 0 };
-  for (const d of destinations) {
-    if (labelCounts[d.label] !== undefined) labelCounts[d.label]++;
-  }
-
-  const ec = manifest.expectedCounts;
-  if (ec.total !== destinations.length) {
-    fail(
-      `expectedCounts.total=${ec.total} but destinations.json has ${destinations.length} entries. ` +
-      'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-    );
-  }
-  for (const label of ['clean', 'suspicious', 'malicious']) {
-    if (ec[label] !== labelCounts[label]) {
-      fail(
-        `expectedCounts.${label}=${ec[label]} but destinations.json has ${labelCounts[label]} ${label} entries. ` +
-        'Run: npm run generate-manifest'
-      );
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// 6. tierThresholds internal consistency
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-if (manifest.tierThresholds) {
-  const t = manifest.tierThresholds;
-  if (
-    t.clean && t.suspicious &&
-    typeof t.clean.max === 'number' && typeof t.suspicious.min === 'number' &&
-    t.suspicious.min !== t.clean.max + 1
-  ) {
-    fail(
-      `tierThresholds gap/overlap: clean.max=${t.clean.max} but suspicious.min=${t.suspicious.min}. ` +
-      'Expected suspicious.min === clean.max + 1 for contiguous tiers.'
-    );
-  }
-  if (
-    t.suspicious && t.malicious &&
-    typeof t.suspicious.max === 'number' && typeof t.malicious.min === 'number' &&
-    t.malicious.min !== t.suspicious.max + 1
-  ) {
-    fail(
-      `tierThresholds gap/overlap: suspicious.max=${t.suspicious.max} but malicious.min=${t.malicious.min}. ` +
-      'Expected malicious.min === suspicious.max + 1 for contiguous tiers.'
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Report
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-if (errors.length > 0) {
-  console.error('Manifest verification FAILED:\n' + errors.map((e) => '  ✗ ' + e).join('\n'));
-  process.exit(1);
-}
-
-console.log('Manifest verification passed.');
-console.log('  manifestVersion  : ' + manifest.manifestVersion);
-console.log('  fixtureRelease   : ' + manifest.fixtureRelease);
-console.log('  sourceCommit     : ' + manifest.sourceCommit);
-console.log('  generatedAt      : ' + manifest.generatedAt);
-console.log('  mappingVersion   : ' + manifest.mappingVersion);
-console.log('  expectedCounts   : ' + JSON.stringify(manifest.expectedCounts));
-console.log('  inputs verified  : ' + Object.keys(manifest.inputs).join(', '));
diff --git a/transactions/README.md b/transactions/README.md
index e052e5a..c19fd8c 100644
--- a/transactions/README.md
+++ b/transactions/README.md
@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ A fixture subsection has:
 
 ## Current fixtures
 
-See [`index.json`](./index.json) for a machine-readable record of each fixture's passphrase, envelope type, Stellar transaction hash, and per-operation metadata. Always consult `index.json` before decoding — the XDR encoding does not embed the network passphrase.
-
 ### `payment.xdr`
 
 **Envelope**
@@ -88,22 +86,3 @@ See [`index.json`](./index.json) for a machine-readable record of each fixture's
 | # | Operation | Op Source | Params |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | 0 | `changeTrust` (SCAM asset) | — | no destination — trustline change only |
-
-### `fee_bump_payment.xdr`
-
-**Envelope**
-
-| Field | Value |
-| --- | --- |
-| Fee Bump | yes (outer fee source: `clean_wallet_2`) |
-| Source | `clean_wallet_1` (inner transaction source) |
-| Memo | none |
-| Time Bounds | none |
-
-**Operations**
-
-| # | Operation | Op Source | Params |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| 0 | `payment` (native XLM) | — | destination: `suspicious_wallet_1` |
-
-**Notes:** This is an `envelopeTypeTxFeeBump` envelope. The outer fee-bump source (`clean_wallet_2`) pays the network fee on behalf of the inner transaction. The inner transaction source (`clean_wallet_1`) is the actual initiator and the account whose operations must be decoded and risk-scored. A decoder that reads `tx.source` on a `FeeBumpTransaction` object receives the fee-bump source, not the inner transaction source — it must call `tx.innerTransaction.source` and `tx.innerTransaction.operations` to reach the relevant data.
diff --git a/transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr b/transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr
deleted file mode 100644
index 0690ae0..0000000
--- a/transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-AAAABQAAAAA4cpZHz94Bws4osmxXRyc39cNWGhdhGFvYWJpDzgu6dQAAAAAAAAPoAAAAAgAAAACjHAa9Rj45I7warb3kixaXbAgHFzc7gZoGjzK3prOLawAAAGQAAAAAAAAAAgAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAQAAAACi1V0pXlo1q0Sz766lEpuiK4i6Pil2YUX97KOwjjivUwAAAAAAAAAAHc1lAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/transactions/index.json b/transactions/index.json
deleted file mode 100644
index a07a007..0000000
--- a/transactions/index.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "_comment": "Machine-readable index of all transaction XDR fixtures. Consumers must pass the recorded passphrase to TransactionBuilder.fromXDR — the XDR encoding does not embed the network passphrase and decoding under a wrong passphrase will succeed silently but produce a wrong transaction hash.",
-  "network": "TESTNET",
-  "passphrase": "Test SDF Network ; September 2015",
-  "fixtures": [
-    {
-      "file": "transactions/payment.xdr",
-      "envelopeType": "envelopeTypeTx",
-      "signed": false,
-      "stellarHashTestnet": "f8310e15760cc1c233efef19dec99146cad5ba9f8e61947d3e36d76d5d7e6636",
-      "source": "GCRRYBV5IY7DSI54DKW33ZELC2LWYCAHC43TXAM2A2HTFN5GWOFWXPC2",
-      "description": "Plain payment from clean_wallet_1 to suspicious_wallet_1. Tests basic payment decode.",
-      "operations": [
-        {
-          "index": 0,
-          "type": "payment",
-          "destination": "GCRNKXJJLZNDLK2EWPX25JISTORCXCF2HYUXMYKF7XWKHMEOHCXVGP4J",
-          "asset": "native",
-          "amount": "50.0000000"
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "file": "transactions/path_payment.xdr",
-      "envelopeType": "envelopeTypeTx",
-      "signed": false,
-      "stellarHashTestnet": "1877a9c875a93739f36ea36edb55d9a65dd8848f046ba9339fb6569d9c3feec0",
-      "source": "GCRRYBV5IY7DSI54DKW33ZELC2LWYCAHC43TXAM2A2HTFN5GWOFWXPC2",
-      "description": "Path payment strict-send (XLM → USDC) from clean_wallet_1 to malicious_wallet_1. Tests multi-hop decode.",
-      "operations": [
-        {
-          "index": 0,
-          "type": "pathPaymentStrictSend",
-          "destination": "GD7XPB2A7CG5Z4ICV24B3LXCRHAEJRFEK4OEW3ZIOQAPJOHAXBB7QHGE",
-          "sendAsset": "native",
-          "sendAmount": "10.0000000",
-          "destAsset": "USDC:GBWPMNXNRLA3VMBTWZHWN7VLUZPXBZUEOMPD6OIQKYCZNDJ2SY4ACC5B",
-          "destMin": "1.0000000",
-          "path": []
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "file": "transactions/change_trust.xdr",
-      "envelopeType": "envelopeTypeTx",
-      "signed": false,
-      "stellarHashTestnet": "2cfea90bd307d103e0dec8c999ffdc224d2eff89f0c022cafc2e0a187ed0272f",
-      "source": "GCRNKXJJLZNDLK2EWPX25JISTORCXCF2HYUXMYKF7XWKHMEOHCXVGP4J",
-      "description": "Change trust to add the SCAM asset trustline from suspicious_wallet_1. Tests trustline-establishment decode.",
-      "operations": [
-        {
-          "index": 0,
-          "type": "changeTrust",
-          "asset": "SCAM:GAJLLIIPHII6OCG4KQJIGPCHVN6DNCRBXHX6DEUTPE7MQ6OONAYBRLET",
-          "limit": "922337203685.4775807"
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "file": "transactions/fee_bump_payment.xdr",
-      "envelopeType": "envelopeTypeTxFeeBump",
-      "signed": false,
-      "stellarHashTestnet": "7ab7ae0df710a6d37484f403f7d2ccd14b88832c843b961cd5f52311a027876f",
-      "feeBumpSource": "GA4HFFSHZ7PADQWOFCZGYV2HE437LQ2WDILWCGC33BMJUQ6OBO5HKI5D",
-      "source": "GCRRYBV5IY7DSI54DKW33ZELC2LWYCAHC43TXAM2A2HTFN5GWOFWXPC2",
-      "description": "Fee-bump wrapping payment.xdr. Outer fee source is clean_wallet_2; inner tx source is clean_wallet_1. Tests fee-bump envelope decode — a decoder must traverse into the inner transaction to extract operations and source; reading the top-level source gives the fee-bump source, not the transaction initiator.",
-      "innerTransaction": {
-        "stellarHashTestnet": "f8310e15760cc1c233efef19dec99146cad5ba9f8e61947d3e36d76d5d7e6636",
-        "source": "GCRRYBV5IY7DSI54DKW33ZELC2LWYCAHC43TXAM2A2HTFN5GWOFWXPC2"
-      },
-      "operations": [
-        {
-          "index": 0,
-          "type": "payment",
-          "destination": "GCRNKXJJLZNDLK2EWPX25JISTORCXCF2HYUXMYKF7XWKHMEOHCXVGP4J",
-          "asset": "native",
-          "amount": "50.0000000"
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}