Discussion: Exploring changes to GrantShares voting membership

[deanragnarok]

For a while now, we’ve been experimenting with different ways to improve engagement on GrantShares proposals. We’ve expanded the voting member set, added new channels for updates, and explored ideas like bringing in dedicated, paid contributors to assist with proposal reviews, follow-ups, and other operations.

Still, some community feedback suggests it might be time to consider a more fundamental shift - potentially replacing some or all current voters with others in the community who may have more time, fresh energy, or a different perspective.

To be clear, this is not something GrantShares has agreed to or decided on. Nobody is being forced out or in. This is an open discussion I’m putting forward to see if there’s a path the community and maintainers might be willing to explore together.

A few things I hope we can discuss:

• Are existing voters open to the idea of voluntarily passing on their voting responsibilities to others?
• Could they share some reflections - what worked well, what was difficult, what they learned? This context would be valuable for both the community and any potential new voters.
• If change is warranted, how do we propose, nominate, and elect new members in a way that’s transparent and community-led?
• What would a respectful and coordinated transition look like?
• Should we consider term limits, clearer expectations, or defined responsibilities?

All suggestions are welcome. Personally, I believe this thread should be actively moderated to ensure the conversation remains respectful and constructive. However, I know GrantShares does not like any kind of censorship, so let's just make sure it doesn't even become an issue in the first place.

Let's also keep in mind, any changes to specific mechanisms, features, or workflows will require development work for the AxLabs team. That doesn't mean these suggestions are off the table, but it means these changes won’t be quick to implement. So let’s keep our expectations realistic when it comes to broader updates to the platform, beyond just the voting base.

I think this discussion also aligns with broader efforts underway to increase community involvement in governance - such as initiatives aimed at improving transparency and accountability within the Neo Council. While GrantShares is a separate mechanism, distributing more responsibility for decision making here could be another step toward a more open and participatory ecosystem overall.

[lock9]

The silence from the existing voters already speaks louder than any argument. The problem with GrantShares is not operational or cosmetic; it is structural. The design itself incentivizes stagnation, self-preservation, and favoritism. You can see this clearly: no one shows up here, but they do show up on the other issue. They know precisely what is happening - they do not want to let go of their privileges.

This is not an isolated problem. It reflects a broader pattern in the Neo ecosystem, where a small circle has monopolized influence for years and has led it into decline. Expecting this same group to produce a different outcome suddenly is naïve.

There is also something fundamentally incoherent in the process: every suggested improvement must be implemented by AxLabs, through closed development, with invisible costs and no competitive alternatives. Why is “decentralized governance” dependent on a single contractor? Why is a DAO operating through GitHub threads, instead of using its own treasury to support proposals that reform its own mechanism?

In practice, this setup replicates a social club rather than an economic or incentive-aligned system. There is no connection between voting power and Neo's actual economic exposure. The loudest voices in the previous issue were precisely those financially tied to the ecosystem, receiving funds through a contract or a community. The rest, as expected, do not bother to participate. That alone reveals the incentives.
Those who aren't on the payroll didn't share the same opinion, and hardly any Neo holder will. The reason is evident: these people are responsible for Neo's poor situation. They were the ones who abused their positions to gain personal gain.

So even though you may personally be trying to fix things, your colleagues clearly are not. Their motivations are primarily financial. If change is truly the goal, it must begin with acknowledging that the current architecture cannot be patched.