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Termination of GrantShares and Dissolution of Treasury #186

@grantshares-dapp

Description

@grantshares-dapp

GrantShares has failed to operate as a functioning DAO. Its design, membership model, review process, and governance mechanisms fail to produce accountability or meaningful outcomes. After more than three years of existence, GrantShares has delivered no measurable benefits to the Neo ecosystem, while actively damaging its credibility, wasting resources, and fostering systemic favoritism.

GrantShares was created to support builders, incentivize innovation, and introduce transparent governance to the Neo ecosystem.

After years of activity, none of these goals has been achieved.

There are:

  • no meaningful success cases,
  • no sustained builder retention,
  • no ecosystem-wide integrations,
  • no measurable improvements to the developer experience,
  • no transparency in decision-making,
  • and no accountability for failed outputs.

Instead of enabling growth, GrantShares has become a bottleneck. Proposals with genuine value are ignored or endlessly questioned, while proposals that meet social proximity, rather than technical merit, are approved quickly and without scrutiny.

2. Non-Representative Governance

The claim that GrantShares represents “collective decision-making” is misleading.

A typical vote looks like this:

  • Accept: 4
  • Reject: 1
  • Abstain: 2

This is not collective governance. It is a small, fixed group that allocates funds based on personal preference. The members who decide who enters the DAO are the same people who were initially appointed, and already control the voting.

This produces a closed loop where:

  • insiders select insiders,
  • insiders approve insiders,
  • dissenters are filtered out before they can even participate.

No external builder can realistically affect outcomes because they are structurally denied any leverage within the system.

3. The Review Process is Arbitrary and Driven by Proximity

There is overwhelming evidence that proposals are not evaluated by merit or contribution.

3.1. Constructive builders receive extreme scrutiny for trivial amounts

Projects such as Neo Red Pill or Reddon News requested modest funding (< USD 500), and were met with:

  • dozens of questions,
  • more than 30 back-and-forth responses,
  • exhaustive nitpicking,
  • and a lot of delay.

These proposers are real community members, producing content, maintaining a presence, and actively engaging with users. It's not like they're requesting thousands of dollars every month.

3.2. Outsiders with no track record receive privileged treatment

Proposal #152. The applicant, a luxury real estate executive with no commits, no documentation, no forum history, and no ecosystem engagement, requested USD 2,000 for a trip to Dubai.

His justification was vague: “deepen conversations” and “explore opportunities.”

The RFP explicitly stated:

  • Only contributors to the ecosystem should apply.
  • Travel grants were for active builders lacking resources.

He met neither requirement. Yet the proposal was approved.
This was not “risk.”It was favoritism.

Months later:

  • there are no results,
  • no integrations,
  • no reports,
  • no public deliverables,
  • no innovation channel output,
  • and the applicant no longer responds.

Those who endorsed the proposal also show no interest in accountability. This is a governance failure, not a funding risk.

4. The Model Encourages Irresponsibility and Indifference

As a former recipient of funds myself, I can attest that the members do not care about the outcomes**** of what they fund.

In my case:

  • I repeatedly documented structural issues in the ecosystem,
  • highlighted the mismatches between stated goals and real operations,
  • proposed improvements and analysis.

None of it mattered. It was like being hired to deliver work that nobody intends to read, review, or value. Some members do not dedicate any time at all.

Others do, but lack the technical knowledge to evaluate proposals. The result is always the same: decisions are decoupled from competence.

Approving funds to someone who contributes nothing is easy. Holding them accountable is impossible. And scrutinizing real builders is effortless, because there is no cost to rejecting them.

5. The Membership System Produces Dead Weight

Being a GrantShares member offers:

  • no meaningful responsibilities,
  • no measurable expectations,
  • no external accountability,
  • and no consequences for negligence.

It is unsurprising that:

  • most members contribute nothing,
  • some do not understand the ecosystem,
  • and others operate with clear conflicts of interest.

The current structure incentivizes inertia and irresponsible spending:

  • GrantShares has failed to operate as a functioning DAO. Its design, membership model, review process, and governance mechanisms fail to produce accountability or meaningful outcomes. After more than three years of existence, GrantShares has delivered no measurable benefits to the Neo ecosystem, while actively damaging its credibility, wasting resources, and fostering systemic favoritism.

GrantShares was created to support builders, incentivize innovation, and introduce transparent governance to the Neo ecosystem.

After years of activity, none of these goals has been achieved.

There are:

  • no meaningful success cases,
  • no sustained builder retention,
  • no ecosystem-wide integrations,
  • no measurable improvements to the developer experience,
  • no transparency in decision-making,
  • and no accountability for failed outputs.

Instead of enabling growth, GrantShares has become a bottleneck. Proposals with genuine value are ignored or endlessly questioned, while proposals that meet social proximity, rather than technical merit, are approved quickly and without scrutiny.

6. The GrantShares Model Does Not Work

Fundamentally, the system is unsalvageable.

Key design flaws:

  • People with no subject-matter expertise can approve or reject complex proposals.
  • There is no standardized review layer.
  • There is no respect for RFPs.
  • There is no on-chain accountability.
  • There is no budget logic.

This is not a DAO.

It is a static whitelist of voters with arbitrary power. And because the membership gatekeepers protect their own interests, this proposal will likely be rejected.

Conclusion

GrantShares has failed:

  • Institutionally,
  • structurally,
  • and culturally.

Its existence actively harms the Neo ecosystem by:

  • discouraging builders,
  • rewarding proximity over merit,
  • eroding credibility,
  • and burning treasury with no follow-through.
  • occupying the space of a true DAO, which cannot co-exist in the current model.

For these reasons, this proposal recommends terminating GrantShares and dissolving its treasury.


Proposal Info 📋

[ {
  "target_contract" : "0x6276c1e3a68280bc6c9c00df755fb691be1162ef",
  "method" : "removeWhitelistedToken",
  "params" : [ {
    "type" : "Hash160",
    "value" : "d2a4cff31913016155e38e474a2c06d08be276cf"
  } ],
  "call_flags" : 15
} ]

👇 React with 👍 if you liked it, or 👎 if you think this proposal can be enhanced!

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