diff --git a/SECURITY_AUDIT.md b/SECURITY_AUDIT.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89d15ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SECURITY_AUDIT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+# Security Audit Report — BY (Blatant-Why)
+
+**Date:** 2026-03-25
+**Scope:** Full codebase security analysis
+**Method:** 6-agent parallel sweep (secrets, injection, MCP servers, supply chain, safety gates, data validation)
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| CRITICAL | 8 |
+| HIGH | 9 |
+| MEDIUM | 12 |
+| LOW | 8 |
+
+The codebase has **no hardcoded secrets** and the **triple-layer lab safety gate is intact** (no bypass found). However, there are significant risks in command injection via SSH, path traversal in campaign/export code, unsafe NumPy pickle deserialization, and unpinned Python dependencies.
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL Findings
+
+### C1. Command Injection via SSH Paths
+- **File:** `src/proteus_cli/ssh_runner.py:81,114,164`
+- **Issue:** User-controlled paths interpolated into SSH commands via f-strings without escaping. `subprocess.run()` uses list args (good), but the remote command is a single unescaped string interpreted by the remote shell.
+- **Attack:** `remote_workspace = "/tmp/job; rm -rf /"` → executed on remote host.
+- **Fix:** Use `shlex.quote()` for all path variables in SSH command strings.
+
+### C2. Path Traversal in Campaign Export
+- **File:** `src/proteus_cli/campaign/export.py:92-369`
+- **Issue:** `output_path` parameter in `export_fasta()`, `export_csv()`, `export_campaign_summary()` written without validating it's within the campaign directory.
+- **Attack:** `output_path = "../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor"` → arbitrary file write.
+- **Fix:** Resolve path and validate it starts with the campaign base directory.
+
+### C3. NumPy Pickle Deserialization (RCE)
+- **File:** `src/proteus_cli/scoring/ipsae.py:162`
+- **Issue:** `np.load(npz_path, allow_pickle=True)` on untrusted NPZ files enables arbitrary code execution via crafted pickle payloads.
+- **Fix:** Use `allow_pickle=False`. If pickle is required, implement a restricted unpickler.
+
+### C4. Path Traversal in Campaign Server
+- **File:** `mcp_servers/campaign/server.py:374-376,653-672`
+- **Issue:** `campaign_dir` parameter passed to file operations without validating it's within an authorized base directory.
+- **Fix:** Validate `Path(campaign_dir).resolve()` is under the campaigns root.
+
+### C5. Approval File TTL Bypass (Safety Gate Weakness)
+- **File:** `mcp_servers/adaptyv/server.py:160-217`
+- **Issue:** Approval file not consumed after use (no atomic check-and-consume). Can be reused within the 1-hour TTL window for multiple submissions.
+- **Fix:** Rename approval file to `.consumed` after first use; implement per-submission nonces.
+
+### C6. SSH Password Storage in Plaintext
+- **File:** `mcp_servers/cloud/server.py:162-187`
+- **Issue:** SSH passwords accepted from `~/.by/config.json` in plaintext, used directly for authentication.
+- **Fix:** Remove password auth support; enforce SSH key-based auth only.
+
+### C7. Subprocess Injection via `extra_args`
+- **File:** `mcp_servers/local_compute/server.py:406-425,480-489,553-562`
+- **Issue:** `extra_args.split()` passes user-controlled arguments to subprocess without validation or proper shell-aware parsing.
+- **Fix:** Use `shlex.split()` or whitelist allowed flags.
+
+### C8. Unpinned Python Dependencies (No Lock File)
+- **File:** `pyproject.toml:6-16`
+- **Issue:** All Python deps use `>=` constraints with no lock file committed. Supply chain attack via compromised upstream package.
+- **Fix:** Generate and commit `uv.lock` or `poetry.lock`.
+
+---
+
+## HIGH Findings
+
+### H1. Disabled SSH Host Key Verification (MITM)
+- **Files:** `mcp_servers/local_compute/server.py:117-119`, `mcp_servers/cloud/server.py:169`
+- **Issue:** `StrictHostKeyChecking=no` and `AutoAddPolicy()` disable MITM protection.
+- **Fix:** Use `StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new` or maintain known_hosts.
+
+### H2. SSRF via External API Calls
+- **Files:** `mcp_servers/pdb/server.py`, `tamarind/server.py`, `sabdab/server.py`, `research/server.py`, `uniprot/server.py`
+- **Issue:** HTTP requests to external APIs without URL validation or internal IP blocklisting.
+- **Fix:** Blocklist internal IPs (127.0.0.1, 169.254.x.x, 10.0.0.0/8); enforce HTTPS-only.
+
+### H3. No Authentication on MCP Servers
+- **Files:** All MCP servers
+- **Issue:** No caller identity or authorization checks. Any process can invoke any tool.
+- **Fix:** Add API key validation or caller identity verification.
+
+### H4. Quote Injection in TypeScript execSync
+- **File:** `src/init-cli/verify.ts:20`
+- **Issue:** File path interpolated into shell command string with double quotes. Path containing `"` breaks out of quoted context.
+- **Fix:** Use `spawnSync()` with array args instead of `execSync()` with string interpolation.
+
+### H5. Unescaped SCP Paths
+- **File:** `src/proteus_cli/ssh_runner.py:59-63`
+- **Issue:** Local and remote paths passed to SCP without escaping spaces or special characters.
+- **Fix:** Use `shlex.quote()` for path arguments.
+
+### H6. Unsafe `cmd.split()` for Subprocess
+- **File:** `src/proteus_cli/campaign/state.py:85-92`
+- **Issue:** `_get_cmd_output()` uses `cmd.split()` which breaks on paths with spaces.
+- **Fix:** Use `shlex.split()` or pass command as a list.
+
+### H7. Unverified GitHub URLs for External Tools
+- **File:** `plugin-manifest.json:7-24`
+- **Issue:** Protenix, PXDesign, BoltzGen referenced without commit SHA, version tag, or integrity hash.
+- **Fix:** Pin to specific tags/SHAs; add integrity hashes.
+
+### H8. Pip Install Without Hash Verification
+- **File:** `setup.sh:29`
+- **Issue:** `pip install` without `--require-hashes` or version pinning. Errors suppressed with `2>/dev/null`.
+- **Fix:** Use lock file with `--require-hashes`.
+
+### H9. JSON Deserialization Without Schema Validation
+- **Files:** `src/proteus_cli/campaign/state.py:161`, `export.py`, `decisions.py`
+- **Issue:** JSON loaded and unpacked into dataclasses without field-level validation.
+- **Fix:** Use Pydantic models for schema enforcement (already a dependency).
+
+---
+
+## MEDIUM Findings
+
+| ID | File | Issue |
+|----|------|-------|
+| M1 | `adaptyv/server.py:172` | Path not normalized — campaign_dir accepted without bounds validation |
+| M2 | `adaptyv/server.py:44-45` | Asymmetric TTLs (1h approval vs 5m confirmation) allows stale approvals |
+| M3 | `adaptyv/server.py:196-206` | No clock skew protection on approval timestamps |
+| M4 | `adaptyv/server.py:76-78` | Weak confirmation code entropy (24 bits / 16M codes — brute-forceable) |
+| M5 | `tamarind/server.py:221-232` | File upload extension whitelist without content/magic-byte validation |
+| M6 | `campaign/server.py:815-817` | JSON input parsed without size limits (DoS vector) |
+| M7 | `config.py:201-206` | YAML config paths (ssh_key_path) not validated for traversal |
+| M8 | `export.py:26`, `active_learning.py:62` | `glob()`/`rglob()` follows symlinks — can exfiltrate data |
+| M9 | Multiple servers | API error responses leak internal details (paths, tokens) |
+| M10 | `active_learning.py:68-69` | Generic exception handling masks permission errors |
+| M11 | Multiple servers | No rate limiting on API calls or confirmation attempts |
+| M12 | `adaptyv/server.py:98-100` | Audit logs only to stderr (transient, lost on restart) |
+
+---
+
+## LOW Findings
+
+| ID | File | Issue |
+|----|------|-------|
+| L1 | `ssh_runner.py:158` | Truncated UUID (`uuid4()[:8]`) reduces job ID entropy |
+| L2 | `config.py:213` | Missing explicit `Dumper=yaml.SafeDumper` on YAML dump |
+| L3 | `main.py:15,28,41` | No file size or extension checks on CLI path args |
+| L4 | `export.py:211` | CSV formula injection — design names not escaped for `=+@` |
+| L5 | All external API servers | Hardcoded API URLs not configurable via env |
+| L6 | PDB, UniProt, SAbDab | Missing User-Agent header on HTTP requests |
+| L7 | `.planning/screening_gates.md` | Screening gate spec not implemented in code |
+| L8 | `adaptyv/server.py:400-404` | Minor race condition in expired entry cleanup |
+
+---
+
+## Code Defect (Non-Security)
+
+### `state.py:111-112` — Indentation Bug
+- **Issue:** Line 112 references undefined variable `key` due to incorrect indentation inside a for loop.
+- **Impact:** `NameError` on campaign initialization. Not a security issue but blocks functionality.
+
+---
+
+## Positive Findings
+
+- **No hardcoded secrets** found in any file
+- **YAML loading** correctly uses `yaml.safe_load()` everywhere
+- **No `pickle.load()`** in production code (only numpy's allow_pickle, flagged above)
+- **`subprocess.run()`** consistently uses list args, never `shell=True`
+- **`.gitignore`** properly excludes `.env`, `.env.local`, settings files, campaign data
+- **Triple-layer lab safety gate** has no complete bypass — all three layers enforced
+- **Confirmation codes** use `secrets.token_hex()` (cryptographic randomness)
+- **Two-step submission** (prepare → confirm) prevents accidental lab submissions
+
+---
+
+## Remediation Priority
+
+### Immediate (Before Next Deploy)
+1. Fix `np.load(allow_pickle=True)` → `allow_pickle=False` (C3)
+2. Add `shlex.quote()` to SSH command construction (C1, H5)
+3. Add path traversal validation to export functions (C2)
+4. Add path validation to campaign server `campaign_dir` (C4)
+
+### Urgent (Next Sprint)
+5. Consume approval file after use (C5)
+6. Remove SSH password auth (C6)
+7. Use `shlex.split()` for `extra_args` (C7)
+8. Generate and commit Python lock file (C8)
+9. Pin external tool versions in plugin-manifest.json (H7)
+10. Enable SSH host key checking (H1)
+
+### Standard (Regular Cycle)
+11. Add schema validation for JSON deserialization (H9)
+12. Implement rate limiting on MCP servers (M11)
+13. Add persistent audit logging (M12)
+14. Block SSRF to internal IPs (H2)
+15. Switch `execSync` to `spawnSync` in verify.ts (H4)
+
+---
+
+*Generated by 6-agent security analysis swarm on 2026-03-25*